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Western media have come under intense scrutiny over the past 20 years for their 
propensity to marginalise Africa and to rely on colonial stereotypes, images and 
narratives. Both within and outside academia, commentators appeal to the concept 
of ‘Afro-pessimism’ to qualify and condemn this phenomenon. And yet, the notion 
is under-theorised and existing empirical studies insufficiently analyse and explain 
the phenomenon. Drawing on journalism, critical/cultural and postcolonial studies, 
this thesis seeks to answer the following questions: What is Afro-pessimism? Is it 
an adequate characterisation of media coverage, and if so, to what extent? Is media 
coverage moving beyond Afro-pessimism? In order to answer these theoretical and 
empirical questions, this thesis develops a conceptualisation of Afro-pessimism 
and provides a Critical Discourse Analysis of British and French print media. 
 
The analysis focuses on British and French broadsheet newspapers and news 
magazines. I critically analyse the visual and linguistic features of media texts 
against the background of their context of production and through interviews with 
foreign correspondents based in South Africa and Kenya. There are two sites of 
investigation: (1) the press coverage of the 50th anniversaries of independence 
(2007-2012); (2) the news magazines’ front covers dedicated to continental Africa 
(2011-2015). In site 1, I assess three recurring claims about Western media 
coverage of Africa, and investigate the discursive nature of the coverage in relation 
to Afro-pessimism and postcolonial memory. In site 2, I explore the emergence of 
an Afro-optimist discourse in media coverage of Africa. Finally, I offer a critical 
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It emanates from all these discussions a strong sense of 
Afro-pessimism, although the word remains to be invented. 
(Diop, 2010) 
 
This thesis is about the social construction of a discourse about Africa known as 
Afro-pessimism within the context of British and French print media. I offer a 
conceptual framework to critically examine how journalists report on Africa, and 
then employ this framework to empirically shed light on the changes and 
continuities of journalistic discourse. What is Afro-pessimism? Is it an adequate 
characterisation of media coverage, and if so, to what extent? Is media coverage 
moving beyond Afro-pessimism? These are the main questions that this thesis 
seeks to answer. The introduction that follows is divided in three parts. First, I 
introduce the question of Afro-pessimism in Western news media. I then outline 
my research questions, the four intellectual traditions in which the project is 
located, and highlight my research contributions at a theoretical, methodological 
and empirical level. Finally, I present an overview of the thesis’ structure and of 
the core arguments of each chapter. 
 
“A sense of Afro-pessimism” 
 
A shirtless black man wearing short dreadlocks carries on his shoulder a rocket-
propelled grenade. His right forearm pointed towards the sky tells us he is joyful, 
perhaps like a sports-fan celebrating a goal from his team. This enjoyment is 
further communicated by the large smile on his face, as well as his smiley eyes. 
Behind him, there is nothing but a plain background. We do not know who he is or 
where he is from. In a large brown font, the title of the book rules over the image 
“Négrologie” (Negrology), while the subtitle, in a smaller font, reads “pourquoi 
l’Afrique meurt” (Why is Africa dying). 
 
Taken together, these elements communicate a vast range of meanings. The 
weapon connotes a world of violence and civil war. The black man, shirtless and 






irresponsible and childlike. It uses the codes of the most classic racist 
representations of black people as close to nature and to their primitive instincts to 
create the image of an African ‘Other’, essentially different and inferior. The 
subtitle makes clear that the book is about “Africa”. Yet the choice of a black man 
and of the word “negro” in the title tells us that it is not about Africa as a 
continental entity, but rather sub-Saharan, ‘black’ Africa, understood as a racialised 
entity. Although the subtitle “Why is Africa dying” could have ended with a 
question mark, it does not. Instead, it is a statement. It promises an answer, and the 
cover gives a number of clues as to what the answer may be. The image provides 
an explanation, even before we open the book, as to why Africa dies: because of its 
‘barbaric Africans’. The main title brings all these connotations together by 
combining the racist lexicon of the “negro” with that of death, fatalism and 
hopelessness (“negrology”).  
 
Small details like the choice of a man wearing dreadlocks are not fortuitous. As the 
symbol of the lion, and consequently strength, pride and wisdom, dreadlocks 
symbolise anti-colonial struggle and pan-Africanism. They have been associated 
with the guards of Ethiopian leader Haile Selassie who fought the imperial troops 
of Mussolini. This conflict was notably driven by Mussolini’s desire to avenge the 
Italian defeat to the hands of Ethiopian fighters during the first Italo-Ethiopian war 
in the late 19th century. In choosing a picture of a man with dreadlocks, this cover 
thus provocatively says: “look at what happened to the dreams of African 
independence”.  
 
In sum, the cover implies that the “death of Africa” is essentially of its own making 
and strongly tied to some essence of “Africa” and “Africans”. One simply needs to 
look at the opening pages of the book to confirm the intention to communicate 
these meanings: “The African continent, this borderless ‘Ubuland’, the land of 
massacres and famines where all hope dies. Why is Africa dying? Mostly, because 
it commits suicide” (Smith, 2004 p. 13). 
 
This book was not written in the 19th century. It was not written in the 1960s, or the 
70s or the 80s. It is not an obscure and little-known book. It is from 2004 and was 
written by Stephen Smith, a famous foreign correspondent in Africa who worked 
for Reuters and RFI, and who was the former Africa editor of Le Monde and 






read left-wing French broadsheet newspapers. His book, Négrologie, received the 
prestigious France Télévision Prize for the best non-fiction book of the year 2004.1 
 
The cover of Stephen Smith’s book is as close as one gets to an ideal type of Afro-
pessimism. Afro-pessimism is a term that was coined in the early 1990s to capture 
the construction of an image of Africa as a homogenous place plagued by war, 
famine, suffering, violence and disasters. Cursed, outside the realm of rationality 
and modernity, promised to a future as bleak as its past and present, this 
representation of Africa carried with it a set of racist assumptions and stereotypes 
reminiscent of older colonial discourses about Africa as a “Dark Continent”. News 
media in particular have been criticised for playing a key role in shaping and 
reproducing such Afro-pessimism. From the Mau-Mau uprisings and the Biafran 
war in the 1950s and late 1960s to the 1984 Ethiopian famine and the 1994 
Rwandan genocide, images of violent, barbaric, starving, poor and helpless black 
Africans have dominated international news. This assessment and perception of 
media coverage led many to postulate that news media were key agents of Afro-
pessimist discourse (Hawk, 1992a; Olsson, 1993; Gordon & Wolpe, 1998; 
Schraeder & Endless, 1998; Ahluwalia, 2001; Franks & Ribet, 2009; Berger, 2010; 
de Beer, 2010; de B’béri & Louw, 2011; Hammett, 2011; Schorr, 2011). 
 
If news media provide a window to the world, that window seems to be particularly 
narrow and oddly shaped when it comes to Africa. To respond to this, journalists 
over the past 20 years have often appealed to an argument grounded in their 
professional ethos – namely that journalists reflect ‘reality’. Robert Guest, former 
Africa editor for the Economist and regular contributor to CNN and the BBC, 
writes in his memoir: “The reason they [Western journalists] report that Africa is 
plagued by war, famine and pestilence is that Africa is plagued by war, famine and 
pestilence. They will stop reporting this when it stops being true” [my emphasis] 
(Guest, 2005 p. 254). Afro-pessimism, in that sense, would be the unavoidable 
sense that one would get when faced with African news, not a deliberately shaped, 
and thus avoidable, discourse.  
 
Scholars who have examined the media coverage of Africa generally oppose the 
view that the media simply reflects ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ (Hawk, 1992a; Fair, 1993; 
Brookes, 1995; Wall, 1997). They embrace a social constructivist approach that 
                                                      






views reality as being created through mediatisation and representational 
processes. The news is manufactured by a few individuals working under 
organisational constraints, and shaped by different incentives and factors 
(Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979; Fishman, 1980; Schlesinger, 1987; Shoemaker & 
Reese, 1996; Paterson, 2011). Media outlets construct a particular vision of the 
world by selecting and frontloading certain issues, phenomenon, events, places and 
people over others. Far from being a neutral reflection of the world, the news 
produces reality in a specific way and according to certain conventions, priorities 
and values that are shaped socially, economically, culturally, technologically and 
historically.  
 
In consequence, news media convey images and ideas that inform the knowledge 
of geographically distant places, people, and societies. Particularly in the case of 
international reporting, this representational repertoire feeds into the imagination 
that a culture ‘back home’ has of cultures ‘back there’. In other words, it impacts 
“how we come to see, think and feel about the world, and our place and relations 
with others in this world” (Orgad, 2012 p. 3). The discussion about international 
media reporting is thus a fundamental one, whose implications branch far out of 
the media sphere, in the economic, cultural, financial and political worlds.  
 
It is these concerns about the power of representation that underpinned the critique 
by Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe (1988) of the image of Africa presented in the 
work of Joseph Conrad. His controversial essay “An image of Africa: Racism in 
Conrad’s ‘Heart of Darkness’” sought to deconstruct the racist assumptions of a 
landmark of contemporary British literature. But for Achebe, the point was not so 
much to attack Conrad but rather to question “the dominant image of Africa in the 
Western imagination” within which this novel was located (Achebe, 1988 p. 258). 
What spurred this essay was indeed that Achebe wearily witnessed the continuation 
of such an image decades after the formal end of colonisation:  
 
But as I thought more about the stereotype image, about its grip 
and pervasiveness, about the wilful tenacity with which the West 
holds it to its heart; when I thought of the West's television and 
cinema and newspapers, about books read in its schools and out of 
school, of churches preaching to empty pews about the need to 
send help to the heathen in Africa, I realized that no easy optimism 
was possible.  







More recently, it is a similar lassitude towards images of Africa presented by the 
media that led Kenyan writer Binyavanga Wainaina to write a satirical essay about 
how not to write about Africa: 
 
Always use the word ‘Africa’ or ‘Darkness’ or ‘Safari’ in your 
title. (…) Also useful are words such as ‘Guerrillas’, ‘Timeless’, 
‘Primordial’ and ‘Tribal’. (…) An AK-47, prominent ribs, naked 
breasts: use these. If you must include an African, make sure you 
get one in Masai or Zulu or Dogon dress. In your text, treat Africa 
as if it were one country.  
(Wainaina, 2005 p. 92) 
 
The crux of the issue he addresses is the same as what another Nigerian writer 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (2009) helpfully summarises as “the danger of a 
single story”. Upon arriving in the US at age 19 to study at University, she recalls 
being pressed by questions from her roommate about where she had learned to 
speak such good English, and if she could share some of her “tribal music”: 
 
She had felt sorry for me even before she saw me. Her default 
position towards me, as an African, was a kind of patronizing, 
well-meaning pity. My roommate had a single story of Africa: a 
single story of catastrophe. In this single story there was no 
possibility of Africans being similar to her in any way, no 
possibility of feelings more complex than pity, no possibility of a 
connection as human equals.  
(Adichie, 2009) 
 
In sum, such a representation of Africa constitutes a violent symbolic process that 
dehumanises individuals, perpetuates racist thinking and creates a sense of 
inferiority and insurmountable difference. 
 
If news media are far from being the sole providers of Afro-pessimism, they 
nonetheless have a particular and crucial place in this story. News is a non-fiction 
genre that seeks to provide objective accounts of reality and facts. News stories are 
also encountered routinely, often on a daily basis. Both in its iterative dimension 
and its claims of truth, the news constitutes a key instrument in the danger of a 
single story, that is the fact of showing “a people as one thing, as only one thing, 
over and over again” (Adichie, 2009). Moreover, news media are also seen as 
fulfilling a democratic function in society, acting as a Fourth Estate, giving a voice 
to the people and holding political power to account. Thus, if news media actively 
sustain a regime of representation that fosters, at best, pity and condescension, and, 
at worst, contempt and xenophobic sentiments, thus exacerbating inequalities 






reason, they should be held accountable for the representations they construct and 
convey. 
 
Over the last 10 years, there has been a real uptake for the criticism of Afro-
pessimism of Western media. As I will demonstrate, however, the concept is under 
theorised and lacks a clear definition. In particular, it is often reduced to a set of 
“negative images of Africa”. By this token, any discussion of war, poverty, 
conflict, corruption or violence in Africa would be problematic because of its 
negative content. However, as Fanon [1961](2004) reminds us, violence should be 
extensively examined and discussed precisely because it is constitutive of the 
colonial and postcolonial experience. By reducing Afro-pessimism to negative 
images, there is a risk for studies of Africa’s media image to fail to show precisely 
how contemporary discourses contribute to a particular image of Africa entangled 
in a colonial representational legacy. In addition, this lack of conceptual clarity 
contributes to taking for granted Afro-pessimism as a systematic feature of 
Western media coverage of Africa. Yet, a few recent studies suggest that media 
coverage might be evolving, and moving beyond Afro-pessimism (Scott, 2009; 
Haavisto & Maasilta, 2015). This thesis therefore aims to clarify the debate on 
Afro-pessimism in Western media, first by proposing, at a theoretical level, a fully-
fledged definition of Afro-pessimism and second, by assessing, at an empirical 




In light of this background, this thesis investigates British and French print media 
coverage of Africa in order to answer the following key research questions: 
 
1) What is Afro-pessimism?  
2) What is the nature of media discourse on Africa? Is it really Afro-pessimist 
and if so, in what sense? 
3) Are mythical representations enduring, evolving or disappearing, and what 
are the forces and power relations driving these evolutions and/or 
continuities? 
4) To what extent does the context of news production explain the formation 






journalistic production and the formation of postcolonial discourse(s) on 
Africa? 
 
Question 1 is addressed in Chapters 1 and 2. The research questions 2 to 4 are 
tackled in my empirical analyses. I seek to provide solid evidence – within the 
bound of my empirical investigation – to assess the nature and formation of media 
discourse with a view to contribute to a broader understanding of whether and how 
Western media coverage of Africa is moving beyond Afro-pessimism. I provide a 
comparative study of British and French print media discourse on Africa through 
two specific sites of analysis: 1) the coverage of the 50th anniversaries of African 
independences (2007-2012), and 2) the coverage of continental Africa on news 
magazine covers (2011-2015). I investigate each site by analysing a combination of 
textual data, including newspapers articles, news magazine covers, and interviews 
and questionnaires with foreign correspondents and a range of media professionals.  
 
This research project is located at the crossroad of four academic traditions. It is 
primarily grounded in the academic tradition of critical/cultural media studies (for 
an overview see Barker, 2000; Durham & Kellner, 2005). This approach holds that 
language and media texts enact and dialectically reproduce power relations; that 
media are pervaded by ideology and contribute to create and reinforce a certain 
social reality. Just like a palimpsest whose old texts keep re-emerging, postcolonial 
discourses are made of evolutions and continuities; they carry traces from the past, 
adapt them to new situations and sometimes challenge them. For this reason, 
within this broad critical/cultural approach, I also adopt a perspective inspired by 
postcolonial studies, which analyses the spectres from the colonial era that 
continue to haunt the imagination of contemporary societies (Ahluwalia, 2001; 
Mbembe, 2001; Shome & Hegde, 2002; Willems, 2015).  
 
The methodology that I use in this research is Critical Discourse Analysis. It places 
an emphasis on the relationship between media discourse and power relations (van 
Dijk, 1993b; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; 
Fairclough & Wodak, 2004; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Aiello, 2012b). This approach 
aims to uncover ideological assumptions contained and conveyed in media texts – 
both linguistically and visually – and stresses the importance of the historical and 
cultural contexts in which discourses are produced. But the making of news in 






context of production (Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979; Schlesinger, 1987; Shoemaker 
& Reese, 1996). Therefore, my research is also grounded in journalism and news 
production studies. I use this literature to understand how commercial incentives, 
newsgathering and gatekeeping practices, as well as media routines and journalistic 
values contribute to the production of media discourse. In other words, I 
contextualise the critical analysis of media texts and postcolonial discourse within 
the environment of news production. 
 
At first sight, these literatures may appear disjointed because each field emphasises 
different aspects of discourse analysis. Critical/cultural media studies place an 
emphasis on culture as a vehicle of ideology. Postcolonialism is primarily 
concerned with the structures of power and domination developed through the 
colonial experience, and their legacy in the current era. Critical Discourse Analysis 
serves to highlight the ways in which various types of discourses operate, and news 
production studies are more concerned with the processes involved in the specific 
context of journalism. Yet, all these traditions have one thing in common that binds 
them together. They share a social constructivist approach that holds that 
representations, media texts, discourses and journalistic practices reflect and, 
dialectically, shape a certain view of the world that is fundamentally imbued with 
power relations. In that sense, my research is not about Africa, but about the social 
construction of a representation of Africa in the context of British and French print 
media 
 
This thesis aims to make three main contributions to the study of Afro-pessimism 
and media coverage of Africa at the theoretical, methodological and empirical 
levels.  
 
While the concept of Afro-pessimism has gained strong visibility both in academia 
and public debates, it remains a floating signifier. As I will show, the concept is 
underspecified and, as a result, runs the risk of failing to contribute to an 
understanding of how the colonial representational legacy pervades contemporary 
journalistic discourse. In a special issue on Afro-pessimism of the journal Critical 
Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies, the editors, de B’béri and Louw 
(2011 p. 335), explain that “although there are bits and pieces and research works 
on Afropessimism, none has yet brought it all together in a coherent way”. This 






Afro-pessimist discourse. This conceptual definition is the result of a critical 
synthesis of, on the one hand, studies of Afro-pessimism and, on the other hand, 
studies of Western news media coverage of Africa. In doing so, I hope to clarify 
the debates beyond a simplistic “negative images” framework. 
 
My methodology combines analyses of media texts – both in their linguistic and 
visual dimensions – with interviews with media producers. This choice is inscribed 
in the uptake in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis and social semiotics for 
greater engagement with production processes shaping texts (Aiello, 2012a; Aiello, 
2012b; Machin & Mayr, 2007; Machin & Niblock, 2008). This approach aims to 
trace key linkages between the linguistic, semiotic and rhetorical features of media 
texts, their context of production and the political, economic and ideological 
processes in which they are implicated. By using this methodology, this thesis 
seeks to link more clearly text and context of production in relation to the 
postcolonial themes of power and domination. In that sense, it contributes to 
bringing issues of journalistic production within the field of postcolonial theory 
that largely developed in abstraction of such empirical considerations (Saha, 2009). 
 
Finally, this thesis seeks to make four empirical contributions to the study of 
Western media coverage of Africa. While the topic can appear old and sufficiently 
informed, there are in fact many empirical gaps (Scott, 2015). (1) Existing studies 
have extensively focused on UK and US media representation of Africa, but in 
contrast, studies of French media coverage are rare.2 Do we observe similar 
phenomena in different Western national contexts? (2) A correlative of this 
anglophone bias is that very few studies shed light on the way francophone African 
countries are covered. (3) In addition, the literature tends to focus on the coverage 
of a narrow range of topics related to war, conflict, disaster and violence (Scott, 
2015). The coverage of more banal and mundane news stories has seldom been 
studied. (4) Finally, despite the key role played by foreign correspondents in 
producing representations of Africa, these individuals have rarely been consulted in 
previous studies. According to Scott (2015 p. 9), 80% of the studies on US and UK 
media representation of Africa focus on media content alone. This thesis is 
therefore designed to contribute to filling these four empirical gaps. 
 
                                                      






Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is structured in seven chapters: Chapters 1 to 3 set the background, and 
introduce the theoretical framework and methodological approach of the project; 
Chapters 4 to 7 provide the empirical analyses. 
 
Chapter 1 presents the theoretical framework of critical/cultural and postcolonial 
studies in which this thesis is located. I introduce and define the key concepts of 
representation, discourse and the ‘Other’ used throughout the research. The chapter 
also importantly provides the historical background to the concept of Afro-
pessimism, proposes a genealogy of the concept and discusses the lack of clarity 
that surrounds it. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the Western media coverage of Africa in the context of 
journalistic production. I review existing studies of Africa’s image in the news to 
identify the key features of this coverage. I also introduce the literature on 
journalism and news production that helps us contextualise the formation of 
journalistic discourse. This chapter concludes by putting forward a conceptual 
framework of Afro-pessimism that combines the disjointed literature on Afro-
pessimism and the broader literature on media coverage of Africa. This 
conceptualisation is subsequently used in my empirical analyses.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces my methodological approach and its key epistemological 
features. Critical Discourse Analysis constitutes the integrated methodological 
framework through which I link the different intellectual traditions introduced 
previously to analyse my empirical data. In addition, Chapter 3 explains the design 
of the empirical investigation into media texts – both in their linguistic and visual 
dimensions – and their context of production, through semi-structured interviews 
and questionnaires with foreign correspondents and media professionals. Finally, I 
introduce my two sites of analysis: 1) the coverage of the 50th anniversaries of 
independence, and 2) the coverage of continental Africa in news magazine covers. 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I focus on the first site of investigation. Chapter 4 starts by 
providing background for the analysis; it offers a brief historical overview of the 
period of independence of the late 1950s, and frames the 50th anniversaries of 






chapter maps out the coverage of these anniversaries by looking at which countries 
and stories were the most covered. In the last section, I assess in the context of this 
site three claims about Western media coverage of Africa found in the literature: 1) 
the use of systematic references to “darkness” and “tribalism”; 2) the presentation 
of Africa as a homogenous entity; 3) the overreliance on Western/foreign sources. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a more interpretive and critical analysis of the dominant 
narrative, linguistic and rhetorical strategies found in the coverage. I first focus on 
the editorials to assess when the anniversaries of independence were deemed 
newsworthy enough to be given salience, and if Afro-pessimism is at play in these 
cases. I then offer an interpretation of the discursive common sense of this 
coverage at large. In order to do so, I propose to step outside the conceptual lens of 
Afro-pessimism to grasp the ideological function of media discourse in relation to 
the uneasiness surrounding the colonial past in Britain and France. 
 
Chapter 6 deals with site 2 and presents a multimodal discourse analysis of covers 
published in British and French news magazines between 2011 and 2015. I use 
these covers as micro-textual cases that shed light on the more ‘macro’ dimensions 
and social implications of a shift in perception and representation from Afro-
pessimism to Afro-optimism. The first section consists of a micro-textual analysis 
of the magazine covers and of the idea of Africa they construct. The second section 
fleshes out three key drivers of this evolution. Drawing on these two sections, the 
last section critically analyses the power relations reproduced through this 
coverage. 
 
Chapter 7 explores the perspective of foreign correspondents on Afro-pessimism 
and media representation of Africa. As a way to identify drivers of changes and 
continuities in the reporting of African news, I analyse how foreign correspondents 
talk about Afro-pessimism, about the constraints of news production and about 
their audience. 
 
Finally, the conclusion presents a cross-comparative discussion of my findings and 
their implications for the study of representation of Africa. It also addresses the 






CHAPTER 1 - Representation of Africa and Afro-pessimism 
 
 
In this first chapter, I establish the theoretical framework in which this study is 
located and I introduce the key concept of Afro-pessimism. The first section 
introduces the critical/cultural and postcolonial studies traditions and defines the 
notions of representation, discourse and the ‘Other’ that constitute the theoretical 
background to my investigation. In the second section, I draw on this framework 
and the input of several key postcolonial theorists to examine the historical 
construction of an “idea of Africa,” and to highlight the power relations that 
underpin it. I pay particular attention to its discursive construction in the colonial 
context, and highlight the contribution of culture in general, and journalism in 
particular, to this discursive formation. Finally, I turn to the concept of Afro-
pessimism and its etymology. In spite of a significant uptake for the term in the last 
20 years, I argue that there is a lack of definition of what Afro-pessimism precisely 
is and that this creates risks for research into media representation of Africa. The 
chapter ends on the necessity to establish a clear conceptual definition of Afro-
pessimism. 
 
1.1 Theoretical framework of critical/cultural and postcolonial 
studies 
 
This section provides an introduction and discussion of the key conceptual lexicon 
used throughout this research, namely, the concepts of representation, discourse 
and the ‘Other’. 
1.1.1 Representation 
 
At first, a representation can be defined as the mental depiction of an object. When 
I think of an apple, my mind forms a mental picture of what an actual apple is. This 
representation is thus produced through the mental faculty of imagination. The 
study of imagination has a long philosophical tradition. Bouriau (2003) goes as far 
back as Aristotle who described imagination as the feeling of an object happening 
without its actual presence. In a similar vein, Sartre (1940) used the concept of 






symbol through which we aim the real object. A representation is therefore the 
result of the mental faculty of imagination. Kant (1848) went even further in 
analysing imagination and representation; for him, imagination is not simply 
reproductive but also productive. It is the faculty that unifies our sensitive 
experiences; thus, there is no actual perception without the necessary intervention 
of imagination and thus representation. In sum, representation is a fundamental 
mental process through which we imagine and experience our world (Bouriau, 
2003). 
 
Beyond this first process (ideas and mental pictures we construct in our heads), the 
notion of representation also refers to the way we communicate these ideas through 
language (the second process of representation) (Hall, 2003b p. 17). Language is 
entirely based on a system of representation where words stand for something else, 
for example an object or an idea. Hall (2003b p. 24) identifies three approaches to 
understanding how representation through language works: reflective or mimetic, 
intentional, and constructionist. In the reflective approach, any object or idea in the 
real world has a meaning, and representation is the process through which this 
inherent meaning is communicated. On the contrary, the intentional approach 
argues that the meaning is not contained in the object itself, but that it is the 
speaker “who imposes his or her unique meaning on the world through language” 
(Hall, 2003b p. 25). The constructionist approach, finally, emphasises that 
communication relies on the fact that we share meaning socially. It is not the object 
or the individual that fix meaning but rather social conventions. In this perspective, 
representation is the construction and exchange of meaning through language 
between members of a society. Drawing on Hall (2003b) we can delineate two 
traditions in this constructionist approach to representation: the first is inherited 
from linguistics and semiotics, and the second from Michel Foucault’s theory of 
discourse.  
 
The first tradition finds its roots in the work of Swiss linguist Saussure (1960) who 
developed the concepts of sign, signifier and signified to explain how language 
functions. In a nutshell, a word stands for an idea, and the association between the 
word (signifier) and the idea (signified) is the sign. In a sense, a sign brings 
together two systems of representation (speech and writing / mental concepts; 
signifier / signified). Language, then, is the organisation and combination of 






“natural”; it is constructed and arbitrary. A “house” could be called a “blurf”, it 
would not change the meaning conveyed by the word. Saussure was not so much 
interested in the reasons why meaning was attached to signs; rather, he focused on 
the structure of signs and their meanings as being inter-related to other signs within 
the same system. 
 
Forty years later, Barthes (1957) used this “lexicon of signification” and applied it 
to various objects of popular culture, hereby taking on the task to extend 
Saussure’s theory to a “science that studies the life of signs within society” (Hall, 
2003b p. 36). By looking at travel guides, films and advertisements, he provided 
one of the key theoretical frameworks to understand representation: every object in 
society conveys meaning and is thus likely to be analysed as a combination of 
signs, or a text. By extending the analysis of sign beyond the realm of linguistic, 
Barthes’ semiotics provided a conceptual milestone to understand representation as 
the construction of meaning across society and not only confined to written and 
spoken words. 
 
His semiotic perspective also emphasised the cultural and social construction of 
meaning; signs contain particular values, beliefs and assumptions. To explain this 
phenomenon, Barthes used the concept of myth. A myth is a “second-order 
semiological system” in which a sign becomes a signifier for another signified 
(Barthes, 1972 p. 114). For instance, in a Saussurean perspective the words “red 
flag” are used to signify the actual object, a red flag. This sign then can also 
become a signifier for another signified for instance revolutionary politics and 
socialism in the context of the Paris Commune of 1871 – a myth. In a myth, the 
arbitrary association of a signifier and signified does not happen in a vacuum; it is 
constructed by and through culture, history and social conventions. It is in this 
sense for Barthes that there is an ideological dimension to the myth. 
 
Using the example of a Paris-Match cover, Barthes argued that the photograph of a 
black boy, with his uniform, his salute and his look towards a potential French flag 
is a myth which, given the cultural codes of the time, signified the concept the 
French Empire (Barthes, 1972 pp. 125–126). This myth is an assemblage of 
various signs constituting a “total of linguistics signs” (Howells, 2003 p. 101). 






the values of colonialism, and glorifying and unifying a sense of the French 
empire: 
 
But, whether naively or not, I see very well what it signifies to me: 
that France is a great Empire, that all her sons, without colour 
discrimination, faithfully serve under the flag and that there is no 
better answer to the detractors of an alleged colonialism than the 
zeal shown by this negro in serving his so-called oppressors.  
 
(Barthes, 1972 pp. 125–126) 
 
A key feature of myths is their ability to appear as natural and common sense, to 
make “the contingency appear eternal” (Barthes, 1972 p. 155), thus erasing the 
historical intentions and inequalities that led to their constitution. As far as the 
study of representation is concerned, Barthes’ ideas were decisive: he extended the 
analysis of signs to culture more generally and developed the concept of myth, 
which contributed to a critical understanding of culture’s ideological assumptions, 
and of the way meaning is naturalised. 
1.1.2 Discourse  
 
Alongside this semiotic tradition, Foucault (1972) appealed to the concept of 
discourse, which proved very influential for studying representation. A discourse is 
the constitution of knowledge about a topic or an object; it is grounded in a 
historical context, and therefore contains a set of assumptions that are socially and 
historically produced (Hall, 1992 p. 291). For instance, Foucault would argue that 
science does not produce objective knowledge, but instead is regulated by 
discourses. Moreover, Foucault saw discourse as extending beyond the realm of 
texts or signs. He considered all social practices and institutions – including jails, 
schools and hospitals – as produced by and regulated through discourse, or in other 
words discursively formed. Insofar as they structure knowledge, discourses 
regulate both practices and behaviours by distinguishing, for instance, what is 
acceptable from what is punishable (Foucault, 1977).  
 
In this discursive perspective, meaning is not natural or fixed but it is power that 
attempts to fix meaning through discourse. Any discourse claims to hold authority 
over knowledge, but this authority is shaped unequally. The more dominant the 
structures are, the stronger their claims to truth are; or in other words, the more 
authoritative and powerful they are in shaping society by fixing meaning through 






“naturalising” the historical. But Foucault believed that one ought to look at a 
much broader historical map of meanings. Moreover, he did not talk of the 
discourse of an epoch but preferred the idea of discursive formations, which can be 
defined as a “pattern of discursive events which refer to, or bring into being, a 
common object across a number of sites” (Barker, 2000 p. 384). When various 
discourses constitute a discursive formation, they then reach a “regime of truth” 
(Barker, 2000 p. 20); they hold a dominant position in the constitution of 
knowledge about an object or a topic. 
 
Although Foucault used his concept of discourse to investigate issues of power and 
discipline, of identity formations and the regulation of bodies and difference, he 
showed little interest in racism and colonisation as discursive formations (Young, 
1995; Ahluwalia, 2005).3 This is all the more surprising since the authority of 
science that Foucault sought to deconstruct with regard to madness and sexuality 
was also at the heart of the racial epistemology of the 19th century, and of the 
discursive justification of colonialism: “Foucault had a lot to say about power, but 
he was curiously circumspect about the ways in which it has operated in the arenas 
of race and colonialism” (Young, 1995 p. 57). This could be part of what 
Ahluwalia (2005) called the colonial roots of poststructuralism. He argued that the 
colonial and postcolonial experience might have played a role in shaping the main 
issues explored by poststructuralism such as ‘Otherness’, power, difference, the 
role of language, the deconstruction of the enlightenment discourse and the 
domination of subjected bodies (Ahluwalia, 2005). Although Ahluwalia focused 
mainly on Derrida, he also mentions Foucault, who took a post in the University of 
Tunis in Morocco in 1966 (Horrocks & Jevtic, 1997 p. 82). Without going as far as 
reducing the entire poststructuralist project to a colonial unspoken or unconscious, 
we can certainly highlight that Foucault’s silence on colonialism is conspicuous. 
Yet his concept of discourse “provided the theoretical basis for what has 
effectively become the founding disciplinary text for contemporary postcolonial 
theory, Edward Said’s Orientalism” (Young, 1995 p. 57). 
 
                                                      
3 Foucault (2003) discusses racism in relation to biopolitics in a way that inspired Balibar’s 
(2007) concept of “neo-racism”, a racism less based on the concept of ‘race’ but rather on 
culture. Foucault’s writings on racism were not translated in English until 2003 and it is in 
fact his concept of discourse that was much more influential for the field of postcolonial 






1.1.3 The ‘Other’ 
 
Focusing on late 18th and 19th century British and French literature, Said 
[1978](2003 p. 2) referred to Orientalism to describe a discourse through which 
Europe constructed a representation of the Orient and its people. Said (2003 p. 322) 
was not trying to assess if this “Orientalist Orient” distorted a “real Orient”.4 
Instead, he argued that Western discourses about the Orient were infused and 
shaped by the imperial domination of the time and, as such, the knowledge of the 
Orient was inseparable from these relations of power. He relied on the concept of 
hegemony – borrowed from Gramsci (1971) – to explain the dominance of certain 
ideas and cultural forms over others at a given time in a society (Said, 2003 p. 7). 
What colonialism achieved was the domination of the Orient, not only militarily 
but also culturally and symbolically through the hegemonic control and ordering of 
knowledge:  
 
Orientalist discourse and European material interests were mutual 
allies. As a discourse, Orientalism has always operated as a general 
configuration of ideas and images which organise and enact a way 
of representing knowledge of the East, determining not only the 
means by which but also the position from which the East is 
represented.  
(Pickering, 2001 p. 150) 
 
Said also stressed that there was dialectic dimension to this process: as the West 
constructed the Orient, it also constructed itself as a binary opposite. Where the 
Orient is represented as violent, irrational, barbaric and repressive, the West is 
constructed around categories of freedom, rationality, secularity and progress.5 In 
doing so, Orientalism accomplishes two things. Firstly, it creates and sustains an 
absolute difference between the Orient and the Occident, between ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
– an assessment which echoes strongly Foucault’s depiction of madness in Europe: 
                                                      
4 In Covering Islam (2008), Said revisited these concerns in a contemporary context, and 
focused specifically on news media. However, Said seemed to adopt an ideological 
approach, rather than a discursive one. He notably argues that current coverage failed to 
understand Islam (Said, 2008 p. 176). It therefore implies that there would be something as 
a real Islam, which the media fail to cover and understand. Both ideology and discourse are 
connected to issues of power and control; but the reason Foucault did not use the concept of 
ideology is precisely because it postulates something as a real object, which is 
misunderstood and/or distorted. A discursive approach, on the other hand, implies that any 
understanding of Islam would be a signifying practice and imbued with power relations. 
5 Said was criticised for accomplishing himself a form of essentialism by reducing the West 
to France and the UK in Orientalism, or to the US in Covering Islam (2008). For a criticism 






The history of madness would be the history of the Other – of that 
which, for a given culture, is at once interior and foreign, therefore 
to be excluded (so as to exorcise the interior danger) but by being 
shut away (in order to reduce its otherness).  
(Foucault, 1970 p. xxiv) 
 
Secondly, this discursive construction also implies a value judgement in which 
what and who is ‘Other’ is also inferior. In sum, it creates polarised 
representations, which reinforce a sense of absolute difference and inferiority. In 
this perspective, the study of Orientalism tells us more about the West than it does 
about the East, an idea that we also find in Fanon [1961](2004 p. 58) and his claim 
that “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World”. 
 
Taking a macro-historical approach starting as far back as the Portuguese 
exploration of the African coast (1430-1498), Hall (1992) extended this opposition 
between the West and the Orient to the West and the “Rest” more generally. Like 
Said, he stressed that the West invented itself in opposition to the “Rest” of the 
world seen as primitive, underdeveloped, backward and closer to nature: “The 
‘Other’ was the ‘dark’ side – forgotten, repressed, and denied; the reverse image of 
enlightenment and modernity” (Hall, 1992 p. 221). 
 
The approach developed by Said attracted several criticisms (Varisco, 2007). Two 
main and interrelated critiques are particularly important here. First, his approach 
has been criticised for assuming “a single, systematic and homogenous colonial 
discourse rather than various discourses in circulation that related to colonialism 
and indigenous peoples” (Pickering, 2001 p. 152). In this regard, the strength of 
Said’s critical framework is also a weakness in that it falls short of paying attention 
to contradictions, gaps and nuances. For instance, Siran (2011) in his study of late 
19th century French dramaturge Jean-René Lenormand demonstrated that cultural 
forms of anti-colonial rhetoric of the time were also widely pervaded by Orientalist 
representations, hereby making it difficult to systematically reduce Orientalism to a 
discourse at the service of colonialism. Second, Said’s analysis has been deemed to 
not pay enough attention to “change in discourse over time, tending to present 
Western discourse about the Orient as if it was historically unified and seamless in 
its construction of Europe’s ‘silent Other’” (Pickering, 2001 p. 154). 
 
The fields of cultural and postcolonial studies that blossomed in the footsteps of the 






limitations in several ways. The second critique – a lack of attention to historical 
evolution of discourse – has become a key concern of postcolonial studies of 
representation. I will address this concern in the following two sections of this 
chapter, by looking more precisely at the evolution of representation of Africa in 
the West. For now, I would like to introduce the notion of stereotype, which 
constitutes a powerful conceptual tool to pay attention to the contradictions of 
colonial discourse (first critique). 
 
The concept of stereotype is usually traced back to Lippman (1922) to describe a 
cognitive process, essential to our perception, where we categorise objects as 
different or familiar. Lippman was not really interested in racism or racial 
stereotypes, but his definition set the standard to understand the process through 
which individuals and societies experience cultural and ethnic difference. Indeed, 
the concept of stereotype developed by social psychologists incorporates the idea 
that it mainly has to do with different social groups: 
 
Stereotypes are generalization about social groups – characteristics 
that are attributed to all members of a given group, without regard 
to variations that must exist among members of that group. 
Stereotypes are not necessarily based on people’s first-hand 
experiences with members of stereotyped groups. They may be 
learned from others or from the mass media.  
(Seiter, 1986 p. 15) 
 
Stereotyping is therefore a core representational practice in the depiction of people 
and cultures perceived as different, one that “reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and 
fixes ‘difference’” (Hall, 2003a p. 258). But if stereotypes are reductive and crude, 
they also hold their share of ambivalence, for instance by categorising 
representation of the ‘Other’ around extremes and polar oppositions, and often 
requiring from the ‘Other’ to be “both things at the same time” (Hall, 2003a p. 
229). Thus, stereotypes are crossed by contradictions and split figures or “tropes” 
(Bhabha, 1983; Gilman, 1985; Hulme, 1992). In that sense, studies of stereotyping 
pay particular attention to how meaning about difference is closed, but also the 
various and sometimes contradictory ways in which it is done. Conversely, 
grounding the process of stereotyping within the conceptual framework of the 
‘Other’ allows us to shed light on the “structures and relations of power which give 







In this section, I outlined the key theoretical features of the critical/cultural and 
postcolonial traditions in which this study is located by introducing several key 
concepts. The study of representation and discourse holds that culture and media 
play a pivotal role in shaping and fixing perceptions of people, places and cultures 
perceived as ‘Other’, and in establishing and sustaining representations entangled 
in relations of power. I now use this theoretical framework to deconstruct more 
precisely the historical and discursive “invention of Africa” in the West (Mudimbe, 
1988).  
 
1.2 Genealogy of the discursive construction of Africa  
 
This representation has a complex historical and discursive genealogy. This section 
identifies the key features of this representation and discusses how it was shaped 
by a Euro-centric system of knowledge infused by a background of oppression, 
racism and domination, from the beginning of the modern period to the colonial 
era. I close this section by discussing more specifically the role of European 
journalists in the 19th century in “inventing Africa”. 
1.2.1 Modernity and the idea of Africa 
 
The way Africa came to be dominantly imagined, represented and invented in the 
Western world can be traced to the discovery of the New World and the birth of the 
modern world-system (Mignolo, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013), which is often 
defined as the birth of modernity (Toulmin, 1992; Mignolo, 1995). Europe, as it 
sought to put itself at the centre of world history through economic and territorial 
expansion and domination, simultaneously started to construct ‘Others’ as 
essentially different and inferior (Hall, 1992; Toulmin, 1992; Gilroy, 1993). This 
modern paradigm of alterity together with the growth of the Atlantic slave trade 
shaped an “idea of Africa” (Mudimbe, 1988; 1994) and a racist view of Africans as 
inferior, savage and less than human. 
 
For Mudimbe (1994) this idea of Africa as a sort of radical ‘Otherness’ emerged in 
the Greco-Roman civilisation. On the contrary, others like Snowden (1970), 
Fredrickson (2002) and Bassil (2011) argue that prior to the Atlantic slave trade, 







Before the middle of the fifteenth century, Europeans had little or 
no direct contact with sub-Saharan Africans. Artistic and literary 
representations of these distant and exotic peoples ranged from the 
monstrous and horrifying to the saintly and heroic.  
(Fredrickson, 2002 p. 26) 
 
More importantly, during the late Middle Ages, Europe saw the establishment of 
several positive and glorified images of black Africans. Religion was at the core of 
this trend as “Europeans began to view Africans as potential military partners 
against the spread of Islam” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997 p. 682). For instance, a 
cult of Prester John – mythical ruler of a Christian empire often located in Ethiopia 
– emerged and grew increasingly popular from the 12th century onward. Similarly, 
it became common to represent Balthazar, one of the nativity magi, as a black 
African (Fredrickson, 2002 p. 28). In any case, the advent of the slave trade and the 
development of modern European consciousness led to the establishment of a 
strongly prejudiced, monolithic, unified and racialised representation of Africa and 
Africans. 
 
At the core of modernity’s conception of ‘Otherness’ was the dichotomy between 
noble and wild savages. This dichotomy shaped early representations of native 
Americans and infused a key philosophical debate of the Enlightenment, the debate 
on man in the state of nature (Mudimbe, 1988). For Hobbes, man in the state of 
nature was violent and savage, while for Rousseau this man was fundamentally 
good, living in simplicity and harmony with nature. While their writings assumed a 
hypothetical state of nature, both philosophers were impacted by the account of 
European travellers exploring remote geographical areas. This foundational debate 
of modernity cemented the dual categories of savageness/barbarity and 
authenticity/simplicity, which subsequently impacted representation of black 
Africans (Mudimbe, 1988). As the European commercial slave trade thrived and 
forced some 12 million black Africans into ships to America to provide cheap 
labour force, it discursively inscribed difference and inferiority to the black body 
(Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Hall, 2003a).  
 
Parallel to the expansion of the slave trade, the era of Enlightenment – often 
heralded as the symbol of humanity’s walk towards progress, reason and 
civilisation – was therefore crossed by the paradox that many of its leading thinkers 
who promoted universal claims of liberty and equality were “anxious to establish 






(Bracken, 2001 p. 174). The Enlightenment effectively laid the foundation for the 
development of the scientific racism of the 18th and 19th century, which 
underpinned the European colonialism in Africa and contributed to one of its most 
successful enterprise: “forcing most diverse regions, traditions, and cultures in 
Africa into one symbolic system” (Mayer, 2002 p. 1). 
1.2.2 The colonial myth of the “Dark Continent” 
 
Around the late 18th and early 19th century an image of Africa appeared in a more 
systematic and coherent way, infused by the racial and colonial episteme of the 
time (Mudimbe, 1988). The domination of imperial powers was based on 
civilisational and racial classifications grounded in the newly born anthropology 
and the development of scientific racism. On the physical, aesthetic, moral and 
intellectual scales, whites ranked the highest and blacks the lowest (Gould, 1996; 
Rattansi, 2007). The pseudo-science of craniology notably became one of the main 
tools used by anthropologists to prove inherent biological inequalities between 
‘races’. In spite of internal inconsistencies that could have been discarded from 
within the science of the time (Gould, 1996), racial inequalities were taken at face 
value, hereby making science a convenient tool for morally justifying the economic 
and political incentives of colonialism.  
 
This racial episteme pervaded not only the science of the time, but also other social 
fields of knowledge production, from religion to politics. In the UK, for instance, 
Bassil (2011 p. 391) argues that Christianity played a pivotal role in shaping a 
racialised perception of Africa as “savage, backward and indolent, and in need of 
redemption through British intervention”. This view underpinned the debates about 
the abolition of slavery on both sides, as well as about the civilising mission of 
colonialism. For Bassil (2011), this view was rendered particularly popular through 
the medium of the Church and missionary organisations. In France, on the 
contrary, the view of Africa as inferior and in need of uplifting was heavily 
supported by a secular tradition of universalism and French republicanism, 
captured by the famous speech of leader of the Republican party Jules Ferry before 
the Chambers of deputies in July 1885: “the superior races have a right because 
they have a duty: it is their duty to civilise the inferior races” (quoted in Bancel et 
al., 2006 p. 98). Both pro and anti-colonial proponents relied on a similar set of 







The underlying assumption was that modern society had evolved 
from its antithesis, that non-white “primitives” in the contemporary 
world were “childlike, intuitive, and spontaneous”, and that 
because of this they required control and guidance from Europe if 
they were not to suffer from their inherent physical violence and 
sexual drives.  
(Pickering, 2001 p. 53) 
 
This episteme of racial superiority shaped the way Europe started to “invent” 
Africa as the “Dark Continent” (Achebe, 1988; Mudimbe, 1988; Bassil, 2011). 
This metaphor became the common way of describing and talking about Africa in 
the Victorian period, in particular following the publication of Henry Morton 
Stanley’s account of his expeditions Through the Dark Continent [1878](1988). 
The most influential cultural manifestation of this metaphor is found in Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness (1995). The book is inspired by the many stories of colonisers 
who were reported to act extremely brutally and madly against black Africans and 
eventually against their fellow colonisers. While the book was conceived as radical 
critique of the horrors of imperialism, the extreme cruelty it depicted was blamed 
on them being in Africa, with Africans, under an African Sun. Thus, it implied a 
determinism linked to some kind of African essence. In this perspective, the 
“darkness” of the African land, echoed by the skin colour of its inhabitants, 
ultimately affects the white colonisers and turns them into brutes and savages, 
awakening in them their own “darkness” (Achebe, 1988; Spurr, 1993; Lindqvist, 
2007). What ultimately became a landmark of British literature, and that remains 
today an educational rite of passage, was therefore at once a radical critique of 
colonialism and “the culmination of a nineteenth century literary/political way of 
seeing the Other” (Fothergill, 1992 p. 45). 
 
Following Barthes’s concept of myth, we can say that Africa was shaped or 
invented as the myth of the “Dark Continent”. The word “Africa” does not only 
signify a large continent located west of Asia and south of Europe. It also became a 
myth, originating in the Western world, that associated sub-Saharan Africa with 
violence, brutality, poverty, absence of culture, being outside of history and 
primitivism (Mudimbe, 1988; Bassil, 2011). This essentialist myth, at once, 
homogenises Africa as a single entity while reducing it to sub-Saharan, ‘black’ 
Africa. It contributes to a “naturalization of racial difference” by representing black 
Africans as savage, inferior, violent or promiscuous (Hall, 2003a). The black body 
in particular “became the discursive site through which much of this ‘racialized 






like the Orient was a mirror through which the West constructed its own identity, 
Africa constituted “one of the metaphors through which the West represents the 
origin of its own norms, develops a self-image, and integrates this image into the 
set of signifiers asserting what it supposes to be its identity” (Mbembe, 2001 p. 2). 
As Europe invented itself as enlightened, educated, progressive and scientific, it 
also constructed Africa as an opposite myth characterised by savageness, blackness 
and inferiority: “Africa became an indispensable term, a negative trope, in the 
language of modernity” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997 p. 689). Despite the fact that 
on “the very eve of the colonial conquest and occupation, Africa was far from 
being primitive, static, and asleep or in Hobbesian state of nature” (Boahen, 2011 
p. 23), the knowledge and representation of Africa was filtered through these 
preconceptions.  
1.2.3 Colonial culture and journalism 
 
This myth of the “Dark Continent” infused and was reproduced by culture at large, 
from philosophy and literature to human exhibition and travellers’ accounts. 
German philosopher Hegel (1861), for instance, in his authoritative Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History contributed to popularise the view of Africa as “out of 
history” and to fixing some of the most pervasive stereotypes about black Africans:  
 
It [Africa] has no historical interest of its own, for we find its 
inhabitants living in barbarism and savagery in a land, which has 
not furnished them with any ingredient of culture. From the earliest 
historical times, Africa has remained cut off from all contacts with 
the rest of the world; it is the land of gold, forever pressing in upon 
itself, and the land of childhood, removed from the light of self-
conscious history and wrapped in the dark mantle of night. Its 
isolation is not just a result of its tropical nature, but an essential 
consequence of its geographical character.  
(Hegel, 1861 p. 103)6 
 
In Britain and France, human exhibitions played a key role in reinforcing a certain 
image of black Africans as exotic savages, since it allowed European population to 
                                                      
6 Susan Buck-Morss (2000) provides a fascinating analysis that links Hegel’s theory of the 
master/slave dialectic to the Haitian revolution and the self-liberation of the slaves of Saint-
Domingue. For her, that Hegel dealt with the question of lordship and bondage was not ex 
nihilo but in fact the result of him reading press accounts of the Haitian revolution, and of 
its centrality to the European political discourse of the time: “Hegel knew about real slaves 
revolting successfully against real masters, and he elaborated his dialectic of lordship and 
bondage deliberately within this contemporary context” (Buck-Morss, 2000 p. 844). Surely, 
many key philosophical debates of the 19th century would benefit from further studies that 






directly encounter ‘Otherness’ staged and commodified for the purpose of this 
audience and its assumptions (Blanchard, 2008).7 Advertisements and theatre also 
drew significantly on a similar colonial lexicon of representation (Blanchard & 
Lemaire, 2003; Ramamurthy, 2003; Bancel et al., 2006). 
 
Hammond and Jablow’s (1977) and Milbury-Steen’s (1981) respective work on 
British, and British and French literature provide tremendous evidence of the 
pervasiveness of a dehumanising discourse on Africa and racial stereotypes, in 
particular in the very popular genre of adventure fiction. In most of the British and 
French colonial novels of the 19th century, the role reserved to African characters 
was limited to certain categories such as “loyal servants, cunning villains, 
Westernized Africans or uncivilized primitives” (Milbury-Steen, 1981 p. 15). 
Milbury-Steen observes striking correlation between the most commonly used 
stereotypes in both British and French colonial novels, which notably included 
physical (ugliness and sensual acuteness), mental (lack of intelligence and culture), 
moral (primitive, childlike, deceitful) and emotional (impulsive, musically gifted) 
stereotypes.  
 
As most people in Europe in the 19th and early 20th century only encountered Africa 
through mediated representations, the authority of those having been there was 
further increased, despite the fact that their observations essentially reproduced 
their own preconceptions. In that regard, explorers’ and journalists’ accounts 
played a pivotal role in feeding representations of the “Dark Continent”. The fabled 
encounter between Henry Morton Stanley and David Livingstone in East Africa in 
1871 is often seen as epitomising the interplay between the imperialist enterprise 
known as the “Scramble for Africa” and the colonial practices of cultural 
representation of the continent (Dunn, 2004). Between 1870 and 1914, the world 
witnessed an increased exploration, invasion, occupation and colonisation of Africa 
by European powers. Generally hidden behind humanitarian and civilisational 
concerns, the imperialist enterprise was characterised by the control and 
exploitation of raw materials and land. It was also a way for European countries to 
establish their economic and symbolic power nationally and internationally. Seen 
                                                      
7 An exhibition at the Musée du Quai Branly in Paris, “Human Zoo, The invention of the 
savage” (2012), provided extensive visual material to explain the historical evolution of the 
staging of ‘Otherness’. It was particularly interesting to see that many West Africans in the 
early 20th century were paid to act as Zulu Warriors, from South Africa, for the pleasure of 
European audiences, thus showing how this form of representation materially constructed 






as a terra nullius, Africa was to be explored and exploited. This domination was 
enacted at a material and symbolic level, and the partition of the continent during 
the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference is the perfect example of the alignment between 
the material and symbolic ordering of the world performed by colonialism. The 
colonial map of Africa, characterised by borders drawn with rulers and setsquares, 
testified to the conquest and domination of the continent, while rendering its 
geography “legible to the European gaze” (Popke, 2001 p. 10). 
 
This period was also the early days of international news, as popular press drew on 
the telegraph technology to report more routinely on the imperial expansion. Press 
coverage of Africa’s exploration grew popular and reached a broader audience; this 
provided further legitimisation for the imperial project while creating a lucrative 
market for further expeditions funded by newspapers (Fabian, 2012 p. 95). Stanley, 
for instance, became a celebrity thanks to his coverage and writings (In Darkest 
Africa sold 150,000 copies in 1890 and was translated in 10 European languages), 
and his expeditions were funded by newspapers, including the Daily Telegraph and 
the New York Herald (Willems, 2015 p. 303). 8  He eventually organised an 
exhibition in London in 1890 – with the financial support of the Queen Victoria 
and Leopold II – which praised the British presence in Africa and his “heroic 
travels in darkest Africa” (Pettitt, 2007). In this way, press accounts of expeditions 
played a significant role in constructing and cementing representations that suited 
the needs of imperial expansion and domination (see also Curtin, 1964; Simonsen, 
2010; Willems, 2015), while feeding off as well as feeding into the popular literary 
style of fiction of colonial travel (Fabian, 2012 p. 98). 
 
Pankhurst’s (2005) study of the Times (London) coverage of the Battle of Adwa 
provides a compelling example of the press’ support to imperialism, even in spite 
of conflicting interests between British, French and Italian colonial powers. The 
battle of Adwa of 1 March 1896 was won by the troops of Ethiopian Emperor 
Menelik against the imperial Italian troops of General Oreste Baratieri. Although 
France was in competition with Italy, the French public opinion was “unwilling to 
side with the invaded country because it was situated on the African Continent” 
                                                      
8  Murray (2012) reminds us that Stanley’s popularity did not decrease despite the 
documented accusations of him and his officers using brutality, violence and plunder and 
even slavery, leading to the death of around one thousand individuals, mainly Africans 






(Pankhurst, 2005 p. 218). Before the Italian troops were defeated, the Times 
correspondent in Paris wrote: 
 
No one here – with the sole possible exception of one or two dim-
witted persons or a few habitually malevolent minds – wishes for 
the success of the Abyssinians at the price of the discomfiture of a 
civilized nation, from which it is quite possible to differ in aims 
and opinions without cherishing any ill-will when that nation is 
face to face with a brave but barbarous foe.  
(Pankhurst, 2005 p. 218) 
 
Following the Italian debacle at Adwa, the Times coverage adopted a pro-Italian 
stance that reflected that of the British establishment; a friendly and sympathetic 
attitude that was largely explained by the fear that “the defeat of a European power 
by an African nation would create unrest in British colonies” (Pankhurst, 2005 p. 
224).  
 
Because journalists travelling to Africa, especially in the second part of the 19th 
century, arrived there with an image shaped by previous accounts, they often 
reproduced a prejudiced image of the continent. They were “on the lookout for 
scenes that carry an already established interest for a Western audience, thus 
investing perception itself with the mediating power of cultural difference” (Spurr, 
1993 p. 21). Such personal and racist prejudice is particularly visible in Stanley’s 
account of Sierra Leone during an assignment for the New York Herald: 
 
If I were asked where I could find the most insolent, lying, thieving 
negroes, I should undoubtedly say at Sierra Leone. Through some 
strange caprice the English have permitted a colony of semi-
civilized Africans to grow up in order to experiment, perhaps, how 
wild and rank a colony of negroes can become when left to their 
own sinful and wicked devices, unchecked and uncurbed by the 
hand of law. The English will, perhaps, plead as an excuse that the 
climate is against the exercise of strong will; that no matter how 
valiant a man be in his intentions when he sets out to govern the 
blatant woolly-headed rabble of this colony, he will be prostrated 
before the unconquerable lassitude which the climate quickly 
engenders in him as soon as he sets foot on its shores.  
 
(Stanley, 1874, pp. 6-7 quoted in Spurr, 1993 p. 80). 
 
Anthropologist Johannes Fabian (2000; 2012) puts forward an additional reason 
that may have further contributed to the reproduction of such images in travel and 
journalistic writing: mental and physical exhaustion caused by difficult travel 
conditions, uncertainty and anxiety. In this perspective, the material conditions of 






impacted the state of mind of these writers, eventually contributing to them 
reproducing images of wilderness and danger (Fabian, 2012 p. 97). However, and 
importantly, these difficult travel conditions were not inherent to Africa’s 
geography; rather they were the result of self-imposed constraints by explorers and 
driven by the ethos of colonial expansion. 
 
With the development of the press and of international coverage spurred by the 
global expansion of colonial empires, the press therefore played a crucial role in 
informing Western audiences with images of Africa that perpetuated these 
stereotypes. Even at the dawn of decolonisation, not much seemed to have changed 
in the way Western journalists wrote about Africa.9 Allimadi (2002) accessed the 
archive of the New York Times, including correspondence between Africa 
correspondents and editors from this period. This material perfectly reveals such 
continuity. Homer Bigart, two times winner of the Pulitzer price and often heralded 
as one of the most acclaimed American reporter of the 20th century, covered many 
of the independence movements in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In a 
communication to his editor in 1960, he writes about the independence 
movements: 
 
I’m afraid I cannot work up any enthusiasm for the emerging 
republics. The politicians are either crooks or mystics. Dr 
Nkrumah is a Henry Wallace in burnt cork. I vastly prefer the 
primitive bush people. After all, cannibalism may be the logical 
antidote to this population explosion everyone talks about.  
 
(Bigart quoted in Allimadi, 2002 p. 6) 
 
This quote reveals his contempt for the independence movements and his racism. 
The response of his editor – Emanuel Freedman – shows that Bigart’s racist views, 
on the field, were met with similar enthusiasm back at the office: 
                                                      
9 In spite of an impressive amount of research conducted into Western media coverage of 
Africa, in particular on the period from the 1990s onward, there is surprisingly little in-
depth, systematic research into media coverage of African news prior to that, and in 
particular from the late colonial era. The studies quoted here surely provide evidence of the 
press contribution to the myth of the “Dark Continent”, as well as the contribution of travel 
and missionary writings and travel fictions. And historians of colonial culture provide a lot 
of evidence of press coverage being in alignment with imperial interests while reproducing 
well-established stereotypes. Nonetheless, it would be particularly interesting to see media 
historians deepen our knowledge of media coverage of Africa during this period, using 
perhaps some of the tools developed by media analysts of contemporary coverage of 
Africa. This might help us understand better just how far the view of the “Dark Continent” 
infused press coverage at the time, and, consequently, assess more confidently continuities 







This is just a note to say hello and to tell you how much pleasure 
your peerless prose from the badlands is continuing to give us and 
your public. By now you must be American journalism’s leading 
expert on sorcery, witchcraft, cannibalism and all the other exotic 
phenomena indigenous to darkest Africa. All this and nationalism 
too! Where else but in the New York Times can you get all this for 
a nickel? 
 (Freedman quoted in Allimadi, 2002 p. 6) 
 
This rare material provides compelling evidence of the ways in which mythical 
representations of Africa pervaded the mentalities of journalists up to the end of the 
colonial era, and ultimately shaped images of Africa produced by the media.10 
 
In sum, the West discursively created an idea of Africa infused by a background of 
domination, slavery, racism, paternalism and imperialism. The representation 
shaped by colonial discourse cemented a myth of the “Dark Continent” and a view 
of Africa as ‘Other’, savage, wild, mysterious and dangerous; ultimately a mirror 
dialectically shaping the identity of European nation states as developed and 
modern. The period that saw the establishment of this myth also witnessed the birth 
and expansion of modern telecommunication systems, with an increasing number 
of journalists sent in Africa to report on the progress of the imperial project, thus 
further contributing to reinforce mythical images. It is against this historical and 
discursive backdrop that a debate on Afro-pessimism emerged in the 1990s, to 
which I now turn. 
 
1.3 Afro-pessimism: from a postcolonial phenomenon to a 
postcolonial concept 
 
The concept of Afro-pessimism emerged in the early 1990s. Since then, there has 
been a real uptake for the concept across the humanities and social sciences, 
including in literature, sociology, anthropology, geography, and cultural and 
postcolonial studies. For indication, Google scholar records 89 publications 
mentioning “Afro-pessimism” or “Afropessimism” between 1990 and 1995; 897 
publication between 1995 and 2005, and 1314 between 2005 and 2014. The term 
                                                      
10 Allimadi’s book has gone relatively unnoticed in the academic literature. One reason 
might be that Allimadi is a journalist and his book does not follow academic conventions. 
However, the book provides fascinating first hand material that shed lights on the behind-
the-scene processes of production of African news in what is one of the most respected 






has also gained visibility within the media. Again for indication, Nexis records 35 
news articles between 1990 and 1995, 222 between 1995 and 2005, and 903 
between 2005 and 2014. In order to understand the uptake for the concept and how 
it links to the issues of colonial discourse and representation, I start by 
contextualising its emergence in relation to sub-Saharan Africa’s economic 
development and political situation in the 1990s.  
1.3.1 Emergence of the concept 
 
The oldest occurrence of the term of Afro-pessimism is found in a 27 March 1988 
article from the Xinhua General Overseas News service, the Chinese state press 
agency. The article “France: creditors should do more for Africa’s debt problem” 
relayed the call from Michel Aurillac, French minister of cooperation – a ministry 
created after decolonisation by General de Gaulles with the aim to contribute to the 
development of former colonies. Aurillac called creditor countries to do more to 
alleviate the debts of sub-Saharan African countries and “warned of what he called 
‘an afro-pessimism’ held by some contributors” and their “pessimistic views on 
Africa’s economic situation” (Xinhua News Agency, 1988). The first occurrence of 
“afro-pessimism” in academic writing is in an article by economist Tony Hawkins 
in 1990 in The World Today, where he noted that “[s]o widespread and deep rooted 
is Afro-pessimism that it is now impossible to read anything on regional economic 
prospects without being subjected to a litany of dismal economic statistics” 
(Hawkins, 1990 p. 205). These two early occurrences allow to historically and 
discursively locate the uptake for the concept of Afro-pessimism. 
 
The African independences of the 1950s and 60s were backed by a strong sense of 
optimism and pride (Momoh, 2003 pp. 44–46; Young, 2004 p. 23; Meredith, 2005; 
Rothermund, 2006); finally free from the burden of colonialism, there were great 
hopes that most of these countries would finally blossom (Mulwo et al., 2012). The 
1980s, instead, gave way to a strong sense of pessimism regarding the ability of 
African countries to establish on their own “what the West would regard as ‘good 
governance’” (de B’béri & Louw, 2011 p. 339). In the aftermath of the 1970s 
worldwide energy crisis, many countries on the continent witnessed successive 
military coups, corruption and the establishment of dictatorships. By the mid 
1980s, these countries were unable to repay mounting foreign debts to European 
and US sources, and were “grappling with the burden of poverty, famine and 






International Monetary Fund (IMF) to contract further loans to repay these debts 
(Momoh, 2003 p. 50). Following the emerging economic neoliberalism, these 
institutions required the borrowing countries to implement structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) (Harrison, 2005 p. 1308). These entailed systematic cuts in 
public sector budgets to favour a free market economy and stimulate economic 
growth, most notably through international trade. However, these countries 
integrated a global market where they were unable to compete with the 
international private sector. As the SAPs required the scaling back of education, 
health and labour protection, they “led to greater social and economic deprivation 
and an increased dependence of African countries on external loans” (Colgan, 
2002). These SAPs contributed both to greater poverty and dependency, while 
preserving Western dominance in the global economy. 
 
Rather than questioning this global framework and its structures of power, the 
dominant discourse that emerged in the 1990s, especially from the fields of 
economics and development, focused on painting an “apocalyptic” picture, as 
evoked earlier by Hawkins (see also Ferguson, 2006 p. 10). At the core of this 
discourse was the view that not only had Africa failed to “progress” but also that it 
was mainly to be blamed for this failure (Spurr, 1993 p. 62). Culturalist 
explanations – that accounted for this failure as a specifically African phenomenon 
and the result of perceived social and cultural uniqueness – emerged and were 
reinforced by comparisons with Asian countries, whose economy had taken off in 
the meantime. This played an effective rhetorical role in sustaining a view of 
“Africa as being to blame for its own ills” (de B’béri & Louw, 2011 p. 342). As 
analysed by Escobar (1995), the post World War II development discourse divided 
the world between “First” and “Third Worlds”. This contributed further to 
pathologising Africa within an ethnocentric framework that sustained the Western 
global hegemony and its self-representation as modern, progressive and superior. 
In that regard, the evolution of the World Bank discourse on Africa provides 
interesting insights into the formation of an Afro-pessimist discourse. Initially seen 
in the 1970s as a “child” in need of external help to develop (modernisation 
theory), Africa came to be seen as a “patient” to be cured of its own ills in the 
1990s (Wijngaarden, 2006). 
 
From dictatorships, corruption and civil wars to famines, pandemics and even 






that there was little hope to overcome them progressively took hold. The end of the 
Cold War – which had provided a framework to locate Africa on the map of global 
geopolitics – also did much to reinforce this sense of hopelessness as the continent 
became seen as less relevant, if not irrelevant, to global geopolitics. Discussions of 
the “African crisis” were thus dominated by a strong sense of pessimism, with 
prescriptions ranging from recolonisation of the continent to its abandonment (see 
for instance Rieff, 1998). The profusion of mediatised images of the “African 
crisis”, especially following the iconic coverage of the Ethiopian famine of 1984-
1985 and the emergence of 24-hour TV news network, echoed “prevailing 
representations of both Africa and Africans, as the ‘dark continent’: primordial, 
tribal, violent, unable to feed itself and with a begging bowl permanently in its 
hand” (Ahluwalia, 2001 p. 133). They created “a view that Africa is a basket case, 
beyond help, a negative outlook known as ‘Afro-pessimism’” (Popke, 2001 p. 6). 
Thus, a representation of the post-independence Africa was shaped, “driven by a 
need to fit its supposed complexities – its enigmatic psychology, as it were – into 
an explanatory scheme congruent with our view of Western development” (Chabal 
& Daloz, 1999 p. 141). 
1.3.2 A lack of conceptual definition 
 
Afro-pessimism is thus a discourse. Those attacking this discourse are concerned 
with how the continent and its people, its present and its future, are being 
represented as ‘Other’ through a Western lens that echoes colonial and racist 
images of the “Dark Continent”. It is no surprise, then, that early mentions of Afro-
pessimism almost systematically linked it to the role of the media as seen, for 
example, in the following quote: “alarming reports on declining African economies 
and environments are frequent in the mass media. The overall picture is bleak, 
creating a general Afro-pessimism” (Olsson, 1993 p. 395). South African media 
studies notably contributed to discussions of Afro-pessimism and the media, 
notably in relation to the context of post-apartheid South Africa (Wasserman & de 
Beer, 2009; de Beer, 2010; Berger, 2010; Evans & Glenn, 2010; Evans, 2011; 
Mulwo et al., 2012). In condemning and deconstructing Afro-pessimism, this 
literature aimed to confront contemporary discourses and representation with their 
racist and colonialist roots so as to undermine them, together with the system of 







But up to now, little research has attempted to offer a substantial and authoritative 
definition of Afro-pessimism. In spite of having a context and some general 
features, the concept of Afro-pessimism remains a floating signifier. As de B’béri 
and Louw argue in a special issue of Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and 
Media Studies dedicated to Afro-pessimism: “although there are bits and pieces 
and research works on Afropessimism, none has yet brought it all together in a 
coherent way” (de B’béri & Louw, 2011 p. 335). This was the first, and for now 
only, special issue to be published on the topic of Afro-pessimism per se and 
provides a very welcome effort that should be praised for attempting to understand 
what Afro-pessimism is. They identified different views on Afro-pessimism that 
are reproduced below in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - B'béri & Louw’s table ‘Perspectives on Afro-pessimism’ (2011 p. 336) 
 
Does their table help clarify what Afro-pessimism is? By their account, it seems 
that an Afro-pessimist can be anyone ranging from someone criticising corrupt 
governments and neocolonialism, to someone believing that “Africans are 
incapable of running things” and that Africa should be either “recolonised” or 
“excised” from the world community.  
 
Overall I see three main difficulties with de B’béri and Louw’s attempt to 






related, should be separated. The views 1 and 2 are critiques of Afro-pessimism (a), 
whereas the views 3, 4 and 5 are different forms of Afro-pessimist rhetoric (b). 
This confusion between the phenomenon (Afro-pessimist discourse) and its 
criticism makes it hard to understand the nature of the phenomenon being referred 
to in the first place, namely, Afro-pessimism.  
 
In addition, despite these different perspectives, de B’béri and Louw assume that 
Afro-pessimism is a “discourse” and “a practice of representation”, one that 
“produced Africa as a naturalized pessimistic object of knowledge” (2011 p. 345). 
But their table presents Afro-pessimism as a discourse in the sense of a linguistic 
unit of text and speech, rather than a system of knowledge. There is a risk, then, to 
remove from the concept of discourse what gives it its critical edge: revealing the 
power structures and relations of domination contained, and dialectically 
reproduced, through discourse.  
 
Finally, de B’béri and Louw argue that mass media are central to this discourse: 
“[Afro-pessimism] has gained widespread currency in the global mass media (…) 
journalists now regularly use it as a shorthand commonsensical expression which 
means that there is no hope for sub-Saharan Africa”(de B’béri & Louw, 2011 p. 
338). Yet, none of the articles in the special issue address the question of Afro-
pessimism in the context of news media and journalism. 
 
Thus, in their attempt to make sense of Afro-pessimism, de B’béri and Louw 
simultaneously reinforce its position as a floating signifier and its “taken for 
grantedness” in news media. These ambiguities permeate more broadly the ways in 
which Afro-pessimism is used, both in academia and public discourse. The main 
reason as to why this happens is that the concept is underspecified. In particular, it 
is too often equated with “bad news” or “negative portrayal” as in the view 1 and 2 
of de B’béri and Louw. At this point, the concept of Afro-pessimism drifts away 
from a refined understanding of a system of knowledge that produces a 
contemporary, postcolonial image of Africa entangled in older colonial ideas, to a 
simplistic and reductionist condemnation of “negative” portrayal.  
 
There are several risks in trivialising Afro-pessimism in such a way. For instance, 
this could prevent studies of Africa’s media image to understand precisely the 






play. In other words, there is a risk to fail to see what constitutes discursive 
continuities and what constitutes changes. In addition, the trivialisation of Afro-
pessimism as simply a negative portrayal means that the critique of Afro-
pessimism can easily be co-opted. For instance, politicians can rely on a trivialised 
idea of Afro-pessimism as a way to equate “negative coverage” with “racist and 
imperialist thinking”. In this way, they seek to discredit international media, 
regardless of the quality, accuracy, meaningfulness and public interest of a story. 
But the question is not only one of negative images of crisis or violence. As Fanon 
[1961](2004) reminds us, violence should be talked about precisely because it is 
constitutive of colonial and postcolonial power relations, both in their material and 
symbolic dimensions. The question then is how this violence is being presented, 
framed and discussed, and how it is discursively constructed in relation to other 
representations. Finally, the critique of Afro-pessimism as “negative portrayal” 
implies, and advocates for, more “positive images” as the desired imaginary 
horizon. However, in doing so, it dramatically narrows the potential to create 
different forms of meaning about the continent rather than opening it up in a more 
complex and multifarious fashion. 
 
Nonetheless, the concept of Afro-pessimism has potential. At its roots, the concept 
has an important and socially engaged ethos: to assess, and condemn, the 
reproduction of colonial and racist representations in the postcolonial era. In order 
to fill the gap of its underspecification while retaining the critical ethos of the 
concept, a clearer definition is necessary. First, this definition would need to draw 
both from the literature on Afro-pessimism per se and from the insights of the 
literature on Western media coverage of Africa – which often refers to Afro-
pessimism, although not systematically. This would allow understanding and 
characterising precisely the discursive nature of Afro-pessimism in news media.  
 
Secondly, this definition needs to be firmly grounded in a postcolonial perspective 
(Shome, 1998; Ahluwalia, 2001; Mbembe, 2001; Willems, 2015). Postcolonial 
here should not be understood merely as happening after colonialism, or, worse 
even, that colonialism, its system of knowledge and representation, and its power 
structures are things from the past. Instead, the concept of postcolonial “takes into 
account the historical realities of the European imperial incursions into the 
continent from the fifteenth century onwards” (Ahluwalia, 2001 p. 14). Thus, it 






context. This postcolonial approach holds that colonialism did not only affect 
countries under domination, but also the imagination and system of knowledge of 
the colonising countries (Fanon, 1952) and continues to do so. In that sense, the 
definition of Afro-pessimism that I will put forward in Chapter 2 anchors the 
concept in this postcolonial perspective that rejects the contemporary inscription of 
Africa’s difference within a hegemonic framework infused by a background of 
racism and Western domination. By taking seriously the phenomenon of Afro-
pessimism as a discursive formation – one that can be identified and deconstructed 





In this chapter I introduced the theoretical framework of critical/cultural and 
postcolonial studies in which this thesis operates. I introduced and defined the key 
concepts of representation, discourse and the ‘Other’, and explained how these 
tools can be used to study cultural artefacts and unpack the power relations that 
they contain. I then drew on this framework to trace the construction of an idea of 
Africa, a Western construct entangled in relationships of power and shaped by an 
historical background of institutional racism and domination. The colonial era in 
particular played a decisive role in shaping an image of Africa as the “Dark 
Continent”, an inverted mirror of Europe’s self image. In this colonial context, I 
also highlighted the key role played by journalists in mediating images of Africa 
and reproducing and sustaining such discourse. This discursive genealogy served to 
contextualise the discussion, in the last section, of the concept of Afro-pessimism. 
In spite of its increasing visibility in the last 20 years, especially to criticise 
Western media coverage of Africa, I argued that the concept lacks a clear 
definition. If the concept of Afro-pessimism is to be useful as a critical, 
postcolonial tool to guide research into media representation of Africa, it needs to 
be defined more clearly. In order to establish such a definition, I now turn to the 












This chapter brings in focus my discussion of representation of Africa and Afro-
pessimism by concentrating on Western news media coverage of Africa and news 
production. I proceed in three steps. Firstly, I provide a review of the literature on 
Western media coverage of Africa to identify the key features of this coverage. I 
draw on an extensive body of studies that use a variety of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Secondly, I turn to the specific context of journalism and 
news production in which this coverage occurs. I provide an overview of the key 
factors shaping this coverage. In the process, I introduce several analytical tools 
and approaches emerging from the field of journalism and news production studies, 
including gatekeeping, news values, commercialism, political economy and media 
imperialism. This section makes the argument that we ought to situate media texts 
in their context of production in order to understand how power relations shape 
media discourse. This process of reviewing the literature on Western media 
coverage of Africa is necessary in order to establish, in a third and final section, the 
definition and conceptualisation of Afro-pessimism that is subsequently used to 
answer my research questions in my empirical analyses. 
 
2.1 Features of news coverage  
 
In this first section, I review the existing literature on Western media coverage of 
Africa in order to establish what are the dominant features of this coverage. I 
respectively look at how much coverage Africa receives, what types of stories 
dominate the coverage and, finally, the language and images used in this coverage. 
2.1.1 Africa on the map of international news 
 
Several studies have captured quantitatively the first characteristic of Western 
coverage of African news. Larson (1984) analysed the news content of more than 
1000 US TV newscasts between 1972 and 1981, and he found that Africa 
accounted for 7% of the international content. A 1995 study mapped the flow of 






throughout 44 countries (Wu, 2004). Based on statistics of the research, I counted 
722 African news stories, which amounts to 1.67% of the total international 
coverage. Paik (1999) analysed the Wall Street Journal international news content 
between 1990 and 1992. The coverage of Africa represented only 3% of the 
foreign news coverage, whereas Europe and Asia received 37% and 24% 
respectively. Wilke et al. (2012) investigated the content of foreign coverage of TV 
news during four weeks of the year 2008 across 17 countries from five regions. 
When we focus the results on the six European countries included in the study, the 
coverage of Africa represent 4% of foreign news coverage, as opposed to 76% of 
the coverage focusing on other European countries or North America. Overall, 
their analysis shows that Africa (3%) is the least covered continent along with 
Australia/Oceania (3%), South America having 9%, the Middle East 18%, Asia 
19%, North America 23% and Europe 40% (Wilke et al., 2012 p. 309). The 3% of 
coverage are in stark contrast with the fact that Africa is home to about 15% of the 
world’s population. This scarcity of the coverage – also referred to as the “neglect 
of Africa” (Franks, 2010b) – is one of the key and most recurring features 
identified by the literature on Africa in Western news. 
 
It is not clear if Africa constitutes the most neglected continent in foreign news. A 
research by the Oxford Internet Institute found that between January 1979 and 
August 2013, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 13.4 million of stories as opposed 
to 60 million for North America and Europe combined, 32.6 million for Asia and 
23.5 million for the Middle East and North Africa (Graham & de Sabbata, 2013). 
Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for only 6.5 million, and Oceania 3.4 
million. In fact, if one were to add the countries from North Africa to those of sub-
Saharan Africa, the continent would register nearly as many events as the Middle 
East. The numbers provided by this study should be approached carefully because 
they do not represent the amount of coverage, but, rather, registered news events.11 
Nonetheless, they point to the fact that Africa may not be the most neglected 
continent.  
 
A study of 10 years of foreign coverage on three US TV channels shows that both 
Africa (6.7%) and Latin America (6.2%) receive the least coverage (Weaver et al., 
1984). De Beer (2010), for his part, explored UK, US and German TV news 
                                                      
11 These results are based on a catalogue of events derived from news stories published in 






coverage over the year 2008. He found that while Africa (10.8%) received 
significantly less coverage than Asia (25.5%), the Middle East (22%) and North 
America (21.4%), it nonetheless “received substantially more coverage than South 
America (1.9%)” (de Beer, 2010 p. 603). More recently, Hennig (2011) analysed 
the entire global news coverage of the Guardian’s news website for the years 2010, 
2011 and 2012. He then created maps to visualise the picture of the world created 
by the newspaper, where the size of each country is relative to the amount of 
coverage it receives. The 2010 map (Figure 1), like those of the subsequent years, 
shows that the media are far from providing a neutral window to the world. While 
the African continent is significantly shrunk down, this is also very much the case 
for Latin America. On the one hand, this suggests that the phenomenon of scarce 
coverage is not unique to Africa and that Africa may not be the continent the 
“most” marginalised by the media. On the other hand, all studies demonstrate a 
clear imbalance in that Western countries receive much more coverage than the 
rest of the world. In sum, the media provide a distorted window to the world where 
the amount of coverage is far from being relative to the size of the population of 
the world’s geographical area. 
 
Figure 1 - News coverage of the world on guardian.co.uk (Hennig, 2011) 
 
 
In addition, Hennig’s map also shows another feature of Africa’s coverage: the 
concentration on a handful of countries. In their analysis of the New York Times’ 
coverage of 18 southern African countries between 1960 and 1975, Charles et al. 
(1979 p. 151) found that “five nations – Angola, Kenya, South Africa, Rhodesia, 






69) analysed the regional distribution of African news in the Times. He found that 
74% of the overall coverage was focused on five countries (South Africa, Sudan, 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Libya). Domatob (1994) looked at the coverage of Africa in US 
news magazines between 1989 and 1991. His results show that 75% of the 
coverage emanated from South Africa alone, and that, except for a few articles on 
Kenya, the rest of the articles were concerned with “Africa in general” (Domatob, 
1994 p. 27). As a result, some 50 countries in the continent were not individually 
covered. Schraeder and Endless (1998) provide an analysis based on a much 
greater sample of articles (n=1168) published in the New York Times between 1955 
and 1995. Southern Africa dominates the coverage with 31% of all articles, and six 
countries account for 63% of the overall coverage (South Africa, Egypt, Congo-
Kinshasa, Algeria, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Nigeria) (Schraeder & Endless, 1998 p. 
31). In the British context, Brookes (1995) looked at the Daily Telegraph and the 
Guardian in 1990 and found that more than half of the coverage concentrated on 
only two countries, South Africa and Liberia.  
 
This trend continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s. A study on the British TV 
news coverage of the developing world found that “the African continent received 
proportionately much less coverage than the other areas” and that “less than half of 
the 52 African states/territories received any coverage at all” (Glasgow Media 
Group, 2000 p. 19). Looking at US TV between 2002 and 2004, Golan (2008 pp. 
49–50) found that “coverage of 22 nations accounted for more than 90 percent of 
overall coverage”, that five countries (Liberia, Egypt, Libya, South Africa, Kenya) 
made up more than 50% of the coverage and that 13 countries were not covered at 
all. Similarly, the results provided by the Oxford Internet Institute show that more 
than half of the stories about sub-Saharan Africa come from only six countries 
(Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda) (Graham & de 
Sabbata, 2013). 
 
Whether Africa is the most neglected geographical area in Western media or not, 
the existing literature shows that it has consistently been one of the most neglected 
and that the coverage has systematically reduced the coverage of Africa to a 








2.1.2 “Negativity” as the core value of African news 
 
Moreover, the few stories about African countries that appear in the news are 
selected in a specific way. The consensus in the literature is that the coverage has 
been found to focus on “negative stories” and to follow a “crisis-driven news 
agenda” (Lugo-Ocando & Malaolu, 2015 p. 86). Domatob (1994) found that crisis 
and disaster stories dominated the coverage of US news magazines, and Brookes 
(1994 p. 465) that “civil war, civil conflict, aid, human rights, politics, crime and 
disaster account for 92% and 96% of all news about Africa in the Daily Telegraph 
and the Guardian, respectively”. Schraeder and Endless (1998 p. 32) for their part 
established that some 73% of the articles published in the New York Times between 
1955 and 1995 communicated “negative” images of politics and societies, and that 
there had been an increase in “negative” news, from 67% in 1955 to 85% in 1995. 
Looking at the New York Times and The Washington Post coverage of Africa in 
2000, Biko et al. (2000) found that 84% of the stories were “negative” and that 
70% were about conflict and war. They conclude that: “judging from the 
disproportionate reporting of ‘negative’ news over ‘positive’ news, there is an 
imbalance in the reporting of news from the African continent” (Biko et al., 2000 
p. 4). Golan (2008 p. 53) also found that “the majority of stories about African 
nations focused on negative and highly deviant issues such as conflict and disasters 
both natural and human caused”. Similarly on British TV, the issues most 
frequently reported concerning Africa and the developing world appear to be 
related to conflict, war and terrorism (Glasgow Media Group, 2000). 
 
The Pew Research Center (2011) provides interesting findings to understand how 
scarcity and “negativity” interact in the coverage of Africa. Based on a 
comprehensive analysis of TV, newspapers, online news websites, cable news and 
radio news in the US, the study found that the top African news stories in 2011 
were all related to violence or conflict, and that they represented a minuscule 
fragment of the newshole: 0.17% for the East African famine, 0.07% for the Sudan 
conflict, 0.06% for the Ivory Coast conflict, 0.02% and 0.01% for violence in 
Nigeria and Somalia respectively. Taken together the five top African news stories 
(0.33%) do not even account for 0.4% of the newshole. These various findings 
concur to support the widespread claims in the literature that “some overselection 







However, there are several pitfalls in reducing the analysis of Africa’s coverage to 
a focus on “negative” news. Firstly, the phenomenon of “bad news” is not specific 
to Africa. De Beer (2010 p. 604) for instance found that the tone of news reports 
about Africa in Western media is mostly negative (54.1%) but that it is even more 
so for Central America (55.4%). Along with the adages “if it bleeds, it leads” or 
“no news is good news”, the idea of news more generally is crossed by a negativity 
bias. I discuss this aspect in relation to studies of “news values” in more depth in 
the second part of this chapter.  
 
Secondly, the existing evidence for such a “negative” focus may not be as strong as 
suggested by the widespread claims in the literature and may be a question of 
interpretation of the findings. Bosompra (1989) for instance found that 59.30% of 
the Times articles analysed contained a “negative direction”, as opposed to 26.75% 
and 13.95% of positive and neutral direction respectively. He concludes that this 
supports the critics’ contention that the “Western media tend to project a distorted 
image of Africa” (Bosompra, 1989 p. 68). Yet, one could also give another reading 
of these results and suggest that given the in-built tendency of news to focus on 
negative issues, these results may not be as compelling. Similarly, Lugo-Ocando 
and Malaolu (2015 p. 88) conclude that “Nigeria is predominantly portrayed 
negatively” on the basis that 58.9% of the articles link the country to crime, 
corruption and fraud, whereas “only” 41.4% link it to sport, democracy and 
infrastructure. Here again, a contradictory reading of these findings could be done. 
Furthermore, Scott (2009 p. 547) – also looking at the British press – reveals that, 
when we combine the main “negative topics” (civil war, civil conflict, aid and debt 
relief, terrorism, natural disasters, living conditions, health and disease, and human 
rights), they amount solely to 23% of the articles. He concludes: “coverage of 
Africa, in the UK press at least, is not as negative as is often assumed” (Scott, 2009 
p. 548). 
 
Thirdly, “negativity” is a fairly subjective criterion. For instance, in October 2014 
Burkina-Faso experienced a wave of demonstrations and riots in response to 
President Blaise Compaoré’s attempt to amend the constitution so as to run in yet 
another election. Most studies quoted previously would characterise this as 
“negative news” through categories such as “social unrest” or “political 
instability”. This popular uprising eventually led to Compaoré resigning from the 






transitional government. In another reading of the event, we can thus see it as an 
empowering and “positive” popular movement that succeeded in its demands for 
greater political accountability and democratisation.  
 
Finally, an exclusive focus on “negativity” risks sidetracking what constitute the 
most important and unique aspects of the coverage, namely, the language, images, 
rhetoric and narratives used. 
2.1.3 An “African” bias 
 
These decisive elements have to be assessed against the historical and cultural 
background detailed in Chapter 1. As Hawk (1992b p. 4) puts it: 
 
Unusual historical relations have shaped peculiar structures of 
knowledge regarding Africa. These repertories of knowledge, 
symbols, and a priori structuring of Africa are a Western creation 
(…) Cultural receptors among readers are different for African 
news. 
 
A plethora of studies have shown that Western media rely on a specific set of 
vocabulary, metaphors and explanatory frameworks when reporting on Africa, and 
that these contribute to creating a peculiar image grounded in a colonial vulgate 
(Fair, 1992; Hawk, 1992b; Fair, 1993; Brookes, 1995; Myers et al., 1996; 
Ogundimu & Fair, 1997; Wall, 1997; Allen & Seaton, 1999; Beattie et al., 1999; 
Moeller, 1999; Philo et al., 1999; Styan, 1999; Brijnath, 2007; Pontzeele, 2008; 
Kothari, 2010; Ibelema, 2014). In the reporting of conflicts, this has notably 
happened through the reliance on “tribalism” as an explanatory framework used 
specifically for Africans and not for Europeans (Mano, 2015 p. 7). In doing so, 
media coverage contributed to create a sense that conflicts in Africa are essentially 
different, that explaining them escapes the bounds of Western rationality: 
 
“Tribalism” invokes the primordial; it invokes the “uncivilized”, 
locating Africa in a time distant in evolutionary scale from “our” 
contemporary and modern time. “We” (the “non-tribal”) are not 
like “they” (the “tribal”). 
(Fair, 1993 p. 15) 
 
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 provides a particularly well-informed example of 
an event whose coverage relied on a “tribal” framework (Myers et al., 1996; Wall, 
1997; Karnik, 1998; Thompson, 2007; Pontzeele, 2008; Chari, 2010). The 






spurred by “ancestral ethnic and tribal hatred”. Presented as incomprehensible, it 
was “explained through comparison to Biblical myths, supernatural causes, natural 
disasters or diseases” (Wall, 1997 p. 121). In doing so, it simplified the complex 
colonial and postcolonial history and political context that led to the planning and 
unfolding of the crisis. In the process, it disengaged the past responsibilities of 
former colonial powers that established the racist framework that shaped tribal 
identities and ultimately gave birth to the conflict (Chrétien, 1997; Chrétien & 
Prunier, 2003). It also silenced the immediate responsibility of the French 
government of the time in arming and training many genocide perpetrators, and in 
eventually providing them an opportunity to flee the country under the guise of a 
late humanitarian intervention (Chrétien & Prunier, 2003).  
 
This tendency to reduce complex processes and political situations to simple 
narratives imbued with a colonial mindset has been identified in the context of 
many other events, from the reporting of the 1984 Ethiopian famine (Sorenson, 
1991; Franks, 2013) or violence in South Africa during apartheid (Brock, 1992) to 
the question of land in Zimbabwe (Willems, 2005; 2015) or the 2007/2008 post-
election violence in Kenya (Somerville, 2009). The reliance on colonial narratives 
extends beyond the reporting of war and conflicts. For instance, Brijnath (2007) 
analysed how TIME magazine represents sub-Saharan African women in its 
reporting of HIV. She found that their voices were marginalised in favour of 
“white heroes” and she identified “the recycling of colonial narratives in the AIDS 
discourse which perpetuates stereotypes of Africa as feminine, dark and diseased” 
(Brijnath, 2007 p. 384).  
 
In addition, the standards of what can be shown – or said – when it comes to Africa 
seem different from those applied to other parts of the world. The previous 
aforementioned studies show that during events such as the Ethiopian famine of 
1984, the reporting provided images whose unbearable violence are almost never 
given to see in other contexts, not because they do not exist but because they are 
treated with more decency (see also Myers et al., 1996; Chouliaraki, 2006; Sontag, 
2003; Campbell, 2012). As Sontag (2003 p. 56) puts it, “the more remote or exotic 
the place, the more likely we are to have full frontal views of the dead and dying”.  
 
In previous research (Nothias, 2014), I found a compelling example that highlights 






was invited on I-Télé (French 24-hour news channel) to discuss his vision of 
contemporary South Africa in relation to the hosting of the World Cup. After 
drawing an apocalyptic picture of the country (“it is a country in distress”), 
summoning the colonial trope of “darkness” (“South Africa’s situation is dark and 
going to get darker”) and eventually affirming that “Mandela did not do anything 
for South Africa”, Lugan went on to argue “I sing the praises of the Bantustan” 
(Ménard, 2010).12 Translated into a European context, this rhetoric amounts to 
saying for instance that Italy was better off under Mussolini than now. Though it 
might be true that, for instance, there was a lower rate of unemployment at the 
time, such a statement would be seen as sympathising with fascism. It would be 
considered a nostalgic account of a fascist regime, and therefore very shocking, 
eventually leading the TV presenter to intervene. Instead, the journalist sitting with 
Lugan did not comment on this particular statement and casually carried on with 
the interview. 
 
Different types of news events throughout Africa appear to be reduced to an 
Africa-specific system of linguistic, semiotic and symbolic references. For 
instance, metaphors and expressions such as “Dark continent”, “in darkest Africa”, 
“out of Africa” or “heart of Darkness” have been regularly observed in 
contemporary journalistic writing (Hawk, 1992b; Spurr, 1993; Brookes, 1995). 
These phrases directly refer to the colonial literature of the 19th century travellers 
and colonisers, and inscribe journalistic discourse in a clear historical discursive 
continuum where literary and journalistic styles collide. This process, as Fair (1993 
p. 5) perfectly puts it, shows how “‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ constantly reinforce each 
other in the construction of Africa and Africans as the undifferentiated ‘Other’”.  
 
As a result of the inscription of different news stories in a cohesive symbolic 
system of references specific to “Africa”, journalistic discourse reproduces a view 
of “Africa as a country”, as “a homogenous block with violence, helplessness, 
human rights abuses and lack of democracy as its main characteristics” (Brookes, 
1995 p. 465). There has been a tendency to relate an event located in one country 
to events happening in other ones, or even to relate it to the continent as a whole. 
Looking at the Rwandan crisis, Wall (1997 p. 131) found that it was also by virtue 
of portraying all the neighbouring countries as “just as chaotic and violent” that the 
coverage inscribed the event in a broader “African” framework. This process of 
                                                      






conflating from one country to “Africa” is perfectly played out in a 1977 TIME 
magazine cover presenting Idi Amin as “the wild man of Africa” (Figure 2). One 
man, in one country, metaphorically embodies the essence of the entire continent; 
an essence characterised here by a racist view of black Africans as wild, ultimately 
closer to nature, irrational, in other words essentially different and inferior.  
 
Figure 2 - TIME magazine cover (1977) 
 
 
Stereotypes, as defined and analysed in Chapter 1, constitute an integral part of this 
symbolic system. The literature provides various examples of coverage relying on 
racial stereotypes by assigning unambiguous and recurring roles to participants in 
news stories. These polarised representations range from black Africans as closer 
to nature, barbaric and/or helpless (Wall, 1997 p. 121) to that of benevolent and 
good willing Westerners. This phenomenon is best summarised in the satirical 
guide of Kenyan writer Wainaina on “How to write about Africa”:  
 
Your African characters may include naked warriors, loyal 
servants, diviners and seers, ancient wise men living in hermitic 
splendour. Or corrupt politicians, inept polygamous, travel-guides, 
and prostitutes you have slept with.  







In that context, a key discursive tool to assess how stereotyping occurs is to look at 
who holds the power to speak in a news story. Studies have regularly criticised the 
coverage for relying on Western sources and foreign interviewees over local ones 
(Higiro, 1988; Paterson, 1992; Fair, 1992; Paterson, 1996; Styan, 1999; Malaolu, 
2014). In her study of the coverage of US food aid in Africa between 1980 and 
1989, Fair (1992 p. 116) found that “of the 134 stories about US food aid sent to 
Africa, only a handful of stories used as sources the common person, Africans 
unconnected to governments or relief agencies”. Focusing on the reporting of the 
frontline states on US TV in the 1980s, Paterson (1996 p. 68) observed a similar 
tendency: “only 46 of 110 interviews appeared to be with black southern Africans. 
The remainder were with Americans, Europeans, white South Africans, and white 
Zimbabweans”. In the British context, Malaolu (2014 p. 31) found that over 10 
years of coverage of Nigeria in five British newspapers, only 28% of the sources 
were Nigerian while European/foreign sources make up 67%.13 These studies along 
with those of Higiro (1988) and Myers et al. (1996) concur in assessing this bias as 
one that discursively reinforces the view of a world where the authority to speak 
about and for Africa is located externally; a view that cements the discursive 
supremacy of a Western world presented as “stable and knowledgeable” as 
opposed to “a developing world in chaos” (Paterson, 1996 p. 63). 
 
There are two examples in the literature that suggests that local sources may be 
given more voice in the coverage than the previous studies suggest. In the coverage 
of the Rwandan genocide, Wall (1997 p. 125) found that there were nearly as many 
Rwandan sources (44%) as non-Rwandan (mainly Western) sources (48%). 
Looking at articles on sub-Saharan African in the Daily Telegraph and the 
Guardian, Brookes showed that “Western participants are not quoted more than 
African participants – who are given 30 per cent more word space” (Brookes, 1995 
p. 482).  
 
                                                      
13 Based on this finding, Malaoulu concludes: “Thus the preference for non-Nigerian 
sources ensures that the voices ringing out loud in the construction of Nigeria as news are 
those of foreigners whose perspectives are not only culturally at variance with Nigerians’, 
but mostly reflect the long-established precolonial and colonial construction of Nigeria” 
(Malaolu, 2014 p. 31). This statement calls our attention to the risk that exists in such 
analysis, that of essentialising European/foreign sources as voicing necessarily “long-
established precolonial and colonial construction”. It should be a cause of concern if the 
power to talk about Africa lies largely outside the continent, but we should not conclude 
that Western/European/foreign sources necessarily provide “precolonial and colonial” 






Both Wall and Brookes go further by looking at how these sources are presented 
and framed. Rwandans sources are mainly portrayed as passive (70%) and rarely as 
active in solving problems (7%), whereas non-Rwandans are overwhelmingly 
presented as solving problems (75%) and much less frequently as passive (19%) 
(Wall, 1997 p. 125). Similarly, Brookes provides several findings that warrant a 
more refined understanding of sources quoted. She found that the coverage 
provided a greater variety of Western participants. These were presented as more 
authoritative and truthful than African sources that were largely discredited, 
especially government representatives. This discredit takes different forms, for 
instance the use of expressive verbs such as “to claim” or “to allege” over more 
neutral verbs like “to say” often used for Western sources. The discredit can also 
be communicated by providing information that contradict statements by African 
leaders (either by offering contradicting facts, or by using past and contradicting 
quotes from the same source), by relying on Western sources to evaluate these 
statements or by using quotation marks as a “shock device” around parts of 
“exaggerated, boastful, illogical, unreasonable or tyrannical statements” (Brookes, 
1995 p. 483). In analysing not only who gets to speak but also how these 
individuals are framed, these studies highlight the subtle ways in which media 
discourse assigns stereotypical roles to local voices caught between villains – in 
Brookes – or helpless victims – in Wall. 
 
From the use of the vocabulary of “darkness” and “tribalism” to the presentation of 
Africa as a homogenous block or the overreliance on Western voices, the 
discursive nature of journalistic coverage suggests a specific bias in the reporting 
of Africa. Assuredly, the selectivity and negativity of the coverage contribute to 
limit the representational repertoire found in coverage. But I have shown that 
closer and more qualitative investigations of media content allow for a better 
understanding of how a colonial legacy is enacted in media discourse through 
metaphors, images, rhetoric and narratives. These features highlighted by the 
literature feeds into my conceptualisation of Afro-pessimism. However, before 
turning to this conceptualisation, I first engage with forces and production factors 









2.2 Forces shaping news coverage 
 
While the previous section provided a comprehensive account of the features of 
media content, this section focuses on the context of journalism production and the 
factors that contribute to shaping such coverage. This section is structured through 
the model of influences on media content developed by Shoemaker and Reese 
(1996). Shoemaker and Reese’s framework is grounded in a social constructivist 
approach to the study of news (see also Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979; Fishman, 
1980; Schlesinger, 1987). This theoretical approach is akin to the one of 
representation and discourse introduced in Chapter 1. It holds that a news item is 
not a reflection of reality but rather is the product of the interplay of routines, 
norms, values, organisational constraints and dominant ideologies that exist in a 
particular historical and social configuration.  
 
Shoemaker and Reese identified five key levels of influence on media content 
(Figure 3): 
 
- The individual level, which is concerned with the impact of factors such 
as education, age, gender, ethnicity, personal values and beliefs at the level 
of the individual media producer; 
 
- The media routine level, which focuses on the “patterned, routinized, 
repeated practices and forms that media workers use to do their jobs” 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996 p. 100); 
 
- The organisational level, where the emphasis is on the constraints 
imposed by organisations and on the collective processes involved in news 
production; 
 
- The extramedia level, where the focus is on sources of influences that are 
external to the media; 
 
- The ideological level, which is concerned with the influence of the set of 










Shoemaker and Reese see these influences as more or less constraining; with the 
individual level being the least constraining and the ideological level the most. This 
level approach does not mean that higher levels “eliminate the influence of the 
level below, but requires that we take it into account, that it sets certain boundaries 
within which other influences range” (Reese, 2007 p. 37). I now go through each of 
the first four levels of influences in the context of the reporting of Africa to flesh 
out key factors explaining the content analysed in the first section of the chapter. 
The ideological level overlaps with the issues of representation, discourse and 
power introduced in Chapter 1; it is therefore not discussed independently here. In 
the process of revealing factors shaping the coverage, I introduce a set of analytical 
tools and approaches emerging from the field of journalism and news production 
studies more broadly (gatekeeping, news values, commercialism, political 
economy, media imperialism). While there are other models of analysis of 
influences on media content, Shoemaker and Reese’s provide a very 
comprehensive framework that allows bringing together an eclectic body of 
research and perspectives.  
2.2.1 The individual level  
 
In the context of the US civil rights movement in the 1960s, the Kerner 
Commission (1968) provided a report that identified the mainstream media as a 
powerful source of racism. The report equated the lack of diversity in the 






looking out of it, if at all, with white men's eyes and white perspective" (Kerner 
Commission, 1968 p. 389). Looking at international news, the Macbride report 
(1980) came to a similar conclusion, i.e. that a Western bias in content could be 
correlated with the lack of non-Western individuals in news production. 
 
Applied to the context of Africa’s coverage, one could argue that the occupational 
field of foreign correspondence having being dominated by white Westerners is a 
strong factor. Long time Africa correspondent Bartholomäus Grill puts in clear 
terms the causality between a journalist’s background and her or his reporting: 
“You can only portray Africa and the Africans from a European perspective. You 
have no other" (Grill, 2003). It would notably explain why the coverage contains a 
racial bias such as the focus on the fate of white South Africans and Zimbabweans 
perceived as “kith and kin” (Gilroy, 2004 p. 114), the framing of stories around 
white protagonists or the reliance on white, Western sources. In addition, because 
foreign correspondents are “outsiders”, they do not necessarily have a good 
knowledge of local histories, cultures and languages, and often arrive with few 
local sources (Wall, 1997 p. 122). This is exacerbated in the case of parachute 
journalists “who have no particular knowledge or understanding of the continent 
and who therefore present the most conventional interpretation of events” 
(Marthoz, 2007 p. 225). In such instance, a journalist is more likely to rely on 
preconceptions that then lead to simplification and ultimately the reproduction of 
stereotypes brought from “home” (Hunter-Gault, 2006). Marthoz notes that even 
for correspondents who have a greater experience of travelling throughout the 
continent, these issues do not go away: 
 
Too few Western journalists have bothered to learn any African 
languages, though some, such as Swahili in East Africa or Pulaar 
in West Africa, are spoken by tens of millions of people. This lapse 
means that journalists are cut off from sources of information, 
opinions, and perspectives other than those given by ministry 
spokesmen, the UN, or the NGOs.  
(Marthoz, 2007 p. 227) 
 
Conversely, then, many studies advocate for the inclusion of more local journalists 
in the reporting as a way to alter biased coverage. What can be the impact of such 
changes at an individual level? In this regard, Bunce (2011; 2010) provides two 
very interesting analyses of the coverage of the conflict in Darfur in 2007 and the 
post-election violence in Kenya in 2007/2008. She conducted interviews with 






the New York Times, as well as an analysis of the content they produced. Out of the 
7 foreign correspondents whose content was analysed, 3 are Sudanese nationals, 
while 2 are British and 2 US American nationals. Bunce asked if there was a 
difference in the way local-national correspondents reported the story, as opposed 
to foreign-Western correspondents. She found that Sudanese nationals did not use 
more local sources in Darfur than Western correspondents. They relied more on the 
government of Sudan and tended to use fewer sources; the AFP Sudanese 
correspondent for instance wrote more than 50% of articles with only one source, 
nearly always the Sudanese government. She concludes that Sudanese 
correspondents working for international media were less likely to perform a 
watchdog role compared to Western foreign correspondents (Bunce, 2011 p. 29). 
 
In Kenya, Bunce (2010) conducted an ethnographic observation in the Reuters 
newsroom during the reporting of the post-election crisis of 2007-2008. She found 
that there were a lot of debates, and even clashes of values between local/national 
journalists and Western ones: “the Kenyan reporters felt that international 
journalists should be more selective and cautious with what they covered, and more 
reserved in the language they used” (Bunce, 2010 p. 523). This difference of 
opinions, however, had little impact on the content of the reporting as the editorial 
control remained in the hands of the Western bureau chief and deputy bureau chief. 
She concludes “that the dominance of Western views and ‘traditional’ news values 
in the newsroom continues without major challenge, not least because of the 
newswire’s pro-business orientation” (2010 p. 527). 
 
Bunce’s studies call our attention to three aspects. Firstly, there has been an 
increased involvement from local-nationals in the international news coverage of 
Africa at large (Bunce, 2015). The main providers of international news such as 
Reuters, AFP and the BBC currently operate a network of journalists that is much 
more diverse than it was just a decade ago. This means that Africa’s media image 
is no longer solely the work of outsiders but also increasingly that of local-national 
journalists (Bunce, 2015). Secondly, the Darfur study suggests that the individual 
characteristics of journalists may have an impact but perhaps not in the way that 
one would expect. In this particular case, the fact of being “local” did not seem to 
translate into coverage less selective in terms of sourcing. Finally, the Kenya study 
shows that while individual characteristics can impact how journalists perceive a 






professional values and organisational setting in which they operate. I now turn to 
these aspects. 
2.2.2 The media routine level 
 
Out of all events that happen everywhere in the world on a daily basis, only a few 
become news. Media producers make routine decisions that determine what events 
are selected. This process of gatekeeping was the focal point of an influential study 
by White (1950). He conducted research with a newspaper editor, “Mr Gates”, and 
tracked his decision making for a week to understand how the selection process 
occurred. He concluded that this process was “highly subjective (…) reliant on 
value-judgements based on the ‘gatekeeper’s own set of experiences, attitudes and 
expectations” (White, 1950 p. 65). White thus emphasised the agency of one 
individual to “make” the news. But as it became clear that news changes very little 
whomever the individual is, Galtung and Ruge (1965) developed the concept of 
“news value”. They hypothesised that journalists relied on a set of criterion – news 
values – to determine whether an event is newsworthy or not. The more criterions a 
story ticks, the more likely it is to become news. In addition, news values not only 
play a role in the selection process but also in the framing of stories by “suggesting 
what to emphasize, what to omit, and where to giver priority in the preparation of 
the items for presentation to the audience” (Golding & Elliott, 1979 p. 144).  
 
Galtung and Ruge focused specifically on international news and identified twelve 
news values. Out of these, three particularly shed light on the nature of the 
reporting of Africa as described by the literature: unambiguity, meaningfulness, 
and reference to something negative. Unambiguity holds that the simpler a story 
can be presented, the more likely it is to be newsworthy. This would explain the 
simplification at stake in the coverage and the reliance on simple explanatory 
frameworks such as “tribalism” in the case of conflicts. This is even more acute in 
the context of international news where journalists usually have little words or 
airtime. Meaningfulness can be defined as “cultural proximity” or ethnocentrism: 
the more an event involves people perceived as more like ‘us’ (the audience), the 
more it is likely to be of interest (see also Cottle, 2013). In the British context, this 
sheds light on the preference given to a country like Zimbabwe that is a former 
colony and home to a sizeable white population, and on the preference given to 
anglophone African countries over francophone ones. It would also explain that the 






protagonists perceived as more familiar to the audience. Finally, I have shown that 
negativity was one of the key features of the coverage (section 2.1.2). This feature, 
then, can be understood as part of the broader, taken for granted, perception by 
media professionals that news is bad news.  
 
These news values are summoned routinely, although not in a way that is clear and 
obvious to journalists themselves (Hall, 1973 p. 181). Instead, it is through the 
process of socialisation and professionalisation in the field – daily practices, 
training, editorial meetings, formal and informal exchanges with colleagues – that 
journalists develop a naturalised, but largely unspoken, sense of what “news is” 
and a certain way of seeing the world (Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979). In the 
reporting of Africa and foreign news more generally, an important socialisation 
process is “pack journalism”, the phenomenon “whereby individual journalists 
assigned by different news organizations to cover the news informally rely on each 
other to validate news judgment, and corroborate story angles and notes” (Fair, 
1993 p. 9). This phenomenon leads to group consensus among the “pack” and 
would explain, for instance, the relative homogeneity found in the coverage by 
previous studies, largely irrespective of the political alignment or editorial lines of 
different media outlets. 
2.2.3 The organisational level 
 
A news story is the result of a collective process involving translators, stringers, 
photographers, correspondents, sub-editors, regional editors, picture editors and 
editors. But not all individuals involved in the production have the same power to 
shape the end product. Editors in particular have more power to determine what 
becomes news. They have to ensure that a news item conforms to the values and 
priorities of the organisation. Several foreign correspondents in Africa have long 
complained about constraints imposed on them by editors to explain the selection 
and framing of news events in fairly homogenised and stereotypical ways. One 
U.S. network correspondent in Africa explains for instance: “In many of my 
stories, I used interviews with African experts… But [my bosses] would want a 
young American who was there on his first trip” (Kalter, 1986 in Paterson, 1996 p. 
62). The distance between the field and the office exacerbates these situations 
where the product goes through different, if not contradictory, intellectual 
processes. Kothari (2010 p. 220) notes in her study of the coverage of Darfur that 






amendments and interpretations being made to a story, because the journalist is 
unable to see the multiple revisions before publication”. 
 
In a largely and increasingly profit-driven news environment, commercial viability 
is a key consideration for news editors. They need to ensure that a story sells and 
that it outweighs its costs of production. In this light, the aforementioned quote by 
a US correspondent suggests that the emphasis on Western sources or actors is 
driven by the need to make it more familiar to the audience so as to ensure its 
commercial viability. The perception of “what the audience wants” is entirely 
naturalised in the newsroom and is often assessed through only one, commercial 
metric: sales, viewership or clicks. This rationale perfectly testifies to a production 
logic in which what interests the public overrides what is in the public interest; a 
logic that ultimately leads to reproducing what has worked previously and/or 
elsewhere, even if this means reproducing stereotypes. Anne-Cecile Robert, 
assistant editor for the French newspaper Le Monde Diplomatique, found this to be 
particularly acute in the reporting of Africa: “the race for profits leads to 
simplification” (Robert, 2011 p. 69). 
 
The fact that many outlets have one “Africa correspondent” is also a reflection of a 
costs maximising thinking. At the same time, the idea of the “Africa 
correspondent” contributes to a view that “Africa” can be treated as a single, 
homogenous block. In spite of the continent’s political, economic, linguistic, 
cultural, social, geographical and religious diversity, this idea of “Africa 
correspondent” assumes and, dialectically contributes to the view that a single 
individual is enough to make sense of the continent. In that sense, even long-term 
Africa correspondents are always at risk of being parachutists in their own 
specialised assignment.  
 
Several logistical factors exacerbate the need to minimise production costs. For a 
long time, one would have to go through Europe to travel between East and West 
Africa (Harrison & Palmer, 1986). In spite of significant improvements in airport 
infrastructures and an increase in air traffic, this still often remains the cheapest 
way to do so. Governments keen on keeping some of their actions out of the public 
eye have also caused troubles to journalists by preventing them from getting visas 
(Hunter-Gault, 2006 p. 13). There are also issues related to insurance and 






include the risks involved in reporting war and conflict, as well as those related to 
reporting terrorism, such as journalists being taken hostage and becoming targets. 
Marthoz notes:  
 
The number of “no-go” zones has multiplied. Though journalists 
were still able to visit rebel areas during the conflict in Biafra in 
1978, and during the wars of independence in Angola or 
Mozambique, this option is now practically impossible. The level 
of generalized insecurity, the cost of reporting and insurance, in 
addition to the desire of the armed groups to keep witnesses at a 
distance, all prohibit journalists from covering conflict in Africa.  
 
(Marthoz, 2007 p. 233) 
 
These working conditions have made reporting the continent increasingly 
expensive, while revenues for news media have significantly decreased. Fair (1993 
p. 8) estimates that, in the early 1990s, the cost of a foreign correspondent posted 
abroad had increased to between $250,000 and $500,000. Budget considerations 
and the application of market logic to news production (McManus, 1994) thus play 
an important role in shaping news coverage. This is particularly the case in foreign 
reporting where stories less expensive and perceived as more relevant to a Western 
audience will be given priority at the expense of a broader range of stories 
(Paterson, 2011). 
 
In return, this cost and benefit logic has made journalists even more reliant on 
external sources such as NGOs and the military: 
 
Confronted with the reticence and refusal of their editors in chief, 
brandishing the arguments of costs or lack of interest, a number of 
journalists became increasingly dependent on invitations from 
humanitarian organizations or national armies for their travels in 
Africa.  
(Marthoz, 2007 p. 231) 
 
Africa correspondent Tristan McConnell, while trying to minimise the 
phenomenon, recognises this to be a real issue driven by logistical considerations: 
 
Working this way is rare and while not ideal (for either journalists 
or readers) it is sometimes necessary, partly as a function of 
shrinking travel budgets and partly due to our calculation that any 
access is better than none.  
(McConnell, 2012) 
 
This reliance on external sources, then, can lead to framing stories in ways that 






observations, the French TV coverage of the French intervention in Mali in January 
2013 relied almost exclusively on images provided by the French military. As a 
result, the intervention was largely framed through the viewpoint of the French 
army. NGOs and aid agencies, for their part, have long capitalised on an image of 
Africa as violent, poor and in need of saving. Journalists relying on these agencies 
for access and to balance production costs are therefore at risk to provide coverage 
more sympathetic to these sources, and to the image they seek to benefit from 
(Franks, 2013; Wright, 2015).  
 
A perfect example of this process was the story that won the 2014 Amnesty media 
award for best “photo-journalism” story. Human Rights Watch initially paid for 
journalist Peter Bouckaert and photo-journalist Marcus Bleasdale to come and 
report on violence in the Central African Republic. The story then appeared in 
Foreign Policy a few days later, but without any attempt at foregrounding the 
association with Human Rights Watch. One month later, the story reappeared in 
the Telegraph Magazine without any reference to the Human Rights Watch 
affiliation. When Marcus Bleasdale won the award in the “photo-journalism” 
category for the publication in the Telegraph Magazine, this affiliation was again 
invisible. Unsurprisingly, the story was one of violence and horror that frontloaded 
linguistic and visual tropes of savagery all too familiar to Western audiences 
(“hellish”, machete-yielding mob), and ultimately, but silently, advanced the 
agenda of the agency (Figure 4). 
 
Finally, traditional media have increasingly relied on another source in the face of 
increased commercialism: news agencies. The current media landscape is 
dominated by three agencies with a global role and an incredible ability to set the 
agenda for international news, with 80% of global news provided by three 
agencies: AP, Reuters and AFP (Thussu, 2004 p. 51; Paterson, 2011). Because 
coverage of international news is costly, broadcasters and newspapers rely heavily 
on news agencies and journalists often churn out wires as articles (Davies, 2009). 
These agencies have established a monopoly in providing images of Africa 
(Paterson & Sreberny, 2004 p. 7). Paterson (1994) coined the joint metaphor of 
“gatekeeping concentration” to describe the increasing importance of a few editors 
working for Western news agencies to determine which stories from the African 






fewer people, in ever fewer organizations, deciding how Africa is to be seen by the 
rest of the World” (Paterson, 1994 pp. 16–18). 
 
Figure 4 - Bouckaert & Bleasdale's article on the Telegraph website (2014) 
 
 
Like their main clients, these agencies work on a commercial basis. Thus, news 
agencies provide stories deemed to be more newsworthy according to the set of 
news values of their Western clients; stories that are more accessible for a Western 
audience, visually appealing, negative and easily compressible for the format of 
TV news reports (Paterson, 1992 pp. 179–181). This market-based structure is 
confirmed by APTN news executive Nigel Baker who explains that “there is 
currently no revenue base there for the agencies, but coverage is provided of 
African stories of major world interest or of interest to the main agency markets” 
(quoted in Paterson, 2011 p. 39). Paterson’s ethnographic research provides a 
compelling example of how a commercial rationale feeds stereotypical 
representations. The Reuters Television newsroom in London received a report 
from an Africa bureau. But the visual of the story did not “fit” with their 






images of a traditional ceremony where a political rally was taking place with older 
images of Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi (Paterson, 2011 p. 38). With little or 
no revenue coming from African subscribers, news agency editors thus feel 
compelled to produce stories that will appeal to their Western clients, giving 
credence to the importance of Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) news values of proximity 
and meaningfulness. 
 
The commercial orientation of a media outlet, and its positioning on the media 
market significantly shapes its content and can thus contribute greatly to 
reproducing stereotypes. These organisational constraints override the values of 
individual journalists. This notably explains why greater diversity in production 
processes does not necessarily translate into radically different coverage (see the 
previously mentioned studies by Bunce, 2010; 2011). Looking at the US press and 
attempts at addressing racism in the newsroom, Drew found that these attempts did 
not lead to “long-term, sustained, and institutionalized change” (2010 p. 369). She 
contends that to undermine the racialisation of news in the US, the professional 
field would need to revise  
 
its emphasis placed on objectivity, urgency, and how the industry 
defines “newsworthy”. [Journalists] would need to contend with 
the market pressures of deadlines and competition, wherein news 
coverage about systemic social problems does not have the same 
appeal to consumers that the spectacle of “breaking news” has.  
 
(Drew, 2010 p. 370) 
 
Saha (2012) makes a similar argument regarding broadcasting programmes in the 
UK and the greater involvement of British Asians in production. For him, it is the 
ever more commercial culture of TV production – spurred by deregulation and 
market competition – that accounts for the reproduction of “problematic, reductive 
representations of race” (Saha, 2012 p. 424) in spite of greater diversity.  
2.2.4 The extramedia level 
 
In the previous section, I have started to discuss extra media level forces that 
impact media production at the organisational level (NGOs, governments, news 
agencies, market). In this section, I focus on the broader, more macro-level that 







The political economy approach to the media holds that the media are social 
institutions entangled, shaped and part of broader political and economic structures 
(Murdock & Golding, 1973). This approach finds its roots in a Marxist tradition, 
and its subsequent reading by Gramsci, where the economic base determines the 
superstructure (Williams, 2005). The greater the control of the means of production 
is, the greater is the power to shape cultural products and, through them, 
hegemonic discourse and ideological consensus (Herman & Chomsky, 2010). In 
the late 1970s, this political economy approach, combined with an anti-imperialist 
perspective, underpinned one of the most vocal and public criticism of 
international news: the NWICO debate. 
 
In its early days, foreign news was characterised by a commercial bias inextricably 
linked to the colonial expansion and the internationalisation of trade (Harris, 1981). 
Decades into the postcolonial era, international news was still concentrated in the 
West. This assessment of the structure of international news production led to 
heated debates about a New World Information and Communication Order 
(NWICO) (Masmoudi, 1979). This debate took place over nearly 10 years and 
notably finds its roots in the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1955, 
and the decolonisation movements in Africa and Asia. When Third World leaders 
and thinkers called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in Algiers in 
1973, they put at the forefront of the debates the idea of cultural imperialism: 
 
It is an established fact that the activities of imperialism are not 
confined solely to the political and economic fields, but also cover 
the cultural and social fields, thus imposing an alien ideological 
domination over the peoples of the developing world.  
 
(Jankowitsch & Sauvant, 1978 p. 226 in Roach, 1999 p. 94) 
 
Three years later in Tunis, the Non-Aligned media seminar called for a new 
international order in information. In a resolutely anti-imperialist perspective, it 
condemned firmly the ways in which imperialism infuses media and culture: “The 
colonialist, imperialist and racist powers have created effective means of 
information and communication which are conditioning the masses to the interests 
of these powers” (Information in the Non-Aligned Countries, 1976 p. 41). This 
culminated in the publication of a UNESCO report in 1980. The MacBride Report 
(1980) challenged the “free flow of information” position defended by Western 
countries. It forced them to engage politically with an issue that, within UNESCO, 






(Hamelink, 1999 p. 72). The report that summarised the key points of this debate 
was received with great hostility by the US and the UK; President Ronald Reagan 
and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher saw it as an attack on freedom of the press, 
and the two countries withdrew their membership from UNESCO in 1984 and 
1985 respectively. 
 
A key focus of the debate was the structure of international news and news flows, 
starting with the crucial observation that the system was geographically and 
economically concentrated in Western countries and in particular in Paris, New 
York and London (Boyd-Barrett, 1980; Sreberny-Mohammadi et al., 1985; van 
Ginneken, 2005). Tunisian information minister Mustapha Masmoudi – one of the 
figures that spearheaded the movement, together with the Director-General of 
UNESCO, Senegalese Amadou Mahtar M’Bow – noted: 
 
Information in the modern world is characterized by basic 
imbalances, reflecting the general imbalance that affects the 
international community... Almost 80 percent of the world news 
flow emanates from the major transnational agencies; however 
these devote only 20 to 30 percent of news coverage to the 
developing countries.  
(Masmoudi, 1979 p. 172) 
 
This hegemonic structure of the flow of information, it was argued, contributed to 
constructing a reductive and stereotypical image of Third World countries in the 
West.14 Moreover, this structural inequality also meant that Third World countries 
also relied heavily on Western agencies for news from abroad as well as from 
within the Third World. In a way, media could be seen as playing a role in the 
psychological phenomenon at the heart of Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Mask, 
namely the “internalization – or better still, the epidermalization – of inferiority”, 
where the colonised facing the gaze of the coloniser integrates the set of dominant 
colonial values (Fanon, 1967 p. 11). In this perspective, the structural inequality in 
international news production leads to a lack of attention to the “concerns and 
aspirations of the developing countries” and to an emphasis on “events whose 
significance, in certain cases, is limited or even non-existent” (Masmoudi, 1979 pp. 
173–174).  
 
                                                      
14 The Third World terminology is used here since it was the expression used during the 







This political economy/media imperialism approach highlighted that the nature of 
this coverage could therefore be explained at a macro-level. The deeply unequal 
structure of news production resulted from political and economic inequalities 
inherited from the colonial era; as a result, it favoured a very peculiar 
representation of the world subservient to Western political and economic interests. 
This way, representations of Africa, the structure of news production and the 
broader political economy are linked into an historical continuum of economic and 
cultural domination, from the colonial project (globalisation I) to the expansion of 
economic neoliberalism (globalisation II) (de B’béri & Louw, 2011 pp. 337–338). 
 
In this second section, I brought together an eclectic body of studies and 
approaches in journalism production studies. These shed light on various forces 
shaping Africa’s image in the news and provide additional insights into why media 
discourse is formed in ways that contribute to ‘Othering’ Africa. That being said, 
this research is primarily concerned with the discursive nature of the coverage. I 
therefore put the analytical emphasis on in-depth evaluation of the language and 
imagery across media texts. In order to assess the discursive nature of journalistic 
discourse, I rely on a conceptualisation of Afro-pessimism that I now turn to. 
 
2.3 Defining Afro-pessimism 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the concept of Afro-pessimism is dominantly used as a 
way to summarise the criticism made to Western media vis-à-vis their reporting on 
Africa. However, I also showed that the concept was undertheorised and 
underspecified. In particular, Afro-pessimism is too often equated with “bad news” 
from, or “negative images” of, Africa. I argued that a lack of clear definition 
created several risks including an inability to identify discursive changes and 
continuities in the reporting, an inability to identify drivers of changes and 
continuities in journalistic production, and even a risk to see the criticism of Afro-
pessimism being co-opted for political gain. In short, an underspecified concept of 
Afro-pessimism could lead research to fail to show precisely how, where and why a 
colonial representational legacy impacts journalistic discourse on Africa.  
 
In order to fill the gap of its underspecification while retaining the critical ethos of 
the concept, I argued that a clearer definition was necessary. I argued that to 






would need to draw both from the literature on Afro-pessimism per se and from the 
insights of the literature on Western media coverage of Africa. The definition that I 
now put forward is an attempt at providing a synthesis of these fairly disjointed, yet 
related, literatures. In linking these literatures, this conceptualisation of Afro-
pessimism therefore contributes to emerging postcolonial approaches to media and 
communication studies (Fürsich & Robins, 2002; Parameswaran, 2002; Shome & 
Hegde, 2002; Willems, 2015). 
 
Rather than providing a list of types of events or frames (such as “war”, “disease”, 
“violence”, “famine”…), or a list of stereotypes (“helpless victims”, “corrupted 
leader”, “violent rebels”…), I provide a typology of what I take to be the five core 
discursive features of Afro-pessimism; i.e. the key processes through which an 
Afro-pessimist discourse is constructed. While these features work in conjunction 
and often simultaneously, they can be separated for clarification and for analytical 
purpose.  
 
In addition, this typology allows moving beyond a simplistic negative/positive 
framework to a more refined and sharper understanding of what Afro-pessimism is. 
This conceptualisation will be operationalised in my empirical investigation. The 
clear definition will allow identifying what constitutes an Afro-pessimist discourse 
in journalistic coverage. To the extent that a media text reproduces these five 
features, it can be deemed Afro-pessimist. Importantly, a clear definition will also 
allow identifying coverage that is not Afro-pessimist. The task of this research, 
then, will be to show to what extent and how such an Afro-pessimist discourse is 
precisely enacted in media coverage through various linguistic, semiotic and 
rhetorical strategies.  
2.3.1 Homogenisation 
 
For Ahluwalia (2001 p. 133), Afro-pessimism has a “tendency to homogenize the 
‘African tragedy’, concluding that Africa has neither the political will nor the 
capacity to deal with its problems”. This reveals a key feature usually associated 
with Afro-pessimism, namely, that it is a discourse about Africa as a whole (de 
B’béri & Louw, 2011; Bassil, 2011). As such it implies a generalisation about the 
continent, which, more often than not, contributes to erasing the diversity of its 54 







That Afro-pessimism is a discourse about the continent as a whole does not mean 
that it cannot emerge in the coverage of a single African country. A compelling 
example of how this happens can be seen in the international media coverage 
leading to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (Nothias, 2014). Following a 
terrorist attack on the Togo team in Angola in January 2010, by a separatist group 
of the Cabinda exclave, international media turned to South Africa with worries 
that it possibly foreshadowed violence to come during the tournament. Interviewed 
by journalists, chief World Cup organiser Danny Jordaan responded: “If there is a 
war in Kosovo and a World Cup in Germany, no one asks if the World Cup can go 
on in Germany. Everyone understands the war in Kosovo is a war in Kosovo” 
(Myers & Smith, 2010). For Gumede (2010), this coverage revealed that “Western 
media too often see the whole continent of Africa as one country”. This example – 
in which a local event is related to Africa as a whole – highlights homogenisation 
as a core feature of Afro-pessimism (Berger, 2010; Hammett, 2011). 
2.3.2 Racialisation 
 
“African” as it is used in Western media, Hawk argues (1992b p. 7), does not really 
refer to people living on the continent as a geographical entity “but rather people 
who are black and live on the African continent. It is a colonial label. North 
Africans and descendants of European settlers are not included in the term”. This 
division of the continent along the skin colour of its inhabitants has been essential 
to the invention of the idea of Africa (Mudimbe, 1988; 1994) and to Afro-
pessimism (Bassil, 2011). As Mano (2015 p. 11) explains, “the categorisation of 
Africans according to skin colour was part of racial ideologies developed by white 
colonial settlers to give greater legitimacy to economic exploitation of different 
groups”. It is perhaps most visible in the light of the recent uprisings in Tunisia or 
Libya. They might take place on the African continent, yet the media refer to them 
as part of the “Arab spring” (despite Libya, in particular, being historically at the 
forefront of the African Union and continental pan-Africanism). The “fact of 
blackness” discussed by Fanon (1952) is therefore “tied to representations of 
‘Africa’ as the ‘Other’” (Fair, 1993 p. 6). This has led some to talk of Afro-
pessimism as a racialised phenomenon (Evans, 2011 p. 399). The racialisation at 






Africa to construct and fix its difference (Fair, 1993 p. 11), as articulated through 
expressions such as “black-on-black” or “tribal” violence. 
2.3.3 Selectivity 
 
Another feature of the Afro-pessimist discourse is that it is highly selective and 
partial. This selectivity takes many forms. For instance, the selectivity can be seen 
in the types of topics and issues that constitute what de Beer calls the Afro-
pessimist “codebook” that includes “famine, civil conflict and disputed 
elections”(de Beer, 2010 p. 598). In other words, it is selective because it focuses 
only and iteratively on certain aspects of lived experiences in Africa (Momoh, 
2003 p. 34). It is also selective in the way it makes sense of these experiences, for 
instance by relying on “tribal” or exclusively ethnic explanations of complex 
political situations, and by using simple, unambiguous, ethnocentric explanatory 
frameworks, or what Dunn calls “the ‘emplotment’ of Africa and Africans within 
specific Western-scripted narratives” (Dunn, 2004 p. 485). The selective dimension 
of Afro-pessimism is similarly at stake in the way the discourse controls who holds 
the authority to talk, and how it tends to silence certain voices and/or assign them 
disempowering and stereotypical roles (Brookes, 1995; Wall, 1997). This feature is 
particularly entrenched with the nature of the news production process that always 
involves elements of selection. As such, this selection process is not unique to 
Afro-pessimism but it operates alongside and together with other discursive 
features to ideologically construct Afro-pessimism. In that sense, the ways the 
Afro-pessimist discourse homogenises (feature 1) and assigns racial meanings 
(feature 2) also testify to the highly selective nature of this discourse (feature 3), 
just like the reliance on a ranking framework (feature 4) and the projection of 
Africa into the future (feature 5) that I now turn to. 
2.3.4 Ranking framework 
 
Garret and Schmitt (2011) conceptualise Afro-pessimism in a broader context of 
neoliberal politics and a narrative of progress emerging from the development 
literature. In this global narrative, the African continent is presented as unable to 
put itself on the track of progress and to live up to its postcolonial expectations 
(Schmidt & Garrett, 2011 p. 425). This echoes the 19th century racist theories of 
civilisations and history (Hegel 1861; Renan 1882), as well as their contemporary 






argument (1992) that Western liberal democracies constitute the final stage in the 
narrative of progress (Momoh, 2003 p. 51). Put into this broader framework of 
progress, Afro-pessimism appears as deriving from a discourse of measurement 
standard, which assesses the failures of the continent against standards established 
in and by the West; it fixes “Africa and Africans in a specific reading of space and 
time within an evolutionary narrative dictated by Western/modernist values of the 
individual and the market” (Dunn, 2004 p. 489). Afro-pessimism thus constitutes a 
ranking framework concerned with Africa’s progress in terms of Westernised 
development or rather, “the disappointment of that promise” (Spurr, 1993 p. 19). 
2.3.5 Prediction 
 
The last feature of Afro-pessimism is its ability to make predictions and project 
Africa into the future (Ahluwalia, 2001 p. 133; Momoh, 2003 p. 34). It is what 
“pessimism” stands for in Afro-pessimism. Evans, in her study of Afro-pessimism 
online among white South Africans expatriates, identified projections in the future 
as key to their Afro-pessimism: 
 
Online expatriate responses to events in South Africa perpetuate 
this [Afro-pessimist] thinking to varying degrees, with openly 
racist declarations and fantasies of recolonisation sitting at the 
extreme of the continuum, and predictions about the country’s 
decline and apologetic speculations about the benefits of apartheid 
situated further along the scale.  
(Evans, 2011 p. 400) 
 
From the belief in recolonisation to feelings of bitterness and renunciation, Evans 
research points to active predictions of a dark future as a key component of Afro-
pessimism – a features that, again, echoes strongly colonial myth of Africa as the 
“Dark Continent” (Mudimbe, 1988; Bassil, 2011). By predicting a bleak future, 
this discourse not only works upstream – in its interpretation of the past and the 
present – but also works downstream by actively promising that things cannot get 
better or will get worse, in a determinist fashion (Ahluwalia, 2001 p. 133). In that 
sense, it continues the legacy of imperial discourse that “carries with it a 
prescription for change that must be conveyed with self-confidence and certainty” 








In summary, Afro-pessimism as a discourse is a system of knowledge and 
representation of Africa that regulates its geography, history, identity, societies, its 
past, present and future through five key features that work in conjunction: 
1) It is a discourse that homogenises Africa; 
2) It is a racialised discourse which assigns particular racial meanings; 
3) It is highly selective and partial; 
4) It relies on a ranking framework through which the continent’s progress is 
assessed against criteria set by the West; 
5) It involves an element of prediction and projection into the future. 
 
While the definition that I put forward provides a comprehensive way to apprehend 
the phenomenon, it is the task of empirical investigation to unravel the different 
ways in which these features are activated in media discourse, through language, 




This chapter achieved three tasks. I reviewed the literature on Western media 
coverage of Africa. It established that the coverage was scarce and generally 
focused on a few countries and on “negative” stories. More importantly, it 
demonstrated that the coverage contains a set of linguistic, semiotic and rhetorical 
components that construct a specific image of Africa grounded in a colonial 
representational legacy. I then turned to the context of news and journalism 
production in which these representational processes occur. I drew on Shoemaker 
and Reese’s model of influence on media content to introduce an eclectic body of 
research that contributes to refining our understanding of the forces shaping such 
an image. Finally, I drew on the input from the existing studies of Western media 
coverage of Africa, and combined it with existing studies on Afro-pessimism per se 
to establish a clear conceptualisation of Afro-pessimism as a discourse. I identified 
five key discursive features and I argued that this conceptual clarification allows 
establishing whether journalistic coverage can be deemed Afro-pessimist. Whether 
and how these features manifest themselves precisely in journalistic discourse will 
be assessed through my empirical investigation of media content in Chapters 4, 5 
and 6. Before entering this investigation, I turn to the methodological approach and 
tools used to investigate Afro-pessimism in British and French print media and to 






CHAPTER 3 - Methodology 
 
 
This chapter introduces the methodological approach used in this research, Critical 
Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA). I first provide a discussion of CDA and of 
its key epistemological features, namely the emphasis on text, discourse, context 
and power. I stress the importance of accounting for the production context of 
media texts as a way to gain a deeper understanding of the formation of media 
discourses and of the power relations shaping them. I also introduce the 
multimodal dimension of the project, i.e. the attention to not only the linguistic but 
also visual components of media discourse. Finally, I argue that CDA constitutes 
both a theoretical and methodological framework ideally suited to answer my 
research questions at the crossroads of the different approaches introduced in 
Chapters 1 and 2, namely critical/cultural media studies, postcolonial studies and 
journalism production studies.  
 
I then turn to the practical aspects involved in designing the research. I introduce 
the rationale for the research focus and for the selection of the two sites of analysis. 
I explain the process of data gathering and I map out the various empirical tools 
used to answer my research questions in the context of each site. I use a mix of 
tools including quantitative content analysis, qualitative discourse analysis, 
multimodal discourse analysis, semi-structured interviews with foreign 
correspondents and questionnaires with media professionals. The last section 
discusses additional methodological thoughts regarding translation and the use of 
Twitter as a research tool. 
 
3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis 
3.1.1 Text and power 
 
I use a methodological approach rooted in CDA, which combines micro-analyses 
of textual data with a broader understanding of their context of production and of 
the power relations shaping media discourse. CDA has become particularly well 
established as a critical/cultural approach to the study of communication (van Dijk, 
1993b; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough & Wodak, 2004; Machin & 






reproduces power relations (Fairclough & Wodak, 2004 p. 357; Tonkiss, 2004 p. 
373). By qualitatively looking at media texts, CDA aims to deconstruct the latent 
meanings and underlying assumptions contained in texts. It puts the emphasis on 
paying close attention to how things are said, and why (what kind of ideological 
purpose a discourse serves) rather than to only what is said (as can be the case in 
descriptive content analysis) (Machin & Mayr, 2012 p. 5). In particular, CDA has 
been concerned with the role of discourse in reproducing dominant ideologies, with 
dominance here being understood as “the exercise of social power by elites, 
institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, 
class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality” (van Dijk, 1993b p. 249). This 
hegemonic view of society does not assume a direct top-down model, but it 
“recognizes that the distribution of power in society is paralleled by the distribution 
of meanings in texts, and that struggle for social power are paralleled by semiotic 
struggle for meanings” (Fiske, 1989 p. 98). It does not imply that the reception of 
these texts is fixed; but it tries to show how dominant discourses precisely try to fix 
a certain meaning and worldview in texts. 
 
Over the years, CDA scholars have developed tools to systematically analyse the 
linguistic components of media texts, for instance, by looking at who gets to speak 
about certain topics (and who does not), at the lexical fields used to discuss certain 
issues, at the ways in which certain concepts are taken for granted 
(presuppositions), at the use of figure of speeches (metaphor, hyperbole, 
metonymy, synecdoche) and at silences in texts (what is not being said and why) 
(Machin & Mayr, 2012). Most early versions of CDA – which emerged in the field 
of critical linguistics – sidetracked other components involved in the construction 
of meaning in texts, in particular visual ones. This shortcoming has been addressed 
by integrating a multimodal dimension developed in the field of social semiotics, 
which stresses how visual components communicate along, and together with, 
linguistic components (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996; 2001; 2006; Kress, 2010). In 
this context, a multimodal CDA of visual texts can investigate:  
- The setting and objects depicted and the connotations behind them;  
- The most salient components of an image;  
- The gaze of a person represented and the way the viewer’s gaze is positioned in 
relation to the image;  







- The choice of a particular angle, and visual metaphors; 
- The composition of an image (Machin & Mayr, 2012). 
 
In other words, a multimodal approach calls for integrating how different modes of 
communication work together to construct meaning and discourse in texts. My 
research therefore integrates a multimodal component as way to account for the 
textual richness of journalistic discourse on Africa. 
 
In sum, CDA is primarily a form of qualitative textual analysis that seeks to 
deconstruct media texts so as to explain how power relations are enacted in media 
discourse (Machin & Mayr, 2012 p. 5). Fürsich summarises several reasons that 
warrant a specific analytical focus on text as “a distinctive discursive moment 
between encoding and decoding that justifies special scholarly engagement” 
(Fürsich, 2009 p. 238). Textual analysis makes several central contributions to the 
understanding of communication, including: unpacking the range of meaning 
possibilities contained in a text and its ideological potential; understanding the 
historical evolution of discourse; interpreting the mediated reality constructed in 
media texts and “[what] versions of reality are available in a given media text” 
(Fürsich, 2009 p. 245); and explaining “which cultural sensibilities prevail that 
allow for such a text at this specific point in time” (Fürsich, 2009 p. 247). 
3.1.2 Text and context of production 
 
Although CDA principally offers an in-depth analysis of media texts, it holds that 
discourses are constructed in specific social and historical contexts that the analysis 
needs to integrate. News in particular is constructed in a very peculiar context and 
has its own goals, ethics and professional practices and cannot therefore be 
analysed like any other texts (Richardson, 2008). However, CDA-inspired research 
can fail to integrate contextual components and this has led to sharp criticisms 
(Widdowson, 2004; Philo, 2007). It has been particularly criticised for not 
discussing enough with producers and thus reading too much out of the text. In 
discussing the work of van Dijk and Fairclough, Widdowson argues that: 
 
over and over again (...) there is the insistence that you cannot read 
significance straight off from the text, but that it is a matter of 
relating texts to their conditions of production and consumption. 
But what they say is not what they do.  







In practice, he argues, these contextual elements of production or consumption are 
largely missing from most CDA studies. A notable risk of this structuralist 
tendency is to attribute an intention to the producers of texts, without consulting 
them or investigating the ways media texts come about. Although this criticism 
was made more than 10 years ago, it is still a challenge for the current generation 
of CDA analysts. This is visible for instance in the recent multimodal CDA 
framework developed by Machin and Mayr (2012). Their approach is based on the 
idea of “semiotic choices”: 
 
The communicator always has a range of semiotic choices 
available to them when they wish to represent a person. The 
choices they make will never be neutral but will be based on the 
way they wish to signpost what kind of person they are 
representing, or how they wish to represent them as social actors 
engaged in action.  
(Machin & Mayr, 2012 p. 103) 
 
On the one hand, this idea of semiotic choice stresses the importance of the use of 
specific words, narratives, images and rhetorical devices that make up a text. On 
the other hand, it also attributes to the producers of these texts an intention. This 
approach takes for granted that the choice of a word or image reflects the 
ideological intention of its producer. There is a risk, then, to wrongfully assign 
intentionality, to miss on the collective processes involved in constructing media 
texts and to fail to capture the range of contextual factors – sometimes 
contradictory ones – leading to these semiotic choices. Ultimately, this can 
contribute to missing out on key forces that shape media discourse.  
 
In order to overcome this difficulty, some have argued for more systematic 
investigations of media producers and of their working condition. Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough (1999 pp. 61–62) go as far as to argue for the “the systematic presence 
of the researcher in the context of practice under study” as a way to dig deeper into 
“the beliefs, values and desires of [the] participants”. For Machin and Mayr (2012 
p. 217), it is crucial to do so when analysing newspaper discourses, for instance by 
conducting interviews with media professionals. There is now an uptake for 
grounding CDA of media texts in their context of production through interviews as 
found in the work of Machin and Mayr (2007), Machin and Niblock (2008) and 







I adopt a similar approach. I do not aim to research journalistic production per se, 
but I integrate contextual information to ground my textual analysis in a broader 
understanding of news production. I do so by engaging with media producers 
through interviews and questionnaires, as well as by grounding the analysis in 
existing studies of foreign news production (Chapter 2). By focusing on texts and 
linking them with broader professional practices, values and ideology of 
production, I will therefore examine how discourses construct and convey 
meanings that enact power relations, while suggesting contextual explanations as to 
why they appear. Although this methodology does not exhaust the complex ways 
in which discourses circulate from production to reception, it will provide solid 
evidence of how discourses are enacted in media texts and some explanations as to 
why. In doing so, I make a contribution to the literature on media representation of 
Africa that has dominantly fallen short of combining textual analysis and original 
analysis of production. According to Scott (2015 p. 11), 80% of all studies on 
representation of Africa in the US and the UK focus on media content alone. Only 
a few combine text and context of production by producing original empirical data 
at both levels, in particular through interviews with correspondents; and many of 
these do so by relying on a very small amount of production-oriented data. The 
methodology that I adopt therefore contributes to filling this gap. 
3.1.3 A theoretical and methodological framework 
 
Because of its emphasis on text, power relations and context of production, this 
CDA approach provides the perfect methodological framework to answer the three 
research questions addressed in my empirical analyses: 
 
• Text: What is the nature of media discourse on Africa? Is it really Afro-
pessimist and if so, in what sense? (Research question 2) 
 
• Power: Are mythical representations enduring, evolving or disappearing, 
and what are the forces and power relations driving these evolutions and/or 
continuities? (Research question 3) 
 
• Context: To what extent does the context of news production explain the 
formation of media discourse? What is the interplay between the processes 
of journalistic production and the formation of postcolonial discourse(s) on 







In the remainder of this chapter, I will turn to the design of the empirical analysis 
and the analytical tools used to answer these questions. The subsequent sections 
therefore constitute a sort of audit trail of the research design and process. 
However, it is important to note here that CDA constitutes as much a 
methodological framework as a theoretical one. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough 
(1999 p. 16) highlight, CDA implies working across disciplines and putting them 
in dialogue. In the context of this research, the key epistemological features of 
CDA outlined above relate to different aspects of the intersecting literatures 
introduced in previous chapters. As I use it here, CDA is also the integrated 
theoretical framework through which my analysis brings the different intellectual 
traditions introduced in Chapters 1 and 2 – namely critical/cultural studies, 
postcolonial studies and journalism studies – to reflect on the data and the 
phenomenon of Afro-pessimism. The concept of Afro-pessimism as defined in 
Chapter 2 is therefore the analytical interface between, on the one hand, 
critical/cultural and postcolonial approaches, and, on the other hand, the more 
empirical approaches of news production research. This conceptualisation of Afro-
pessimism creates a connection in the direction of these different literatures and 
allows “connecting the level of text or discourse analysis with sociological 
positions on institutions, actions and social structures” (Weiss & Wodak, 2003 p. 
8). 
 
3.2 Research design 
 
This section provides the rationale for choosing a comparative approach between 
France and the UK and for studying broadsheet newspapers and magazines. I then 
turn to the sites of analysis and why they were selected. 
3.2.1 Rationale 
 
Why France and the UK? 
 
This research is grounded in a postcolonial perspective that explores the remnants 
of colonial past, the spectres that keep haunting contemporary memory and 
imagination (Mbembe, 2001). I thus look at the way former colonial empires cope 






past representations. When it comes to colonial history, France and Britain are two 
major former colonial empires, especially in Africa. The two former empires have 
kept strong links with their former colonies after independence, be it through 
immigration, language, politics or ongoing economic interests. For this reason, 
France and Britain are – among the former European colonial empires – two of the 
most interesting cases. In addition, adopting a comparative approach is a fruitful 
way to assess both similarities and differences across local contexts; it can help 
identify more clearly what is taken for granted in a given culture. Finally, while 
there are many studies of UK coverage, there are only a few studies of French 
media coverage. A correlative of this anglophone bias is that the coverage of 
francophone countries is rarely studied (Scott, 2015 p. 11). My comparative 
approach thus contributes to filling these two gaps. 
 
Why study news media? 
 
Richardson (2008) notes that news texts cannot be analysed like any other texts in 
particular because of their function in society. As Nimmo and Combs (1992 p. xv) 
explain: “historically, the mass media were heralded as the ultimate instruments of 
democracy (…) [They] were destined to unite, educate and as a result to improve 
the actions and decisions of polity”. News media are traditionally seen as an 
essential tool in a healthy liberal democracy, fulfilling roles of information 
providers, watchdogs and Fourth Estate (Curran, 2000; McNair, 2009; Hearns-
Branaman, 2011). Yet, the literature (see Chapter 2) suggests that Western news 
media have overall failed to the task of reporting the African continent in a way 
that contributes to the reduction of racist perceptions. 
 
Assuredly, news media cannot be blamed for being solely responsible, since myths 
and stereotypes are deeply embedded in culture. Here one can notably think of the 
contribution of humanitarian agencies (Chouliaraki, 2006; Campbell, 2012), 
advertising (Ramamurthy, 2003), film (Evans & Glenn, 2010) and literature 
(Fabian, 2012). However, precisely because news media are supposed to fulfil a 
democratic function in society, they should be held accountable for the discourses 
they construct and convey. In addition, and as opposed to fictional genres, the news 
media make stronger claims of representing ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. In fact, and in the 
same way that philosopher John Rawls (1971) argued that you can assess the 






we can gauge the quality of our news media by assessing the way they report on 
disadvantaged groups, be it ethnic and religious minorities, working class, or 
habitants from distant and poorer countries. We should care about the way news 
media report on Africa since this tells us something about their quality and the 
extent to which they live up to the expectations of media fulfilling a democratic 
role in liberal societies (McNair, 2009).  
 
Why study broadsheet print media? 
 
As Scott notes, newspapers have “several distinctive features which make them 
particularly influential sources of information” (2009 p. 535). These include a 
greater contribution to political knowledge of audiences and the capacity to 
communicate more context and complexity due to the ability to fit more words in 
an article than in a TV item. According to a research by Harvey (2008) quoted in 
Scott (2009 p. 535), 41% of people in the UK state that they get their knowledge of 
“poor countries” from newspapers. Even in the digital context, traditional news – 
including newspapers and news magazines – still dominate the online news market 
in France and the UK. In the UK and France respectively, 87% and 74% of the 
people use traditional news brands online, as opposed to 32% and 38% for 
aggregators, and to 31% and 30% for social media and blogs (Newman & Levy, 
2013). This report also shows a particular resilience of French newspapers and 
magazines in the digital context: 6 out of the 12 top French online news brands are 
newspapers or magazines, with three newspapers leading this ranking. 
 
There are three further reasons that underpin my focus on broadsheet print media. 
Firstly, this choice is grounded both in a CDA tradition concerned with elite 
discourse and racism (van Dijk, 1991; van Dijk, 1993a) and in theories of agenda 
setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). These approaches hold that the view of elites 
and socially advantaged groups – including for instance politicians, investors and 
businessmen, journalists, academics and intellectuals – play a stronger role in 
framing public consensus on political, social and economic issues as well as 
decision making. The CDA tradition in elite discourse and racism, for instance, 
sought to understand how the issue of immigration is framed in the European 
broadsheet press, and how this links to the reinforcement of racism and to the 
promotion of reactionary immigration policies (van Dijk, 1993a). Because CDA 






approach to knowledge formation (Fairclough & Wodak, 2004 p. 365). This 
explains why CDA scholars have put an emphasis on studying social inequalities, 
elite ideologies and issues related to identity formation such as nationalism, racism 
and classism. In that sense, CDA shares an affiliation with the politically 
committed and interventionist form of research found in cultural and postcolonial 
studies. By drawing on these literatures, I inscribe my research in a similar 
politically committed, anti-essentialist and anti-racist approach. This socially 
situated approach drives the focus on broadsheet print media as a way to “look up” 
to the discourse of socially advantaged groups. 
 
Secondly, the broadsheet press remains a point of reference and authority within 
the journalistic industry. A position as a foreign correspondent in a newspaper like 
Le Monde or the Times carries a prestige that many journalists see as epitomising 
the “best of” journalism. It is not uncommon for journalists working for broadsheet 
print media to be invited on TV and radio shows to provide expert opinions. 
Similarly, it is frequent for other media to rely on what was written in broadsheet 
papers, for instance through press reviews. In other words, this section of the media 
has a discursive impact in the journalistic field that extends beyond the immediate 
context of their home media.  
 
Finally, a recurring argument in the debate on Afro-pessimism is that the portrayal 
of Africa in the news has a detrimental impact on the continent’s economic 
development. According to Schorr (2011), Afro-pessimism contributes to 
perceptions of political risk and provides an explanation as to why, for instance, 
FDI in some African countries do not reflect the countries’ economic 
competitiveness. She argues that the news media are a key factor in this perception 
gap: “the news and media sources, to which investors look to be informed, are 
biased and woefully inaccurate in their portrayals of Africa” (Schorr, 2011 p. 56). 
While I do not focus on the niche of business/financial media, many of the 
broadsheet newspapers and news magazines included in this research constitute 
part of the news diet of the business audience. They therefore contribute to 
perceptions of Africa among these circles. For all these reasons, the broadsheet 
print media are perfectly suited to an investigation into the state and discursive 







3.2.2 Selection of sites 
 
Site 1: The 50th anniversaries of independence 
 
Between 1957 and 1962, 24 African countries gained their independence from 
colonial powers; 15 were French colonies and 7 British colonies (see Appendix I 
for a full list). Between 2007 and 2012, these countries celebrated their 50 years of 
independence. The debates surrounding these anniversaries offer a particularly 
interesting vantage point to explore the issue of Afro-pessimism; it is a moment 
where the postcolonial past and present are assessed, and the future possibly 
predicted. Afro-pessimism can partly be seen as the expression of a disappointment 
that followed, and contrasted with, the optimism of the independence period (see 
section 1.3.1); and these anniversaries constitute an invitation to look back on, and 
take stock of, this period and what has been achieved. Given that a key feature of 
the Afro-pessimist discourse is the emphasis on assessing Africa’s “progress” 
(feature 4, ranking framework), the coverage of these anniversaries could provide a 
fertile ground for an Afro-pessimist discourse to flourish.  
 
Site 2: News magazine covers on Africa 
 
A cover is the most salient feature of a news magazine. It is the first piece of 
information that a reader encounters. It is as much a sales argument as it is an 
editorial statement frontloading the main news of the week or the month. Magazine 
covers also constitute rich, multimodal texts. When the Economist published in 
2011 a cover on Africa with the title “A hopeful continent”, many saw this as a 
sign that a new narrative about Africa was emerging. Taking this cover as a starting 
point and ending in January 2015, I focus on news magazine covers that were 
dedicated to continental Africa. In doing so, I will empirically assess, using my 
typology of five discursive features, to what extent Afro-pessimism constitutes the 
dominant discourse about Africa as a whole in British and French news magazines 
covers between 2011 and 2015. 
 
Rationale for the selection of sites  
 
The selection of these two sites was driven, on the one hand, by the definition of 






assessment of the limitations of the current literature. The majority of existing 
studies tend to focus on the coverage of one African country and from this they 
conclude that it is representative of how “Africa” is covered. This is not necessarily 
problematic if putting together all these studies could give us insights into how 
most African countries are covered. However, the countries analysed are often the 
same. Scott found that six countries – South Africa, Rwanda, Sudan, Kenya, Sierra 
Leone and Somalia – make up 55% of all studies (Scott, 2015 p. 13). He also notes 
“the relative absence of studies of coverage of francophone African countries” and 
that “28 countries were not the subject of any analysis at all” (Scott, 2015 pp. 13–
14).15 As such, the literature is far from providing strong insights into how Africa is 
covered, but rather how the coverage of a few countries relate to the social 
construction of a broader idea of Africa. Because a key feature of the Afro-
pessimist discourse is to claim an authority over the knowledge of Africa as a 
whole, I have therefore chosen two sites of analysis with a continental dimension. 
Site 2 focuses on media coverage of continental Africa. Site 1 includes 24 
countries, which will allow me to draw broader conclusions more confidently. In 
addition, site 1 includes 15 francophone countries and thus contributes to the 
knowledge of the coverage of francophone Africa. 
 
Scott also remarks a narrow focus on specific events and most notably the 1984 
Ethiopian famine, the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the Darfur crisis between 2003 
and 2009. There seems to have been a tendency to focus on events that fit with the 
preconception of what researchers want to find. Scott (2015 p. 3) gives the example 
of Moeller (1999) who focused on four case studies precisely “because they 
correspond with ‘the crises represented by the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse – 
pestilence, famine, death/assassination and war/genocide’” (Moeller, 1999 p. 4). 
On the contrary, site 1 falls outside an expected focus on war and crisis, and defies 
an easy preliminary categorisation into negative or positive news. It will therefore 
provide insights into the more routine and banal aspects of media coverage, those 
that are taken for granted in the literature. As for site 2, the focus is not on a theme 
or an event but on the entirety of the media discourse about Africa.  
 
Finally, site 1 focuses on the linguistic aspects of journalistic discourse, while site 
2 puts the emphasis on the visual dimension. Taken together, these two sites 
                                                      
15 This is also the case for lusophone African countries and more research is similarly 






provide complementary insights into the multimodal nature of British and French 
print media discourse on Africa. 
 
3.3 Data gathering and analysis 
 
I gathered the data so as to cover, in one case, a significant section of the media 
industry (site 1), and in the other case, its entirety (site 2). The data in site 1 
constitutes all the articles about the 50th anniversaries of independence published in 
most broadsheet newspapers between 2007 and 2012. The data in site 2 constitutes 
all magazine covers focused on Africa published in all the main broadsheet news 
magazines between 2011 and 2015. In that sense, the data gathered in both sites is 
to be understood more as an entire corpus of texts than as a sample. The 
methodological tools used in each site derive from the nature and amount of data 
gathered. I used a mix of methods to provide analyses tailored to each site but in a 
way that reflects the research commitment to contextual and critical analysis of 
media discourse. 
 
The data analysis follows the three-stage process outlined by Thurlow and Aiello 
(2007 p. 313). The aspects tackled at each step are interwoven, but for analytical 
purposes these distinctions are useful to understand the different stages I went 
through during the collection and analysis of the data: 
 
• Descriptive analysis: I identify the main discursive patterns and features 
contained in the textual data.  
 
• Interpretive analysis: I analyse how these discursive patterns and features 
communicate a certain meaning and I draw on contextual elements to 
explain how media texts are produced. 
 
• Critical analysis: I relate these discursive patterns and features to power 
relations characteristic of the postcolonial era. 
 
The goal of this approach is to link the micro-analyses of texts (identification and 
analysis of textual strategies) with an understanding of their contexts of production 
and, at the macro level, with the power relations that frame them (Aiello, 2012a; 






do so in different ways due to the nature and amount of data in the respective sites. 
In the two sections that follow, I explain how I gathered the data and how this 
three-stage analytical approach was operationalised in each site. 
3.3.1 Site 1: The 50th anniversaries of independence 
 
Data gathering process 
 
Based on the rationale outlined previously for studying broadsheet print media, I 
included four broadsheet newspapers in each country and using the following 
criteria: broadsheet orientation, agenda setting role, significant national circulation, 
reputation within the industry and good amount of international news. Not all 
newspapers tick these criteria in the same way, and it is the balance of these criteria 
that determined the selection of each newspaper. In addition, I also selected the 
newspapers to keep a balance between the two countries in terms of political and 
editorial orientation by including in both countries a newspaper with a financial 
orientation and three newspapers with a centre-left, centre-right and right political 
affiliation. With this selection of eight newspapers (Table 2), I am covering the 
great majority of this section of the industry in both countries. 
 
Table 2 - Newspapers under study (and political/editorial orientation) 
France UK 
Le Monde (centre-left) Guardian (centre-left) 
La Croix (centre-right) Times (centre-right) 
Le Figaro (right) Telegraph (right) 
Les Échos (business orientation) Financial Times (business orientation) 
 
The articles were collected through Nexis, and I followed a similar procedure to 
search articles in both British and French newspapers. 16 I used the following time 
frame: January 1st 2007 to January 1st 2013. This time frame covered the 
anniversaries of 50 years of independence for 24 African countries. With the year 
2010 dominating most of these anniversaries under the umbrella expression of 
“African independence”, I conducted an initial search for articles that contained 
                                                      
16 I also included the weekend editions of the newspapers. These have different names in 
the UK because they are published by sister papers and I took this into account during the 
search: the Telegraph (the Sunday Telegraph), the Guardian (the Observer), the Times (the 






three sets of key words (Table 3). I then replaced “Africa” with the name of each 
individual country that celebrated 50 years of independence (Appendix I). 
 
Table 3 - Combination of words used to identify news articles 
Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 
Africa / Afrique   + Independence / indépendance     + Celebration / fête    
Africa / Afrique   + Independence / indépendance     + Anniversary / anniversaire 
Africa / Afrique   + Independence / indépendance     + Jubilee / cinquantenaire 
Africa / Afrique   + Independence / indépendance     + 50 / fifty / cinquante 
 
I searched the entire newspapers, and not only the news sections, so as to cover the 
entirety of the media discourse about the 50th anniversaries available to readers in 
these newspapers. All articles were skimmed to assess if they were relevant for my 
analysis. Broadly, there were two types of relevant articles: articles that focused 
specifically on a celebration marking 50 years of independence, and articles that 
mentioned the celebration within the coverage of a different story. All articles that 
fell in one of these two categories were downloaded from Nexis and stored 
chronologically and per newspaper. 
 
This process allowed me to systematically gather all the articles that discussed – in 
one way or another – the celebrations (framed in the media in a continental or 
national perspective, and either as an event in itself or an event worth mentioning 
in the context of another story). As the search took place, I found that the 
anniversaries of Swaziland’s 40 years of independence and Zimbabwe’s 30 years 
of independence received significant media coverage in this time frame. These 
were also included in the data collection because, as I will show, these two 
anniversaries were covered at the expense of the 50th anniversaries of other 
countries. 
 
Amidst optimistic discussions of the power of the internet to challenge traditional 
gatekeeping processes and provide more depth and content, one of my goals was to 
assess if newspapers produced exclusive online stories: that is, stories found on the 
newspapers’ websites but not in the paper editions. I therefore carried a search 
procedure similar to the one described above, using only newspaper websites as 
sources on Nexis. When a relevant online article was identified, I compared it to 
my database of newspapers articles to see if the article had been published in the 






version to the online version. Therefore, when an online article was published on a 
date similar to a print article, I compared them to see if it was the same article with 
a different title. If that was the case, the online article was discarded, as it did not 
consists of exclusive online content. While it might be interesting to learn more 
about the translation of print articles into online articles (and possible changes 
made in the process), this was not the focus of this research. Instead, my 
engagement with online content in this site is limited to assess whether the online 
environment provides a platform for exclusive and different content. 
 
Data analysis: content and discourse analysis 
 
Site 1 consists of 282 news articles. Because this is a fairly large corpus, I used a 
mix of quantitative and qualitative tools, and I focused on the linguistic and 
rhetorical aspects of journalistic discourse. I designed a coding sheet so as to map 
the nature of the media coverage of the 50th anniversaries of independence 
(Appendix II). Among other types of information (author, date, title, section where 
the article appears, length), the coding included details about the geographical 
focus of the articles, the individuals quoted and the way they are quoted (quoting 
verbs), and the use of specific lexical fields. Each article was coded manually and 
the results were then recorded in an excel document. The coding sheet in Appendix 
II gives detailed explanations of the categories used; I also provide explanations in 
the analysis chapters when introducing the results of the content analysis.  
 
The coding process had two functions. Firstly, it served as the basis for a 
quantitative content analysis that mapped out the overall features of the coverage. 
This is presented in Chapter 4 where I provide a systematic analysis of these 
features. The analysis details when the anniversaries became “news” and why, i.e. 
what requirements and aspects of news production drive the coverage. In the 
process, I also assess three of the most common kinds of criticism raised against 
Western media coverage of Africa (see section 2.1.3): a) the constant references to 
“darkness” and “tribalism”; b) the portrayal of Africa as a country; c) the 
overreliance on Western voices and sources. The textual analysis is complemented 
by material retrieved from the interviews conducted with foreign correspondents. 
In doing so, the analysis of the coverage of the anniversaries of independence in 
Chapter 4 is done with an eye to shedding light on the broader question of how 







Secondly, the coding process allowed me to build a gradual understanding of the 
data that I subsequently analyse in Chapter 5. Here the analysis takes a resolutely 
qualitative turn. I deconstruct what constitutes the “natural” or the “common 
sense” of the coverage; what Hall would call the taken for granted of 
communication where power relations are buried. I unpack the rhetoric, narratives, 
patterns and silences that make up the coverage and focus on understanding the 
ideological function(s) of this journalistic discourse. Based on in-depth knowledge 
of the data gained through the initial content analysis, the discourse analytical 
approach used in Chapter 5 therefore aims to dig deeper into the social reality 
constructed by media discourse, and the postcolonial power relations shaping this 
discourse. 
 
The analysis of this site is therefore spread across two chapters. Chapter 4 focuses 
on the more descriptive and interpretive aspects of the analysis. Chapter 5 also 
includes elements of descriptive and interpretive analysis, but it primarily 
concentrates on the more critical aspect of the analysis. At the end of Chapter 5, I 
bring together the descriptive, interpretive and critical dimensions to provide an 
overall conclusion to my analysis of this site. 
3.3.2 Site 2: News magazine covers on Africa 
 
Data gathering  
 
The data for the site 2 was gathered from December 2011 to January 2015. I first 
established a list of the main prominent news magazines as well as Sunday 
supplements that stand at the UK national equivalent (Appendix III). Being based 
in the UK most of the time, I checked these publications on a weekly and monthly 
basis in a newsstand, and bought any news magazine with a cover focusing on 
continental Africa. Whenever I was away for more than a month, I monitored these 
publications online. In the French context, the covers of the main news magazines 
are visible on their online archive; every month, I monitored these archives to 
identify any relevant cover. Overall, I identified twelve covers that focused on 
continental Africa over eight news magazines. In addition to the magazine covers, I 
also gathered throughout the research process some 60 news articles and blog posts 
relevant to the phenomenon of magazine covers about Africa. These include for 






interviews with media producers involved in their production. These articles were 
downloaded and thematically organised in an excel document where I included 
quotes relevant for the analysis.  
  
Data analysis: multimodal discourse analysis 
 
In site 2, the method consists of a detailed multimodal discourse analysis that links 
text and context of production in order to critically examine the construction of a 
certain idea of Africa (Mudimbe 1994). Against the saying “do not judge a book by 
its cover” I approach magazine covers as rich multimodal texts. They connote a 
number of values and communicate specific worldviews through a series of 
interconnected semiotic choices. They are meant to draw the attention of the 
readers without alienating them. They should appeal to their values, curiosity and 
assumptions, sometimes by disrupting them. In other words, they can be seen as a 
nexus of semiotic choices, media market imperatives and ideological worldviews. 
Because of the relative small size of the corpus under study (12 covers), I decided 
to provide a very detailed multimodal discourse analysis of each cover. I draw on 
the tools developed in the field of multimodal critical discourse analysis and social 
semiotics by Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) in their study of the grammar of visual 
design, and those summarised by Machin and Mayr (2012) so as to dig deeply into 
the semiotic richness of media texts. This includes looking at the range of visual, 
linguistic and compositional choices (words, images, colours, pose and gaze of 
individuals in photographs, font sizes, salience, compositional structure, lighting 
and design). I also conducted interviews and questionnaires with media 
professionals directly involved in their production to shed some light on the 
various production factors behind textual choices. In doing so, I trace key linkages 
between the covers’ semiotic features and issues of postcolonial representation, and 
the broader political and economic processes in which they are implicated. 
 
Because the amount of textual data in this site is much smaller than in site 1, I 
present the analysis in a single chapter. The structure of the chapter, however, 
reflects a similar three-stage analytical process. The first section of the chapter 
provides mainly the descriptive analysis as well as some interpretive analysis. The 
second section focuses on deepening the interpretive analysis. The third section, 
finally, draws on the descriptive and interpretive analyses to offer the critical 







3.4 Engaging with media producers 
3.4.1 Semi-structured interviews and questionnaires 
 
I complement the analysis of media content with semi-structured interviews with 
foreign correspondents. I focus on foreign correspondents because they are at the 
heart of the production of the coverage. While they often find themselves on the 
receiving end of the criticism of Afro-pessimism, there are very few studies in the 
literature on Africa’s media image that complement qualitative analysis of media 
content with interviews with foreign correspondents. Including correspondents in 
my research is both a way to research and analyse their perspective, as well as gain 
a deeper understanding of the manufacturing of Africa’s media image. 
 
Interviews can be described as a form of “conversation with a purpose” (Bingham 
& Moore, 1959 quoted in Lindlof, 1988 p. 164) and constitute “a practical 
qualitative method for discovering how people think and feel about their 
communication practices” (Keyton, 2006 p. 295). I settled on a semi-structured 
approach to the interviews. All participants were asked a set of core questions 
dealing with production practices (writing, story selection, relationships with 
editors, perceptions of the audience) and issues of media representation 
(understanding of Afro-pessimism; perception of the criticism of Afro-pessimism 
in Western media; stereotypes; intercultural communication). The interview 
questions are attached in Appendix IV and provide details of the different aspects 
that I was probing. 
 
The core questions were not always asked in the same order so as to allow a fluid 
discussion. This way, participants could expand on certain aspects and I was able 
to follow up on others, therefore providing the freedom to “depart briefly to go 
down an unexpected conversational path” (Keyton, 2006 p. 295). I also established 
a set of optional questions to be used depending on the context and flow of the 
conversation, and if the time allowed. As part of these optional questions, I 
included a reconstructive approach (Reich, 2006): I presented journalists with an 
article they wrote and asked them about the production of this text. This stimulus 






as ground the broader discussion of media representation and production into 
specific examples.  
 
Finally, because site 2 focuses on magazine covers, I decided to use questionnaires 
to reach out to other important actors involved in their production including a 
graphic designer, an illustrator, a photographer, and an art director. The 
questionnaire was focused on specific media texts and was kept short (six 
questions maximum) to help receive a positive response rate. Each questionnaire 
was tailored to the magazine cover and to the role of the individual in its 
production (see Appendix V for an example of questionnaire). 
3.4.2 Identifying and accessing participants 
 
Participants were identified following a concentric approach – from those directly 
involved in the content analysed to those working for the media outlets studied, to 
foreign correspondents working for British and French media outlets in Africa and 
those working for Western media. After having gathered my textual data for the 
two sites, I first identified those who were the main contributors of articles (site 1). 
For site 2, I did online research to identify graphic artists, illustrators, art editors, 
photographers and editors involved in the production of the magazine covers 
analysed. I then identified the current Africa-based correspondents (staff) working 
for the newspapers and magazines which content was analysed. I subsequently 
identified freelance journalists who have a working relationship with one, or more, 
of the outlets analysed. Given that Johannesburg and Nairobi are the two cities 
with the greatest concentration of foreign correspondents in Africa, and the greatest 
concentration of interviewees I had identified, I undertook trips there to conduct 
the interviews face-to-face (Johannesburg, 14 days in October 2013; Nairobi, 24 
days in October and November 2013). Once I started the interviews in the field, I 
gained better access to a greater number of journalists working for international 
media. Although not necessarily involved in the textual data analysed, these were 
also interviewed to provide greater insights into the practices, values and 
ideologies of foreign correspondents in Africa, and to contextualise my analysis of 
media representation and discourse. 
 
For the most part, I initially contacted interviewees by email (see Appendix VI). It 
was generally difficult to find the contact details of journalists (email and/or 






directory of members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Association of East Africa 
(FCAEA) and Southern Africa (FCASA) that provided phone and email contacts 
for most correspondents. Unfortunately for future studies, these associations appear 
to no longer make these lists publically available online. As per ethical 
requirements, after a first contact was established, interviewees were provided with 
an information sheet and a consent form before the interview took place so that 
they would know more about the project, what their participation entails and how 
the data would be protected (see Appendix VII). Two copies of the consent form 
(Appendix VIII) were signed upon starting the interview, with one copy remaining 
with participant and one with the researcher. In the case of the phone interview and 
online questionnaires, consent was reached by having participants fill in and sign 
the consent form electronically. 
 
The process of getting access to foreign correspondents was quite smooth. I never 
received an email from a participant refusing to take part in the project on the basis 
that they felt the research was biased or of no interest to them. Only one participant 
initially expressed doubts about participating and asked more questions about the 
project before taking part. Some of my requests remain unanswered, while others 
were declined either because the participants’ calendar did not match mine, or 
because they had move to a new position in another part of the world. I believe 
there were four main factors that contributed to this smooth process of getting 
access.  
 
Firstly, being a Leeds University student turned out to be an advantage in two cases 
where the journalists were Leeds University alumni; in their initial email 
responses, the two journalists highlighted that they studied in Leeds and this 
seemed to create on their side a positive perception of the project and some form of 
bonding point. This was confirmed in the face-to-face meetings that both started 
with some informal discussions about the experience of studying in Leeds.  
 
Secondly, being introduced by someone else contributed to participants taking my 
request seriously. This was particularly true when someone I had just interviewed 
introduced me to someone else. Thus, once I had a foot in, I was in a good position 
to contact new participants by telling them that one of their trusted colleagues 






several foreign correspondents during interviews conducted in a café heavily 
frequented by international journalists.  
 
Thirdly, and related to this, going to South Africa and Kenya to conduct the 
interviews was very important. “Being there” made a huge difference to secure 
access. In several instances, correspondents told me that a key reason they accepted 
to be interviewed was that I came “all the way down here”.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I believe the approach of the project – 
grounding the analysis of media representation and discourse in their context of 
production – was one to which correspondents related. Based on our discussions, 
several correspondents seem to receive quite regularly requests for interviews for 
academic projects. Interestingly, one journalist explained that requests for 
academic interviews had grown exponentially in the last five years and in direct 
correlation with a decline in requests from young journalists asking for advice to 
become correspondents in Africa. In another case, a correspondent explained that 
she received a lot of requests but that she usually does not answer to them mainly 
because she does not like the “tone” of these studies: “but in your case, there was 
something different. And you came all the way here”.  
 
Although journalists often perceive journalism research with suspicion, I found that 
foreign correspondents have strong interests in issues of representation and 
stereotypes – something that I explore in depth in Chapter 7. Their suspicion, then, 
stems from them feeling that academic research on Africa’s media image fails to 
integrate the material conditions in which journalists work, is generally focused on 
the criticism of “negative news” about Africa, and approaches the topic with an 
agenda, namely that researchers will find what they have established a priori that 
they wanted to find. Correspondents did not make it systematically explicit that 
they “liked” the tone of the study. In fact, several participants displayed irritation 
and weariness at some questions – something analysed in Chapter 7. But they made 
their interest in the topic and their appreciation of the approach explicit enough for 
me to believe that the overall framing and presentation of the PhD strongly 
contributed to them accepting to take part. 
 
Twenty-three media professionals participated in the study. Four responded to the 






interviews ranged in length from 66 minutes to 136 minutes, and the average 
length was 88 minutes. In Table 5, whenever a participant requested anonymity 
and to ensure anonymity, I removed the name of the media outlet(s) they work for, 
as well as the specifics of their job description. Except for one, all the interviewees 
who requested anonymity work for media outlets under study in my analysis of 
media content. 
 
Table 4 - List of interviewees 
 
Name or anonymised 
description 
Job title  Media outlet  Interview 
location 
Africa correspondent 1 Anonymised Anonymised Nairobi 
Africa correspondent 2 Anonymised Anonymised Nairobi 




East Africa correspondent 1 Anonymised Anonymised Nairobi 
East Africa correspondent 2 Anonymised Anonymised Nairobi 
East Africa correspondent 3 Anonymised Anonymised Nairobi 
Grill, Bartholomäus Africa bureau chief Der Spiegel Cape Town 
Kelto, Anders Africa correspondent PRI Cape Town 




Macheroux-Denault, Nicole Africa correspondent RTL Television Nairobi 
Moore, Phil Photo-journalist Times, Sunday 
Telegraph, Guardian, 
Le Monde, Le Figaro 
Nairobi 
Nahr, Dominic Photo-journalist  TIME Nairobi 




Perry, Alex Former Africa bureau chief  TIME Cape Town 












Anonymised Anonymised Phone  
Wrong, Michela Correspondent  
(Cote d’Ivoire, Zaire, 
Kenya) 







Table 5 - List of respondents to questionnaire 
Name Job title Magazine cover 
Bacon, Derek Illustrator The Economist – “Africa Rising” 
Delhomme, Anne-
Sophie 
Art director Courrier International – “Africa 3.0” 
Perrier, Aude Graphic artist Le Monde Magazine – “Africa, the take-
off” 
Siegle, Lucy Contributing journalist 
to the special issue 
The Observer / The New Review – 




I approach the interview material in a dual perspective. On the one hand, it 
provides insights to ground media texts in their immediate context of production. 
On the other hand, the respondents’ answers and the language they use to talk 
about specific issues constitute actions that can be observed, and thus analysed. 
This language performs a social function in the sense that foreign correspondents 
talk from a particular social position, that of the journalistic field. As Lindlof notes 
“interview talk is the rhetoric of socially situated speakers, not an objective report 
of thoughts, feelings, or things out in the world” (Lindlof, 1988 p. 165). In this 
perspective, I am interested in how they talk about certain issues, and what their 
ways of talking about these issues tell us about the broader nature, values and 
structure of the journalistic field. In sum, the interview material is used to critically 
contextualise the analysis of content and is also approached as textual data that can 
be discursively analysed to engage with the perspective of correspondents. 
 
This dual approach drives the analysis of the interview material. In a first step, I 
retrieved all the quotes concerned with articles, events and textual features 
analysed in my two sites such as story selection and news values, 
generalisation/conflation or sources quoted. The most relevant material was then 
incorporated into Chapters 4, 5 and 6 to ground the analysis of media discourse in 
both the immediate and broader context of production. 
 
Chapter 7 provides further analysis of this interview material and feeds into my 
overall appraisal of Afro-pessimism and of the production of Africa’s media 






material. In this second step, I immersed myself deeply in the data and gained 
gradual understanding of the transcripts by reading them several times, first in the 
chronological order in which they were conducted; then by grouping them 
according to the geographical location of the participants (Kenya/South Africa); 
and finally by linguistic group (British/French). As I got more familiar with the 
data and saw emerging common themes and differences, I decided to focus on 
three key themes linked to the broader lines of questioning of the thesis: how 
foreign correspondents talk about Afro-pessimism, about the links between 
production processes and issues of representation, and about their audience. I then 
extracted quotes dealing with each of these themes in a fourth reading of the 
transcripts. I also did a keyword search in the transcripts to make sure that I did not 
miss quotes relevant to these three themes (such as “audience”, “afro-pessimism”, 
“editor”, “stereotype”, “representation”, “criticism/critic”, “production”). The use 
of these themes is more structuring than it is limiting; the categories used in the 
analysis of each theme were not pre-established but stem from the range of answers 
given by the respondents themselves. In doing so, I aimed to provide an account 
(Chapter 7) that gives justice to the range of perspectives, and sometimes the 
contradictions, that I encountered in my research.  
 
A last step in the analysis of the transcripts was a form of reverse reconstruction. 
Journalists often spontaneously talked about the production of stories not directly 
related to my sites but pertinent to understand the discursive production of African 
news. I therefore extracted all quotes about these stories, and subsequently 
identified the news articles discussed in order to make further links between news 
producers’ decisions and media texts. I then integrated some of these reverse 
reconstructions into the Chapter 7. This, however, was done very carefully because 
in that case, journalists have the upper hand: they are the ones setting the agenda 
for the reconstruction, and their insights into these stories could impact my 
interpretation of these articles. In other words, it created a risk for me to be too 
close to their interpretation and thus to possibly lose the critical edge necessary to 
deconstruct media texts. These reconstructed stories were therefore used insofar as 
they were either illustrative of experiences reported by many correspondents, or on 
the contrary apparently unique and contrasting with broader routines – I highlight 







3.4.4 Ethics and handling of the data 
 
Ethical approval was granted on 20 August 2013 from the Arts and PVAC (PVAR) 
Faculty Research Ethics Committee. Anonymity was the default position for the 
research, and non-anonymity was included as an option. The information sheet and 
consent form used in the recruitment process are attached in the appendices. Where 
the participant took part on an anonymous basis, I made sure that they would not 
be identifiable in the quotes used in the PhD by removing not only their names, but 
also the specifics of their job description, any reference to the media outlet they 
work for, as well as information about whether they work for British or French 
media; in addition, when reconstructions were conducted with journalists choosing 
anonymity, I made sure the articles discussed in the analysis are not identifiable by 
removing the headline, date, the name of the media outlet and by not including 
exact quotes from the articles. 
 
All steps were taken to ensure the privacy and protection of the data. The interview 
recordings were first uploaded on my laptop, which is password-protected and 
whose hard disk is encrypted, and then deleted from audio-recording device. They 
were then transferred from fieldwork locations to the university ftps server with a 
secure connection. Once uploaded onto the university of Leeds server, all audio 
files were deleted from my laptop. The raw data, including recordings and 
transcripts were not made available to any other persons. 
 
The audio-recordings amount to 1681 minutes (28 hours and 1 minute). Interviews 
with foreign correspondents working for the outlets under study were integrally 
transcribed, while the others were partially transcribed. Any grammatical mistakes 
were transcribed; any actions such as sighs were also transcribed in the following 
form: [sighs]. In some cases, the interviewee had physical gestures; not all of those 
were transcribed, especially as the transcription process started one month after the 
end of fieldwork and it was thus not possible to remember all of these. However, in 
cases where these physical actions were important to make sense of a section of the 
interview, I noted it during the interview and then included it during the 
transcriptions in square brackets. Here is an example of what it looks like on a 
transcript: “I have got a notebook and I am just literally like [mimicking writing 
frantically on a notebook]”. Pauses were noted with an ellipse “…”. Whenever an 






and whenever the respondents included a real or fictional dialogue in their answers, 
this was noted by quotation marks. The punctuation I used in the transcription 
includes periods, commas, exclamation and question marks. Other punctuation 
marks such as colon, semi-colon, hyphen, or bracket are included only when those 
were used in the answers given in writing. I did the transcription using an open-
access software called “transcriptions” that allows including timestamps so as to 
synchronise sections of a transcript with the audio recording. All together, the 
transcripts are 93 466 words long. 
 
3.5 Additional thoughts 
3.5.1 Translation  
 
The study is comparative and it was thus partly conducted in two languages, 
English and French. Some of the data – news articles and interviews/questionnaires 
– are therefore in French. Being a native French speaker with professional 
experience translating a book from French to English, I did all the translations. I 
paid particular attention when translating interview quotes and articles extracts to 
be as close as possible to the original text. I favoured almost literal translation as 
much as possible, only paraphrasing when the literal translation rendered the 
meaning obscure. In some instances, the specificities of the French language were 
such that some translation explanations were necessary to fully grasp the linguistic 
dynamic of a text. This is for instance the case in the use of feminine/masculine 
articles. In French, any word is either masculine or feminine. While this gender 
attribution is often arbitrary, it still has discursive consequences. Africa, for 
instance, is feminine; so when a magazine cover on Africa depicts an image of a 
woman accompanied by a text “Africa, she is beating growth records” the feminine 
article has a discursive function that cannot be translated simply by “it”. Similarly, 
some metaphors in French do not necessarily have an English equivalent, or have 
an equivalent that is quite different in tone and images; in these cases, the French 
metaphor was translated literally, and an explanation provided to clarify the 
meaning. Overall, this was done to keep the reader as close as possible to the feel 
of the original text.  
 
The use of the French language also had implications for the interview dynamics. 






version of “you”, while “vous” is the plural version. This difference has 
implications in interpersonal communication. “Tu” would be used as a mark of 
familiarity and proximity, while “vous” marks politeness and distance. There is 
then a power dynamic at stake in how people address each other. For instance, a 
discussion may start with using “vous” and then one participant starts addressing 
the other using “tu”. This can create an imbalance in the exchange where one 
participant establishes a form of superiority and authority over the other. In simple 
terms, the exchange becomes asymmetric and is no longer taking place on an equal 
footing. In the context of the interviews, I always started with “vous” and moved 
on using “tu” only if the participant offered to do so. No participant started 
addressing me as “tu” without offering me the opportunity to also address them as 
“tu”. Thus, all the interviews in French were always conducted on an equal footing, 
although some felt more intimate and others more formal. 
3.5.2 Twitter as a research tool: two uses 
 
Twitter was an interesting and very useful too during this research. There are two 
ways in which I used Twitter for academic purposes. Firstly, I developed my 
Twitter profile by following as many Western foreign correspondents working 
throughout Africa. Because correspondents use Twitter both personally and 
professionally, following them and seeing their tweets and online interactions was 
also a way to cultivate further my knowledge of the professional field. In a way, it 
constituted a form of small-scale digital ethnography that also feeds into the 
contextualisation of my textual analysis.  
 
Secondly, I used Twitter as a way to cultivate an intellectual engagement with 
bloggers based in Africa and/or interested in African affairs (in particular with 
regard to media coverage of Africa). The list provided by Rachel Strohm of 
African Twitter commentators was a very useful starting point. 17  The issues 
discussed in this PhD extend beyond the realm of academic debates; the digital 
sphere provides some very interesting discussions on the topic of Africa’s media 
image and includes a range of voices (from within Africa, from the diaspora, from 
within academia, from the journalistic field). Whenever I would see a blog post or 
article pertinent to my project, I would re-tweet it. This way, my Twitter timeline 
                                                      







also constitutes a digital archive of some of the discussion happening online – an 
archive that proved very useful in the writing stage of the PhD when I needed to go 




This chapter mapped out in detail the layered methodological approach that was 
used to answer the project’s research questions. I introduced CDA as the 
framework that integrates the theoretical approaches laid out in Chapters 1 and 2, 
and that drives the methodological approach of the research. I argued that 
grounding the analysis of textual material in the context of news production 
provides deeper insights into the nature of media discourse about Africa and into 
Afro-pessimism. Because there are no blue prints as to how to conduct a CDA, the 
chapter then detailed how CDA was implemented in the research. I introduced the 
two sites of analysis, the process of gathering a range of data (news articles, 
magazine covers, interviews, questionnaires) and the tools used to analyse them 
(quantitative content analysis, qualitative discourse analysis, multimodal discourse 
analysis). I now present the analysis of these data in the four chapters that follow. 
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on site 1; Chapter 6 focuses on site 2; Chapter 7 provides an 






CHAPTER 4 - How do French and British journalists 
actually write about Africa? The case of the 50th 
anniversaries of independence 
 
 
I feel like I’m on trial and you are confronting 
me with the evidence of my past sins! 
(David Smith, 2013) 
 
This chapter is the first of two chapters focusing on my first site, the coverage of 
the 50th anniversaries of independence. It has three functions that are respectively 
addressed in three sections. The first section provides a brief historical background 
to the period of independence of the late 1950s. It then frames the anniversaries as 
sites of collective memory construction and their coverage as a form of 
commemorative journalism. This section constitutes the background for both the 
analysis provided in the remainder of the chapter, as well as for the continuing 
analysis in Chapter 5. The second and third sections present findings from my 
content analysis. In the second section, I ask, “When did the anniversaries become 
news”? I answer this question by looking at the amount of coverage the 
anniversaries received, which countries were covered and what were the most 
covered stories. In the process, I flesh out contextual elements pertaining to news 
production that shed light on these features of the coverage. In the third section, I 
empirically assess, within the context of this site, three claims about the Western 
media coverage of Africa found in the literature and discussed in section 2.1.3, 
namely: 1) the systematic references to “darkness” and “tribalism”; 2) the 
presentation of “Africa as a country”, or a homogenous entity; 3) the overreliance 
on Western sources preventing Africans from telling their own (hi)stories. 
 
4.1 The 50th anniversaries of independence 
4.1.1 Historical background to the independence 
 
On 27 January 1960, Congolese musician Joseph Kabaselleh, who was close to 
revolutionary leader Patrice Lumumba, performed with his band African Jazz the 
song Indépendance Cha-Cha in Brussels. At the time, the roundtable talks leading 
to Congo’s independence were taking place. When independence was officially 






fact, it had grown increasingly popular not only in Congo but in several parts of 
francophone Africa. With its upbeat Congolese rumba rhythm, the song seemed to 
capture perfectly the sense of hope and pride that accompanied the independence 
movements: 
 
Indépendance cha-cha tozuwi ye! (We have won independence) 
Oh Kimpwanza cha-cha tubakidi. (We are free at last) 
Oh table ronde cha-cha ba gagner o! (We won it at the roundtable 
talks) 
Oh Lipanda cha-cha tozuwi ye! (Long live the independence that 
we’ve won) 
 
Indeed, between 1957 and 1962, 24 countries in sub-Saharan African (re)gained, 
won or were granted – depending on the context and the perspective taken – 
independence from colonial powers. They included 15 French and 7 British 
colonies. Starting with Ghana in 1957, a “wind of change” blew throughout the 
continent, as British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan famously stated.18 The year 
1960 in particular saw as many as 17 colonies becoming independent states. While 
each independence movement had its own dynamic, context and mode, a sense of 
optimism and euphoria generally backed up this historical moment (Rothermund, 
2006). Underpinning this optimism was the idea that, finally free from the burden 
and constraints of colonialism, these countries would blossom, and that the newly 
independent states would bring about better and fairer conditions of living for their 
inhabitants (de B’béri & Louw, 2011 p. 339; Ahluwalia, 2001). 
 
This historical moment was the culmination of several decades of anti-colonial 
struggles and fights for national sovereignty (Boahen, 2011). As such, it formally 
put an end to the judicial basis of colonialism, and it represented a significant 
historical step towards liberation and independence. Yet, it would be an historical 
shortcut to equate this decolonisation with complete freedom, and the words used 
by Mandela to describe the meaning of the end of apartheid are also relevant to 
describe these early days of independence:  
 
The truth is that we are not yet free; we have merely achieved the 
freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed. We have not 
taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and 
even more difficult road.  
(Mandela, 1995 p. 617) 
                                                      
18 He first used this expression in an address in Accra on 10 January 1960. The formula 
only became popular after he repeated it in a speech in Cape Town to the South African 







From the analysis of the nature of postcolonial African states (Ahluwalia, 2001) 
and neocolonialism (Nkrumah, 1965; Chomsky & Herman, 1979; Sartre, 2001) to 
investigations into the shady links also known as “Françafrique” between French 
politicians and corporations, and several post-independence African leaders 
(Verschave, 2000), a wide body of research explains why the independence did not 
signal the end of Africa’s exploitation and why oppressive politics survived 
colonialism. Mbembe (2010), for instance, reminds us that the agreements signed 
between France and its former colonies in the 1960s were not meant “to put an end 
to the colonial system, but in fact allowed to contractualise and outsource it”. 
Already at the time of independence, revolutionary leaders such as Amílcar Cabral, 
Kwame Nkrumah or Frantz Fanon raised similar concerns and noted the difference 
between, on the one hand, political independence, and, on the other hand, national 
liberation, actual decolonisation and structural changes (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012 p. 
76). In the words of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012 p. 77), “a postcolonial world was 
never born; rather what decolonisation facilitated is better described as a 
‘postcolonial neocolonized world’”.  
  
Yet, a powerful myth of decolonisation, as turning the page of colonial history and 
starting from anew, fared well and proved convenient in hiding what Grosfoguel 
(2007) terms the “coloniality of power”. The idea of coloniality of power points to 
the economic and military domination of the world by the West but also to the 
hierarchisation of social relations – including racial but also sexual, political, 
spiritual and linguistic ones – that underpinned this domination since the beginning 
of modernity: 
 
[This power] put in place over a period of 450 years did not 
evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the 
periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the 
same “colonial power matrix”.  
(Grosfoguel, 2007 p. 219) 
 
Yet, a myth about the postcolonial persisted; one in which the state of things in 
former colonies had little if nothing to do with the past or present actions of 
Western powers. This view contributed to hide the coloniality of power found in 
the social, political and economic structures inherited from colonialism. This 
coloniality of power was also at work in the emerging modernisation and 
developmentalist paradigm (Escobar, 1995), and in the implementation of 






hopes raised by the myth of decolonisation as complete liberation were short-lived. 
Within 30 years post-independence, the continent faced a set of tremendous and 
pressing political, economic and social challenges. As highlighted in Chapter 1, 
this provided the context for Afro-pessimism to flourish in the fields of economy 
and development, and subsequently in the global media imagination.  
4.1.2 Sites of collective memory 
 
Between 2007 and 2012, 24 countries marked their 50th anniversaries of 
independence. 50 years mark a symbolic threshold that invites us to remember and 
cement – or redefine, challenge and disrupt – national and continental histories, 
and also to take stock of the future (Lentz, 2013 p. 218). It is a moment where the 
colonial and postcolonial past, and the immediate present are assessed, and where 
the future is often predicted. This pivotal moment can be understood as a site of 
collective memory construction that “informs our understanding of past events and 
present relationships, and contributes to our expectations about the future” (Edy, 
1999 p. 71). Independence days are a particularly good example of such “sites of 
memory” (Nora, 1989). Throughout the world, they are generally seen as the most 
symbolically important national day for a nation (Zerubavel, 2003). On a first 
level, then, the question of memory and remembrance concerns the immediate 
community involved. In this regard, Lentz (2013) provides comparative insights 
into the celebrations of 50 years of independence in 10 African countries. She 
shows how these celebrations significantly differed from one country to another. 
More importantly, she argues that they were contested sites of collective memory, 
where the norms and limits of the national community and identity were heavily 
debated, “whether the jubilee served as a forum for political campaigning or 
celebrated national unity irrespective of party differences” (Lentz, 2013 p. 233). 
 
In the context of these anniversaries, there were significant debates about who are 
the heroes to be celebrated, or on what date should the anniversary be celebrated. 
Burkina Faso, for instance, became independent on 5 August 1960. The jubilee, 
however, was celebrated on 11 December 2010, echoing the date when the country 
officially became a republic (11 December 1960). But there were concerns among 
the population that the choice of the December date was also a way to silence 
Thomas Sankara’s revolution of 4 August 1983, which closely coincided with the 
date of the independence (Lentz, 2013). Sankara, who was murdered during a coup 






Burkinabe, as well as an iconic figure for pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism. 
The choice of the December date, then, conveniently allowed removing Sankara 
from the official agenda of these ceremonies, and from the collective memory that 
the government sought to emphasise. But given the popularity of Sankara, he 
remained part of the broader collective memory surrounding these celebrations, if 
only because the contentious choice of the date was locally debated (Lentz, 2013 p. 
224). Thus, these anniversaries were contested sites of collective memory 
construction where various and competing interpretations of the past, of the nation 
and of national identities were played out. 
 
As Lentz (2013 p. 209) notes “such national days are usually staged by the state; at 
the same time they stage the state itself, making it palpable to the citizenry and 
potentially to a wider international audience”. In focusing my analysis on British 
and French coverage, I am therefore also interested in the meaning of these 
anniversaries in relation to the identity and imagination of these two former 
metropoles. I aim to understand how the past, present and future of the former 
colonies are being portrayed and to assess if Afro-pessimism dominates the 
coverage. In the process – and following the lead of Said who described 
Orientalism as a discourse that tells us more about the West than the East – I will 
shed light on the discursive construction of France and Britain as colonial and 
postcolonial communities, and on their place and responsibility in this history.  
4.1.3 Commemorative journalism  
 
The reporting of such commemorative events, where the past becomes news, 
constitutes a challenge for journalists: “Long touted as the first draft of history, 
journalism has typically exhibited a reticence to move beyond the topical, novel, 
instantaneous and timely” (Zelizer & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014 p. 2). If reflexive 
and detailed analysis of the past seems to contradict the routine requirements of 
news production, journalism makes much, if not constant, use of the past (Edy, 
1999, Zelizer 2013). Neiger et al. (2014) also note that journalism makes various 
uses of the past and they put forward a typology of its uses. These range 
 
from the clear presence of the past in commemorative journalism, 
to the less salient appearance of the past in items that use it as an 
analogy, and finally to the clandestine yet ubiquitous presence of 
the past in everyday items focusing on current events.  







Commemorative journalism, where the use of the past is perhaps the most visible, 
puts journalists in a complex position where they need to balance and negotiate 
different requirements. Because commemorative events are planned and organised, 
they are convenient for journalists and editors who can work upstream and in a 
timely manner. Commemorations are often state driven which means that 
journalists need to decide whether and how they should alter the frame initially 
provided and, in the process, contribute to the formation of a broader, more 
contested and complex collective memory. Yet the space available for journalists 
to discuss the past remains limited. There will always be a limit to how much detail 
and nuance can be included in any given story, and to an extent there will always 
be room for historians to point to a lack of nuance, detail or complexity.  
 
The seasoned Africa correspondent Bartholomäus Grill – whom I met a few days 
after the al-Shabaab terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 
2013 – sees time and format as the main factors that constraint journalistic 
contextualisation of international news: 
 
News reports are often really poor in terms of background, whether 
historical or sociological and that is due to a lack of time. 
Yesterday I had only one page to explain the threat of al-Shabaab 
in Eastern Africa. I don’t feel good when I have to do these sorts of 
snapshots. In a book, of course, you would have an opportunity to 
go in-depth. (…) I started to read the report of the security council 
of the United Nations on al-Shabaab, which is 500 pages long. I 
wish I had the time to read it all. But what did I read? The 
summary. Because –tic, toc, tic, toc- you have the deadline 
approaching. (…) It’s a much more complicated story than what 
you are actually able to convey in the space that you have.  
 
Deciding just how much historical information should be included in a news report 
is therefore a real challenge, if not something of a slippery slope. Journalists have 
to identify and hierarchise items of information into different categories such as 
assumed, necessary, new or optional knowledge. This hierarchisation of 
information needs to be assessed against the newsworthiness of a story and its 
relevance to a given audience. In that context, commemorative journalism calls for 
balancing 
 
several simultaneous and complementary rituals, such as national 
commemorative rituals, the media rituals that revolve around such 
“national occasions” and, at the same time, the everyday, secular 
ritual of news production and dissemination.  







In reporting the 50th anniversaries of independence, journalists therefore had to 
balance different, and sometimes antagonist, ritualistic requirements: 
newsworthiness, on the one hand, which is more present-oriented; and, on the other 
hand, commemoration, which is more past-oriented. In this case, journalists are not 
only writers of narratives about the present and of the first draft history but also, in 
a way, of the second draft of history (Edy, 1999). Furthermore, these anniversaries 
and commemorations cannot a priori be categorised as negative or positive news 
events. Independence day in Togo, for instance, coincided for a long time with 
both President Eyadema’s rise to power, and the death of anticolonial leader 
Sylvanus Olympio during a coup, in which President Eyadema was involved. In 
that case, the anniversary of 50 years of independence was likely to bring back 
painful memories of the coup. My analysis therefore does not assume that these 
anniversaries are positive or negative events, or that they should be celebrated. 
Rather, I approach these 50th anniversaries as a pivotal moment suitable to draw an 
overall picture of many postcolonial African states – as well as an opportunity for 
introspection into the colonial and postcolonial history of Western powers – and 
therefore relevant to assess the extent of Afro-pessimism in media coverage.  
 
4.2 When the anniversaries become news 
4.2.1 Amount of coverage  
 
Table 6 presents an overview of the articles that focused on, or mentioned, the 50th 
anniversaries of independence, per year and per media outlet. The online articles 
included here are those that can be found online only, and not in print version. 
Overall, this corpus comprises a total of 282 articles, with 154 articles found in the 
French press and 128 in the UK press. In each country respectively, Le Monde 
(n=47) and the Guardian (n=60) had the most substantial coverage overall. A 
reason behind this greater coverage in both papers is their use of the online 
platform. The Guardian’s online content puts it ahead of the Financial Times, 
which had more print articles (n=33). Le Monde similarly published more online 
content than the other French papers. Significantly, nearly 50% (n=30) of the 
online articles appeared in Lemonde.fr and guardian.co.uk. These two newspapers 
made noteworthy use of the online platform to produce additional content, but 
overall the newspapers made marginal use of the online platform to produce 






Overall, some 14.5% of the articles acknowledge the use of news agency material, 
but this proportion changes significantly when broken down into online and print 
articles (Table 7). Only 6.3% of the print articles openly make use of news agency 
content. At first sight, this finding echoes the claim by most correspondents I 
interviewed that they did not really use news agency material to write their stories, 
although this result is limited to assessing the visibility of that content.  
 
Table 6 - Number of online and print articles per year and per newspaper  
Newspaper 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
PRINT (France)        
La Croix 1 4 1 29 1 1 37 
Les Échos 0 0 0 15 0 0 15 
Le Figaro 1 0 0 23 0 0 24 
Le Monde 2 2 3 36 2 0 45 
        
PRINT (UK)        
Financial Times 3 1 3 24 2 0 33 
Guardian 4 0 1 25 2 0 32 
Telegraph 0 1 0 6 2 1 10 
Times 5 3 2 10 3 1 24 
TOTAL Print 16 11 10 168 12 3 220 
        
ONLINE (France)        
Lacroix.fr 0 0 0 8 0 0 8 
Lesechos.fr 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Lefigaro.fr 0 1 0 7 1 0 9 
Lemonde.fr 0 0 0 14 1 0 15 
        
ONLINE (UK)        
ft.co.uk 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 
guardian.co.uk 1 1 0 9 2 2 15 
telegraph.co.uk 1 2 0 5 1 1 10 
times.co.uk 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
TOTAL online 2 4 0 44 6 3 62 
        
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Combined France 4 7 4 133 5 1 154 
Combined UK 14 8 6 82 13 5 128 







Table 7 - Number of articles that acknowledge use of news agency material  
 France  UK  Total  % in relation to all articles  
Print 5 9 14 6.3% 
Online 20 7 27 43.5% 
Total 25 16 41 14.5% 
 
In contrast, nearly half of the exclusive online content correspond to either 
verbatim or re-writes of agency wires. Based only on the assessment of visible 
news agency material, the image of a journalistic industry churning out agency 
wires (Davies, 2009) appears particularly acute in the production of online content. 
Rather than providing a space for more depth and context, or what Chouliaraki 
(2013) would define as a cosmopolitan form of journalism, the online platform 
here appears as a way to publish or re-write stories, generally short, brought from 
wholesale media retailers like AFP and Reuters (Paterson, 2007). But Paterson 
(2007) also found that a significant amount of news agency material is used 
without attribution, which suggests that news agency wires may have a greater – 
albeit difficult to assess – impact on the overall coverage.  
4.2.2 Countries covered 
The vast majority of the articles (n=215) were published in the year 2010, when 17 
African countries celebrated their 50th anniversaries. In addition to national 
anniversaries, several stories were also framed around the idea of a continental 
anniversary; this was notably the case in France where the government invited 
armies from its former colonies to parade on the Champs-Elysées for Bastille Day 
on 14 July 2010. As a result of such continental framing, 34% of the articles 
referred to the 50th anniversary of independence of “Africa” as a whole, and thus 
contained an element of generalisation in their framing (Table 8). Nigeria comes 
second in the result (n=45) and is followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(n=31).  
 
Out of the 24 countries that celebrated their 50th anniversary, French newspapers 
reported on 19 of these countries and British newspapers reported on 11 
countries.19 There are significant differences between French and UK coverage. 
                                                      
19 As explained in Chapter 3, Zimbabwe’s 30th and Swaziland’s 40th anniversary of 






While the 5 most covered countries in France are DRC, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and 
Ivory Coast, the ones in the UK are Nigeria, DRC, Ghana, Zimbabwe and 
Swaziland. Meaningfulness – a news values identified by Galtung and Ruge (1965) 
that encompasses historical, cultural and linguistic proximity – seems here to be an 
important factor at stake in shaping the news agenda of both countries. While 4 of 
the 5 most covered countries in France are francophone countries and include 3 
former French colonies, the UK coverage includes 4 former British colonies.  
 
Table 8 - Geographical focus of the anniversaries covered in all articles  
Country / Location Total French Press UK Press 
Africa 93 71 22 
Nigeria 45 9 36 
DRC 31 15 16 
Ghana 19 5 14 
Senegal 12 8 4 
Zimbabwe 11 1 10 
Swaziland 10 1 9 
Mali 9 9  
Ivory Coast 7 6 1 
Guinea 5 5  
Mauritania 5 5  
Sierra Leone 5  5 
Chad 4 4  
United Republic of Tanzania 4  4 
Cameroon 3 1 2 
Central African Republic 3 3  
Somalia 3 2 1 
Uganda 3  3 
Gabon 2 1 1 
Madagascar 2 2  
Niger 2 2  
Benin 1 1  
Burkina Faso 1 1  
Burundi 1 1  
Congo 1 1  
                                                                                                                                         
 
these two countries to the overall list of countries, the French press reported on 21 countries 







For David Smith, the Guardian’s Africa correspondent, these historical links are an 
important aspect shaping media coverage of Africa: 
 
The British media still write about former colonies and where the 
British empire was, and French journalists still mainly write about 
the former French colonies. Part of that is the historical interest, 
and part of that is also the sheer practicality of language. A British 
journalist can probably operate quicker and easier in Zambia where 
people are speaking English and get a better story out of it, 
whereas if you go to a French-speaking country and you don’t 
speak French, it’s going to be more of an effort to get it. You may 
not have the money to hire an interpreter. So in that way, these 
things still have an impact. 
 
Similarly, Aislinn Lang – Southern Africa correspondent for the Telegraph – 
remarks that “the key interest for the British media is in the former colonies”, while 
the head of AFP in southern Africa explains that the AFP has “more offices and 
staff in francophone Africa – Dakar, Abidjan, Libreville, Kinshasa, for historical 
reasons obviously”. He further elaborates: 
 
There is no demand for Zimbabwean news among our francophone 
clients. It doesn’t work. Madagascar works in France and West 
Africa. But some of these wires are not even translated in English. 
That’s the rule of the game. (…) So here it’s not the proximity of 
the skin colour, it’s the linguistic and historical proximity. 
 
As a result and as shown in Figure 5, the map of Africa constructed through such 
coverage significantly mirrors the partition of the continent into French and 
English colonial empires, and testifies to the ongoing importance of colonial ties in 
determining the relevance and newsworthiness of African news to a given audience 
(see also Skurnik, 1981; Atwood, 1985; Meyer, 1989). 
 
There are also other factors at stake. Nigeria, which comes second across all 
coverage, is the most populated country on the continent, and also the richest 
country in terms of oil resources. Within the African context, Nigeria features as a 
leading economic nation relevant to global market trends. Its dominant position in 
the news agenda, then, links to a commercial bias that has characterised 
international news since its inception in the mid 19th century (Harris, 1981) and that 
Bunce (2013) recently found to be increasingly relevant to understanding 
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In both France and the UK, DRC ranks quite highly (respectively 10 and 13% of 
the coverage), which demonstrates a shared sense of the country’s newsworthiness. 
The DRC used to be a former Belgian colony known as the Belgian Congo. 
Perhaps more than any other part of the continent, Congo was key to the mythical 
construction of Africa as the “Dark Continent”. The country explored by Stanley 
and Livingstone served as the backdrop for Conrad’s novel Heart of Darkness 
(1899), and subsequently became associated with such expressions as “Into the 
heart of Darkness”, “Into Africa”, “Into deepest/darkest Africa”, “In the heart of 
Africa”. This association of Congo to “darkness” was sustained by the violent rule 
of Belgium King Leopold II, and was carried on during the autocratic dictatorship 
of Mobutu in the post-independence era and the subsequent conflicts following his 
overthrow. In many ways, such continuity provides a pre-written, highly symbolic 
and unambiguous media script (Galtung & M. Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 
2001) and a journalistic metaphor familiar to Western audiences (Hawk, 1992b) 
that would partly explain the salience of DRC in the news agenda of both 
countries. 
4.2.3 Most covered stories and news values 
 
To better understand the focus on these countries, it is important to look at the 
specific stories that were covered. Table 9 provides a list of the six most covered 
stories in the French and UK press respectively. 
 
These events reveal a combination of factors. In the cases of Nigeria and DRC, the 
national commemorations could be framed around something that went wrong. On 
1 October 2010, the Nigerian government organised a parade and festivities in 
Abuja. The celebrations were marked by a car-bomb attack claimed by the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Mend), which killed at least 
10 people and injured 36 (Figure 6). DRC for its part celebrated its 50th anniversary 
on 30 June 2010. A few days later, a truck incident in the Eastern part of the 
country killed at least 230 people. Four days before the celebration, there was the 
funeral of Floribert Jubeya, an important personality of the Congolese civil society 
and vocal opponent of the Kabila regime. Jubeya was murdered and the 
governmental authorities were suspected to be involved in his murder. In both 
Nigeria and DRC, then, it is insofar as these celebrations could be described as 
“tarnished”, “spoiled”, or “ruined” that they made it onto the news agenda. This 






celebrations such as Guinea, Ivory Coast and Madagascar. Madagascar, for 
instance, faced a political crisis, which resulted in describing the anniversary as 
“morose” (La Croix #17) and as a “party spoiled by a political dead end” (La Croix 
#27). 
 
Table 9 - Six most covered stories in the French and UK press  
Date Story  N° of 
articles 
French Press   
13 - 15 July 2010 Bastille Day parade in Paris 21 
28 June - 10 July 
2010 
DRC’s official celebration of 50 years of 
independence 
12 
29 - 31 May 2010 France-Africa Summit 12 
21 - 24 Sept. 2010 French Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux in visit 
in Mali for the 50th anniversary of independence 
9 
2 - 5 April 2010 Senegal unveils the monument of the African 
Renaissance 
6 
3 - 5 October 2010 Attacks during Nigeria’s jubilee 6 
   
UK Press   
3 - 5 October 2010 Attacks during Nigeria’s jubilee 24 
28 June - 10 July 
2010 
DRC’s official celebration of 50 years of 
independence 
11 
15 - 19 April 2010 Zimbabwe’s official celebration of 30 years of 
independence 
9 
6 - 8 March 2007 Ghana’s official celebration of 50 years of 
independence 
6 
3 - 5 September 
2008 
Swaziland’s official celebration of 40 years of 
independence and King Mswati III’s 40th birthday 
5 







Figure 6 - Attack during Nigeria’s celebration (Guardian, 2010) 
 
 
References to elite nations or people were also important values that made the 
anniversaries newsworthy. This was the case with the France-Africa summit held 
in Nice between 29 May and 1 June 2010. The yearly summit was held under the 
theme of the 50th anniversary of African independence and of the renewing of 
Franco-African economic relationships. Similarly, the celebration in Mali attracted 
media attention because the French Interior Minister, Brice Hortefeux, attended the 
celebration on 22 September 2010. The visit was primarily an opportunity for the 
minister to meet with President Amadou Toumani Touré to discuss the kidnapping 
of seven French workers from the French companies Areva and Satom-Vinci in 
neighbouring Niger and claimed by AQMI. As a result, the articles dealing with 
this anniversary had more to do with the diplomatic visit and threats of Islamic 
terrorism in the region, and their impact on French economic interests, than with 
the anniversary.  
 
The fact that Western officials attended the celebrations in DRC and Nigeria 
assuredly also fuelled the newsworthiness of these events. In DRC, the Belgian 
king Albert II and the queen Paola attended the celebrations. The queen was even 






controversy in the following days because the costly gift was perceived to be at 
odds with the country being one of the poorest in the world. This controversy 
further raised the media profile of the anniversary. As for Nigeria, the then British 
prime Minister Gordon Brown and the Duke of Gloucester were supposed to attend 
the parade, but pulled out of it after receiving a warning from British intelligence 
services.  
 
On 14 July 2010, France celebrated Bastille Day by inviting armies from its former 
African colonies to parade on the Champs-Elysées (Figure 7). This was the main 
initiative taken by President Sarkozy to mark an anniversary thought as a “way to 
celebrate a shared history” and a “chance to clearly confirm the changing 
relationship between France and Africa; a relationship that ought to remain 
privileged while being balanced, transparent and uninhibited” (Sarkozy, 2009). 
This celebration heavily backfired, with several newspapers noting the “paradox of 
the coloniser celebrating the emancipation of its former subject” (Le Monde #30). 
Organisations from the civil society such as the FIDH (Fédération Internationale 
des ligues des Droits de l’Homme) also complained about the “paradox of 
celebrating the values of the Republic while honouring torturers, dictators and 
other human rights predators” since France invited several armies  
 
involved in bloody repressions against civil populations: 353 dead 
in Congo in 1999 during the massacre of the Beach in Brazzaville, 
500 dead during the presidential elections in Togo in 2005, 100 
dead in Cameroon during the food riots of 2008.  
(Le Monde #30) 
 
Three other anniversary stories were framed around the perceived exuberance of 
African leadership, and around the indecency of celebrations described as lavish in 
the face of extreme poverty. On 3 April 2010, Senegal marked 50 years of 
independence by unveiling the African Renaissance monument, a 49 meters high 
bronze statue that depicts a man, woman and child emerging from a volcano 
(Figure 8). The media significantly relayed criticisms that the statue was a 
“presidential vanity project and waste of money” (Guardian #9) contrasting with 
the living conditions of Dakar’s inhabitants:  
 
Wade, 83, who is expected to seek another term in office at 
elections in 2012, has been criticised for spending so much money 
on the £17m structure, when Dakar residents, living in its shadow, 








Figure 7 - Bastille Day military parade (Telegraph, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 8 - Senegal’s statue of the African renaissance (Le Figaro, 2010) 
 
 
The style of the statue described as “Soviet realist” (Guardian #9) or “Africano-
Stalinist” (Le Figaro #4) also attracted critical media attention. In most cases, the 
coverage noted that such initiative would not benefit the population and that most 
people were, in fact, not even able to attend the ceremony. A perfect example of 
this framing is the following concluding section of an article: 
 
Seated next to her mother, the 10-year-old Mariatou wonders about 






cover the 10km between their village and the statue is too much of 
a luxury.  
(Le Figaro, #3) 
 
Similarly, the celebration of Swaziland’s 40 years of independence was marked by 
controversy because the anniversary of independence coincided with the 40th 
anniversary of King Mswati III (Figure 9). Again, journalists contrasted the 
sumptuous £ 7 million party with poverty in the country:  
 
About 70 per cent of the country's population of 1.1 million live 
off on less than 23p a day, making Swaziland one of Africa's 
poorest and least-developed nations (…) there is little to celebrate 
for the 41 per cent of Swazis who are HIV positive (the highest 
rate in the world), or the 40 per cent who are unemployed, or the 
70 per cent who live on less than 23 pence a day.  
(Times #11) 
 
Figure 9 - Swaziland’s 40th anniversary of independence (Telegraph, 2008) 
 
 
The polygamy of King Mswati III was also a significant aspect of the coverage, 
which described a traditional dance of “tens of thousands of bare-breasted virgins” 
(Times #11) during which the King could pick his 14th bride to  
 
live in one of the many palaces that the king (listed by Forbes 
magazine as the world's 15th-richest monarch) has built for them. 
She will use his helicopters and his cars. She will join his other 




In addition to the perceived exuberance of the event, and the contrast between 






nudity. Harcup and O‘Neill (2001 p. 274) identified reference to sex and nudity as 
a significant contemporary news value that also provides picture opportunities, 
something that several correspondents also noted: “certainly, when you are going 
off on a story now you are obliged to think about pictures” (Aislinn Laing, 
Southern Africa correspondent, Telegraph). 
 
Finally, Zimbabwe’s 30th anniversary of independence attracted British media 
attention, in part because of the historical links with the country, but also because 
this event provided the opportunity to tell an unambiguously negative story through 
one symbolic character, Robert Mugabe. The 30 years threshold was an occasion to 
remind British readers of the familiar script of the “liberator” becoming a “tyrant” 
(Guardian #59) who turned “so much hope into so much misery” (Telegraph #26). 
Again, the coverage stressed the contrast between lavish celebrations and the state 
of poverty in the country, with some calling the party “insensitive to the suffering 
of the country’s people” (Guardian #63). Finally, the attendance of child cadets 
during the celebrations provided noticeable visual material (Figure 10), 
symbolically echoing the image of the child soldier, which is a trope that Evans 
and Glenn (2010 p. 15) found to be “the perfect embodiment of a doomed future” 
and of Afro-pessimism. 
 







Of all the most covered stories then, only Ghana’s celebration escaped a narrow 
news selection framework, which made these anniversaries newsworthy and 
relevant insofar as something went wrong or when the anniversaries could be 
related to something controversial and exuberant, or when they directly involved 
Western nations and/or individuals. 
 
As noted previously, this selection process has partly to do with the tendency of 
news to focus on geographical areas of interests based on existing historical links. 
Similarly, for my interviewees this selection process has also to do with features of 
news production that go beyond the specific case of Africa. In this sense, Africa 
correspondent Bartholomäus Grill remarks: 
 
It’s a general approach of news: news is only bad news. That’s a 
sort of unwritten law of news making. It has nothing to do with the 
perception of Africa. This is the way a newspaper or a news 
agency works in general. 
 
Nonetheless, he recognises that the outcome of this selection process is not 
unproblematic and is not independent from existing perceptions of Africa’s 
‘Otherness’: 
 
We always carry the burden of a long history of perception of the 
‘Other’; an ‘Other’ continent, an ‘Other’ culture, ‘Other’ people 
and so on. The problem is that the reporting of Africa is usually 
very superficial: it is focused on catastrophe, wars, famines and so 
on. 
 
When it came to choosing which anniversaries to cover, David Smith (Guardian 
Africa correspondent) provides particularly revealing insights into the various 
factors at stake in the selection process and what he terms the “inbuilt 
inconsistencies”: 
 
Another illustration of the inbuilt inconsistencies is that this sort of 
50th anniversary of Cameroon and many other countries just came 
and went. We don’t do much on them. But then the 30th 
anniversary of Zimbabwe independence happened; even though 30 
years is a less significant figure, we did a whole big spread on 
them because it was Zimbabwe. (…) I do remember having a 
conversation or just thinking to myself: “ok so it’s Mugabe’s 30 
years in power or it’s a sort of cluster of African countries turning 
50. We’ll do Mugabe’s 30 years in power”. Partly because we 
write about it a lot; partly because of the British colonial links; 
partly because it was easy to get to from here; partly because 
Mugabe is such a news personality. It feels a little bit more live to 






stories about guys who are now long dead. And there is also a 
sense of “if we are going to go really big on Zimbabwe 30, it’s sort 
of pushing anniversary journalism too far to write about lots of 
countries turning 50”.  
 
In sum, while at first sight my data may give the impression of a multifarious 
coverage that included various events and different types of stories, there was in 
fact a clear logic that brought these anniversaries onto the news agenda. This 
rationale combined several requirements of news production, from the focus on 
negative events, the unambiguity of a story and its potential to provide compelling 
visual material, to a cluster of ethnocentric news values that included the focus on 
events that involved Western nations or people, or on stories and countries more 
familiar to a given national audience. In this regard, Smith’s testimony perfectly 
gives to see how these naturalised news values interact with practical 
considerations to shape the coverage. 
 
4.3 Dark and tribal? Homogenised? Voiceless? 
 
I now turn to findings of the content analysis that address more directly three 
claims found in the literature on the coverage of Africa. These are that the coverage 
systematically refers to “darkness” and “tribalism”, present “Africa as a country” 
or a homogenous entity, and tend to rely on Western/foreign sources (see section 
2.1.3). These three claims point to linguistic components through which several 
features of Afro-pessimism as defined in Chapter 2 can be deployed, namely, 
racialisation, homogenisation and selectivity. In that sense, assessing these three 
claims gives indications of the extent to which media coverage contains features 
through which Afro-pessimism can be activated. 
4.3.1 Lexical fields 
 
I assessed the first claim – the systematic references to “darkness” and “tribalism” 
– through an analysis of the lexical fields found in the coverage. Drawing on 
Fowler (1991), Machin and Mayr (2012 p. 31) compare a lexical field to a map of 
meanings that symbolically delineates areas of salience and that foregrounds 
certain features, ideas and values. I tracked a range of lexical fields throughout the 
articles to get an overall sense of the map of meanings surrounding these 
anniversaries, the results of which are found in Figure 11. The figure presents the 






categories were developed using some of the most common themes referred to in 
existing studies of media coverage of Africa. I also created other categories that 
allow capturing other lexical fields such as “economic growth”, “progress and 
achievements”, “good governance” and “culture”. Looking at lexical fields alone is 
limited in terms of revealing the rhetorical and discursive nature of the coverage; 
but it provides a first entry point that gives a sense of the vocabulary most 
commonly used in the context of these stories. 
 
Figure 11 - Percentage of articles in which selected lexical fields appeared 
 
 
The four most prevalent lexical fields were those of social and political instability 
(55%), violence and death (49%), corruption (38%) and poverty (34%). The 
coverage routinely commented on these anniversaries in relation to “poor” or 
“impoverished” people “in risk of dying” and “victims of violence”, to states being 
described as “collapsing”, “anarchic”, “oppressive” and to leaders as “corrupt”, 
“despotic” or “autocratic”. However, the lexical field of “progress and 
achievements” comes 5th in these results (21%), and 13% of articles contained the 
lexical fields of “good governance” and “economic progress” which suggests that 






Moreover, and quite significantly, the lexical fields of “tribalism” (8%) and 
“darkness” (6%) – that is, the use of words such as “tribe”, “tribalism”, “tribal”, 
“ethnic” “or “dark”, “darkness”, “darkly”, “gloom”, “gloomily”, “bleak” – were far 
from being systematic features of the coverage.  
4.3.2 Conflation 
 
In a debate organised by the Guardian development network to debunk the “Myths 
about Africa”, panellist Onyekachi Wambu started the debate by saying that “the 
biggest and most pernicious myth about Africa is that you can talk about a 
continent that can contain China, the United States, most of Western Europe, India 
and make these kinds of generalisation” (Chambers, 2014).  
 
In order to assess the extent to which media coverage contributes to a view of 
Africa as homogenous, I used several tools. Throughout my corpus, I tracked all 
generic references to Africa, that is, instances where articles refer to “Africa”, 
“African” or the “continent”. This is done through the use of various nouns and 
adjectives that can appear negligible: “governance on the continent”, “in sub-
Saharan Africa”, “in Africa”, “sub-Saharan Africa continues to”, “to feed the 
whole of Africa”, “Africa’s biggest oil industry”, “most African countries”, “the 
continent’s most effective fighters”. One generic reference to Africa in an article 
does not necessarily make for a clear case of conflation. But it can act as a subtle 
linguistic marker that activates in the reader’s mind an “Africa frame”.  
 
In order to identify more precisely how journalistic writing contributes to a 
conflated view of the continent, I also looked at three further linguistic strategies: 
active generalisation, comparison and overlexicalisation.  
 
*Active generalisation: This is when one country is taken to evoke a larger African 
phenomenon, when a text relates a specific case to Africa as a whole. An example 
of such active generalisation can be seen in the following article: 
 
Ghana, which on independence had an economy larger than South 









Here, the reading and understanding of the story is actively framed within a 
broader “Africa” framework that conflates Ghana’s situation with that of “modern 
Africa”. 
 
*Comparison: Another strategy that I identified is comparison. For instance, 
Philippe Bernard in Le Monde (#11) paints a broad-brush comparison between six 
different countries so as to ultimately evoke, explicitly, a generalised view of 
Africa: 
 
From Liberia to Sierra Leone, war lords driven by a murderous 
madness and sustained by the wealth of raw materials turned 
children into killing machines (1989-2003). From Sudan to Angola 
and from Somalia to Congo, Africa was a patchwork of civil wars 
for the control of natural resources and power. [my emphasis] 
(Le Monde #11) 
 
There were other ways for comparisons to be used to contribute to a generalised 
view. In an interview with Guinean militant Alioune Tine, journalist Philippe 
Bernard (Le Monde #6) asks him a question about Guinean president Lansana 
Conté: “so, in a way, he behaved like Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe?” The 
respondent then leans into this leading question: “Yes. Conté truly is the Mugabe 
of francophone Africa given his sort of mad way of running power, and his belief 
that the country belongs to him” [my emphasis]. This quote is then used as the title 
of the article “The Mugabe of francophone Africa”. Up to this point, the interview 
did not contain any generic reference. By using such a leading question, the 
journalist effectively puts the reference to Mugabe in the mouth of the respondent. 
This comparison then contributes to reframing the interview within an existing and 
easily understandable framework of the “bad African leader” driven by “power” 
and “madness”; an “essentialist and racist assumption (…) [that] suggests that 
African somehow have a higher propensity to being ‘corrupt dictators’” (Willems, 
2015 p. 306). 
 
Two final examples of how comparisons are used to evoke a larger African 
framework can be found in La Croix: 
 
Although not a "Narco-state" like Guinea-Bissau or Conakry, 
Ghana is showered with money and drugs, among the political 
class as well.  







Senegal is often presented as model of democracy compared to 
other countries on the continent. But this assessment should not 
blind us from the fact that several acts of violence have hindered 
the democratic process in the country.  
(La Croix #11) 
 
These comparisons start by differentiating the situation of one country (Ghana and 
Senegal) to its immediate neighbours (Guinea-Bissau and Guinea Conakry) or 
“other countries on the continent”. At first, the comparison seems to introduce a 
positive statement (“Unlike elsewhere, …”). However, this is instantly undermined 
as the articles note dysfunctional aspects (“showered with money and drugs”; 
“several acts of violence”). In doing so, these comparisons not only turn a similarly 
positive statement into a negative one, but they also implicitly but actively create a 
broader “African” reference framework which is simultaneously mobilised to 
frame these statements. 
 
*Overlexicalisation: Machin and Mayr (2012 p. 37) define overlexicalisation as the 
“abundance of particular words and their synonyms” that create a form of over-
persuasion. In my case, I looked at the overlexicalisation of generic references to 
“Africa”, “African” or “the continent”.  
 
The article below was published in the Financial Times and provides a compelling 
example of how the overlexicalisation of generic references to Africa works. These 
lexical reminders are disseminated throughout the article and within each 
paragraph. In doing so, overlexicalisation serves to foreground the particular case 
of Ghana within a continental framework. In this particular article, the sense of 
over-persuasion is reinforced by the simultaneous reliance on comparisons and 
generalisation. 
 
“Ghana-ing votes; Thriving democracy is a rare model for 
Africa” (Financial Times, 8 January 2009). 
 
Elections of one sort or another have taken place in all 48 sub-
Saharan African countries in the past decade. On a continent that 
has also experienced some 83 successful coups in half a century, 
this is often cited as a mark of progress.  
 
Many elections, however, have not in themselves translated into 
greater stability or social justice. In most countries, voting has 
merely added trappings to a new form of one-party rule, where 
incumbent regimes control electoral machinery and use patronage 
and oppression to maintain power. A slew of election setbacks 






by ethnic discord and beset by development challenges is yet 
suited to western democracy. 
 
Nigeria's 2007 polls were marred by fraud of every kind. In 
Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe is still in power nine months after he 
and his party were beaten at the ballot box. Kenya is struggling to 
overcome the traumatic aftermath of its own hotly disputed 
elections. Overall, the evidence suggests Africans still tend to vote 
along ethnic lines – rather than for what they believe in – and that 
their leaders rarely miss an opportunity to cling to power. The 
combination can be deadly. 
 
In this context, Ghana's elections, culminating in victory at the 
weekend for John Atta Mills, the opposition candidate, are cause 
for celebration. Yesterday, Ghanaians witnessed the second 
constitutional transfer of power in a decade. Only Benin, on the 
mainland continent, has experienced alternating political power of 
this kind. 
 
The peaceful outcome was the more remarkable for following such 
a tight contest with so much at stake. Only 40,000 out of 9m votes 
separated the ruling party candidate and his victorious opponent, to 
whose government the first drops of Ghanaian oil will accrue. 
Ghana was the first African country to win independence and 
among the first to be ravaged by coups and counter coups. Two 
years ago, the country celebrated its 50th anniversary of 
independence. It is now blazing a trail towards more democratic 
rule. 
 
Yet Ghanaians, like many other Africans, are divided along ethnic 
lines in who they vote for. They face the same daunting 
development challenges as their peers. 
 
What has made the difference is that successive leaders have 
allowed an independent media to flourish and an autonomous 
electoral commission to gain strength as an institution, and with it 
public trust. In the process, Ghanaians are becoming increasingly 
demanding of performance from their politicians. Their example is 
particularly welcome at a time when real democracy in Africa is 
otherwise under threat. 
 
This article also shows how a comparison can take the form of a positive statement 
– “Ghana is a rare model for Africa”; “Only Benin, on the mainland continent, has 
experienced alternating political power of this kind”– which ultimately recreates 
broader “African standards”, as the positive example of Ghana is presented as an 
exception, in opposition to “Africa” where “real democracy (…) is otherwise under 
threat”. 
 
The foreign correspondents I interviewed claimed to be careful about generic 






creeping in, but I hope not ever in my writing” (East Africa Correspondent 1). 
Similarly, Aislinn Laing, the Telegraph’s Southern Africa correspondent, said that 
she was careful when referring to “Africa” in an article: 
 
I try not to use Africa because I obviously don’t think that you can 
put an entire continent into a word. I don’t feel I need to and I 
don’t feel any frustration with the fact that I can’t use the word 
Africa. If you are writing about one particular issue that is that 
country’s issue, then you don’t need to broaden it to say Africa. 
(…) I think I resist any attempt to refer to Africa as a whole, ever. 
 
Laing then tried to identify more precisely if and when she does use the word 
Africa and suggests that generalisation can occur as a result of fairly practical 
reasons:  
 
I’m trying to think when do I use the word Africa. I mean, I very 
rarely just write Africa. I’m writing about African elephants and 
how many there are at the moment. But as a reference to an issue I 
would never use the word African. I could be proved wrong, I’m 
sure, if you go through my articles and find some references to it. 
(…) Sometimes people use broad-brush because they know that 
they can’t be accurate in the time that they have. To find the 
statistics for one specific country can be difficult. For example, 
I’ve been trying to find the statistics for how many elephants are 
killed in Southern Africa each year and I can’t. So I’m having to 
use the African statistics. So you sometimes have to be broad-
brush because you don’t have the time or the ability to be able to 
find the very specific stats. So when they talk about other African 
countries it’s because actually they don’t have the time to probably 
go and find out which ones it is. In a way that’s better to be broad-
brush rather than trying to be more specific and getting it wrong. 
But yes there is that danger. 
 
Figure 12 shows that 72% of all articles made use of generic references. This result 
shows a discrepancy between generic references to Africa in 73% of the articles 
and the 33% of articles that had an initial continental framing. It is also noticeable 
that there is a much greater discrepancy in the context of British reporting (74% of 
generic references for 17% of articles with a continental framing) than in the 
French context (72% for 46% of articles with a continental framing). Overall, 
conflation was certainly constitutive of the coverage as a whole. 47% of the articles 
contained cases of conflation, through active generalisation, comparisons and/or 
overlexicalisation. While foreign correspondents claim to avoid generalisation as 
much as possible, this finding suggests that this may occur more often that they are 







Figure 12 - Generic references to Africa and conflation (in %) 
 
 
These conclusions echo the results of an application created by data-driven 
journalist Nicolas Kayser-Bril (2013). Using the APIs of the Guardian and the New 
York Times, the application measures how many articles mention “Africa” without 
referring to a specific country. This result is then compared to articles that refer to 
“Asia” without mentioning a specific country. The results demonstrate that there 
are many more articles referring to “Africa” in generic terms than to “Asia”, with 
respectively 8601 and 2783 articles in the Guardian since 1 January 2012. In 
addition, it shows that articles mentioning Africa in generic terms are much more 
likely to occur than articles that mention 1 of the 3 biggest African economies with 
South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria respectively appearing in 6871, 4394, 2343 
articles. Again, these results are at odds with those for Asia where China was 
referred to in 15126 articles, India in 8309 and Japan in 7913. That such a 
differential treatment between Africa and Asia persists in two of the most 
internationally respected broadsheet newspapers is an indication that the 
encouraging signs noted by Scott (2009) with regard to the UK press coverage of 
Africa should not blind us to ongoing features of this coverage that indeed seems to 
be specific to Africa. 
 
While my findings support the view that the coverage of Africa is pervaded by 
conflation that contributes to a generalised view of Africa, two observations 
nuance these results. Firstly, my corpus contains several articles that are not written 
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news pages (e.g. culture, editorials, domestic news, comment/opinion pieces). In 
addition, my interviews confirmed that most correspondents do not write their own 
headlines – something that I discuss in more depth in Chapter 7. I found several 
cases of active generalisation in the headlines, where the article focuses on one 
country but its title refers to Africa more generally: 
 
•  “Wearing a red nose for Africa’s corrupt clowns is a bad joke” for an article 
on Ghana (Telegraph #13); 
• “Africa’s other Zimbabwe” for an article on Swaziland (Guardian.co.uk 
#40); 
• “The Mugabe of francophone Africa” for an article on Guinea (Le Monde 
#6); 
•  “Ghana-ing votes; Thriving democracy is a rare model for Africa” for an 
article on Ghana (Financial Times #9); 
• “France, the main target of Islamic terrorism in Africa” for an article on Mali 
(Le Monde #33); 
• “Africa at 50” for an article on Nigeria (Times #20); 
• “Nouakchott, the first capital born African” for an article on Mauritania (Le 
Monde #45). 
 
There is therefore the possibility that conflation maybe more likely to occur in 
articles not written by foreign correspondents, and/or maybe the result of the 
editing process back home. Secondly, 33% of the articles contained an initial 
continental framing which already constitutes a process of conflation. While there 
is a discrepancy between these 33% of articles with an initial “Africa” framing and 
the 47% of articles containing cases of conflation, this discrepancy remains 
relatively low (14%). If we remove the 33% of articles with an initial continental 
framing, then the proportion of articles containing cases of conflation is 20%. In 
that sense, conflation through generalisation, comparison and/or overlexicalisation 
was a feature observed in the coverage but it was not systematic.  
4.3.3 Voices and quoting verbs 
 
As discussed in section 2.1.3, several scholars have emphasised the overreliance on 
Western sources. Yet, the extent of such bias in media coverage has not really been 






exceptions of Bunce (2011) and Malaolu (2014). When it comes to newspapers 
analysis, this perhaps has to do with the difficulty in assigning a category to an 
individual based on textual material only. If one is interested at looking at a 
potential skin-colour bias, this is easier done with TV coverage, although it still 
raises issues about the epistemological violence that exists in subsuming and 
classifying an individual under one category (Levinas, 1974). In my case, then, I 
made the choice to categorise speakers according to (a) their professional 
occupation and (b) nationality or the national affiliation of the institution they 
represent, insofar as the text makes this evident. As such, this categorisation does 
not seek to make a statement about the individuals’ identity – something 
fundamentally multifarious, mixed, unstable and complex. Rather it is interested in 
understanding how the media comes to frame individuals as representative of 
certain nations and parts of the world, and especially if this is done at the expense 
of others. In spite of the limitations of such categorisation, this remains nonetheless 
a useful tool to understand partly who is given a voice in media discourse.20 
Categories were developed by using those found in previous studies and by 
expanding them to get a more detailed and accurate understanding of the voices 
quoted (see appendix II for details on the categories used). 
 
As can be seen in Table 10 and 11 below, politicians are the most visible, with 
n=80 and n=116 in the UK and French press respectively. Bearing in mind the 
specificity of my site of analysis, these results align with the long-standing and 
broader tendency of news to give prominence to official voices, and in particular 
government representatives. In the French press, politicians are followed by 
journalists (n=29), academics (n=22) and members of the civil society (n=18); and 
in the UK press, by members of the civil society (n=26), NGO representatives 
(n=22) and vox pop (n=21). 
 
 
                                                      
20 If an individual is identified by her/his nationality, this takes precedence over their 
institutional affiliation. However, when this was not the case, the institutional affiliation 
was used instead (when applicable). For instance a researcher at the Paris School of 
Economics might be American and identified as such in an article. However, if he/she is 
presented simply as a “researcher” at the Paris’s School of Economy, then it is the national 






Table 10 - Individuals quoted in the French press 
 French British Other 
Euro 




Politician 56 0 2 2 56 0 116 
Journalist 10 0 3 0 15 1 29 
Academic 13 0 1 0 8 0 22 
Civil society 2 0 0 0 15 1 18 
Expert 12 0 0 0 1 1 14 
Other 2 0 0 0 8 3 13 
NGO 5 0 0 0 1 3 9 
Vox Pop 0 0 0 0 7 1 8 
Business 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
        
Sub-Total 103 0 6 2 111 10 232 
 
Table 11 - Individuals quoted in the British press 
 French British Other 
Euro 




Politician 6 12 5 5 52 0 80 
Civil society 0 0 1 0 25 0 26 
NGO 1 10 1 0 4 6 22 
Vox Pop 0 0 0 0 20 1 21 
Academic 1 5 0 0 8 1 16 
Business 0 9 1 0 4 1 15 
Other 0 0 2 0 8 4 14 
Journalist 0 2 1 0 8 0 11 
Expert 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 
        
Sub-Total 8 43 11 6 129 13 210 
 
 
When it comes to the use of Western sources (French, British, other European and 
US American), both the French and UK press favour national sources with 
respectively 103 French voices and 43 British voices. But, overall, do journalists 
significantly quote more Western sources than African ones? Figure 13 provides 






overall African sources. The results highlight that the media use either as much 
African as Western voices in the French press (48% for both), or, in fact, more in 
the UK press (32% of Western voices as opposed to 61% of African voices).  
 
Figure 13 - Proportion of Western vs. African interviewees 
 
 
On the one hand, these results seem to undermine the idea that there is a strong bias 
in favour of Western sources. In fact, there seems to be a strong awareness among 
correspondents about balancing sources. For instance, East Africa correspondent 1 
expressed concerns about a subtle bias in the use of sources: 
 
Take the example of South Sudan when it was becoming 
independent in 2011 where a lot of foreign journalists flew in, 
including a lot of young freelance journalists. During that time, 
what you would see is that the voice of reasonable authority would 
be a white man. And then, the kind of local colour would be a dude 
seating under a tree. And you would always see that the only black 
South Sudanese boy would be a poor dude on the street, and the 
only brainy boys would always be the white dudes. That kind of 
thing really worries me so I would always make sure that I always 
quoted a South Sudanese brain. Because, of course, it is really easy 
to ring WHO (World Health Organization) – they have a good 
press department – so that you can get the authority voice, and then 
do a vox pop in the street. And I think it shifted insidiously the 
voice of reason to the white man. (…) If you look at who gets 
quoted, that is part of – I don’t know if it’s Afro-pessimism – but 
of the failure of journalism to capture the complexity of such 
situations. (…) It’s very easy to be lazy and not to see the impact. 


















On the other hand, one could make the case that a significant part of African news 
stories remains told through the voice of Western individuals. Moreover, and as the 
previous quote suggests, it is important to ask what kinds of African voices are 
given space to speak in the news.  
 
Once again, elite voices are given the most weight (Table 10 and 11), with nearly 
half being politicians (45%); they are followed by members of the civil society 
(17%), journalists (10%), vox pop (9%) and academics (6%). This salience of 
African politicians and government officials should be understood in the context of 
a broader framing of African leadership. Table 12 below provides a list of the five 
heads of state the most referred to in all articles. 
 
Table 12 - Top five African heads of state most referred to in the coverage 
Name N° of Articles 
French Press  
Joseph Kabila (DRC) 13 
Laurent Gbagbo (Ivory Coast) 13 
Amadou Toumani Touré (Mali) 10 
Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal) 9 
Goodluck Jonathan (Nigeria) 6 
  
UK Press  
Goodluck Jonathan (Nigeria) 24 
Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) 23 
Joseph Kabila (DRC) 13 
King Mswati III (Swaziland) 9 
John Kufuor (Ghana) 9 
 
Joseph Kabila (DRC), Goodluck Jonathan (Nigeria), John Kufuor (Ghana), Robert 
Mugabe (Zimbabwe), King Mswati III (Swaziland), Amadou Toumani Touré 
(Mali) and Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal) figure high in these results given that their 
countries were among those that received most coverage. But if we remove all the 
stories on Zimbabwe from this count, it appears that Mugabe still appears very 
often, in particular throughout the UK coverage, with 14 articles not about 






referred to African head of states (n=13) whereas only six articles were initially 
about Ivory Coast. In an article on Ghana’s jubilee, Chris McGreal writes: 
 
African leaders, including South Africa's Thabo Mbeki and Robert 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe, joined the celebrations along with 
celebrities such as Pelé. [my emphasis]  
(Guardian #6)  
 
Similarly, David Smith writes about the ceremonies organised in DRC for the 50th 
anniversary of independence:  
 
A total of 18 African presidents, including Zimbabwe's Robert 
Mugabe, watched a parade of 15,000 soldiers and 400 tanks and 
heard Congo's leader, Joseph Kabila, call for a “moral revolution”. 
[my emphasis]  
(Guardian #33) 
 
While it is understandable that a news article cannot list all the names of 18 heads 
of state, the singling-out of Mugabe is a telling example of a peculiar discursive 
construction of African leadership in the press. In the interview, Smith explained: 
 
Part of the British media’s obsession with Zimbabwe is the 
historical link. But also it has its own characteristics about this 
dramatic fall from grace. And Robert Mugabe has become almost 
this symbolic African dictator figure. He’s a news celebrity so we 
are much more likely to write about him than Paul Biya who most 
people in Britain have never heard of, whereas they probably have 
heard of Mugabe. This again is sort of indicative of how all news, 
not just African, really feeds off personalities. You have to give 
something a human face. You have to tell the story through a 
person. And Mugabe is this sort of larger than life figure so that’s 
often the touchdown. 
 
When presented with the example above taken from his article, he said: 
 
I feel like I’m on trial and you are confronting me with the 
evidence of my past sins! [Laughing] “18 African presidents, 
including Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe”, yes that’s right. But a lot 
of this, one has to bear in mind, is something that’s not unique to 
Africa but is actually representative of the way the media works 
worldwide. 
 
Again, the specificity of news – beyond the particular case of Africa – is pointed 
out to account for this linguistic choice. The first example written by Chris 
McGreal does demonstrate that news more routinely feeds off personality, as it 
mentions Mugabe alongside Mbeki and Pelé. While this provides some answers as 
to why this occurs – a why located in the specificity of news production – this 






narrative about “bad African governance” (Willems, 2015 p. 305). By associating 
systematically Mugabe with other African leaders, then, such instances 
simultaneously frame, conflate and frontload a very specific idea of African 
leadership as systematically and essentially dysfunctional, something made very 
explicit in the headline of an opinion piece published on Ghana’s jubilee: “Wearing 
a red nose for Africa’s corrupt clowns is a bad joke” (Telegraph #13). In sum, 
although there were as many African voices as Western ones in all articles (and 
even more in the case of UK newspapers), the coverage did not necessarily 
constitute a media space that empowers Africans to tell their own stories and 
address their own concerns, given that this space was heavily dominated by 
politicians which, additionally, are framed in such terms.  
 
Another way to understand how voices are framed in media discourse is to look at 
the quoting verbs used to introduce them. For instance, is the person “saying”, 
“explaining”, “ordering”, “complaining” or “adding”? The way a speaker is 
introduced impacts the way the reader is invited to engage with that person. These 
subtle linguistic choices implicitly convey judgments and connote or undermine 
agency. They position the individuals quoted in specific ways and can even make 
evaluation as to whether the person should be trusted or their comments dismissed. 
Drawing on Caldas-Coulthard’s typology (1994) of quoting verbs and their 
connotation, I coded the quoting verbs used to introduce speakers. This 
classification includes seven categories: 
 
* (1) Neutral verbs such as “say” or “tell” that do not introduce any particular 
judgment or evaluation about the speaker. 
 
* Metapropositional verbs that convey the author’s interpretation of the person 
quoted and which can be broken down into three types: (2) assertive verbs such as 
“explain” or “announce” where the speaker is positioned as a reliable, balanced and 
rational voice; (3) directive verbs where the speaker “orders” or “instructs” and 
which can connote authority and control; (4) expressive verbs such as “complains” 
or “claims” that frame the speaker in more emotional terms, as more defensive and 
possibly less in control. 
 
* (5) Metalinguistic verbs characterise the language used by the person to talk such 







* (6) Descriptive verbs such as “laugh” or “gasp” which relate what is being said to 
the attitude of, and interaction with, the speaker. 
 
* (7) Transcriptive verbs, finally, signify that what is being said relates to things 
previously discussed or marks the continuation of someone’s speech, for instance 
“add” or “go on”. These verbs can signify that these speakers are given more space 
to expand on their ideas, or it may link different pieces of speech together. 
 
Table 13 provides an overview of the quoting verbs used to introduce interviewees 
identified as African or Western (as defined previously).  
 
Table 13 - Quoting verbs used to introduce African and Western voices 










Neutral 21 25 46 104 63 167 
Assertive 34 86 120 8 24 32 
Directive 9 2 11 5 1 6 
Expressive 61 16 77 19 8 27 
Metalinguistic 5 1 6 1 1 2 
Descriptive 6 1 7 2 2 4 
Transcriptive 18 18 36 5 6 11 
Total 154 149 303 144 105 249 
 
To begin with, there is a strong imbalance in the use of neutral verbs between the 
French and the UK press. With 46 neutral quoting verbs used for a total of 303 
verbs in the French press, and 167 neutral verbs used for 249 quoting verbs overall 
in the UK press, there seems to be a clear journalistic difference between the two 
countries. In their attempt to define different types of journalistic cultures, Hallin 
and Mancini (2004) identified France as part of a polarised pluralist model 
characterised by more opinion based journalism and literary writing. British 
journalism, for its part, is part of an Anglo-American tradition that favours 






quoting verbs partly testifies to these historical, and ongoing, journalistic 
differences (Esser & Umbricht, 2014).  
 
Beyond these national differences, we can see similar discrepancies, notably in the 
ways in which both French and British journalists make use of assertive and 
expressive verbs that mark the author’s interpretation of the speaker (Table 14). 
 
Table 14 - Chances of speakers to be quoted neutrally, assertively & expressively 
(%) 









Chances to be quoted neutrally 14% 17% 72% 60% 
Chances to be quoted assertively 22% 58% 5% 23% 
Chances to be quoted expressively 40% 11% 13% 7% 
 
In both cases, the chances of an African source to be quoted assertively were much 
lower than for a Western source (22% vs. 58% in France; 5% vs. 23% in the UK). 
Similarly, the chances of an African source to be quoted expressively were higher 
than for a Western source (40% vs. 11% in France; 13% vs. 7% in the UK). There 
was little use of directive verbs but once again, the chances of African interviewees 
to be framed in a directive way were much higher. It should be noted here that 
expressive or directive quoting verbs do not have a single connotative value. For 
instance, depicting a speaker as directive can connote authority, but it does not 
necessarily imply a value judgment as to the validity or legitimacy of this 
authority. Similarly, introducing a speaker as expressive is not necessarily 
disempowering, and can, in fact, bring the speaker emotionally closer to the reader. 
These results should therefore be read against the specificity of this site of analysis, 
and in particular the fact that politicians dominated African voices. But politicians 
also dominated Western voices. Such consistent discrepancies – in particular, that 
African voices were systematically framed as less assertive – therefore suggest a 











This chapter provided the first part of my investigation into the British and French 
press coverage of the 50th anniversaries of independence. I analysed the context 
and ways in which these anniversaries became news and several linguistic 
components of this coverage in relation to features of news production. The 50th 
anniversaries of independence were moulded so as to fit several requirements of 
news production. Newspapers tended to focus on stories that concerned the former 
colonies of their respective national market. The anniversaries mainly became 
news insofar as they could be related to something negative, controversial, 
exuberant or when it directly involved Western nations or people. I then looked at 
three core claims of the literature and assessed the extent to which they characterise 
the way British and French journalists write about Africa in the context of this site. 
These three claims point to linguistic components through which several features 
of Afro-pessimism as defined in Chapter 2 are deployed, namely, homogenisation, 
racialisation and selectivity. Therefore, assessing these claims provides some 
indication of the extent to which media coverage contains features through which 
Afro-pessimism can be activated. 
 
The coverage dominantly drew on lexical fields that do paint a bleak picture 
(“social and political instability”, “violence and death”, “corruption” and 
“poverty”). However, references to “darkness” and “tribalism” were far from being 
systematic, a finding that contrasts with previous studies (Hawk, 1992b; Spurr, 
1993; Brookes, 1995). Whereas 1/3rd of the articles initially had a continental 
framing, more than 2/3rd contained generic references to Africa, and nearly 50% 
contained cases of conflation through active generalisation, comparisons and/or 
overlexicalisation. This finding however is nuanced by the fact that of all the 
articles not initially framed in a continental perspective, 20% contained cases of 
conflation. Finally, I showed that in the French coverage there were as many 
African as Western voices, and that in the UK coverage there were more African 
voices than Western ones. However (1), these were dominated by politicians that 
were more broadly framed in a way that undermined a sense of African agency or 
empowerment; and (2) there was a subtle linguistic bias in that journalists 







In the context of this site, the claims that the coverage of African news 
systematically refers to “darkness” and “tribalism”, treats Africa as a country and 
relies pre-dominantly on Western voices do not appear to be supported by the 
analysis. However, this does not mean that Afro-pessimism was absent from the 
coverage or that the coverage did not testify to the endurance of mythical 
representations. In fact, my analysis revealed that processes of conflation, while 
not systematic, are nonetheless constitutive of the coverage, and that the framing of 
African voices is impacted by a subtle bias linked to peculiar perceptions of 
African political leadership. In order to shed further light on the discursive nature 
of this coverage, in the next chapter, I provide a more qualitative and critical 






CHAPTER 5 - After 50 years, what is there to celebrate? 




There is nothing happy about independence 50. What 
are we celebrating? Our independence every year 
should be a time of reflection when everybody locks 
themselves up in a dark room and cries. 
(Seun Keuti, 2011) 
 
In this chapter, I carry on my investigation into the coverage of the anniversaries of 
independence by providing a qualitative and critical analysis of media discourse. 
The chapter is structured in three key moments. I start by analysing editorials to 
assess when the anniversaries were deemed newsworthy enough to be given 
salience, and what discourse is constructed in these editorials. I then take a 
qualitative and interpretive approach to analyse the construction of a discursive 
common sense in the coverage at large. While the primary aim of my analysis is to 
identify dominant narratives and linguistic and rhetorical trends across all articles, I 
also make use of a core analytical tool of discourse analysis, namely the appraisal 
of silences, i.e. I ask what is not being said and why? In the last section, I bring 
back this media discourse to what it tells us about the societies that produced it. I 
propose to step outside the conceptual lens of Afro-pessimism and to interpret the 
ideological function of the press coverage in relation to the uneasiness of 
contemporary France and Britain to engage with their colonial past.  
 
5.1 The anniversaries in the editorials 
 
I start my analysis by looking at editorials. Editorials have a very salient place in 
newspapers; they appear in the first pages and tackle what a newspaper sees as the 
main news of the day. Moreover, editorials are not merely personal opinions but 
argumentative reports advising social and political elites on specific issues, in 
particular in the case of broadsheet papers (van Dijk, 1991 p. 126). In that sense 
they are “manifestations of more complex, socially shared, and dominant 
ideological frameworks that embody institutional relationships and power” (van 






Monde. These constitute only two articles out of a corpus of 282 articles and, as 
such, I am not claiming that they are representative of the entire coverage. But 
given their salient and authoritative position, I now provide a close analysis of their 
linguistic and rhetorical features so as to understand under which discursive 
circumstances the anniversaries were deemed newsworthy enough to be given 
prominence. 
5.1.1 Lexical fields and conflation 
 
The first editorial published in December 2008 concerns Guinea (Le Monde #2). It 
does not focus on the anniversary of independence per se, an event celebrated in 
October 2008. It uses the anniversary as a backdrop to frame the present situation 
of the country as it faces political instability in the aftermath of the death of its 
president Lansana Conté. The second editorial uses the celebration of the 
anniversary of independence in DRC as a news peg for political instability and 
human rights violation in the country (Le Monde #27). Both editorials attempt at 
interpreting the present situation of the countries in the context of the 50 years 
post-independence.  
 
They both make extensive use of the lexical fields of death and violence, poverty, 
political instability and corruption: for Guinea, “death”, “confusion”, “distress”, 
“putsch attempt”, “poor Guinea”, “Stalinist dictatorship”, “military rule”, “abusive 
power”, “catastrophic”, “one of the most corrupted in the world”; for DRC, 
“human rights violations”, “strangled”, “war”, “dictatorship”, “state weakness”, 
“militias that terrorise and rape”, “persecutions”, “murders”, “appalling business 
environment”, “attacks”, “poverty”, “torture”, “decline”. Both editorials appeal to a 
broader “African” framework via the use of generic references (“one of the richest 
countries in Africa”; “at the heart of the African continent”) and active 
generalisation. For instance, the description of Guinea’s president Sékou Touré 
rule as an “African style of Stalinist dictatorship” purposely evokes an image of 
“bad African governance” (Willems, 2015). DRC, for its part, is taken as an 
example symbolising most of postcolonial Africa: “the former Belgian Congo 
dramatically symbolises the regressive spiral that took hold of a great many 
African states during this postcolonial half-century”.  
 
This conflation is reinforced by the use of the language of darkness and 






distress more than ever”. Its population is “exasperated” and “worn out” and its 
“only hope is that they [the people] have nothing to lose”. The use of the adverb 
“gloomily” to describe the anniversary reinforces this sense of despair and 
hopelessness. Similarly, DRC’s anniversary is described as “tragically grotesque” 
and is associated, very saliently, in the title with the heart of darkness: “In Congo, 
an anniversary into the heart of darkness”. The opening sentence geographically 
plays out this metaphor by dramatically evoking a “red light flickering in the heart 
of the African continent”. Such metaphor not only geographically locates Congo 
“in the heart of the continent”, but it also actively frames Congo as “the heart of 
the continent” – metaphorically capturing some form of ‘African’ essence. 
5.1.2 Interpretation and prediction 
 
Both editorials reveal a need to inscribe the two national histories within a linear 
historical narrative reminiscent of the colonial perception of Africa as lacking 
history or out of history. The most famous formulation of this argument in the 19th 
century was Hegel’s exclusion of Africa from universal history (Hegel, 1861; 
Camara, 2005); a discourse that “denies history as well as place, constituting the 
past as absence, but also designating that absence as a negative presence” (Spurr, 
1993 p. 98). Perhaps less known are the words of Victor Hugo, French literary hero 
of the 19th century and often heralded as the defender of the oppressed given his 
engagement against the death penalty and social inequalities:  
 
Africa has no history; some sort of large and dark legend 
surrounds her (…) Africa is the tropical blazing. It seems that to 
see Africa is to be blinded. An excess of sun is an excess of night. 
(…) There are only two sides to this savage Africa: populated, it is 
then barbarous; deserted, it is wild. (…) In the 19th century, the 
white man transformed the black into a man; in the 20th century, 
Europe will turn Africa into a new world. The problem is to create 
a new Africa, to make the old Africa suitable to civilization. 
Europe will solve it. Hail, people! Seize this land. Take it. From 
whom? From no one. Take this land from God. God gives the land 
to men. God gives Africa to Europe. Take it. [my emphasis] 
 
(Hugo, 1879 in M’Bokolo, 2008 p. 3) 
 
Such perspective on Africa as a terra nullius, out of history, stuck in a repetitive 
and circular temporality conditioned by “darkness” and “primitivism”, was not the 
prerogative of a few thinkers. Rather, it was part of the broader paradigm that 
underpinned the European debates on the civilising mission of colonialism. 






modern civilisation and out of the historical progress towards human flourishing 
and the expansion of rationality, until or unless Western countries were to be 
involved (M’Bokolo, 2008; Spurr, 1993).  
 
This colonial fascination with a perceived lack of history is echoed in the 
description of Guinea as a country that “entered history with great fanfare” at the 
time of independence. This “entry into history” is immediately contrasted with the 
present situation as the country “starts the 21st century in tatters”. This statement 
not only implies that the country’s history started after independence, as if it had 
not pre-colonial or colonial history; it also implies that the country ultimately failed 
to “enter history” as demonstrated by its current catastrophic situation. In the case 
of DRC, the salient use of the “heart of darkness” in the title carries a similar 
colonial tone, implying that nothing has changed and that the country is stuck in a 
circular temporality of “darkness”. Another testament to the reliance on the 
framework of a linear historical narrative is the description of the independence as 
something “reached” rather than “won” or “fought for” – an expected step in the 
trajectory of progress that ultimately proved to be too big of a challenge for the two 
countries. 
 
This postcolonial failure is further assessed via the use of a ranking framework that 
relies on standards established by international institutions: 
 
[Guinea] is ranked 160 out of 177 in terms of standards of living 
by the UN; it is considered one of the most corrupted in the world 
and half of its population lives with less than 1 dollar per day. 
 
DRC, for its part, is “ranked second to last in the World Bank’s ranking for its 
appalling ‘business environment’”. The main reason behind their failure then 
comes down to one thing: irrationality. The results for Guinea in the post-
independence years are “as catastrophic as they are absurd”; while in the DRC they 
come from the “regressive spiral” seen in “great many African states”. As a way to 
further stress the irrationality behind the two countries’ situation, the editorials 
contrast the potential for success (assessed via the countries’ material richness) 
with actual results: 
 
While Guinea is one of the richest countries in Africa, its 







While a geological miracle, the Congo, one of the poorest 
countries on the continent, is also ranked second to last in the 
World Bank’s ranking for its appalling “business environment”.  
 
These statements reinforce the sense that the terrible results are somehow 
inexplicable; that the countries were seemingly in the best position to flourish after 
becoming independent. This decontextualised presentation of the postcolonial 
failure as the result of some irrationality carries racist undertones that promote a 
racialised view of black individuals as less rational and more instinctive. This 
decontextualisation also links to the myth of decolonisation as turning the page of 
colonial history that I discussed in the previous chapter; appealing to irrationality 
prevents from engaging with the actual rationality of the coloniality of power that 
shaped post-independence states (Grosfoguel, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). 
Nothing is said for instance about the fact that these countries became so poor, for 
a large part, because they were so rich in natural resources (Davidson, 1992; Auty, 
1993). Similarly, nothing is said about the impact of colonial structures, both 
material and psychological, on the functioning of postcolonial states (Ahluwalia, 
2001), on the political instrumentalisation of tribal identities (Chrétien & Prunier, 
2003), or on the promotion of extractive economies and their terrible social 
consequences.  
 
In fairness, the editorial on Guinea does refer to the “one-sided contracts” signed 
after the independence, hence pointing to Western involvement and responsibility. 
These, however, are mentioned to stress the failure of Guinean leaders to 
renegotiate them: 
 
Neither of them [Sékou Touré and its successor] managed to 
reconstruct the development of their country by renegotiating the 
one-sided contracts that link the country to the main international 
producers of aluminium.  
 
In doing so, the editorial emphasises the failures of Guinean leadership – and 
responsibility – rather than a more global system, which also benefited from such 
leadership. Guinea’s failure is reduced to the irrationality of its leaders: “All it 
took, so to speak, was the rule and the lost illusions of two men”. The broader 
structures and system that contributed to creating, sometimes promoted, and often 
benefited from such leadership is never questioned; they remain in the background, 
invisible. In fact, colonialism is never mentioned in these two editorials. In the case 
of DRC, in particular, nothing is said about the Belgian colonisation that spanned 






and then under the authority of the Belgian parliament – and that laid the cultural, 
political and economic foundations of Mobutu’s violent rule, a dictator who came 
to power by overthrowing anti-colonial leader Patrice Lumumba with the backing 
of US military forces. By focusing, instead, on a perceived irrational history 
presented essentially as of African responsibility, these articles contribute not only 
to erasing colonialism but also to silencing the rationality behind the coloniality of 
power that played a vital role in shaping the postcolonial era. 
 
Finally, the editorials conclude with a prediction or a prescription and therefore 
actively propel these two countries into the future. Having such a concluding 
paragraph is a traditional feature of editorials as news schemata that “do not merely 
formulate opinions to be conveyed to the public, but also attack, defend, or give 
advice to the authorities” (van Dijk, 1991 p. 126). Here, the editorials mention the 
French government and other authoritative institutional figures including the 
European Union, the African Union, Western countries and the United States. In 
the case of Guinea, the prediction is one of clear hopelessness: 
 
Guineans know that they don’t have much to expect from the 
African Union or from the European Union, and even less from 
France that have all witnessed this disaster almost without saying a 
word. Their only hope is that they have nothing to lose, which 
unfortunately does not guarantee the serenity of their future.  
 
It is not a prescription but a pessimistic prediction: nothing has been done, nothing 
can be done, and nothing will change. For DRC, the editorial evokes the risks of 
further disruption for the whole region of central Africa: 
 
Western countries, which have supported the election of Joseph 
Kabila, must denounce the drift of its protégé and the decline of a 
strategic country which risks spreading in the Central African 
region that is barely recovering. In response to the deafening 
silence of the Belgian king, the European Union and the United 
States must show vigilance, given that these countries are essential 
financial backers and the first beneficiaries of the richness of the 
Congolese sub-soil.  
 
In mentioning the mineral richness of DRC from which Western countries 
benefited as well as the support to Kabila’s regime, the editorial certainly 
recognises a form of Western responsibility. But this responsibility, its history and 
impact are not called into question. It is mentioned in passing and used to present 







5.1.3 Key features of Afro-pessimism in the editorials 
 
These editorials are structured in three key moments. They start with (1) a 
seemingly neutral observation of an event. This observation is grounded in (2) an 
interpretation that draws on lexical fields, metaphors and images that are 
aggregated into a broader “African” framework; an interpretation that recreates the 
bleak postcolonial history as exclusively the responsibility of a few irrational 
leaders and one which entirely silences the impact of colonialism. Finally (3), the 
editorials conclude by predicting that things will get worse or cannot get better. At 
best, the solutions come from the West and, at worst, there are none. For all these 
reasons, these editorials can be seen as cases in point of Afro-pessimism. In the 
table below, I provide a summary of their linguistic, narrative and rhetorical 
components through which the five features of Afro-pessimism put forward in 
Chapter 2 are actively deployed. 
 
Table 15 - The discursive construction of Afro-pessimism in editorials 
Features of Afro-pessimism Linguistic, narrative & rhetorical components 
Homogenisation - Generic references to Africa 
- Active generalisation 
- Colonial metaphor and language (heart of 
darkness and out of history) 
Racialisation - Irrationality of African leadership and of the 
postcolonial failure  
- Colonial metaphor and language (heart of 
darkness and out of history) 
Selectivity - Silencing colonialism 
- Frontloading the present failure 
- Irrationality of African leadership and of the 
postcolonial failure 
- Lexical fields of death & violence, poverty, 
political instability & corruption  
Ranking framework - Highlighting the lack of progress 
- Highlighting the failure to enter history 
- Contrasting potential with (lack of) achievements 
- Reliance on statistics from international/Western 
institutions (World Bank, UN). 
Prediction - Western countries as the only solution  
- No hope 
- No African agency (local or regional) 
 
Key to the discursive construction of Afro-pessimism is a set of production 
requirements. The inclusion of the anniversaries in editorials is constrained by 
dominant news values (focus on francophone countries, negativity). The format of 
editorials provides little room for historical contextualisation, which leads to 






concluding paragraph that ends on a prediction or a recommendation; and the fact 
that these predictions systematically involved Western powers is linked to 
editorials in the broadsheet press being aimed directly at a Western audience of 
decision-makers. This micro-textual analysis therefore demonstrates how Afro-
pessimism as a discourse is being enacted in journalistic writing, as well as how 
requirements of news production and conventions of journalistic writing 
dialectically drive the reproduction of this discourse. 
 
The point of this analysis is not to say that newspapers should have covered these 
two anniversaries in a more positive light, or that political leaders in DRC and 
Guinea have no responsibility in the current state of both countries. They ought to 
be held accountable, and if anything the media have not talked enough about the 
two successive wars in Congo which have killed more than 5 million people since 
1996, making it the deadliest conflict since World War II (Sundaram, 2014). What 
I have shown, however, is that the anniversaries of independence appeared in 
editorials insofar as they could be narrated through a clearly Afro-pessimist lens. 
The editorials paint a bleak and conflated picture of postcolonial Africa that 
removes traces from colonisation and Western responsibility; one that actively 
conveys hopelessness and promises violence, and that portrays the future as relying 
entirely on Western agency. As the ‘Other’ is portrayed as essentially different, 
inferior and without agency, a sense of the national ‘Self’ is dialectically 
reinforced; a ‘We’ that is given agency and the higher moral ground, while its 
colonial legacy is negated. 
 
5.2 Reconstructing the discursive common sense of the coverage  
 
These editorials, of course, are only two examples of a much larger corpus. In this 
section, then, I answer the question: what was the dominant discourse that 
surrounded the coverage of these anniversaries more broadly? The analysis 
provided is qualitative and interpretive in nature. It makes connections across the 
different media texts so as to understand the discursive common sense that emerges 








5.2.1 Framing the anniversaries: failed, insensitive and discreet 
 
During my content analysis, I noted all the adjectives used to describe these 
anniversaries. This allowed me to identify three dominant frames used in the 
coverage of the anniversaries at large: to present the anniversaries as failed, 
insensitive or discreet. 
 
The failed anniversaries 
 
The best and most visible example of the failed anniversary frame was the 
coverage of Nigeria’s jubilee as the “celebrations to commemorate the 50th 
anniversary of Nigeria’s independence were rocked by a series of attacks” (Times 
#25). Three car bombs exploded in Abuja during the festivities, two outside the 
justice ministry and another one at Eagle Square where Nigerian President 
Jonathan was welcoming foreign dignitaries. With 12 people dead, the celebrations 
were “wrecked” (Guardian #21) and “plunged into mourning” (La Croix #31). 
Times (#22) concludes with a pessimistic outlook that “as well as overshadowing 
the 50th anniversary of the independence of Africa's most populous nation, the 
bombs could derail a shaky peace deal brokered last year with the rebels”. In 
addition to describing the commemoration via means of this tragic event, the press 
also heavily stressed the failure of Nigerian authorities in preventing it. British 
intelligence received warning of an upcoming security threat, which led British 
dignitaries to pull out of the parade. The warning was shared with Nigerian 
authorities but these carried on with the festivities nonetheless. As a result, 
Nigerian authorities were not only represented as incompetent, as opposed to the 
British, but also ultimately responsible for the failure of this anniversary.  
 
The insensitive anniversaries 
 
The second frame consisted in describing the anniversaries as insensitive, 
polemical or shocking. Key to this framing was to stress the lavishness of the 
celebrations. In Senegal, the inauguration of the monument of the African 
Renaissance – “a soviet-style statue which spurred much controversy” (La Croix 
#11) given its costs and the fact that it was build by North-Korean workers – took 
place “with great pomp” (Le Figaro #8). In Cameroon, the ceremony was 







A huge portrait of Cameroon’s president Paul Biya stands in the 
background. There are smokes and traditional dances everywhere. 
On this 18th of May, Yaoundé celebrates the 50th anniversary of 
independence from the former colony. The event takes place in a 
brand new sport venue, which looks like a flying saucer. Highly 
symbolically, it was just built by the Chinese.  
 
The anniversaries in Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Swaziland were 
also described as celebrated with “much pomp”. In all cases, this pomposity – 
materially embedded in the urban landscape, infrastructures and in commodities – 
was contrasted with aspects perceived to be at odd with the very idea of a 
celebration. This contrast notably provided compelling visual material for 
journalists. East Africa correspondent 1, who covered the celebrations in DRC as 
both journalist and photographer, recalls taking a lot of pictures of this contrast: 
“the pomp and the expenses contrasted with horror in the East and oppressed 
opposition, completely corrupt deals at every turn and so on”. 
 
In Mali, the party was contrasted with the abduction of seven workers of the 
French multinational energy company Areva: 
 
The large roads of Bamako are dressed with flags. The pavements 
have been carefully repainted; the asphalt of the roads has been, 
once again, fixed. Mali was yesterday fully dedicated to celebrate 
the 50th anniversary of independence. In the newspapers, everyone 
only talked about this. But there were barely any mention of the 
seven Areva workers who were abducted a few days ago.  
(Le Figaro #23)  
 
In Ghana, the celebrations are described as “ostentatious” (La Croix #5) as the 
country “splashes out for jubilee”:  
 
A fleet of 50 Mercedes, 50 BMWs and 30 jaguars, costing about 
£3 million, ferry the continent's elite to a huge party to celebrate 
Ghana's 50th anniversary of independence (…) Events include a 
miss Ghana competition, an African fashion show, the longest 
table of traditional food dishes, a golf competition, lectures, boxing 
and a beach party.  
(Times #6)  
 
Here, the “lavishness” of the yearlong party is vigorously questioned by 
contrasting it with poverty in the country:  
 
The total budget for these festivities, which commenced with an 
all-night party in Accra, is said to be £10.4 million. You might 






time when the average citizen of Ghana as a daily income of 
around 67p (1.33$).  
(Telegraph #13) 
 
Similarly in Swaziland, the celebration is described as “extravagant” (Telegraph 
#3, #15), “posh” (Telegraph #20) and a “huge 40th birthday bash” (Times #10). The 
costs of the “lavish silver jubilee” (Telegraph #21) notably became the focal point 
of the media narrative: 
 
There will be parades, traditional dances, fireworks and feasting to 
honour King Mswati III, the Sherbone-educated ruler who has 13 
wives and is at the apex of a still highly traditional society. (…) 
The dignitaries will be ferried to a stadium close to the royal 
family's kraal in a fleet of 20 newly-bought BMW 750s (…) The 
cakes for the occasion cost £7,000, and nine of the king's 13 wives 




In addition to fleets of expensive cars, including a Chrysler 
Maybach 62 costing £250.000 and private helicopters, the king has 




The perceived exuberance and eccentricity of the event was further highlighted "as 
scores of bare-breasted virgins dance in front of the portly King Mswati III of 
Swaziland to celebrate his 40th birthday" (Times #12). Eventually, the description 
of this exuberant lavishness is contrasted with poverty and social deprivation. King 
Mswati III “feasts off a country which is bleeding” (Times #12) and “spent the 
equivalent of half the national health budget to dispatch his 13 wives on a 
collective shopping trip to Dubai and Europe last month” (Guardian #40). As 
summarised in Le Figaro (#29): “The lavish celebration shockingly contrasts with 
the abject poverty in which two third of the population live in”. In all these cases, 
the coverage of the anniversaries was polarised around extremes: on the one hand, 
lavishness and, on the other hand, poverty, social deprivation and/or economic and 
political instability. Ultimately, these descriptions all point to the idea that 
celebrating anything in these contexts was insensitive. 
 
The discreet anniversaries 
 
Finally, the other anniversaries mentioned in newspapers were described as 






was marked by a simple military parade and the traditional ‘tree planting 
ceremony’ during which thousand of trees are planted to stop the desert” (La Croix 
#24). Mauritania “celebrated discreetly its 50th anniversary of independence” as 
financial constraints and security issues forced the government “to revise its 
ambitions: no pomp, no foreign envoys and no military parade (…) The celebration 
of the small Islamic Republic therefore took place in the ‘Mauritanian’ style, with 
simplicity” (Le Monde #45). Other countries like Chad and the Central African 
Republic even had to postpone their celebrations due to economic and political 
problems (La Croix #27). Finally, Togo’s anniversary was described as 
“confidential, and taking place amidst political cacophony” (Le Monde #15). In the 
year 2010 – where some 17 sub-Saharan African countries commemorated their 
independence – “the celebrations on the continent remained generally very 
discreet” (Le Figaro #8).  
 
Overall, this discreetness was either welcomed as more in tone with what should be 
expected in this situation, or criticised for being a way for governments to avoid 
unwanted media attention: 
 
Such a jubilee could be a pretext to analyse the past and question 
the future. (…) This 50th anniversary is embarrassing for leaders 
who don’t want to face their disastrous results. Only a few 
countries, then, have prepared spectacular ceremonies (…) In most 
countries, some statements, an historical conference and a military 
parade will do. The people, too busy to survive, have many other 
concerns.  
(Le Monde #15)  
 
“Should we organise pompous and expensive celebrations in a 
context of misery and austerity?” asks Le Potential [a Congolese 
newspaper]. “Spectacular celebrations would be an insult to the 
majority who rot in darkest misery. In fact, a poor and highly 
indebted country can't afford these fancy expenses”.  
(Le Monde #61) 
5.2.2 Reversed memory and the narrative of failure 
 
These dominant frames all have one thing in common: they resulted in a coverage 
being much more about the present than about the past, and especially the past 
events being commemorated, namely the anti-colonial struggles for independence. 
This process is similar to what Neiger, Zandberg and Meyers (2014) describe in 
their study of the coverage of the Holocaust Remembrance Day in Israel. They 






and the main interest of the narrative, while the details of those past occurrences 
themselves are pushed aside, or, rather, into the background”(Neiger et al., 2014 p. 
114). 
 
To describe this phenomenon, they coined the concept of “reversed memory” that 
is “the cultural mechanism and journalistic practice of focusing on the present 
while commemorating a shared past” (Neiger et al., 2014 p. 114). This mechanism 
is the result of several competing rituals, mainly the ritual of news production 
(present-oriented) and the one of collective memory construction (past-oriented). 
Reversed memory, then, is the collusion of these different rituals into a narrative 
device where the “past is commemorated by means of the narration of the present” 
(Neiger et al., 2014 p. 114). 
 
This focus on the present over the past appears clearly when looking back at the 
stories that attracted most media attention (see Table 9 in Chapter 4). The main 
news items focused either on a present event happening coincidentally to a 
commemoration, or on a commemorative event that would be contextualised into 
the present social, political and economic state of the country discussed. In the first 
group, we notably find the attacks during Nigeria’s celebration and the visit of 
French Foreign Minister Brice Hortefeux in Mali to discuss the abductions of 
French worker by Islamic terrorists. These events frontloaded the present 
newsworthiness of an event and relegated the commemorative event in the 
background. In the second group, the commemorative event was frontloaded as 
“news” but was mainly a way to discuss a present situation. All the stories on 
Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Senegal and DRC focused extensively on the dysfunctional 
present including corruption, poverty and anti-democratic leadership while, once 
again, sidetracking the history of the independence commemorated. In any case, 
these two strategies contributed to reversed memory and resulted in a similar 
outcome: an absence of discussion, analysis and actual commemoration of the 
independence movements. 
 
A telling example of this absence of the past being commemorated is that the 
actors of the independence movements were largely absent from newspaper 
coverage. With the exception of Kwame Nkrumah and Patrice Lumumba (both 
mentioned in 12 articles) and of leaders who stayed in power after independence 






virtually erased from the collective memory constructed at this occasion. Thomas 
Sankara was mentioned in only one article while revolutionary leaders such as 
Sylvanus Olympio, Barthelemy Boganda, or Amílcar Cabral were not mentioned at 
all, hereby confined to the recess of history. Similarly, while it is common in 
commemorative journalism to interview survivors or individuals involved in the 
past events commemorated, only seven articles interviewed people that were 
actively involved in – or simply witness to – the anti-colonial struggles.  
 
Newspapers therefore emphasised the dysfunctional present over a complex and 
contested past. The anniversaries, whether failed, insensitive, or discreet, all 
testified to this dysfunctional present. But, as Neiger, Zandberg and Meyers (2014) 
argue, the focus on the present also impacts the framing and understanding of the 
past, in particular when done in a commemorative context. In other words, the 
framing of the present anniversaries also constituted a specific entry point into the 
past. It epitomised and frontloaded a discursive common sense about the 50 years 
post-independence that can be summarised under the following motto: there’s 
nothing to celebrate.  
 
This discursive common sense was made very explicit in several instances:  
 
The 18 states that celebrate 50 years of independence are unable to 
say exactly what success they are celebrating.  
(La Croix #18) 
 
[Nigeria] There’s nothing good to celebrate after 50 years of 
failures.  
(Le Monde #69) 
 
[Nigeria] There is nothing happy about independence 50.  
(FT #35) 
 
It may be 50 years since the country [DRC] won independence, but 
there is little to celebrate.  
(FT #12)  
 
It's 50 years since many countries across Africa gained 
independence but there is little to celebrate for the people whom 
Robin Denselow meets in Nigeria.  
(Times #20)  
 
Many Ghanaians have little to celebrate today.  







It's the 50th anniversary of the beginning of independence for 
colonial Africa. I hope we get shown something less embarrassing 
in the coming years.  
(Time #23)  
 
This idea that there is nothing to celebrate was further supported by the 
condemnation of local elites and politicians, and a denunciation of social 
inequalities: 
 
[Swaziland] “I have nothing to celebrate because the only people 
that can celebrate are the few, the minority within the royal 
family,” said Mario Masuku, president of the People's United 
Democratic Movement. “The king has a right to celebrate his 
individual birthday like anybody, but as a country to say we have 
something to celebrate is a misnomer. While the invited guests are 
eating sumptuous meals they must know they are eating and 
drinking the blood of the poor Swazis”. While impressive 
highways link the capital Mbabane to the South African border and 
the other main centre, Manzini, Swaziland has the highest HIV 
prevalence rate and the lowest life expectancy in the entire world. 
Most of its people live in dire poverty, relying on subsistence 
agriculture to survive.  
(Telegraph #15) 
 
[Swaziland] There is little to celebrate for the 41 per cent of 
Swazis who are HIV positive (the highest rate in the world), or the 
40 per cent who are unemployed, or the 70 per cent who live on 
less than 23 pence a day. 
(Times #11) 
 




[Nigeria] For the common man, things have never been so bad; for 
the politician, things have never been so good.  
(FT #21) 
 
Key to this rhetoric of failure were references to the disappointment in the face of 
unfulfilled hopes – “the failure of many parts of Africa to live up to the promise of 
decolonization” (Guardian #6) – and of the gap between potential and actual 
results: 
“There is frustration about the gap between where we could be and 
where we are," says Femi Lijadu, 51, a lawyer and a former 
executive director at United Bank for Africa.  
(FT #19) 
 
At the time, everyone wanted to see in this young nation [Ghana] 
and its leader the future of all Africans. These great hopes are now 
gone.  







This year, 23 [sic] African countries are celebrating their 50th 
anniversary of independence. Most hopes that emerged at the end 
of colonisation did not become real.  
(Le Monde #17) 
 
How did Mugabe turn so much hope into so much misery?  
(Telegraph #26) 
 
On October 1 1960, Nigeria was Africa's great hope. The same 
promise lives on 50 years later, having survived civil war, military 
dictatorship, economic mismanagement and social turmoil.  
(FT #18) 
 
[Africa] It is a somewhat depressing story of hopes raised and 
dreams dashed.  
(Times #4)  
 
The new state [DRC] spiralled into the chaos which has scotched 
so many of the hopes vested in independence (…) the swift defeat 
of democracy in Congo prefigured many of the subsequent 
disappointments and betrayals in post-independence Africa.  
(Guardian #42) 
 
It is this "gap between potential and fulfilment" that has enraged 
Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, who spoke in Port Harcourt on 
Monday demanding the Nigerian leadership give its citizens better 
reasons to celebrate.  
(Guardian #45) 
 
[Africa] There is a huge disappointment towards most of the hopes 
from the decolonisation.  
(La Croix #49)  
[my emphasis, throughout] 
 
In several instances, the main success that deserved to be celebrated was that things 
could have been much worse: 
 
The country's [Nigeria] success in remaining "one nation" over the 
past 50 years – enduring decades of disunity, civil war, and over 30 
years of military rule – is an achievement in itself.  
(Guardian #45) 
 
Nigeria is being praised for being “back from the precipice” (Guardian #20), and 
Burkina Faso because “compared to most African countries, it looks like a haven 
of peace” (La Croix #12).  
 
Amidst these tales of failures, Ghana partly stood out in the coverage. Ghana’s 
anniversary in 2007 was the only anniversary that gained significant attention for 






related to something negative or that directly involved Western nations or people. 
Nonetheless, the coverage was done against the backdrop of a broader framework 
of continental failure as can be seen through the use of various comparisons: 
 
Compared to its neighbours, Ghana looks like a haven of peace, 
democracy and relative prosperity.  
(La Croix #8)  
 
The former British colony remained a stable democracy contrary 
to its neighbours and in particular Ivory Coast and Togo. Ghana, 
the first country in black Africa to gain independence, has been 
celebrating this anniversary since March 6.  
(Le Monde #7) 
 
Though the great majority of Ghanaians remain very poor, Ghana 
is relatively prosperous and politically stable and is now re-
emerging as one of the success stories of the region.  
(Guardian 5) 
 
Ghana's elections, culminating in victory at the weekend for John 
Atta Mills, the opposition candidate, are cause for celebration. 
Yesterday, Ghanaians witnessed the second constitutional transfer 
of power in a decade. Only Benin, on the mainland continent, has 
experienced alternating political power of this kind (…) [This] 
example is particularly welcome at a time when real democracy in 
Africa is otherwise under threat.  
(FT #7)  
[my emphasis, throughout] 
 
These comparisons systematically assess Ghana against a broader regional or 
continental framework. Ghana’s case is presented as an exception that contrasts 
with a broader ‘African failure’; a good example insofar as other countries did 
much worse; ultimately, an exception that is used to prove a more general rule. 
Ghana’s anniversary was chronologically the first to be covered by the media – an 
event whose newsworthiness could not, at first sight, be found in the limited set of 
news values that shaped the coverage of other anniversaries in the following years. 
Yet, throughout these comparative examples, we see that the master narrative of 
failure that subsequently blossomed was already here. And even if Ghana appeared 
as an exception, it was still framed through the rhetorical features of the master 
narrative of failure found in the broader coverage of the other anniversaries. These 
included:  
 
! Questioning the costs of the celebrations: 
The $20 million spent on these celebrations – in a country that 






per habitant is of 450$ – are at sharp contrast with the urging social 
needs of the population.  
(Le Monde #7) 
 
! Highlighting the gap between potential and results: 
A colony that went from riches to rags.  
(Times #6)  
 
“I don't think we have lived up to the promise of independence”.  
(Guardian #39) 
  
It was also a time for reflection on what had gone wrong in a 
country [Ghana] that won independence with an economy larger 
than South Africa's. Even today, much of the population lives on 
less than a dollar a day.  
(Guardian #6)  
 
! Celebrating the fact that things could have been worse:  
Ghana can look back with pride because it has not gone down the 
doldrums like other African countries.  
(Times #6) 
 
“But having survived the last 50 years intact, when you look at our 
neighbours, is something” [Kyeretwie Opoku members of the 
Ghanaian advocacy group the Committee for Joint Action].  
(Guardian #39) 
 
In other words, Ghana was framed either as an exception that proved a more 
general rule or through a frame similar to the one used to describe other countries. 
In any case, this framing of Ghana fed and reinforced the broader narrative of 
failure about the postcolonial past that dominated press coverage.  
5.2.3 Traces of colonial myths 
 
As part of this discourse of failure, the press appealed to several long-standing 
colonial myths, namely the pathologisation and infantilisation of Africa, and the 
view of the continent as out of history. 
 
In Le Figaro (#9) Guinea is described as a “tropical gulag” that “progressively 
sunk into a bloody paranoia” [my emphasis]. In an article titled “African 
schizophrenia” Le Monde’s Africa correspondent Philippe Bernard very positively 
reviews a book by Malian writer Moussa Konaté Is black Africa cursed? Bernard 
summarises the book’s key argument, in his own words, as follows: 
 
Why does Africa remain at the bottom of the world order? (…) 






turned it into a subjugating tool and a strong factor of inertia (…) 
Behind the apparent conviviality, the submission to the group 
favours parasitism, corruption and tyranny at the cost of labour. 
[my emphasis]  
(Le Monde #44) 
 
Bernard then highlights the paradox of “a fallback on idealised traditional cultures” 
on the one hand, and the admiration towards “the knowledge of the whites” on the 
other. It is this paradox that he describes, again in his own words, as the “African 
schizophrenia”. In the face of a “probable disaster”, this schizophrenia should be 
urgently overcome through “the recognition by Africans of their mistakes, starting 
with the role of their chiefs in the slave trade”. 
 
These references to “schizophrenia” and “paranoia” as a way to understand the 
postcolonial African experience are telling examples of a process of 
pathologisation. Fanon (1952) showed that the pathologisation of colonial societies 
and identities was integral to the discursive reproduction of colonial and racialised 
power relations. In the 1980s and 1990s, the language of the modernisation and 
developmental paradigm also carried this discursive pathologisation in talking 
about “Third World countries” (Escobar, 1995) and the “disappointment of [the] 
promise [for Westernised development]” (Spurr, 1993 p. 19). Processes of 
pathologisation have also been constitutive of the “new racism” that emphasises 
cultural differences as opposed to racial or biological ones in the context of the 
European immigration debates of the 80s and 90s (Barker, 1981; Balibar, 2007). 
For Clarke, key to this new racism was “the development of a politics of fear 
which uses emotional and affective processes to pathologise others in a language of 
cultural difference” (Clarke, 2008 p. 518). The pathologisation of culture and 
identities perceived as different is therefore a discursive tool in a continuing 
process of ‘Othering’ – taking the form, in this case, of an essentially different and 
unique “African” culture that is “sick” and, ultimately, is the best explanation as to 
why the continent remains “at the bottom of the world order”. 
 
Fanon also reminds us that another important discursive feature of the racialisation 
of colonial identities was the view of blacks as childlike (1952 p. 6). In my case, 
there were several instances of this childlike analogy used in the description of 
states and leaders. In La Croix (#13), the era of the 1970s and 80s was described as 
the “teenage crisis” of anglophone African countries, one that ultimately “led to 






CNRS researcher Roland Marchal described the expectation on the side of French 
elites that “Africans retain their childlike behaviour by favouring French 
businesses”. Analogies of states being childlike were also communicated via 
African voices. In Les Échos (#8), Cameroon’s former Prime Minister Henri 
Hogbe Nlend is quoted saying “If we don’t let a child fall, he will never be able to 
walk”. In the Telegraph (#8), Donsky Traoré, a member of the Malian hip-hop 
band SMOD, says, “many countries in Africa are celebrating 50 years of 
independence. But would a 50-year-old person make so many wrong choices? 
You’d expect some maturity”. This statement ultimately implies that these states 
remained in a childhood state. For Saminaden, Loughnan, and Haslam (2010 p. 91) 
this colonial metaphor of the ‘Other’ as childlike, carefree and undisciplined 
constitute a counterpart to the stereotype of the ‘Other’ as savage or governed by 
instinct rather than reason. In this sense, the imagery of the childlike African states 
– incompetent and irresponsible and, ultimately, in need of control, parenting and 
even discipline – reproduces a racialised and colonial gaze. 
 
Finally, the press appealed in several ways to the myth of Africa’s lack of history. 
As discussed in my analysis of the editorials, the view of the continent as out of 
history was key to the discursive construction of the colonial idea of Africa. This 
myth was entrenched in the broader paradigm of modernity in which Western 
countries and cultures were seen as leading the trajectory of human progress 
towards the flourishing of rationality and universal freedom. This myth has proved 
to be enduring. A testament to the contemporary persistence of this myth was the 
speech given by former French president Nicolas Sarkozy in Dakar in 26 July 
2007:  
The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered 
history. The African peasant, who for thousands of years has lived 
according to the seasons, whose life ideal was to be in harmony 
with nature, only knew the eternal renewal of time, set by the 
tempo of the endless repetition of the same gestures and the same 
words. In this imaginary world where everything starts over and 
over again, there is no place for human adventure or for the idea of 
progress. In this universe where nature commands all, man escapes 
from the anguish of history that torments modern man, but he rests 
immobile in the centre of a static order where everything seems to 
have been written beforehand. This man never launched himself 
towards the future. The idea never came to him to get out of this 
repetition and to invent his own destiny. The problem of Africa, 
and allow a friend of Africa to say it, is to be found here. Africa’s 
challenge is to enter to a greater extent into history.  
 







This was Sarkozy’s first official visit in sub-Saharan Africa as French president. 
Several commentators have highlighted the discrepancy between Sarkozy’s claim 
to “conduct policies of reality and not policies of myths anymore” and his obvious 
appeal to a set of colonial myths (Stoler, 2008). His words also carried a particular 
echo in a French context where a public debate over national identity, immigration 
and colonial memory was gaining momentum. A milestone of this debate was the 
2005 French law on colonialism, which required high-school teachers to lecture 
their students on the “positive values” of colonialism and on the “positive role of 
the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa” (Stoler, 2008 p. 126). The 
law was eventually repealed a year later but it did spur a heated public debate, 
with, on the one hand, those attacking the law as disastrous, negating colonial 
history and revelatory of a postcolonial inhibition, and, on the other hand, those 
complaining about the “political correctness”, culpability and self-hatred that 
underpinned the criticism (Ledoux, 2013).  
 
In the French coverage, references to a perceived lack of history were mainly done 
to refer to the controversial speech itself:  
 
The main thing for a large part of the French public opinion is to 
know whether Africa “barely” entered history, or “not enough” or 
“enough”.  
(Le Monde #7) 
 
While these references were probably done with an eye to avoid re-entering the 
controversial debate, they nonetheless constituted the residual traces of this broader 
backdrop. In the UK press, some journalists directly appealed to this myth such as 
William Wallis, the Financial Times Africa correspondent: 
 
The Grand Hotel in Kinshasa, where dignitaries from across Africa 
and beyond arrived yesterday to take part in a celebration of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo's 50th anniversary of independence 
from Belgium, is frozen in time. It is the reflection of a stagnant 
economy that has failed to earn promotion from near the bottom of 
world development rankings despite prodigious mineral wealth and 
recent commodity booms. [my emphasis]  
(FT #12) 
 
In equating the hotel “frozen in time” with the lack of progress of the nation, he 
metaphorically calls upon a broader view of Africa’s timelessness. But the clearest 






“What have politicians done for them? Zilch”. The author, British journalist 
Matthew Parris, grew up in South Africa, Rhodesia and Swaziland, and writes: 
In the 50 years since I was in Malawi as a young boy, life in most 
African villages has not changed in the slightest. (…)  
 
Now I am back here in the sub-Sahara: a subcontinent I know well. 
This time I'm travelling under my own steam, with friends, in true 
rural Africa, a land I love. Malawi is a friendly, safe and gentle 
country, welcoming to strangers, and not by African standards 
notably inefficient or corrupt. But what strikes me most – more 
than any of the changes I see in the cities – is how little has 
changed in the lives of the vast majority of the people of Africa, 
who live on the land.  
  
During the half-century in which Harold Macmillan's winds of 
change have blown themselves – in political terms – into a gale, 
(…) during the half-century between what I saw when I was 10 
and what I see now at 60, life in the average African rural village 
is unaltered.  
 
This week I returned to a small village near Lake Malawi, where I 
went last November to write (for the Times Christmas Appeal) 
about the work of a small British charity. I am not exaggerating 
when I say, without qualification, that nothing – nothing – has 
changed for better or worse or at all, in village life. You could 
rewind the video 50 years and you would not spot a single feature 
that placed us in 2009 rather than 1959 – none, that is, except the 
lines of my face. Oh, there is, perhaps, one: the new pumps we 
were installing are of a more primitive design than the 19th-
century style lever-pumps that used to be installed in colonial days, 
as these often proved too complicated to maintain in remote areas 
in Africa. [my emphasis, throughout] 
 
Taking an example of one small village in Malawi, Parris creates a generalised 
view of Africa as static: “life in most African villages has not changed in the 
slightest”; “little has changed in the lives of the vast majority of the people of 
Africa”; “nothing – nothing – has changed for better or worse or at all, in village 
life. You could rewind the video 50 years and you would not spot a single feature 
that placed us in 2009 rather than 1959”. Things have not changed, except, maybe, 
for the worst as the winds of change turned into “a gale” and “as the new pumps 
we were installing are of a more primitive design than the 19th-century style lever-
pumps that used to be installed in colonial days”. Parris even makes his bias clear 
in the text as he dismisses “any of the changes [he] see[s] in the cities”, refusing to 
engage with them and what they might mean. His narrative style is reminiscent of a 
travelogue, a literary style that Fabian (2012 p. 96) found – at the turn of the 






Victorian era travel narratives, including “images of Africa as snapshots in time, 
contributing to the view of Africa as stagnant”.  
 
Drawing on these observations, Parris carries on: 
 
I do not, from this, conclude that colonialism was good, or that 
African independence has been bad. No, they have both proved 
largely irrelevant, hardly scratching the surface. 
 
When we British marvel at how so small a nation managed to 
govern so much of so large a continent, with so few colonial 
officers on the ground, we overlook the fact that we weren't really 
governing at all. We were just there. We were marching around, 
building and mending a few (rather bad) roads, policing (after a 
fashion) with the help of tribal chiefs and elders, and generally 
flying the flag. And on the whole, and for some time, the locals 
couldn't be bothered to remove us.  
 
That he needs to state what he “does not conclude” shows that there would, in fact, 
be a logical conclusion for the reader to draw based on his observations: 
“colonialism was good”, “African independence has been bad”. While he appears 
to undermine any grandeur of the British Empire, he in fact emphasises that 
colonialism had barely any impact, was irrelevant and superficial, and, in any case, 
was done with the support of locals. More striking, perhaps, is the statement that 
“locals couldn’t be bothered to remove us”, hereby dismissing entirely the history 
of anti-colonial struggles – which, one should bear in mind, were what the 
anniversaries supposedly commemorated. 
 
These residual traces of colonial myths, although not systematic, contributed 
nonetheless to the discursive common sense of failure that culminated in the 
widespread assessment that most countries, or even the continent as a whole, are 
worse off than 50 years ago: 
 
Most Africans are poorer today than they were 50 years ago.  
(Times #16)  
 
Africa is the only continent in the world to have become poorer in 
the past 50 years.  
(Times #6) 
 
The DRC will celebrate the anniversary of its independence from 








Ghana is now one of the poorest countries in the world. The 
average income is $550 per habitant, far from South Korea and its 
$16 000. And yet, in the 1950s the Gold Coast was richer and in a 
better position that what became the “Asian tigers”.  
(Le Figaro #3) 
 
The idea of an absence of progress, or even regression, is perfectly captured in a 
metaphor found in La Croix (#26): “During this half of the century, sub-Saharan 
Africa moved forward and stagnated, just like a runner on a treadmill losing breath 
while not getting anywhere”.  
 
At first sight, this assessment may not seem contentious to the reader, especially 
since plenty of ‘hard’ facts are provided to support it but also because it appears to 
be concerned with social inequalities and poverty. In addition, by taking the form 
of a simple before/after analysis, this master narrative of failure appears obvious 
and common sense. But far from being only a simple observation, the view that 
Africa is worse off today than 50 years ago has a clear rhetorical correlative: the 
continent was better off 50 years ago, under colonial domination. Seen this way, 
this seemingly neutral assessment takes on a different form and its ideological 
dimension becomes clearer. It simultaneously fosters a sense that the independence 
did more harm than good, that colonisation was not so bad after all and that 
ultimately the postcolonial failure proved right many who, before, during and 
immediately after independence, doubted the very ability of colonised people to 
self-rule. This rhetoric was part of the discursive resistance to the demands of the 
anti-colonial movements, and often constituted the core argument of those 
opposing independence. In the early 1960s, the French press quoted abundantly the 
words, possibly fictional, of an old Malian farmer: “son, when will they be done 
with their independence?” (Diop, 2010). The use of this quote in the French press 
at the time served a clear rhetorical purpose; it highlighted in a cynical way and 
with a veneer of colonial nostalgia that the newly independent countries seemed to 
have fared better under colonial rule than after independence. Eventually, this 
rhetoric comes full circle as these words found a contemporary echo in the 
Guardian (#42) but this time in DRC: “One of many mordant jokes doing the 








5.3 The dynamics and ambiguities of postcolonial memory 
 
In this section, I unpack further the ideological work at play in the coverage and 
bring back the discursive common sense to what it tells us about the societies that 
produce it. I propose to step outside the conceptual lens of Afro-pessimism and, 
instead, use Gilroy’s concept of postimperial melancholia (Gilroy, 2001; 2004) and 
Stoler’s concept of colonial aphasia (Stoler, 2008; 2011) as a way to explore more 
fully the dynamics and ambiguities of this media discourse. 
5.3.1 The “post-postcolonial” moment 
 
I previously appealed to the idea of reversed memory to capture the dominant 
narrative used to cover the anniversaries. The coverage focused primarily on the 
present failures of African states as a way to commemorate the past. Dialectically, 
this depiction of the present conditioned the understanding of the past 50 years via 
a master narrative of failure, which stressed the gap between potential and results, 
and the fact that the continent seems to be worse off today than 50 years ago. 
Therefore, reversed memory is not only a narrative device (commemorating the 
past via narration of the present) but also a tool in the advancement of dominant 
ideologies.  
 
In their study of reversed memory in the coverage of Israel’s Holocaust 
Remembrance day, Neiger, Zandberg and Meyers (2014 p. 124) found that the 
commemoration of the Holocaust was reduced, or rather instrumentalised, to 
celebrate “the mere existence of the State of Israel”. Hence it contributed to the 
advancement of a specific political project and provided “a narrative sweetener that 
eases the collective taking of the bitter, traumatic pill of the past” (Neiger et al., 
2014 p. 124).  
 
In my case, reversed memory constituted a “narrative sweetener” that prevented 
France and the UK to face their colonial history, easing the collective taking of the 
colonial pill. Whereas Western colonial powers were, historically, the antagonists 
of a legitimate fight for freedom and self-determination, blame is here exclusively 
focused on and shifted to those at the heart of the news items, namely present 
African leaders. As a result, the present-oriented narratives take over a contested 






failure in which Africans appear solely responsible for both the bleak present and 
past.  
 
Reversed memory and the narrative of failure contributed to the discursive 
formation of what I call a post-postcolonial moment. Rather than providing an 
opportunity to engage into a memorial work on the colonial past, the 50 years 
threshold served to focus on the dysfunctional present and African responsibility, a 
responsibility then extended to make sense of a broader postcolonial failure. The 
commemorative dimension of these anniversaries was sidetracked as the 
newsworthiness value (present-oriented) took over the commemorative value (past-
oriented). Rather than an opportunity to look back, 50 years became a threshold to 
turn the page of colonial history and to advance the idea that colonialism is no 
longer relevant to the understanding of contemporary societies, be they former 
colonies or colonial powers. This function of the 50 years threshold is made 
explicit in an article by David Smith titled “50 years on, can colonialism still be 
blamed for the country’s [DRC] woes?” (Guardian #33). After briefly reviewing 
the history of the country since the rule of Leopold II, Smith eventually quotes 
Congo’s current foreign minister Alexis Thambwe Mwamba as being 
 
ready to end the blame game. “Fifty years later, we cannot say that 
if things are not going well in Congo, it’s the fault of Belgium or 
of Leopold II”. 
 
In order to elucidate more precisely how reversed memory and the features of the 
narrative of failure come together to discursively construct this post-postcolonial 
moment, I turn to an opinion-piece by Niall Ferguson published in the Telegraph 
(#13). Ferguson is a Scottish historian and professor at Harvard University. He has 
been a regular contributor to Bloomberg, Newsweek, the Financial Times and the 
Telegraph, and is the writer of several books adapted into TV series by Channel 4 
including Empire: How Britain made the modern world (2002) and Civilization: 
the West and the Rest (2011). His article was published at the occasion of both Red 
Nose day and Ghana’s inauguration of its 12-months celebration of independence. 
Ferguson starts by observing that Comic Relief provides some £1.7 million to 
NGO projects in Ghana while the Ghanaian government is reportedly spending 
some £10.4 million to fund the festivities. He then vigorously questions the idea 
that there is anything to celebrate by contrasting the costs of this anniversary with 







You might reasonably ask if this is a sensible way of spending $20 
million dollars at a time when the average citizen of Ghana has a 
daily income of around 67p ($1.33). You might also ask what 
exactly Ghana has got to celebrate after 50 years of "freedom". 
 
He then stresses that Ghana is today worse-off than it was 50 years ago: 
 
The average Briton was 39 times richer than the colony's average 
inhabitant. (…) Between 1960 and today, the gap between Britain 
and Ghana has more than doubled, so that the average Briton is 
now 92 times richer than the average Ghanaian. 
 
To understand “what went wrong”, Ferguson appeals to a phenomenon that 
extends beyond the case of Ghana:  
 
The answer is more or less the same answer you would give for 
any sub-Saharan African country since 1957. Kwame Nkrumah, 
who led Ghana to independence, was in many ways typical of the 
first generation of post-colonial African leaders. (…) Nkrumah 
was wholly incapable of distinguishing the virtues from the vices of 
British rule. [my emphasis] 
 
At this point, he sets out to demonstrate that Ghana was in fact better off under 
colonial rule, first by stressing the positive impact of British colonialism and then 
by arguing that the fears expressed by colonial powers vis-à-vis the ability of 
colonised people to self-rule were entirely justified: 
 
Three years before independence, thanks in large measure to the 
efforts of missionary schools, Africans already occupied a third of 
senior civil service posts. (…) Though it was tight-fisted when it 
came to education and healthcare, the Colonial Office at least 
provided the foundations for economic and political stability: 
trade, balanced budgets, sound money, the rule of law and non-
corrupt administration. (…)  
If you look at the photographs of the handover of power in 1957, 
the Duchess of Kent looks pained; the Governor, Sir Charles 
Arden-Clarke, looks sceptical. Those facial expressions proved 
eminently justified. (…) Five years before [independence], one 
British official had warned: "It seems fairly clear that the danger 
now is not that of an outburst of anti-European feeling but rather 
that of an abuse by a certain section of Africans of the power 
which we are transferring to them. This danger arises partly out of 
the tendency of the African to exploit the African if placed in a 
position to do so, and partly out of the lessons in the organisation 
of party dictatorship which some of the leaders learnt from their 
early flirtation with Communism”. Too true. (…) By the early 
1960s Ghanaian women were staging protests with placards 







Ferguson’s argument eventually culminates in attacking what was his main 
target all along, what he has referred to elsewhere as the “imperial guilt” 
leading to a “culture of self-flagellation” (Skidelsky, 2011):  
 
Today, there are still people who fondly believe that all Africa's 
problems are a legacy of colonialism – the fault of the wicked 
British. Those same people also cling to the notion that this legacy 
can be expunged only by the payment of reparations in the name of 
"aid". Fifty years on we can surely think more clearly. In virtually 
every case (Botswana is the sole exception), former British 
colonies in sub-Saharan Africa have fared worse under 
independence than they did under British rule. [my emphasis]  
(Telegraph #13)  
 
50 years therefore becomes the threshold where “we can surely think more clearly” 
and where “all of Africa’s problems” are not “the fault of the wicked British”. The 
problem with this rhetoric is that it reduces the question of the legacy of 
colonialism to a zero-sum game. Surely, the channelling of aid money by corrupt 
governments is a pressing issue that calls for a condemnation of those who benefit 
from it at the expenses of those who actually need it. However, this does not mean 
that there is no room for discussing the impact of colonialism in constructing the 
conditions and structures of this system; a system to which Western countries have 
contributed, even after the formal end of colonialism. In Ferguson’s perspective, 
there seems to be no room for shared responsibility; instead, it is an “either/or” 
choice. 50 years on, the responsibility of the postcolonial failure is exclusively the 
one of “Africa’s corrupt clowns”.  
 
It is in this sense that I talk of a post-postcolonial moment. It is a moment where 
the culture of “self-flagellation” should give way to “clearer thinking”; a moment 
where the “collective taking of the bitter, traumatic pill of the past” (Neiger et al., 
2014 p. 124) is eased by focusing on a dysfunctional present seen as exclusively of 
African responsibility. In this perspective, it becomes safe to say that colonialism 
should no longer be blamed since African countries were better off under colonial 
rule. In other words, it signalled the end of the postcolonial era and inaugurated the 
moment where ‘We’ should get over colonial history by reclaiming its positive 
aspects and by dismissing colonialism as irrelevant to contemporary societies. 
 
This piece was not the work of a journalist, let alone a foreign correspondent. 
Perhaps it is worrying to see it expressed through the voice of an academic, 
although Ferguson is a notoriously controversial figure. On many occasions, he has 






large, and defended British imperialism on the basis that it was not as bad as other 
imperialisms. But Ferguson’s view strongly echoes the discursive common sense 
of failure analysed previously throughout the coverage. This common sense, I 
would argue, is symptomatic of the uneasiness that has taken hold of contemporary 
discussions about colonial history in the UK and France.  
5.3.2 Postimperial melancholia and colonial aphasia  
 
This discourse ultimately tells us more about the societies that produced it, than 
about the countries being covered in this coverage. It is linked to the unsettled 
colonial history in contemporary British and French societies. 
 
In After Empire, Gilroy (2004 p. 2) investigates the meaning of colonial and 
imperial history for, and its impact on, the formation of political conflicts and 
identities in contemporary multicultural British society. For him, British society 
since the 1950s is beset by its inability to come to terms with its colonial past and 
its loss of imperial prestige (Gilroy, 2004 p. 98). This loss has lead to an “anxious, 
melancholic mood [that] has become part of the cultural infrastructure of the place, 
an immovable ontological counterpart to the nation-defining ramparts of the white 
cliffs of Dover” (Gilroy, 2004 p. 15). It is this mood that Gilroy terms 
“postimperial melancholia”. It manifests itself clearly when Britain is invited to 
engage with its brutal history that challenges the nation’s moral legitimacy, self-
esteem and sense of greatness (Gilroy, 2004 p. 100). Such instances 
 
often [trigger] a chain of defensive argumentation that seeks first to 
minimize the extent of the Empire, then to deny or justify its brutal 
character, and finally, to present the British themselves as the 
ultimate tragic victims of their extraordinary imperial successes.  
 
(Gilroy, 2004 p. 103)  
 
As I have shown, such defensive and even revisionist stance was clear in 
Ferguson’s piece on Ghana or Parris’ article on Malawi. Similarly, Gilroy notes 
that such melancholia is particularly visible in the British press obsession with 
Zimbabwe, and its support to white farmers – “Britain’s abandoned colonial kith 
and kin”: 
 
The repetition of tragic southern African themes (…) are a notable 
feature of this moment not only because they convey the 
catastrophic consequences of intermixture and the severe problems 






because, like Linday Colley’s recent work and Enoch Powell’s 
“rivers of blood” speech, they are deployed to contest and then 
seize the position of victim.  
(Gilroy, 2004 pp. 114–115) 
 
Such postimperial melancholia therefore manifests itself in British representation 
of its former colonies. It also underpins the framing of several political debates “at 
home”, such as the ones on black criminality and immigration. In the latter in 
particular, the immigrant – as a political body – becomes the ambivalent discursive 
site where the construction of the ‘Other’ is intrinsically linked to the collective 
identity of the national ‘We’: 
 
[It] comes to represent all the discomforting ambiguities of the 
Empire’s painful and shameful but apparently nonetheless 
exhilarating history (…) the incomers may be unwanted and feared 
precisely because they are the unwitting bearers of the imperial and 
colonial past.  
(Gilroy, 2004 p. 110) 
 
Because it “feeds the illusion that Britain has been or can be disconnected from its 
imperial past” (Gilroy, 2004 p. 2), postimperial melancholia has damaging moral 
and psychological consequences for the construction of a multicultural society. 
Most notably, it frames the phenomenon of immigration as an invasion and fosters 
aggressive sentiment towards migrants seen as “unwanted alien intruders without 
any substantive historical, political, or cultural connections to the collective life of 
their fellow subjects” (Gilroy, 2004 p. 98). For Gilroy (2004 pp. 102–103), then, 
the future of multicultural Britain depends on the nation’s ability to engage with 
“the hidden, shameful store of imperial horrors” and to transform “a revised 
account of the nature of imperial statecraft” into “critical reflections on national 
life”. Only then will appear the prospect for the formation of a reconciled national 
identity. 
 
Stoler (2008; 2011) follows a similar line of enquiry over a blocked colonial 
memory in the French context. Her work is partly inscribed in the trend among 
historians to revisit the French republic as a racialised and colonial entity from its 
start – a phenomenon captured by the oxymoron of république coloniale (Bancel et 
al., 2006). In contemporary popular discourses, the place of colonialism in the 
country’s history, its meaning and legacy, how it should be remembered, 
denounced or celebrated remains unsettled. France’s colonial history is 






reach” (Stoler, 2011 p. 122). It is this process that Stoler conceptualises as colonial 
aphasia. She favours the term aphasia over amnesia so as  
 
to emphasize both loss of access and active dissociation. In 
aphasia, an occlusion of knowledge is the issue. It is not a matter 
of ignorance or absence. Aphasia is a dismembering, a difficulty 
speaking, a difficulty generating a vocabulary that associates 
appropriate words and concepts with appropriate things.  
 
(Stoler, 2011 p. 125)  
 
In other words, the concept of aphasia stresses that the issue is not only that 
colonial history is absent and not discussed (amnesia), but rather that there seems 
to be an inability to make sense of this colonial history precisely when it appears in 
the contemporary context and discussed in the public sphere. Sarkozy’s speech in 
Dakar was a perfect example of such colonial aphasia. For Stoler (2011 p. 139), the 
speech was not epiphenomenal but relied on a pernicious common sense shared by 
the French audience. It was indeed this audience that Sarkozy addressed, rather 
than the Senegalese and African youth that Sarkozy claimed to talk to:  
 
Addressing himself with “frankness and sincerity” to Africa’s 
youth, he urged them “not to dwell on the past,” not to blame 
today’s European generations for the deeds of earlier ones, not to 
expect today’s generations “to expiate the crimes” of those who 
came to conquer “a long time ago”. He asked Senegal’s youth to 
remember that the coloniser indeed took and pilfered, “but also 
gave”. That they “were wrong but sincere, truly committed to ‘a 
civilizing mission’”.  
(Stoler, 2008 p. 209) 
 
While Sarkozy presented his speech as a “sincere” recognition of the exploitative 
nature of colonial history, what he did in fact was to present colonialism as “a 
finished violence and closed history” (Stoler, 2008 p. 210):  
 
[H]e marked “the folds of history” as a danger zone, prompting an 
exhortation to his listeners not to expect “repentance” on the part 
of today’s French society for the crimes of its (often well-meaning) 
forefathers. The warning was clear: neither Africa nor France 
would do well to ferret in those folds.  
(Stoler, 2011 p. 139) 
 
It is therefore both the appearance of colonial history, and the inability to speak of 
it and to understand it not merely as an accident but constitutive of France as a 
racialised republic that constitute colonial aphasia. As a result, colonial categories 
are entirely disjointed from contemporary governing logics (Stoler, 2011 p. 155). 






be explained by a colonial genealogy; rather, Stoler (2008 p. 196) calls for careful 
investigation to assess precisely how and where colonial racial epistemologies are 
deployed in the politics of the present.  
 
In many ways, the coverage of the anniversaries of independence dialectically 
reflected and reinforced this discomfort towards colonial history in France and the 
UK. From the frontloading of Afro-pessimism in editorials to the focus on the 
dysfunctional present, from the silencing of anti-colonial histories to the 
interpretation of the past via a narrative of failure that summoned colonial history 
only to dismiss it as no longer relevant, the dominant discursive features of the 
press coverage of the anniversaries constitute mechanisms that feed off and 
ultimately contribute to postimperial melancholia and colonial aphasia. 
5.3.3 Ambiguities 
 
Yet, as both Gilroy and Stoler note, engagement with colonial history is not devoid 
of ambivalence and ambiguities. In fact, ambiguities can constitute prime tools that 
blur the understanding of, and engagement with, the colonial past. Readers will 
have noted that several of the article extracts used so far included quotes from 
African voices including among others, representatives of the civil society, 
politicians, artists and intellectuals. These voices often constituted the most acute 
and radical critique of African leadership, but also conveyed the narrative of failure 
and disappointment towards the post-independence era. This is where the main 
ambiguity of the coverage of these anniversaries lies.  
In the previous chapter, I showed that African voices constituted the majority of 
individuals quoted. Assuredly, the critique of poor political leadership was a 
dominant feature of the media discourse, and at times contributed to reproduce 
easy stereotypes about “bad African governance” (Willems, 2015). But it was also 
the expression of real frustration and disappointment from within the continent 
towards an elite that failed to live up to popular expectations. As such, this critique 
was ultimately concerned with poverty, inequalities and human rights violations; 
one that can only be dismissed as simply and only stereotypical or Afro-pessimist 
at the risk of refusing to give room to legitimate and pressing calls for social 
equality, government accountability and political freedom. In order to shed more 
light on this discursive tension between stereotypical representation and social 






the celebration organised by the French government on Bastille day on 14 July 
2010. 
Under the impulse of President Sarkozy, the French government invited 14 
countries from sub-Saharan Africa – all former French colonies – to attend and 
take part in the traditional military parade held to celebrate the birth and unity of 
the French republic. The coverage of this event falls under the category of the 
insensitive anniversaries as the ceremony, conceived as a tribute to a shared past, 
heavily backfired. It perfectly captured the paradox of the République coloniale: 
the former colonial power celebrates the end of its own oppression by inviting its 
former colonies to celebrate and commemorate their independence, while 
celebrating the republic itself. Perhaps, one can imagine India commemorating its 
50 years of independence on British soil and on the Queen’s Official Birthday to 
understand the symbolic ambiguity of this event. In representational terms, the 
spectacle of black African military troops parading in the streets of Paris was 
reminiscent of the Paris-Match cover analysed by Barthes (see Chapter 1). 
 
Whenever Barthes’ analysis is summoned, the caption of the picture is almost 
always disregarded. 21  Yet, it provides significant contextual information to 
understand in what sense this image signified a certain myth of the French Empire. 
The caption reads: 
 
The nights of the army: Little Diouf came from Ouagadougou with 
his comrades, children of the troops of the French West Africa 
federation [A.O.F] to open the fantastic spectacle presented by the 
French army this week at the sports palace.  
 
The nights of the army were a 1955 televised military pageant. From the Black 
Guard of Dakar to the Republican Guard and the Foreign Legion, 4000 individuals 
paraded to celebrate France’s colonial empire, just a few years before the French 
colonial empire would start to collapse. The representational continuity between 
this event and the 2010 jubilee is clear. The continuity from the colonial to the 
postcolonial context did not go unnoticed in newspapers, with most of them 
                                                      
21 In a 2009 film, Vita Nova, Vincent Meesen embarked on a quest to find Diouf Birane, the 
cadet pictured on the Paris Match cover. His fascinating film takes us through this journey 
and several reflections on the mediatisation of colonial history and memories. He did not 
find Birane but encountered a schoolmate who also appeared in photographs inside the 
Paris-Match issue. This film constitutes a fascinating way to revisit Barthes’s writing 
through a postcolonial lens as it provides greater historical context to make sense of 
Barthes’s image then and now, but also as it gives an individuality, history and a voice back 






discreetly relaying concerns that the ceremony carried colonial undertones. 
However, none of the newspapers noted the even clearer continuity between the 
parade and the ceremony organised by de Gaulle almost exactly 50 years ago 
(Figure 14). On 14 July 1959, France celebrated the newly established 5th republic 
as well as the new political organisation of the French colonial empire into the 
Communauté (replacing the Union Française). On the Place de la Concorde, de 
Gaulle handed over flags to the heads of states of the 12 countries of the 
Communauté as a sign of union and solidarity. 
 
Figure 14 - De Gaulle on 14 July 1959; Sarkozy on 14 July 2010 
 
 
If the 2010 parade was portrayed as controversial and insensitive, it was mainly 
because the media relayed statements from several NGOs, including the 
International Federation for Human rights (FIDH), that many leaders attending the 
ceremony were dictatorial figures and that several of the armies parading had been 
involved in bloody repressions and human rights violations: 
 
“It’s hard to imagine a stronger paradox than this: as the values of 
the Republic are being celebrated, they are flouted by the presence 
of torturers, dictators and other human rights predators who, 
instead of being condemned, are being honoured by France” writes 
FIDH president Souhayr Belhassen.  
(Le Monde #30)  
 
In relaying information from the civil society about established human rights 






its watchdog role. From a normative standpoint that sees the denunciation of 
dictatorial powers as being key to the democratic role of the media, it is hard to 
complain that newspapers acted as watchdogs and contributed to shed light, and 
ultimately put pressure on, dictatorial governments. In representational terms, 
however, the prominence of these criticisms had several consequences and 
constituted an ideological diversion. Firstly, they lent vigour to old stereotypes of 
“Africa’s big man” and “African savagery”, both embodied in the racialised-as-
black body of the military troops and politicians. Secondly, they called upon and 
cemented idealised values of French republicanism as essentially antithetical to 
phenomena of postcolonial violence. They disjointed colonial racial epistemologies 
from the politics of the present and fed the illusion that France is or can be 
disconnected from its colonial past. Finally, they diverted public attention from 
engaging into a commemorative work about the colonial past by focusing on a 
dysfunctional and decontextualised present with seemingly no connections with, 
precisely, this past. For instance, France has yet to do a public inventory of the 
Françafrique and this anniversary could have been a tremendous opportunity to do 
so; instead, Françafrique was simply mentioned, in passing, in 10 articles out of 
154; as a result, its meaning, spectrum and relevance to put in perspective the 
spectacle organised by the French government remained very marginal. 
 
The discomfort and ambiguities that surrounded the event captured perfectly 
Stoler’s phenomenon of colonial aphasia. Colonial history, at once here and not 
here, available and unreachable, remains unsettled. As the dysfunctional present 
takes centre stage, it remains unclear what should be done with this past, and how 
it should be talked about. Unsurprisingly then, according to a survey conducted by 
iSAMA on behalf of the French government, nearly 70% of the people surveyed 
felt “not concerned by this commemoration”, although more than 80% believed 
that France should “reinforce its links with its former colonies in black Africa” 
including aid (86%), cultural links (86%), commercial links (85%) and diplomatic 
links (82%) (Sainte-Marie & Fert, 2010). These results are a telling demonstration 
of colonial aphasia: the national community simultaneously expects to reinforce its 
involvement with the former colonies, while it hopes to disengage itself from a 
colonial history that seemingly does not concern it.  
 
Reducing the media discourse on the anniversaries of independence to a simple and 






miss the strength of the ideological process at work. Just because media coverage 
focused extensively on the failures of African leadership does not make it Afro-
pessimist. By holding to accounts the governments of countries facing extreme 
poverty and social inequalities, and by trying to convey some of the concerns of 
populations that are not necessarily in a position to attract public attention, the 
press aimed to fulfil an important social function. I would argue, however, that this 
legitimate, even necessary, critique of African leadership was in tension with the 
equally necessary work of colonial memory, and that this discursive ambiguity, this 
tension between commemorative values and news values was key to feeding 
postimperial melancholia and colonial aphasia. As the coverage appropriated a 
critique of African elites and leadership, and of social inequalities, often by means 
of African voices, it also reinforced the idea that discussions of the colonial past 
are irrelevant, ultimately diverting readers from engaging both with the colonial 
past supposed to be commemorated, and with the present ruins of this past. In a 
way, this coverage was made even less objectionable and more ideologically 
powerful precisely because the non-engagement with colonial history was hidden 




This chapter provided a qualitative critical analysis of the discourse surrounding 
British and French broadsheet press coverage of the anniversaries of African 
independence. I showed that the press frontloaded these anniversaries in editorials 
insofar as they could be narrated through a clearly Afro-pessimist lens. In the 
process, I demonstrated precisely how Afro-pessimism was enacted in media 
discourse, and also that the format and schema of editorials played an important 
role in shaping this Afro-pessimism.  
 
Looking at the coverage more broadly, I showed that the past was commemorated 
via the narration of a dysfunctional present, with the celebrations of the 
anniversaries being presented as failed, insensitive or discreet. Interpretations of 
the past 50 years drew partly on colonial myths (pathologisation, infantilisation, 
negation of history), and overall were reduced to a master narrative of failure. On 
the one hand, this master narrative of failure consisted of a social critique of 
political elites and socio-economic inequalities. On the other hand, it also 






colonial and anti-colonial histories. This narrative of failure opened the way for a 
“post-postcolonial moment” where it becomes safe to remove Western 
responsibility from the postcolonial failure, and where colonial history is seen as 
irrelevant to the present. My analysis thus highlighted several discursive 
mechanisms that testify to the inability of the former colonial communities to 
engage with their colonial history.  
 
In order to understand the dynamics and ambiguities of this discourse, I stepped 
outside the conceptual lens of Afro-pessimism to interpret the press coverage in 
relation to what Gilroy, in the British context, has called “postimperial 
melancholia”, and to what Stoler, in the French context, has called “colonial 
aphasia”. In this way, what was a rare occasion for British and French media to 
invite their respective national communities to engage with their colonial past was 
reduced to an invitation to turn the page of colonial history; a complex page that, as 
a result, still remains misread and has yet to find its place in the popular book of 
the two countries’ histories. 
 
My analysis across Chapters 4 and 5 does not paint the picture of a media coverage 
systematically pervaded by generalisation about Africa as a country and by 
constant references to “darkness” and “tribalism”, or dominated by Western voices. 
Instead, it paints a more complex picture of postcolonial discourses in the 
journalistic field, and of the ways in which they relate to broader features of news 
production and journalistic conventions.  
 
The anniversaries became newsworthy insofar as they complied with a 
combination of long standing news values, that is, when they could be related to 
something negative, controversial, exuberant or when they directly involved 
Western individuals or nations. When they appeared in editorials, these 
anniversaries were discussed through a clearly Afro-pessimist discourse. In turn, 
the formation of Afro-pessimism in editorials was linked to the traditional schema 
of editorials as short, spurred by the urgency of the present and aimed at a given 
national audience of decision makers.  
 
Additionally, the propensity of news to be present-oriented led the broader 
coverage of these anniversaries to sidetrack their commemorative dimensions and 






the default position of being critical of governments gave way to vocal critiques of 
social inequalities and of African leadership in the coverage. At the same time, this 
social critique reproduced peculiar narratives about African leadership that are 
entangled in older colonial discourses.  
 
Material conditions of journalistic production, such as a lack of resources, also 
exacerbate the construction of a media discourse linked to a colonial legacy: since 
newspapers have few staff on the continent, they did not give equal weight to the 
different anniversaries. Instead, they focused on what was perceived as more 
relevant to a given audience, thus partly explaining why the British press covered 
Zimbabwe’s 30th anniversary and Swaziland’s 40th anniversary at the expense of 
many francophone countries turning 50. The following comment by David Smith 
perfectly testifies to the naturalisation of several of these production requirements 
within the journalistic field, while revealing a journalistic awareness of the in-built 
inconsistencies and double standards that make up media discourse: 
 
For us as a British paper, numerous African countries turning 50 is 
a bit too vague and abstract. (…) It’s better to have a sharp, simple 
[story] rather than a cluster (…) you would tend to go more for the 
anniversary of a particular person who has been in power for a 
particularly long time. (…) There is an inconsistency around 
anniversaries and clearly for Britain and France next year the 
centenary of the WWI we have to be massive (…) In hindsight, 
maybe we should have done more of it. I mean…I think in an ideal 
world we could have done more. We could have done a whole 
series. Particularly if we had the staff and the resources; if we had 
a correspondent in each of those [countries] it could have been 
really interesting. 
 
Taking into account this context of journalistic production therefore enhances our 
understanding of the formation of postcolonial discourse. The mechanisms behind 
the production of this discourse do not appear to be unique to the coverage of 
African news. But, importantly, the end result of this mechanism is the formation 
of a specific media discourse about Africa that carries the traces of a colonial 
representational legacy. In this site, I tried to demonstrate this by showing that 
requirements of journalistic production worked hand in glove with the discursive 
formation, in some cases, of Afro-pessimism and, more generally, of a discomfort 
surrounding colonial history, characteristic of a broader postcolonial unconscious 






CHAPTER 6 - “Rising”, “Hopeful”, “New”: the emergence 
of media Afro-optimism  
 
 
A reconstructed image of Africa is a historical 
process of correcting the existing 
overrepresentation of its negatives and 
underrepresentation of its positives. 
(Mohammed, 2013 p. 53) 
 
This glowing portrait of Africa’s position in the 
global economic system is a very significant 
historical event. For the first time in five 
centuries, a different image of Africa seems to be 
emerging: one of modernity, economic dynamism 
and progress. 
(Sylla, 2014 p. s8) 
 
In 2000, the Economist published an issue titled “The hopeless continent”. On a 
plain black background, it showed the picture of a young black man carrying a 
shoulder-fired missile embedded in the shape of the African continent (Figure 15). 
This explicitly connoted violence, war, darkness and pessimism. This cover is a 
case in point of visual representation of Afro-pessimism. While often used to 
exemplify Afro-pessimism in Western media, this cover is merely one of many 
other instances of Afro-pessimism making the cover of Western news magazines 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. In 1990, the French news magazine 
L’Express run a front cover story on “Africa, the tragedy”; in 1992, the German 
broadsheet magazine Der Spiegel used the title “Africa, the continent of misery. 
Should the whites save it?” (Figure 16); in 1992, US magazine TIME talked about 
“the Agony of Africa” (Figure 17); in 1999, French monthly magazine Courrier 
International talked about “Africa, the failure of democracy”. 
 
In 2011, the Economist published a special issue on “Africa rising”. This positive 
outlook was at sharp contrast with the Afro-pessimism that historically dominated 
international coverage. In a few years, this cover reached an iconic status. It was 
seen as indicating a change in perceptions of Africa and heralding an era of better, 
more positive representations of the continent. As David Smith, the Africa 
correspondent for the Guardian, comments, he can now rarely go to a conference 
on economy in Africa without someone putting back-to-back the hopeless/hopeful 







Taking this 2011 Economist cover as a starting point, this chapter investigates this 
shift of narrative(s) about Africa on the covers of British and French news 
magazines. Does a similarly positive discourse dominate media representation of 
continental Africa in news magazines covers? If so, what are the key semiotic and 
linguistic features of this positive outlook? What idea of Africa is being 
constructed in the process? What are the drivers of this representational evolution 
and, ultimately, what are its ideological implications? 
 







Figure 16 - Der Spiegel cover (1992) 
 
 










From December 2011 to January 2015, I identified 10 covers that focused on 
continental Africa over eight news magazines (and Sunday supplements in the UK 
which stand as the national equivalent):  
 
! The Economist’s issue of 9 December 2011. 
! The Sunday Times Magazine’s issue of 26 February 2012. 
! The Observer Magazine’s issue of 24 June 2012. 
! Le Point’s issue of 9 August 2012. 
! The New Review’s issue (supplement of The Observer) of 26 August 2012. 
! The Economist’s special report of 2 March 2013, which included two 
different covers depending on the regional edition. 
! Courrier International’s special issue of March-April-May 2013. 
! Le Point’s issue of 26 March 2014. 
! Le Monde Magazine’s special issue of January 2015. 
 
To this corpus of British and French magazine covers, I am also adding a cover 
from the US American news magazine TIME of 3 December 2012 because, in the 
course of my research I interviewed two people involved in its making. These 
individuals provided insights into the production mechanisms of this cover that, as 
I will show, shed light on the broader manufacturing of an image of Africa also 
found in the other covers. Illustrations for all the covers are provided throughout 
the chapter. 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, my methodology consists of a detailed linguistic and 
semiotic analysis that links text and context of production (Aiello, 2012b) in order 
to critically examine the construction of a certain idea of Africa (Mudimbe, 1994). 
Against the saying “do not judge a book by its cover”, I look at magazine covers as 
rich multimodal texts. I approach them as a nexus of interconnected visual, 
linguistic and compositional features (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996), production 
routines and ideological worldviews. These texts reflect and dialectally contribute 
to a discursive construction of Africa entangled in broader social structures of 
power. In addition to a detailed analysis of textual data, I draw on interviews and 
questionnaires with several media professionals involved in their production, 
including foreign correspondents as well as a freelance illustrator, a graphic artist, 






interviews given by three editors and published elsewhere (Chanda, 2013; Pitroipa, 
2013). In doing so, I trace key linkages between the covers’ semiotic features and 
issues of postcolonial representation, and the broader political and economic 
processes in which they are implicated. In sum, I use these as micro-textual cases 
that shed light on the more ‘macro’ dimensions and social implications of a shift in 
perceptions and representation of Africa. 
 
These 10 covers constitute all the covers dedicated to continental Africa among 
this section of the media in my time frame. As such, they do not constitute a 
sample but rather an entire corpus of texts. In addition, a magazine cover is 
particularly salient. It is the first piece of information that readers encounter and it 
can make or break the sales of an issue. A cover story is what a magazine sees as 
the main story of the week or the month. A magazine cover is made for public 
consumption, since one does not need to buy or read a magazine to see it. It 
reaches far beyond the immediate readership of a magazine, and, when it reaches 
an iconic status, a cover can take a life of its own and circulate very widely, 
especially in a digital context that makes covers widely available online. These 
covers therefore constitute a particularly salient site where an authority over the 
knowledge of the continent as a whole is claimed, and it thus makes them highly 
relevant to the study of Afro-pessimism. 
 
The chapter is structured in three parts. The first one provides an analysis of the 
covers’ features and of the idea of Africa they construct. The second part fleshes 
out the key drivers of this representational evolution. The last section brings in 
dialogue the features analysed and the drivers behind this coverage to critically 
analyse the power relations contained and reproduced through this coverage. 
 
6.1 The features of news magazine covers on Africa 
 
This first section maps out the set of linguistic, semiotic and compositional features 
of the magazine covers under study. I pay attention to similarities as well as 
differences across the different covers to exhaust their representational repertoire 
and to critically analyse what idea of Africa they construct. In the process, I shed 







6.1.1 Economic growth, modernity and ‘Africanness’ 
 
My investigation of this emerging media narrative starts with the 2011 Economist 
cover because of the iconic status it has gained. The “Africa rising” cover (Figure 
18) depicts a black child running in the savannah. He is pulling a rainbow-coloured 
kite in the shape of Africa, which rises high in a clear blue sky. An acacia tree is in 
the distance together with sunrays emerging from a mountain chain that draws the 
horizon line in the image’s bottom part. This is a wholly positive picture connoting 
hope for the future. The rays of the rainbow emerge from South Africa, a country 
self-defined as the rainbow nation and, at the time, the leading African economy. 
Its former president Thabo Mbeki was at the forefront of the “African 
Renaissance” – a concept assuredly familiar to the Economist’s readers. The 
African Renaissance revisited the pan-African dream through, primarily, economic 
growth. In a way, the rainbow emerging from South Africa and opening up to the 
rest of the continent suggests that South Africa is leading the way of this 
continental renaissance. After all, South Africa had just hosted the World Cup a 
year before; the same year it joined the BRIC grouping.  
 







The image links clues of “Africanness” with a positive and optimistic message of 
progress and economic growth, a process also at stake in the Sunday Times 
Magazine cover (Figure 19) and a second Economist cover (Figure 20). The 
Sunday Times and the Economist 2 communicate a sense of African wilderness, the 
former with its title “the Lion’s roar” and the latter with the depiction of a giraffe – 
hereby referring to the two savannah animals par excellence that are iconic of 
safari tourism and wildlife documentaries. Together, the savannah landscape, the 
lion and the giraffe evoke the wild environment suitable for big-game hunting. This 
portrayal is reinforced by the emphasis put on sunlight in the two Economist 
covers. These semiotic features resonate strongly with the ironic advice given by 
Wainaina (2005 p. 94) that “readers will be put off if you don’t mention the light in 
Africa”.  
 
Similar components can be found in a special issue of TIME magazine (Figure 21) 
that also uses the “Africa rising” title – itself a linguistic reference to sunlight. It 
shows a pictogram-like graphic composition framed by TIME’s traditional red 
border. The cover has what Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) call a centre-margin 
compositional structure. In the salient centre, a large yellow sun is applied to a 
plain light green background. The shape of a brown acacia tree is inserted onto the 
sun. The savannah tree, also found in the two Economist covers, echoes a sense of 
nature, wilderness and earthiness. These semiotic references – sun, savannah and 
wilderness – are an integral part of a colonial portrayal of Africa as the “white 
man’s paradise” (Hammond & Jablow, 1977 p. 48). Africa is portrayed as an open 
landscape frozen in time; a land of possible and new departures, suitable for 







Figure 19 - The Sunday Times Magazine cover (2012) 
 
 







Figure 21 - TIME cover (2012) 
 
 
The reliance on such a representation of Africa extends beyond the realm of news 
media. In fact, this phenomenon was recently the subject of critical discussions 
online on what has come to be known as the “Africa/acacia tree meme”. Simon 
Stevens, a student from Columbia University first identified the phenomenon 
(Figure 22). His collage of book covers of novels about Africa shows that “whether 
it’s Nigeria, South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana or Zambia, it’s that same kind 
of distended belly of the setting sun” (Campbell, 2014). Peter Mendelsund, an art 
director for publisher Knopf and a cover designer, provided some insights into the 
rationale behind this production choice:  
 
If someone goes out on a limb and tries something different, and 
the book doesn’t sell, you know who to blame: the guy who didn’t 
put the acacia tree on the cover (…) We’re comfortable with this 
visual image of Africa because it’s safe. It presents ‘otherness’ in a 
way that’s easy to understand (…) right now, we’re in the age of 
the tree. For that vast continent, in all its diversity, you get that one 








Figure 22 - The Africa/acacia tree meme (Stevens, 2014) 
 
 
In this context, the use of Africa’s geographical shape in the Economist 1 and the 
Sunday Times carries connotations dating back to the 19th century “Scramble for 
Africa”. Harpold (1999) reminds that the map of Africa and the seductions of its 
“unsolved mystery” were central to the authorial project of Joseph Conrad in Heart 
of Darkness. The map binds “the physical and imaginary geographies of his 
fictions to one of the defining visual tropes of high colonialism” (Harpold, 1999). 
In these two covers, the maps do not include national borders, which contributes to 
a generalised view of the continent, while concealing geographical divisions that 
give to see Africa’s colonial partition for economic purposes in the late 19th 
century. Although the maps include the northern part of the continent, the ‘Africa’ 
discussed in these special issues is in fact sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, 
Madagascar is systematically removed. Such projection is therefore not so much 
geographically informative as it is a coercive instrument “for naturalizing, reifying, 







These clues of ‘Africanness’ are combined with various connotations of modernity 
and economic progress. At a linguistic level, “rising” echoes the assessment of 
economic growth as made clear in the references to “Africa’s economic boom” 
(Sunday Times), to the “world’s next economic powerhouse” (TIME) and to the 
“world’s fastest growing continent” and the giraffe’s neck abnormally extending so 
as to mirror a growth curve (Economist 2). The “lion’s roar”, then, also implicitly 
refers to the “Asian tigers”, a metaphor coined to label Asian countries often hailed 
as the success story of economic neoliberalism in the developing world 
(Parameswaran, 2015). The Sunday Times further connotes economic performance 
by visually associating Africa to a turbo car. The cover has a centre-margin 
composition. On a black mat background denoting the dashboard of a luxurious 
car, it gives salience to a large speedometer. This speedometer displays two gauges 
which both range from green to yellow to red. In its centre is a green Africa, 
circled by the words “Turbo charging Africa”. The use of the pan-African colours 
found on many African flags (red, black, green and yellow) reinforces a visual 
sense of ‘Africanness’.  
 
Similarly, TIME uses the pan-African colours through the interplay between the 
frame and the title (red), and the graphic art (yellow of the sun and green of the 
background). The cover also represents buildings through various rectangular 
shapes that are reminiscent of chart bars or columns found in visual representations 
of economic statistics. The buildings are in marginal position (bottom part and 
along the frame) and relatively small, but their brown colour contrasts with the 
light green of the background, which gives them salience. As the buildings blend 
with the basis of the tree and draw the horizon line, the image metaphorically 
envisions Africa’s future through urbanisation, a clear marker of modernity.  
6.1.2 Generic images and symbolic representation 
 
Strikingly, the four aforementioned covers are symbolically loaded rather than 
informative. They favour graphic design over photographic evidence. Dominic 
Nahr, the former Africa photographer for TIME, and member of the Magnum 
Photos agency, was initially approached to produce the cover. Based in Kenya, he 
was asked to provide city shots of downtown Nairobi – with the hope of visually 







They needed an image in the rush because that’s what happens all 
the time (…) I heard there was a fashion show downtown and so I 
went downtown to get a picture. But it’s a bad day with an ugly 
weather. Downtown looks like crap. So I send them pictures and 
they say: “no we need more downtown, we need the cover. It’s for 
the cover, you know, and we need city shots”. So I am trying to get 
views of the only section of downtown Nairobi that could provide 
nice city shots. But they always look like crap because the city 
does not look like a very inspirational city. It looks like it is 
stopped in time like 30, 40 years ago.  
 
The publication of the issue was delayed by a week and a London based graphic 
artist, Noma Bar, was called to design the cover instead. Nahr knew his images 
would not be used. He admitted being initially surprised by the visual choice of the 
“tree and the sunset”, but then remembered the Economist cover, and some other 
magazines, had the “same feel”. He also recalled something similar happening 
during the World Cup (Figure 23): “in a way the World Cup is also Africa rising. I 
was sure I had the right cover; it was a face, it would have been perfect for Africa 
rising. But they went for the same kind of style again”. Again, graphic composition 
was preferred, although the graphic designer was not in the UK but in Victoria, 
Texas. In that sense, these covers seem to be shaped, less by the diversity of things 
available in the field, and more by expectations and preconceptions from the 
newsroom. The choice of using graphic compositions instead of photographic 
evidences highlights a production mind frame in which if editors (in the US) are 
not able to find what they want (to represent Africa) in Kenya, they will literally 
make it up by asking someone (in London or in Texas) to visually give life to their 
preconceptions. 
 
These covers reproduce various features of what Machin (2004) terms the generic 
image characteristic of the visual language of stock photography. A generic image 
is more about signifying a concept and a mood than about providing informative 
evidence. The Economist 1 shows a wide blue sky – a feature associated with the 
category of freedom and which is a hallmark of the generic image (Machin, 2004 
p. 331). Derek Bacon, the illustrator who produced the image, further explains: 
“The boy used was from a photo library but altered to look black. He was white to 
start with, but was in just the right position for a kid running with a kite”. Once 
again, it does not matter whether the image informs real life events, places or 
people. Instead, graphic efficiency and symbolic representation is key. As the skin 
colour is literally made up like in a Minstrel show, it demonstrates the use of 






individual features” (Machin, 2004 p. 323). Additionally, portraying Africa as a 
child carries colonial undertones of Africans as childlike and irresponsible and 
ultimately in need of guidance. This iconography remains central to humanitarian 
communication (Chouliaraki, 2006), and it comes as little surprise that a secretary 
to one of the heads of Comic Relief asked Bacon for prints for their walls: “That 
issue came out in December so made quite a good present, for the right people. 
Other requests were from people involved in some kind of charity work in Africa”. 
 
Figure 23 - TIME cover (2010) 
 
 
Another feature of the generic image as defined by Machin (2004) is at stake in the 
third Economist cover titled “A hopeful continent” (Figure 24): the importance of 
attributes. The cover shows a medium range photograph of a black woman with a 
prominent smile. Her arms are opened and her pose relaxed. She looks out of frame 
and it is therefore an “offer image” where she is offered as an item of information 
and an object of dispassionate scrutiny (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006 p. 119). We 
look slightly up to her, which connotes empowerment and agency. She holds a 
pineapple in each hand, and wears a Manchester United shirt and a skirt made of a 
colourful African cloth. Just like props in a stock photography, the attributes are 
“used to connote not only the setting but also the identities of the actors and the 






(Machin, 2004 p. 322). The symbolic feminisation of the “hopeful continent” as a 
colourful and warm black woman can be seen as part of a “mother Africa lens” that 
goes hand in glove with “a paradise imagery of sunsets and wildlife” (Jones, 2012 
pp. 40–41). It summons one side of the binary stereotype of the “noble savage”, 
where Africa is inextricably linked to blackness, warmth and exoticism (Berger, 
2010). The woman’s attributes therefore blend signifiers of globalisation (football 
shirt), ‘Africanness’ (dress, blackness, ‘mother Africa’) and positivity (open arms, 
smile).  
 
Figure 24 - The Economist cover (2013) 
 
 
The out-of-focus background suggests that she is in an indoor market. This setting 
connotes the informal sector; one that offers “opportunities to the most vulnerable 
populations such as the poorest, women and youth” (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2013). The 
modernisation theories of the 1950s and 1960s perceived an informal economy as a 
sign of late industrialisation and lack of progress. In the late 1980s, however, 
economist Hernando de Soto argued that this sector provided an interesting 
response to weak states (Mintz-Habib, 2013). This idea attracted the attention of 
the World Bank and the IMF. His thesis promoted “entrepreneurship” and 
“dynamism” but also offered further justification for economic deregulation. The 






Bank (2013) recognises that “most informal workers are without secure income, 
employments benefits and social protection”. It is not, however, this picture of the 
informal economy that the cover depicts. Instead, it associates the informal 
economy – at the heart of the neoliberal project in Africa – with positive values of 
hope and women’s empowerment. By taking the form of an “offer of information”, 
this image simultaneously provides an “offer of goods-and-services” (Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 2006 pp. 122–123), in that case offering Africa’s market opportunities. 
6.1.3 Gendered Africa 
 
Le Point’s first cover (Figure 25) provides a different take on symbolic 
feminisation with a close shot of a black woman with a large Afro haircut. She 
looks straight at the viewer. Such “demand image” (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006 p. 
118) invites the viewer to enter some kind of imaginary engagement with the 
woman. She is wearing eyelash extensions and a glossy red lipstick on her full lips. 
Her features resemble beauty criteria associated with international modelling. On 
her hair, the title states: “Africa is not the one you think she is”. Before the title, a 
small font text reads: “in spite of wars and tragedies, she is beating growth 
records”. In the bottom left, the bullet points read “her successes, her elites, her 
promises”. The use of the feminine pronoun “elle/celle” (translated here by “she”) 
plays a significant role in framing Africa as feminine. She is attractive and 
surprising, not the one “you think she is”. As the woman looks straight at the 
camera, her gaze calls for a response and entices the viewers to dive into the 
magazine, almost in a flirtatious manner. The cover frontloads her appearance and 
relegates her name, Inna Modja, to a very marginal position (lower right; smallest 
font; little colour contrast). In fact, she is not even talked about within the 
magazine. She has no voice or agency, no background and barely a name. Like a 
cover girl, she offers herself as an object of visual consumption and simultaneously 
embodies the attractiveness of the continent’s “growth records”.  
 
Such gendered and sexualised vision has antecedents in metaphors that sustained 
the colonial conquest of Africa seen as female and passive, “spatially spread for 
male penetration and exploration” (Brijnath, 2007 p. 375). But this image is also a 
case in point of typing (Aiello, 2012b p. 60). Unlike in stereotyping, there is no 
exaggeration or simplification of her features. However, other aspects of this image 
are simplified, particularly the background and the setting. The image then 






features and sensual lips). At once, this cover inscribes her (attractive) difference – 
rooted in a sexist and colonial fascination – within the visual codes of 
decontextualised and generic photography so as to ultimately sell Africa’s 
economic performance.  
 
Figure 25 - Le Point cover (2012) 
 
 
Mireille Duteil, the editor of this special issue, was particularly delighted by the 
sales of this issue that stood at more than 90 000 copies sold, “a number slightly 
above the average but particularly good for the August month which is usually very 
bad for sales” (Pitroipa, 2013). She further shared that they “received a lot of 
feedback for this special issue and that the readers asked us to renew the 
experience. They regularly ask us when we will put Africa on the cover again” 
(Pitroipa, 2013). Building on this relative commercial success for a topic long 
viewed as hard to sell among news producers, Le Point published a new special 
issue on Africa on March 2014, less than two years after (Figure 26). This is even 
more remarkable given that Le Point’s covers in their large majority deal with 
national politics; in the same time frame no other continent (not even Europe) 






dedicated to Africa, only five concerned international news (one on Angela 
Merkel, one on Mandela, two on the Pope, and one on the war in Mali). 
 
Figure 26 - Le Point cover (2014) 
 
 
This new cover bears striking resemblance to the previous one. Again, Africa is 
written in bright yellow, this time with a subtitle “The great awakening”, and two 
bullet points “Some incredible destinies” and “An historic shift”. Once more, 
Africa is discursively embodied through the face of a black woman, albeit this time 
the readers probably know her. Indeed, Lupita Nyong’o had recently risen to 
international fame following her winning the Oscar for the best supporting actress 
for her role in Twelve Years a Slave (2013). Her picture on the cover is in fact 
taken from this ceremony as she is wearing the same dress, make up, accessories 
and haircut. It is again a demand image, as she looks straight at the reader. She 
similarly embodies beauty criteria associated with international modelling with 
notably the make up on her eyes and lips. Her association with the world of 
modelling and fashion is reinforced by the fact that she appeared on the cover of 
numerous fashion magazines in previous months, including notably Dujour 






Magazine’s Spring Fashion Issue (February 2014). The background, like in the 
previous Le Point cover, is decontextualised and foregrounds her physical 
appearance. A significant difference with the previous one, then, is that Lupita 
Nyong’o is a celebrity. As such, the relegation of her name to the lower left corner 
does not, in itself, contribute to erasing her voice and individuality. In fact, one 
would expect that with her being on the cover and the bullet point “some incredible 
destinies”, she would be the topic of an article inside the magazine. Her personal 
story, after all, is a tremendous tale of globalising, multifarious identities that 
challenges one-dimensional perceptions of African identities (she was born in 
Mexico, grew up in Kenya and then studied in the US). Yet, like Inna Modja, she is 
not the topic of any article and is not even mentioned in the 54 pages dedicated to 
Africa in the magazine. Her function on the cover is again a commercial one, that 
of being an object of visual consumption so as to sell a magazine while promoting 
a commercially successful Africa. 
6.1.4 Style and identities 
 
Another cover that uses a photograph is Courrier International’s one (Figure 27). 
Art director Anne-Sophie Delhomme expressed the clear desire from the editorial 
team to demarcate their cover choice from a “simplistic and stereotypical Western 
gaze”: 
 
It was a collegial choice. First, we had a brainstorming session 
with the two editors of the special issue, the editor in chief and the 
photo editor to determine several main themes and the angle of the 
cover. We decided that we wanted to show the energy and 
promises of modernity of the African continent. We also thought it 
would have to be embodied; so we wanted a face, an attitude, in 
any case a cover with a human dimension. 
 
The choice was made, then, to use an image by an African photographer. For 
Isabelle Lauze, the special issue editor, “for a long time, foreign experts and 
analysts have held a monopoly in terms of who can talk about Africa. They knew 
better than the Africans what was happening to them! Today, Africans are speaking 
up” (Chanda, 2013). In fact, the special issue as a whole is exclusively made of 
articles and images produced by Africans (defined in the editorial as citizen born in 
Africa or part of the diaspora; who are black, white or mixed-race and from various 
countries), hence the cover’s subtitle “Africans tell the new dynamic of the 






explained: “it was paramount to bear witness to the visual creativity of the 
continent. We therefore made the choice to rely on African photographers”.  
 
The photograph is part of a portrait series by Senegalese photographer Omar Victor 
Diop conceived as a tribute to the new generation of creative and forward-looking 
Africans. The young man looks straight at the viewer. It is a “demand image” that 
brings him closer to us (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006 p. 124). The picture draws on 
the visual codes of iconic African photographers Malick Sidibé and Seydou Keïta 
famous for their staged, playful portraits and their emphasis on clothing, pose and 
colourful backdrops. As a fashion photographer, Diop’s image also emphasises 
high key lighting, style and the art exhibition format. It is therefore also marked by 
a corporate style of visual communication; one that Aiello found to be 
“increasingly prized and profitable in the global marketplace of symbolic 
exchange” (Aiello, 2012b p. 51).  
 
Figure 27 - Courrier International cover (2013) 
 
This image reached a consensus among the editorial team 
 
because of the quality of the picture, the bright colours but also the 






an efficient arrangement of the titles and a good readability. We 
had a lot of good pictures but none met all these criteria.  
 
(Delhomme, art director) 
 
The title “Africa 3.0” – borrowed from the book of two South African journalists, 
Richard Poplak and Kevin Bloom – connotes digital advances and social media 
empowerment. Isabelle Lauze confirms that 
 
it is a wink to the vocabulary of internet. It is also an editorial 
statement. Africa 1.0 was colonial Africa. Africa 2.0 was the 
Africa of the independence movements, but this Africa was still 
under the tutelage of the former colonial powers. Africa 3.0 refers 
to the Africa whose time has finally come, with the end of the 
dependency towards the West.  
(Chanda, 2013) 
 
For all its intent to demarcate itself from Western discursive constructs of the 
continent, this editorial statement nonetheless testifies to a need to inscribe Africa 
within a narrative of temporal progress that necessarily starts with European 
colonialism – ultimately suggesting that Africa had no history before. As Gregory 
Mann (2013) notes ironically in his review of the special issue for the blog Africa 
is a country, “fancy meeting you here, Herr Hegel”, in reference to Hegel’s view of 
Africa as outside of history. This discursive feature is also visible in the statement 
by Delhomme that they wanted to show the “promises of modernity of the African 
continent”. Finally, Mann (2013) also notes that while the two editors Isabelle 
Lauze and Ousmane Ndiaye embraced a diverse definition of who is an African 
author (born in Africa or the diaspora, whether white, black or mixed-race), the 
special issue focused only on sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Overall the cover certainly avoids colonial or racial stereotypes, and portrays a 
young, urban and empowered Africa – a portrayal reminiscent of the idea of 
Afropolitanism. The term was initially used to capture a sense of African identities 
as fluid, mixed, and global, and “refusing on principle any form of victim identity” 
(Mbembe, 2007 p. 28). For Mbembe (2007, p. 28), it constitutes an “aesthetic and a 
particular poetic of the world” that incorporates consumerism, fashion and style. 
Afropolitanism thus defies categorisation of Africans as exotic ‘Others’ 
“untouched by the West’s culture of individualistic atomization and materialism” 
(Berger, 2010 pp. 182–183). Dabiri (2014), in contrast, notes that much of this 
“hipster Africa experience” is entrenched “with the rapacious consumerism of 






structures inherited from colonialism and sustained by economic neoliberalism. 
She thus criticises the emancipatory potential of what she deems to be “the attempt 
to begin with style, and then infuse it with substantive political consciousness” 
where “African progress is measured by the extent to which it can reproduce a 
Western lifestyle” (Dabiri, 2014). Wainaina (2012b) shares similar concerns for the 
potential “commercialization of the African identity to serve capitalist consumerist 
ends” and of Afropolitanism becoming “the marker of crude cultural 
commodification”.  
 
These aspects of Afropolitanism are particularly visible in the cover that the 
Observer dedicated to Nigerian pop star D’Banj, labelled the “Star of Africa” 
(Figure 28). This is yet again another “demand image”. It also uses a plain 
background so as to frontload D’Banj. His attributes – tailored tuxedo, bow tie, 
transparent specs, shinning watch and bracelet – connote style and fashion. 
Assuredly, this image disrupts stereotypes about African identities. In fact, it 
echoes what photographer Nahr would have wanted to see on the TIME cover: 
“something with style, where you would think it’s New York but it’s not. (…) 
Changes are happening in construction and roads, but visual changes are happening 
in personalities and characters, thing like that, and style and music”.  
 







When discussing a section of the current generation of African youth – through a 
portrait of his 16 years old daughter Sue who he describes, among other things, as 
an avid consumer of smartphones and tablets, entertainment TV, fashion and 
celebrities – Nyamnjoh (2013 pp. 129–130) challenges the idea that we should  
 
rush to the conclusion that Sue and young African girls and boys 
like her are victims of Western imperialism and consumerism, and 
that they are guilty of mimicry and of modelling themselves after 
Western stars and desires (…) Sue and her generation simply 
refuse to adhere to the logic of purity and dichotomies, which 
invites everyone to know and stick to their preconfigured place in 
the ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ order of things.  
 
I would side partly here with Nyamnjoh. This, however, does not suppress the 
ambiguities that exist in celebrating as emancipatory a globalising African identity 
defined primarily by consumerism and style. The Courrier International and the 
Observer covers both provide an empowering image that challenges stereotypical 
representations of Africa and African identities. Both images also focus primarily 
on style, with the Observer borrowing from the visual codes of stock and fashion 
photography and with Courrier International combining a corporate style of visual 
communication with traditions of African photographers. These covers therefore 
navigate the ambiguous water of Afropolitanism where commodification, 




The New Review also links to Afropolitanism by providing various stories on 
young creative entrepreneurs. Its cover, however, takes a very different approach 
that favours symbolic representation (Figure 29). The black colour connotes the 
blackness and “darkness” of the continent while giving salience to the white word 
cloud. The most salient linguistic elements communicate stereotyped images of 
Africa: “poverty, HIV, drought, disease and corruption”. The dominant red 
background with yellow linguistic elements evokes the communist flag and an era 
where Africa’s media relevance was largely determined by cold war proxy 
struggles and conflicts. It is also perhaps a subtle reference to China’s growing 
presence throughout the continent; a presence that Mawdsley found to be framed in 







a rather simplistic binary between the sometimes mistaken or 
frustrated but essentially well intentioned West (Dr Livingstone), 
and the amoral, greedy and coldly indifferent Chinese (Fu 
Manchu) battling over a corrupt and/or helpless Africa (the Dark 
Continent).  
(Mawdsley, 2008 p. 523) 
 
Figure 29 - The New Review cover (2012) 
 
 
In any case, the cover’s semiotic features strongly resonate with those of a perfect 
example of Afro-pessimist cover published in TIME magazine in 1984 (Figure 30). 
The New Review cover therefore up-plays Afro-pessimist tropes and a quick look 
at the image would communicate: “postcolonial Africa is a Dark Continent”. The 
key rhetorical moment – the conjunction “but” – is introduced with the smallest 
font. The readers may have to re-read the text, or at least to overcome their first 







Figure 30 - TIME cover (1984) 
 
 
The New Review’s cover plays out en abîme the debate on Africa’s image, with 
reflexivity being the decisive visual aspect of the cover. The cover does not aim to 
portray the “new Africa” talked about in the magazine; instead, it seeks to engage 
the readers by inviting them to question commonly held assumptions about Africa. 
A similar strategy was found on Le Point’s 1 cover and its statement “in spite of 
wars and tragedies, she is beating growth record. Africa is not the one you think 
she is”. But whereas Le Point tries to visually illustrate the “new Africa”, The New 
Review relies on a playful discrepancy between the linguistic and the visual, where 
the linguistic promise of “a script that is starting to change” contrasts with the 
visual that frontloads an Afro-pessimist representation. In that sense, the cover 
operates at a meta-discursive level (Wasserman & de Beer, 2009) by directly 
referring, in the content itself, to a broader debate about Africa’s image and the 
role of the media (“for years we have been telling the same old stories”). 
 
With this mise-en-abîme of Africa’s media image, the New Review draws on, and 
frontloads, Afro-pessimism as a referential framework, even if only ironically. 
There is then an ambiguity in giving prominence to self-reflexivity in the content, 







(It is) as if the most radical critique of the most obtuse and cynical 
prejudices about Africa were being made against the backdrop of 
an impossibility, the impossibility of getting over and done “with 
something without running the risk of repeating it and perpetuating 
it under some other guise”.  
(Mbembe, 2001 p. 1) 
 
Finally, Le Monde’s cover (Figure 31) combines several features found on The 
New Review one and in previous ones. This is a demand image where the character 
– neither obviously masculine or feminine – looks straight at the viewer with a 
sense of pride; her or his gaze is at the middle of the composition and engages the 
reader in a relationship of equal, thus connoting agency and empowerment. The 
cover blends photographic evidence with graphic composition. The black face 
emerges from a plain black background where the only and barely discernable 
element is the hair of the character, which appears to be dreadlocks on the right 
part of the image.  
 
Figure 31 - Le Monde Magazine Hors-série cover (2015) 
 
 
The photo editor proposed the picture to Aude Perrier, the graphic artist that 
produced the cover. It was taken from a series of pictures from an African 
photographer because the editorial team “wanted to put forward an African artist 






didn’t try to find out more about the identity of the person” (Aude Perrier). Applied 
in transparency to this face is a map of the continent (which does not include 
Madagascar) designed through multi-coloured dots that connote a digital aesthetic, 
like the word cloud of the New Review and the reference to “Africa 3.0” in 
Courrier International. Aude Perrier explains: “the dots are here to evoke the 
dynamic dimension of Africa, led lamps, emerging cities, scientific, economic and 
graphic tables”. The title “Africa, the take off” is in line with previous titles of 
Africa “rising”, “aspiring” or the “great awakening”. Perrier notes that “it 
corresponds to the editorial line of this issue. It was meant to evoke the dynamic 
and contemporary side of Africa”. She found the approach to have been successful 
since “this visual pleased a lot of people. And it worked because it was not 
pessimistic, but attractive, modern”. 
 
Like for the New Review, this linguistic element stands partly in contrast with the 
visual dominance of the dramatic black background often associated with Afro-
pessimist representations. In that sense, the cover also incorporates reflexivity and 
mise-en-abîme, with the black background symbolising a canvas of assumptions, 
the shadows out of which the new, empowered and digital face of Africa emerges. 
 
6.2 The drivers of media Afro-optimism 
 
These covers testify to a real uptake for positive images of Africa, an Afro-
optimism. In the following section, I step outside these media texts to discuss three 
key factors driving the emergence of this discourse. I present and discuss these 
drivers following a concentric approach similar to the one put forward by 
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) and introduced in Chapter 2; I tackle individual, 
organisational and extramedia levels. In doing so, I relocate these media texts and 
their linguistic, semiotic and compositional features in a broader production and 
discursive context so as to flesh out, in the third section, the power relations buried 
in them.  
6.2.1 Driver 1: Awareness vis-à-vis Afro-pessimism 
 
A first driver of this positive discourse on Africa is the awareness within the 
journalistic field about issues of stereotypical representation of the continent and its 






visible in public debates. In that sense, this greater awareness seems to have 
contributed to a willingness to tell different, more positive stories about Africa. 
David Smith, who has been working as the Africa correspondent for the Guardian 
for more than five years, bears witness to this evolution: 
 
A lot has changed in the last 10 years. There probably, really was a 
time when there was a very one sided, stereotyped view of Africa. 
And it was portrayed only as a place of evil dictators, cannibals 
and classic images of famine in Ethiopia and all of that. I think 
there was a pushback against that, quite rightly. (…) A lot of media 
have taken that criticism of Afro-pessimism on board and 
consciously set out to give a different perspective, and show an 
optimistic side of Africa. In my five years, this demand has 
increased even more, because editors now ask you to look for a 
story about a fashion show in Lagos, or downtown development in 
Johannesburg, to write about artists and musicians. So in response 
to the criticism of Afro-pessimism, a lot of editors have taken that 
on board. 
 
For Lucy Siegle, who was a contributing journalist to the New Review special 
issue, this greater awareness is linked to the fact that many newsroom staff  
 
have spent time in Africa – including myself, my immediate editor 
and many members of staff – and have a good working knowledge, 
either culturally or politically or both. Perhaps more importantly, 
we have a strong interest in stories from different parts of Africa.  
 
In its editorial to the 2011 “Africa rising” issue, the Economist expressed some 
remorse about its 2000 cover saying that it “regrettably labelled Africa ‘the 
hopeless continent’”, while its 2013 report promised to “paint a picture at odds 
with Western images of Africa”; these two examples suggest a willingness to take 
on board criticisms about a one-sided image of Africa in Western media. Similarly, 
Perry explained “foreign correspondents are aware of the issues of colonial 
stereotypes, and discuss these among themselves” and that his “Africa rising” piece 
which made the cover of TIME was “just the latest in a long line of similar pieces”, 
although he was not involved in the cover design, or the headline which he found 
to be too one-sided. The previously quoted statements from Isabelle Lauze and 
Anne-Sophie Delhomme about the editorial choice to rely exclusively on African 
journalists and photographers also demonstrate similar willingness to tell different 
stories and in different ways. A recent study with 124 international news reporters 
in sub-Saharan Africa similarly found that the majority of them are aware of the 
“representational deficits regarding Africa’s media image” (Vicente, 2013 p. 24). 






that I explore in more depth in Chapter 7 – appears to have contributed to driving a 
more positive media outlook about Africa.  
6.2.2 Driver 2: Commercial incentives 
 
This individual reflexivity, however, should be contextualised in a range of 
commercial incentives for media organisation that significantly drive the 
emergence of this positive coverage. As explained earlier by the editor of Le 
Point’s special issue, Mireille Duteil, their first issue sold quite well – with 
numbers slightly above the average but during a time of the year were sales are 
usually low (August). These results gave them an incentive to publish another 
special issue, whereas foreign news very rarely appears on Le Point’s cover. A 
recent analysis of five French news magazines found that international news 
(including Europe) constituted only 11% of the covers (Piquard et al., 2015). 
Similarly, Ousmane Ndiaye, one of the editors of the Courrier International issue 
explained that they came out of this editorial experience with the conviction that 
Africa is “not an unsalable journalistic material” (Pitroipa, 2013). Foreign news has 
always been a difficult topic to sell for news magazines, especially on their covers. 
According to a former editor of Newsweek “a foreign subject on the 
newsmagazine’s cover results in a 25 per cent drop in newsstand sales” (Moeller, 
1999 p. 312). So what is, then, the commercial potential of such positive coverage?  
 
In revisiting Galtung and Ruge’s typology of news values, Harcup and O’Neil 
noted that, although news still remains generally “bad news”, there is an increasing 
and “surprising amount of good news” (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001 p. 272). They go 
on establishing a new set of 10 decisive news values and, like Galtung and Ruge, 
argue that the more of these news values can be found in a story, the greater the 
chances of it being covered are. This positive trend about Africa then ticks three of 
these news values: good news (“stories with particularly positive overtones”); 
surprise (“stories that have an element of surprise and/or contrast”) given that all 
these magazine covers are made to surprise readers about their preconceptions of 
Africa; and magnitude (“stories that are perceived as sufficiently significant either 
in the number of people involved or in potential impact”) given that these covers 
talk about an entire continent (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001 p. 279). This way, Afro-
optimism becomes a selling point for media outlets and for audiences all too 







However, the greatest commercial incentive driving this positive discourse is the 
strategy adopted by some media outlets to open themselves to new media markets. 
Le Point 2 special issue coincided with the launch of a new website “Le Point-
Afrique”. This project was two years in the making, and the commercial rationale 
behind it was made clear in the editorial of the special issue: 
 
We are hoping to make ourselves heard much farther by engaging 
with the entire francophone world (…) Thanks to Africa and its 
demography, the number of people speaking French will boom in 
the next decades. This is an opportunity that we intend to benefit 
from. 
 
Similarly, Le Monde’s special issue coincided with the launch of their website “Le 
Monde Afrique”, described in the magazine as:  
[a] true pan-African and francophone media, that will accompany 
and follow Africa’s economic take off by engaging with the 
players involved in African news, the African diaspora throughout 
the world, expats in Africa and all those in love with this continent.  
 
This way, Serge Michel Le Monde’s editor in Chief, explains in the magazine that 
the new platform “will be targeting a younger audience in Africa and to do this, we 
might adjust the tone or way certain articles are entitled”.  
 
These strategies are part of a broader trend to extend readership overseas, and 
develop a more global outlook in the face of increased commercialisation and 
global exposure (Sambrook, 2010 p. 57). For instance, the Economist, the 
Guardian or the Financial Times increasingly brand themselves as global, through 
different regional editions and the reliance on a more diverse network of 
journalists. In the context of the African market specifically, Le Point and Le 
Monde follow suit from Al-Jazeera English’s branding as providing a different 
perspective on Africa, symbolised by the fact that the Channel’s first global 
promotional campaign was launched from South Africa (Al Jazeera, 2014). In a 
similar vein, but with a stronger intertwinement of economic and political interests, 
the Chinese media CCTV Africa has sought to develop a “greater engagement with 
African audiences” by notably “advancing new ways of looking at Africa” and 
positive journalism as a way to ultimately “favour [China’s] image or interests 
abroad” (Gagliardone, 2013 p. 25). While Le Monde’s launched its new Africa 
platform, BBC News launched a digital Africa edition spurred by the increase in 
mobile phone users on the continent (Habari Media, 2014). This move was 






generate and develop ideas that will help BBC World Service connect with digital 
audiences across Africa” (BBC, 2015). Therefore, the appetite for positive 
coverage of Africa is also driven by a commercial incentive to get a piece of 
Africa’s growing media cake. In this way, it aligns clearly with a narrative about 
Africa’s economic growth and its place in the global political economy that 
originates from the corporate discourse of the international financial institutions.  
6.2.3 Driver 3: The corporate discourse of financial elites 
 
The uptake for a positive discourse about Africa grounded in economic statistics 
can be traced back to a dramatic change of perception of the continent among 
investment and financial circles. According to Bach (2013 p. 11), this shift 
originates with the discovery of significant oil reserves in West Africa in the late 
1990s. Technological progress allowed the development of offshore oil fields, and 
the business environment was perceived as highly favourable, i.e. extremely 
advantageous terms offered by states to foreign investors. These aspects 
contributed to a view of West Africa as “the last large unexplored energy frontier’” 
(Bach, 2013 p. 11). This view subsequently extended to the entire continent, 
especially after the increased involvement of China and BRIC countries from the 
mid-2000s onwards. In 2008, the OECD Chief economist promised that Africa is 
“in the process of becoming the new emerging markets investment frontier” (Bach, 
2013 p. 13).  
 
The tipping point for the establishment of this discourse was the year 2010, in 
which the publication of several reports from investment firms called for foreign 
investors to change their perception of Africa so as to benefit from its market 
potential. McKinsey published a subsequently much cited report on the “Lions on 
the move” (Roxburgh et al., 2010), while Ernst and Young launched a flagship 
Africa attractiveness programme. The same year, South Africa successfully held 
the first World Cup in Africa. This was the perfect PR vehicle to build up the 
profile of an Africa rising, a project of rebranding in which firms such as Ernst and 
Young have openly claimed to use their brand leverage “global reach to promote 
the African investment agenda” (Ernst & Young, 2014 p. 24). In fact, the title of 
the World Cup’s song “this time for Africa” was directly echoed in the 2011 Ernst 
and Young Africa’s attractiveness report (“it’s time for Africa”), as well as in a 
book written by the former vice-president of the World Bank and former director 






Development Bank published a report on the rise of the African middle class, 
which was subsequently very influential (Sylla, 2014 p. s8). After the year 2010, 
there was therefore an increase in conferences and consultancy reports on the 
theme of Africa rising, as well as a significant increase in official visits and 
diplomatic exchanges with the continent (Bach, 2013 p. 1). This discursive 
consensus emerging from the world of corporate finance also led to 
“unprecedented coverage of Africa in financial media” (Bach, 2013 p. 1). 
 
Against the euphoria of financial circles, some economists such as Sylla (2014) 
have started to question both the accuracy of this view, as well as the interests it 
serves. Sylla explains that this optimistic vision relies on three types of argument, 
namely the potential of the continent (in terms of natural resources, demography 
and urbanisation), an increase in purchasing power, and economic growth. While 
statistics are clear about the continent’s tremendous rate of growth in GDP, Sylla 
(2014 p. s11) notes that this growth “is largely oriented towards reconstruction and 
stabilisation”; in other words, during the 2000-2010 decade, the continent was 
“making up for lost time rather than heading towards ‘emergence’”. Moreover, this 
growth has come at tremendous costs with little job creation and with the 
transformation of African countries as essentially “profitable for a type of foreign 
investment oriented towards the extractive industries and motivated by short-term 
profit” (Sylla, 2014 p. s16). In that sense, this optimistic view emerging from 
financial circles is in continuity with the broader political economy that imposed 
structural adjustments plans throughout the continent in the 1980s and 1990s, 
except that debt repayments has been replaced by foreign direct investments as the 
main transfer tool. This optimistic discourse brushes over the tremendous social 
and environmental costs of the development of extractive economies and of an 
economic growth that only benefits local elites and foreign countries no longer 
confined to Western powers. A recent study found that “lived poverty at the 
grassroots remains little changed” in Africa, pointing to the fact that the effects of 
growth “are not trickling down to the poorest” (Dulani et al., 2013). This positive 
narrative ultimately suggests that the SAPs finally paid off, and equates success 







6.3 Africa’s evolving media image in the context of global 
neoliberalism 
 
While there is certainly a noticeable uptake for this positive discourse, it is 
therefore hard to posit that it constitutes a significant historical break in terms of 
what drives the image of Africa. As a result, this Afro-optimism is far from being a 
discursive rupture in the construction of Africa’s image. 
6.3.1 Discursive features of Afro-optimism  
 
My analysis revealed the emergence of a positive trend in the discursive 
construction of continental Africa. All the covers dedicated to continental Africa in 
British and French news magazines between 2011 and 2015 frontloaded a positive 
discourse about Africa. At first sight, this suggests a significant evolution of 
Africa’s media image. Many critics of Afro-pessimism, such as Mohammed (2013) 
quoted at the beginning of the chapter, would welcome it as a way to correct the 
historical overrepresentation of negatives.  
 
However, my analysis showed that these covers dominantly draw on pre-existing, 
often colonial, notions of ‘Africanness’. These are combined with various 
signifiers of modernity, economic attractiveness and progress. Through this 
combination, these covers work to ‘Other’ its subjects while simultaneously 
reinforcing a neoliberal status quo in which only economic performance and 
attractiveness matter. Even the more disruptive covers of Courrier International, 
the Observer or Le Monde which do not visually rely on colonial notions of 
‘Africanness’ are still part of, and contribute to, the uptake for an Afro-optimist 
discourse. 
 
Such Afro-optimism can be seen as a binary opposite of Afro-pessimism, and, as 
such, is part of a similar discursive continuum. Africa was hopeless, in despair, 
starving, lagging behind; it is now hopeful and rising, it welcomes you with 
pineapples and is the turbo car of the global economy. This discourse reproduces 
the main discursive features of Afro-pessimism identified in Chapter 2: (1) it 
homogenises Africa and (2) provides a racialised view of the continent reduced to 
sub-Saharan Africa and where the “fact of blackness” is essential; (3) it is highly 






framework which assesses the continent’s progress against criteria of economic 
performance; (5) it predicts Africa’s future, but in positive terms this time (see 
Table 16). This Afro-optimism therefore reproduces a reductive vision – infused by 
both a colonial imagination and a neoliberal ideology – of Africa’s present and 
future. 
 




Main linguistic and semiotic components of the magazine covers 
Homogenisation - The use of generic references to “Africa”. 
- The use of colonial images of a landscape frozen in time and wild 
(savannah, acacia tree, lion, giraffe). 
- The reliance on the map of (mainland) Africa without borders. 
Racialisation - The focus on sub-Saharan Africa as opposed to Africa as a 
geographical entity. 
- The use of colonial images of a landscape frozen in time and wild 
(savannah, acacia tree, lion, giraffe). 
- The “fact of blackness” as key to represent African identities. 
- The making up of blackness (i.e. the child running in the savannah 
painted black). 
- The reliance on gendered and racialised representations 
(foregrounding physical appearance / “mother Africa”). 
Selectivity - The frontloading of an unambiguously positive portrayal through 
linguistic references (“hopeful”, “rising”) and semiotic choices used to 
represent individuals (welcoming pose, smiling faces, attractive 
appearance). 
- The assessment of “progress” and “achievements” solely in terms of 
economic growth and of conformism with a Western lifestyle of 
consumption. 
- The silencing of growing social inequalities and of the damaging 
social impact of neoliberal policies. 
Ranking 
framework 
- The reliance on, and the frontloading of, signifiers of economic 
progress (“rising”, “economic boom”, “economic powerhouse”) 
- The use of signifiers of modernity (“turbo car”, high rises, football 
shirts, fashion, consumption, digital aesthetic) 
- The embodiment of economic progress through animalistic 
metaphors (“lion’s roar”, giraffe) 
- The importance of a linear reading of history (“historical shift”, 
“great awakening”, “Africa 3.0”) 
Prediction - The use of signifiers of hope that actively project in the future 
(rainbow colours, “rising”, “aspiring”, “hopeful”, “promises”, 
“growing”, “next economic powerhouse”, “the new Africa”) 
 
Thus, we should be careful about claiming and celebrating the novelty of this 
discourse, or its unprecedented dimension. Sylla (2014 p. s8), as mentioned 






time in five centuries, a different image of Africa seems to be emerging: one of 
modernity, economic dynamism and progress”. My analysis, instead, reveals a 
clear continuity in the discursive construction of the image of Africa. This 
discourse “constitutes an invitation to call back the ghosts of the explorers, 
soldiers, traders and settlers who each in their own way once ‘discovered’ Africa” 
(Bach, 2013 p. 11), and evokes the “Scramble for Africa” and the race by imperial 
powers for raw materials in the 19th century. It is in that sense that Browning and 
Ferraz de Oliveira (2015) talk of the contemporary branding of a continental 
African identity as contrasting with the supranational discourse of pan-Africanism 
of the independence era: 
 
Whereas the pan-Africanism of the ‘leaders of liberation’ called 
for an internally focused dialogue and a refusal to place the 
concerns and perceptions of outsiders at the heart of debates about 
reclaiming subjectivity, branding implies a more direct 
engagement with the orientalist gaze and calls upon Africans to 
respond by reshaping themselves and their societies in accordance 
with the anticipated desires of outsiders.  
(Browning & Ferraz de Oliveira, 2015 p. 11)  
 
Gabay (2015) adds weight to this argument. He notes that there are several 
historical antecedents of similarly positive discourse in Western portrayal of 
Africa: 
 
Africa’s supposedly unspoilt, and indeed unused (environmental 
and demographic) nature, has often been expressed as fundamental 
to Africa’s character at various historical points of the Western 
encounter with the continent from the 18th century (Curtin, 1964: 
60-61, 68-69) until now (Buscher, 2012). (…) Very little about 
today’s Africa Rising narratives is new.  
(Gabay, 2015 p. 29) 
 
More precisely, he argues that these positive narratives have appeared at moments 
of Western insecurity. Thus, the current trend of Afro-optimism could also be 
understood in relation to the post-2008 economic crisis context where “the West is 
beset by economic problems, disillusionment with formal democracy, and in 
Europe in particular, an aging population” (Gabay, 2015 p. 24). In an echo of a 
decisive component of postcolonial scholarship, the Africa rising discourse can be 








6.3.2 A discursive trickling down 
 
My findings suggest that the emergence of Afro-optimism on news magazines 
covers appears to result from a discursive trickling down, where the Afro-optimism 
originating from the view of international financial elites, and subservient to the 
interest of an unequal global political economy, filters through the news agenda. 
This is particularly visible in that the first magazine to frontload the Africa rising 
narrative was the Economist, a news magazine with a broad readership but 
primarily aimed at the world of business. Similarly, MoneyWeek, a properly 
business-oriented magazine also ran a cover on “booming Africa” in 2011. 
Unsurprisingly, its cover relied again on the savannah and acacia tree tropes, with 
high-rise and modern buildings in the horizon line. This filtering through the media 
then serves as a self-fulfilling prophecy with business firms relying on this media 
coverage to further reinforce this discourse, such as Ernst and Young 2013’s report 
which used the Economist’s cover evolution to confirm that “an exciting shift” was 
happening in Africa’s market potential. 
 
There are signs that this demand for positive news is not limited to one-off covers 
but is starting to seep through the broader coverage and to impact media outlets at 
an organisational level. The AFP Southern Africa bureau chief, Christophe 
Beauduffe, confirmed that there was a broader uptake for more positive stories 
driven by demands from the market, a trend also confirmed by several of my 
interviewees: 
 
There is a pressure from our editors, well not really a pressure, but 
let’s say that there are expectations from our clients to cover Africa 
positively. Let’s get over the whole Africa is corrupt, full of poor 
people starving and conflict, which remains largely the case 
because if you look at our production throughout Africa, we cover 
this because this is what happens. But they [the clients] are very 
happy when we have articles on economic development, 
agricultural development and lifestyle. They want more articles 
about the smartphone boom, new technologies and so on. 
Yesterday, we had a large videoconference with all the bureau 
chiefs in Africa and the main editorial bureau in Paris and there is, 
apparently, a demand from our clients to show Africa as a 
continent moving forward. 
 
From the extra-media level of political economy, to the level of media 
organisations and individual journalistic awareness and all the way down to media 






down through which power relations of domination and inequality endure. Seen 
uncritically, this positive narrative risks preventing critical engagement with the 
global neoliberal framework and pressing issues of economic and social 
inequalities. It could favour the development of extractive economies, which 
ultimately only benefit a small local elite and foreign countries no longer confined 
to Western powers. In a way, the concerns raised at the time of the NWICO debate 
are still very relevant but ought to be re-contextualised within this evolving global 
political economy. 
6.3.3 The stylisation and commodification of difference 
 
Furthermore, there is something compelling about the style and visual language of 
these covers. Machin (2004) argues that changes in the global political economy of 
visual communication lead to a homogenised global visual language where 
photography is no longer about being witness to the real but is rather part of a 
symbolic system. While Machin focused on stock photography, corporate 
communication and advertisement, these covers testify to a similar evolution in the 
field of news media. At least, four covers use stock photographs; seven emphasise 
graphic composition over photographic evidence; the photographs used all 
reproduce various features of the generic image (decontextualisation; generic 
settings and people; role of attributes). All the covers draw heavily on the language 
of “positive thinking which is itself a crucial moral value in the 
corporate/consumerist world” (Machin, 2004 p. 331). Within this homogenisation 
of style, however, Africa’s difference is actively summoned. Africa’s specificity is 
visually frontloaded but also stylised to look professional, sleek and competitive 
within a framework of generic global design. This process of honouring difference 
through the inscription of specific representation within generic design should be 
understood in the context of “contemporary processes of aestheticization – which 
are at the heart of the neoliberal restructuring of identities and social relations in 
the service of global capital” (Aiello, 2012b p. 72). In this process, African 
identities and the continent’s future are visualised in the increasingly homogenised 
and generic visual language of global neoliberalism.  
 
Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o (1986) once famously pointed to the linguistic 
challenge in apprehending African realities beyond a Western gaze. During the 
2012 African Studies Association UK biennial conference, he used the example of 






does not convey the colonial connotations that it holds in English or French. He 
made this point to call African writers to write in their own language. But his 
argument has far reaching consequences for Western media. It implies that these 
languages are colonised, that colonialism is linguistically rooted. As a result, and 
perhaps too deterministically, Wa Thiong’o suggests that there would be an 
epistemological and linguistic impossibility to apprehend African realities in their 
own terms through these languages. However, my analysis has shown that it is not 
only at a linguistic but also at a visual level that such debates need to take place. 
For it is heavily through a visual style and aesthetic characteristic of global 
neoliberalism that these covers shape African identities, realities and the 





All the covers analysed in this site signal an evolution of Africa’s media image, a 
gradual shift from Afro-pessimism to Afro-optimism with regard to continental 
narratives. On the one hand, these depictions rely heavily on a set of signifiers of 
modernity, positivity and ‘Africanness’. On the other hand, these covers are a 
prime example of a visual style that favours symbolic representation and generic 
imagery. My analysis further revealed a significant amount of media self-
reflexivity and awareness regarding media Afro-pessimism, both at the production 
and content levels of these covers. But this positive and reflexive trend should not 
be embraced as radically undermining Afro-pessimism. Instead, I have argued that 
this trend was the result of a discursive trickling down initiated in the field of 
international financial institutions and which is subservient to a global neoliberal 
political economy. In other words, I have suggested that the foundations of Afro-
optimism lie in the same political economy that shaped Afro-pessimism.  
 
This, in turn, explains why this Afro-optimism mirrors precisely the five discursive 
features of Afro-pessimism identified in Chapter 2: it homogenises, racialises and 
depicts very selectively Africa; it assesses its progress in a ranking framework and 
predicts its future, albeit in positive terms. Rather than challenging the system of 
representation that shaped Afro-pessimism, this media Afro-optimism constitutes 
an attempt at altering Africa’s image within this system of representations and 






Finally, and in the context of these specific media texts, I demonstrated that the 
distinctive visual style and design of these covers was the process through which 
Africa’s difference was (re)inscribed within a dominant discourse of globalised 
neoliberalism, in a clear discursive continuum with Afro-pessimism. From the 
visual style of these covers to the values embodied in them and the commercial 
incentives driving this discourse at the extra-media and organisational level, the 
image of Africa becomes a commodity through and through (Horkheimer & 







CHAPTER 7 - “I am not trying to seek the true Africa”: 




It all comes down to, in my mind, someone who reads 
my paper, who has never been to Africa and they are 
coming for business for the first time, or more likely for 
a holiday for the first time. (…) They have read the 
paper, and my stories about Africa. They come here, 
and they step off the plane and spend a week and a half 
here. When they get back on the plane, how wrong was 
their impression according to what they had read?  
 
(Africa Correspondent 1, 2013) 
 
Although many studies have looked at the textual and discursive features of media 
coverage of Africa, only a handful of studies analyse, or include, the experiences 
and views of individuals involved in the production of African news (Willems, 
2005; Kothari, 2010; Bunce, 2013; Vicente, 2013; Malaolu, 2014). This is all the 
more surprising given that foreign correspondents are routinely mentioned in 
content-oriented studies of Western media coverage of Africa. This chapter 
contributes to filling this gap by providing a critical appraisal of the accounts of 
foreign correspondents based in the two hubs of international news on the 
continent: South Africa and Kenya. Foreign correspondents are at the heart of the 
journalistic production of Africa’s image, and are generally on the receiving end of 
the criticism of Afro-pessimism. They are located at a key nexus of the production 
process, acting as mediating agents between the ground to be reported and the 
demands of editors back home; a nexus where the politics of representation and the 
constraints of media production meet. This chapter therefore sets out to explore the 
discourse of foreign correspondents to see what it tells us about Afro-pessimism, 
about the production of media discourse, and about the values, priorities and 
challenges that shape their reporting of Africa.  
 
I conducted 19 in-depth semi-structured interviews with a range of journalists 
working for international media organisations in Cape Town, Johannesburg and 
Nairobi. The majority of my interviewees (13) are foreign correspondents working 
for the British and French print media analysed in the previous chapters. They are 






relationship with one, or more, of the newspapers or magazines which content was 
analysed previously. Here, I draw the majority of my observations from this poll of 
core interviewees. 
 
The chapter is structured in three sections. The first section focuses on how foreign 
correspondents understand and react upon being asked to discuss Afro-pessimism 
in Western media. In the second section, I analyse how correspondents talk about 
production processes and their impact on media representation of Africa. The last 
section analyses how foreign correspondents talk about their audience as a way to 
shed light on the continuities and changes in the reporting of Africa. The choice of 
these three sections is linked to the broader lines of questioning of the thesis but 
each section is organised along themes that emerged from the interviews. Before 
entering the analysis, I first provide below the background to the professional 
context of foreign correspondents in Africa.  
 
The notion that foreign correspondents are a dying breed has become common 
currency. The last twenty years have seen a significant decrease in the amount of 
Western foreign correspondents and bureaux posted abroad (Utley, 1997; Moore, 
2010; Sambrook, 2010). This decline results from a combination of economic 
pressure and technological evolution, with print media particularly suffering from 
the loss of advertising revenues and print sales, and from the transition to the 
online environment and cross media competition. In a recent report, Richard 
Sambrook (2010 p. 8) also observes an evolution at large of the nature of news that 
has impacted the provision of international news: “news now appears to be 
ubiquitous and ambient, with the premium on speed and comment – neither of 
which necessarily require expensive bureau”. 
 
The decline of foreign correspondents has been particularly salient in sub-Saharan 
Africa, especially in the 1990s after the continent lost its strategic relevance for 
cold war proxy struggles (Franks, 2010b p. 72). This has come at costs that both 
academics and journalists have complained about. A dramatic illustration of the 
impact of the lack of foreign correspondents posted in Africa was the 1994 Rwanda 
genocide. The international media failed to grasp the scale of the events unfolding. 
Most journalists arrived there too late, only to focus on the crisis of Hutu refugees 
fleeing to Goma and on the French military intervention “Turquoise”, resulting in a 






and the genocide (Philo et al., 1999). For Anne Chaon who worked on AFP’s 
Africa desk in the first weeks of the genocide, this failure was more that of the 
media industry than of the few journalists present at the time. The international 
media attention was focused on other events in the world (the OJ Simpson scandal; 
the death of formula 1 driver Ayrton Sena; the bombing of Gorazde in Serbia) as 
well as elsewhere on the continent as South Africa held its first multiracial 
elections (Chaon, 2007 p. 162). Bartholomäus Grill, then the Africa correspondent 
for German broadsheet newspaper Die Zeit, was in South Africa covering the 
elections. He painfully recalled finding himself in the situation of having to be 
simultaneously at two places some 3500 km away, just like many other Africa 
correspondents at the time: “like others, I too wrote unforgivable stories from afar 
for which I am ashamed today, 20 years later” (Grill, 2014). Concerns about the 
lack of means to cover such a large geographical area are therefore not new. But 
the ongoing decline of traditional foreign correspondents and bureaux keeps on 
raising questions about the ability of the international media to cover it adequately. 
 
Rather than lamenting the decline of foreign correspondents, some like Bunce 
(2010; 2015), Archetti (2012), Murrell (2014) and Skrubbeltrang (2015) focus on 
informing the evolutions in the structure of international news production and how 
these redefine what foreign correspondence is, and who is a foreign correspondent. 
The decline in permanent foreign correspondents posted abroad has resulted in a 
greater reliance on news agencies (Bunce, 2015). In the African context in 
particular, Thomson-Reuters and to a lesser extent AFP have become the prime 
providers of news for most TV channels across the globe (Paterson, 2011). As 
Bunce (2015) notes, these agencies have a more global agenda as they cater to 
clients no longer only confined to Western countries. Moreover, they increasingly 
rely on a large network of local journalists. She concludes “that international news 
– an important source of images and texts in the semiotic construction of ‘Africa’ – 
is to a large extent, discovered and written by journalists from the region” (Bunce, 
2015 p. 2). Looking at Iraq and Indonesia, Murrell (2014 p. 2) demonstrates the 
role played by fixers in international reporting:  
 
Fixers bring to the [foreign] team local knowledge, translation 
capabilities, contacts and access to people and places that will 
affect the kinds of stories that are told and how they are told. They 
offer a window into how locals perceive the issues that are being 
reported, and therefore allow reporters to transcend the limitation 








This growing body of literature paints a more complex picture of international 
news production that increasingly involves local actors and is integrated into a 
globalising market.  
 
While perhaps smaller and part of a more globalised environment, there remains a 
network of Western foreign correspondents based in sub-Saharan Africa working 
primarily for national media ‘back home’. Some are permanent staff, others 
freelancers working for several outlets; some are Africa correspondents, others 
East or Southern Africa correspondents. This elite group still enjoys a strong 
reputation, with a bureau posting traditionally seen “as a reward for years of 
distinguished service in domestic reporting” (Murrell, 2014 p. 1). The media they 
work for remain very influential within the industry at large and are often heralded 
as the benchmark of quality journalism. This group of correspondents shares the 
broad demographic features of their predecessors, and of foreign correspondents 
posted elsewhere. Vicente (2013) provides the most recent information about the 
demographics and occupational characterisation of international news reporters 
working across sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on the answers of 124 participants 
based in 41 countries, he found that their socio-demographic characterisation “is 
consistent with previous research implemented in other geographies of foreign 
correspondence (Hess, 1996, 2005; Nosaka, 1992), confirming a male-oriented 
occupational field composed by an educational elite” (Vicente, 2013 p. 22). Most 
of them are still based in Nairobi and Johannesburg, the two hubs for the 
production of international news emerging from sub-Saharan Africa, and where 
most of my interviews took place.  
 
These journalists are key producers of textual material found in the outlets under 
investigation in the previous chapters. Given their position, these journalists find 
themselves, more than any other group, on the receiving end of the criticism of 
Afro-pessimism. As individual professionals, they come to embody and represent a 
set of values associated with the industry at large. Yet, they also hold key insights 
into the mechanisms, motivations, and constraints that go into the making of this 
image. In addition, because it is part of the daily routine of a correspondent to read 
the competition, foreign correspondents probably constitute the group the most 
familiar with Western media coverage of Africa. Engaging with their accounts, 
experiences and discourse therefore constitutes a unique opportunity to understand 







7.1 Foreign correspondents and Afro-pessimism 
 
This section focuses on foreign correspondents and Afro-pessimism. What do they 
understand by Afro-pessimism? How do they react to the criticism that Western 
media are Afro-pessimist? Are there significant differences in their reactions and if 
so, how can these be explained? 
7.1.1 “Is that a type of hairstyle?” 
 
When looking at all answers, Afro-pessimism, as perceived by foreign 
correspondents, is made of several features (Table 17). These include: negativity / 
selectivity (in the choice and presentation of stories); the reliance on stereotypes 
related to famine, corruption, violence and poverty; a colonial ancestry. In one case 
only, a correspondent identified two more components, namely generalisation and 
hopelessness: 
 
Where you verge from just straight news reporting, and reporting 
on bad things, and turn it into a kind of Afro-pessimism [is] when 
your report is basically saying “there is no hope, this is how it is”. 
And you generalise from this very specific [to Africa].  
 
(East Africa correspondent 2) 
 
Taken together, these answers echo several of the features of Afro-pessimism 
identified in Chapter 2, most notably selectivity, racialisation (“stereotypes” and 
“colonial ancestry”), homogenisation (“generalisation”), and prediction 
(“hopelessness”). However, there was no strong and systematic consensus about 
what Afro-pessimism exactly is, beyond a negative image of Africa. This lack of 
clear, unambiguous understanding was also visible in the way Afro-pessimism was 
described as a “presentation”, a “perception”, a “belief”, an “idea” or an 
“accusation” (underscored in Table 17). Each of these terms confers to Afro-
pessimism a different nature. “Presentation” emphasises the role of the media (the 
act of presenting / representing). In contrast, “perception”, “belief” and “idea” 
underscore Afro-pessimism as existing beyond media portrayal (e.g. audience, 
society generally). Finally, “accusation” stresses the rhetorical use of them. 
 
Overall, the term was perceived as pejorative, as a label akin to being called 






themselves from Afro-pessimism, or to mitigate the relevance of the criticism of 
Afro-pessimism in Western media. 
 
Table 17 – How correspondents understand Afro-pessimism 
Negativity / Selectivity 
It would be if you have a media that talks about Africa only when there is a famine 
or a war. Only when something negative or shocking happens. (Southern Africa 
Correspondent 1) 
 
It would be, I imagine, the unfair presentation of news events and trends in Africa. 
It is unfair because either within a story it focuses on the bad side, simply. Or 
within the choice of which stories to write, it shows that. (Africa Correspondent 1) 
 
I think the accusation of Afro-pessimism is usually made with reference to hearing 
a bunch of these newspapers cuttings. And, “look, all these stories about Africa are 
bad and negative”, and “why do we only write about famine in Ethiopia, rape and 
conflict in Congo”. And particularly in South Africa, “why do we write about a 
potential race war and don’t look at positive achievements”? (David Smith, Africa 
correspondent, Guardian) 
Stereotypes 
The misery and suffering, and preferably misery and suffering that fit into nicely 
delineated boxes, so famine, disease etc. Basically the four horsemen of the 
apocalypse. (East Africa correspondent 2) 
 
I suspect it might mean the kind of perception, prejudiced, that things are terrible 




It’s the idea that Africa is the Dark Continent, the hopeless continent, that famous 
Economist’s front page; [the idea] that it’s full of libidinous and corrupt African 
leaders; that the interest is from stories of tourists being eaten by safari animals; the 
belief that African leaders can’t really run things for themselves and if they do 
they’ll steal the money, mess things up (…) There is a colonial aspect to it. 
(Aislinn Laing, Southern Africa correspondent, Telegraph) 
 
I suppose it's associated with the old [sigh], I hate to say this because I've just had 
it so many times, this is not the way I think, but it's associated with “savage 
Africa”, “colonial Africa”, old of these kinds of stereotypes and tropes which are 
very old hat. (East Africa correspondent 1) 
 
Firstly, foreign correspondents would describe Afro-pessimism as “unfair”, 
“biased” or “prejudiced”. In doing so, they clearly positioned themselves in 
opposition to Afro-pessimism. In fact, most journalists vocally rejected Afro-
pessimism, describing this as being completely at odd with their approach and 
intentions; one even hesitated to discuss Afro-pessimism “because it has nothing to 
do with the reasons why I became a journalist in various bits of Africa” (East 






distanced themselves from the phenomenon, thus making Afro-pessimism 
irrelevant to their individual journalistic production. 
 
The second reaction consisted in arguing that media coverage perceived as Afro-
pessimist was simply a reflection of the truth; that the issue was not the 
‘representation’ but the ‘reality’. Michela Wrong, a former correspondent in Cote 
d’Ivoire, Zaire and Kenya for Reuters, BBC and the Financial Times, made this 
clear: 
 
It seems to me that way too much attention is paid to how Africa is 
viewed in the Western media, when the issue should be how to 
address the problems that lie at the root of that perception. When 
the reality changes, the perception will also automatically. (…) It’s 
more a case of symptom and cause being mixed up. Africa is not in 
trouble because it is being misrepresented in the Western media. It 
is still, sadly, in trouble, ergo the media conveys that message to 
the outside world. [my emphasis] 
 
In a similar vein, the AFP Southern Africa bureau chief, Christophe Beauduffe, 
appealed to the ‘reality’ to explain the pessimistic perception of the continent:  
 
This continent is not faring well, and there are no objective reasons 
to believe it will be better in five year given its leaders. I don’t care 
that people call me pessimist or not, that’s the reality. [my 
emphasis] 
 
These reactions mirror two classical strategies identified by van Dijk (1992) in the 
rhetoric of racism denial by the press: intention denial and justification. Regarding 
the former, van Dijk (1992 p. 92) gives the example of a newspaper that defends its 
focus on minority crimes by “claiming to publish ‘the truth’, and thus deny 
prejudiced opinions about minority crime and hence deny spreading such 
prejudices with the intention of discrediting minorities”. Justification, then, is a 
correlative of intention denial, since media coverage is justified on the basis that it 
reflects ‘reality’. For van Dijk (1992 p. 104), these constitute the most consequent 
forms of racism denial which “often lead to the strategic move of reversal: we are 
not the racists, they are the ‘true racists’”. While not widespread, such reversal of 
the charges was visible in Wrong’s assessment of the criticism of Afro-pessimism 
in Western media: 
 
At times I lose patience with the criticism’s covertly racist tone. 
(…) Perhaps [Africa is] not always [reported on] accurately, and 






and knee-jerk racism operate in the opposite direction, too, in the 
way Africans write about and think about the West. 
 
Finally, the last reaction was to trivialise the criticism of Afro-pessimism by 
equating Afro-pessimism with “bad news about Africa”, or by arguing that critics 
confuse these two things: 
 
I think some of those people mistake Afro-pessimism for what 
journalists do everywhere including their own countries. (…) It’s 
not Afro-pessimism. It’s a sort of world pessimism because the 
default position of journalism is to be sceptical and what some 
might see as negative.  
(David Smith) 
 
In my experience, I don’t think any of that applies to Africa 
uniquely as opposed to anywhere else in the world.  
 
(Africa correspondent 2) 
 
You can draw a distinction between reporting bad news in Africa 
and being an Afro-pessimist. And I think a lot of the critics – and 
you won’t be surprised if I defend the way foreign correspondents 
cover Africa on the whole – see us reporting bad news and 
immediately assume that this comes from this sort of Afro-
pessimist or, worst still, racist or possibly stupid origin.  
 
(East Africa correspondent 2) 
 
By equating Afro-pessimism with bad news about Africa, journalists argue that the 
phenomenon is not specific to Africa but simply reflects what news is. This 
strategy provides both intention denial and justification: there is no particular 
intention targeting Africa, and there is a clear reason why news focuses on negative 
stories – and by extension why Afro-pessimism occurs, if by Afro-pessimism one 
means “bad news about Africa”. 
 
In sum, when faced with the criticism of Afro-pessimism, correspondents 
displayed three defence strategies to distance themselves from Afro-pessimism or 
mitigate the relevance of the criticism. These can be summed-up in the following 
terms: 
1) “I agree with you, Afro-pessimism is condemnable. But Afro-pessimism 
has nothing to do with my work”. 
2) “What people may perceive as Afro-pessimism is simply a reflection of the 
reality. We are victims of a classical case of ‘shooting the messenger’”.  







Finally, there were significant differences in how journalists based in South Africa 
and those based in Kenya reacted. Nairobi-based correspondents displayed more 
exasperation than their South African counterparts. Only then would critics of 
Western coverage of Africa be referred to as “stupid”, or even “racist”. Similarly, 
only in Nairobi did a correspondent initially refuse to talk about Afro-pessimism: 
“I don’t even want to answer. It means nothing. It’s such ah [long sighs]. I have no 
interest in it. I think these things are reductive, and simplistic and unhelpful” (East 
Africa correspondent 1). In contrast, South Africa based respondents were 
generally less defensive and usually relied on the first distance strategy. They were 
more familiar with the term Afro-pessimism itself as opposed to Kenya where a 
few journalists had not heard the term before. This suggests that the local context 
in which journalists are based shapes their reaction to the criticism of Afro-
pessimism. In order to explain these different reactions depending on the local 
context, I now turn to the ways in which the debate about Africa’s media image 
played out in both countries in recent years. 
7.1.2 The Kenyan context 
 
In the 2007 Kenyan presidential elections, Mwai Kibaki was elected in contentious 
conditions against the opposition leader Raila Odinga. Odinga and his supporters 
challenged the results and accused Kibaki of electoral fraud. The political feud 
stirred up identity-based hatred, and escalated in a countrywide post-election crisis 
where more than 1200 people died, and some 350 000 were displaced. For almost 
two months, the event attracted the unusually sustained attention of international 
media (Bunce, 2015 p. 14). In the aftermath of the post-election violence, the role 
of both local and international media came under scrutiny (Somerville, 2009; 
2011). International media were deemed to have overplayed the scale of the 
violence, and to have drawn on a “tribal language that was incorrect, 
condescending and potentially inflammatory” (Bunce, 2015 p. 15). 
 
Similar criticisms emerged in March 2012 when the Kenyan ‘twittersphere’ reacted 
to a CNN story on an attempted terrorist attack on a Nairobi bus. The title 
“Violence in Kenya” was perceived as sensationalist, exaggerated and 
decontextualised. In reaction, the hash tag #SomeonetellCNN grew increasingly 
popular, eventually becoming “the second most trending term on Twitter that 
week” (Bunce, 2015 p. 23). CNN apologised and the report was eventually 







One month later, Foreign Policy published a tribune by academic Laura Seay 
criticising “many Africa correspondents [who] file stories that fall prey to 
pernicious stereotypes and tropes that dehumanize Africans” (Seay, 2012). Her 
article notably targeted Nairobi and Johannesburg based Western foreign 
correspondents and “the lack of journalistic ethics employed by some reporters 
working within the continent” (Seay, 2012). One month later, Tristan McConnell 
(a Nairobi based correspondent working for several US and British media) 
responded in Global Post. He argued that Seay failed to see the existing good 
reporting and that her “lumping together all foreign correspondents as dumb 
racists” was a “cheap rhetorical trick” (McConnell, 2012). In addition, he appealed 
to his “on-the-ground” journalistic authority to undermine Seay whose views, like 
those of “self-appointed Africa watchers”, “(…) emanate from an ivory tower long 
divorced from the reality on the ground” (McConnell, 2012). This exchange 
spurred a lively discussion on Twitter, with several journalists joining in to debate 
the merit of both pieces. But both on Twitter and in the two aforementioned pieces, 
the focus of the debate progressively moved from questions of intercultural 
representation and news production to comments, at times inflammatory, about the 
performance of individual journalists.22  
 
A month later, Kenyan writer Wainaina published a cynical satire of Nairobi-based 
foreign correspondents:  
 
Nairobi is a good place to be an international correspondent. There 
are regular flights to the nearest genocide, and there are green 
lawns, tennis courts, good fawning service (…) If your spouse has 
arrived in Kenya and does not have a job, soon he or she will be 
fully networked and earning lots of pounds/euros/dollars, making 
sure the babies of Africa are safe (…) Because you are a good 




                                                      
22 In her piece, Seay (2012) mentions Nicholas Kristof from the New York Times who 
identified “a 9-year-old Congolese girl who had been gang-raped. The New York Times 
printed the girl’s real name along with a facial photograph and even a video of her online”.  
McConnell (2012), then, recognised that Kristof’s identification of the young girl was 
“abhorrent” but also used this example to both distance himself from Kristof (a New York 
based columnist) while further attacking Seay’s supposedly lack of “on-the-ground” 
knowledge: “his place, rather, is alongside Seay and the other self-appointed Africa-






This further contributed to orient, in the Kenyan context, the debate on Western 
media towards personal attacks on foreign correspondents. This “personal turn” 
reached its climax during the 2013 presidential elections. There were concerns, if 
not expectations, among international media that the elections may spur violence, 
following the pattern witnessed in 2007. In parallel, the work of foreign 
correspondents became increasingly scrutinised, notably through social media and 
Twitter. Many journalists expressed their surprise at this scrutiny, one calling it a 
“huge industry” where there are “as many people analysing our reporting as there 
are people doing the reporting itself” (Africa correspondent 2) – something that he 
had never experienced in his previous post in another part of the world.  
 
There was a humoristic element to these comments and discussions about foreign 
correspondents. Michael Holman – a former editor for the Financial Times – wrote 
in the Daily Nation: “foreign reporters [are] armed and ready to attack Kenya (…) 
Kenya was braced at the crossroads on Saturday amidst growing concern that the 
demand for clichés is outstripping supply” (Namlo, 2013). The column was 
published under a pseudonym (Elkim Namlo), something that prevented most 
people to see the irony that this acerb criticism was written by a former Africa 
correspondent (Ochiel, 2013). In the Guardian, Mukoma Wa Ngugi (2013) 
described a CNN story as “slap your knee funny”, and wrote that he “and many 
other Kenyans saw the Western media coverage of the Kenya elections as a joke”. 
On Twitter, the hashtag #tweetlikeaforeignjournalist trended, and included jokes 
such as “Foreign journalists stranded in their hotels as peace makes it hard for them 
to do their job” (Brown, 2013). 
 
But the active monitoring of foreign correspondents, notably on Twitter, was far 
from being only humoristic. The #SomeonetellCNN re-emerged, and was used to 
“name and shame” journalists (Bunce, 2015 p. 23), often attacking them as “racist” 
and “colonialist”, and in some cases threatening them. One foreign correspondent 
remembers receiving personal attacks and deportation threats, and being vilified in 
a way “that never happened to me before” (East Africa correspondent 1). Overall, 
whatever the content of your reporting, it was not a good time to be a Western 
foreign correspondent in Kenya. One journalist recalled: 
 
Western journalists had a very hard time because we were 
mentioning in our coverage that, last time, around 1100 died and 
half a million people were displaced. (…) [The Kenyan middle-






parallel to draw, and actually it was a perfectly reasonable parallel 
to draw because we were potentially staring down the barrel of a 
repeat performance.  
(Africa correspondent 2) 
 
For another correspondent, these “Twitter punches” and the labelling of foreign 
correspondents as “colonial aggressors” were parts of a broader political strategy, 
which played out on social media: 
 
There were people paid to hunt people in packs through social 
media so I was not at all the most affected. There were many, 
many other journalists and also Kenyan campaigners who were 
very much affected by that kind of thing.  
(East Africa correspondent 1) 
 
The criticism of Western journalists relied on an anti-colonial rhetoric interwoven 
with the political strategy adopted by the Uhuru Kenyatta / William Ruto coalition. 
Following their indictment by the ICC, the two former political rivals joined forces 
in the elections and rallied support notably by relying on anti-colonial sentiments 
(Cheeseman et al., 2014). In the context of the Kenyan elections, then, the criticism 
of Western media was part of a broader political rhetoric used by politicians to 
rally popular support, avoid accountability and ultimately win the elections despite 
strong suspicions of rigging (Brown, 2013; Cheeseman et al., 2014). 
7.1.3 The South African context 
 
In South Africa, the key event that shaped the debate over Western media coverage 
of Africa in previous years was the 2010 World Cup. As soon as it won the bid in 
2004, South Africa was put under the media spotlight over concerns about the 
delivery of infrastructures, and security for visitors. From the start, the event was 
branded by FIFA and the South African government with a symbolic “African” 
dimension, this being the first World Cup “on African soil”.23 In the lead up, the 
questions raised by the media had as much to do with the media scrutinising, as 
they usually do, the host country than with a stereotypical and reductive view of 
South Africa at risk of ‘race’-driven conflicts; and with a prejudiced view that an 
African country would be unable to manage these expectations. 
                                                      
23 The other final contenders for hosting the tournament were Egypt and Morocco. If one of 
these countries had won the bid, concerns about organisation would have also very likely 
be part of the international media coverage. Yet the symbolic load of the event would have 
been quite different since the other contenders were based in North Africa. It would have 
been particularly interesting to see how the notion of a first tournament played “on African 







A key moment in this debate was, interestingly enough, an event that did not 
happen in South Africa. Six months before the cup, there was a terrorist attack by a 
separatist group of the Cabinda exclave on the Togo team in Angola during the 
African Cup of Nations. Because the event involved football and happened in an 
African country, several international media turned to the South African authorities 
with worries over security during the tournament. The chief World Cup organiser 
Danny Jordaan swiftly pointed at the Afro-pessimism of Western media and the 
double standards behind these questions, and called for “the world [to] be balanced 
and not apply different standards when it comes to the African continent (Myers & 
Smith, 2010). 
 
Following the use of the word Afro-pessimism by South African officials, the term 
started to circulate in the media and became visible in public debates as a shortcut 
for biased and prejudiced coverage. In a previous research, I found that British and 
French newspapers routinely used the term, and often discussed, at a meta-
discursive level, the role of the media in relation to Afro-pessimism (Nothias, 
2014). Symbolically, the World Cup became as much a way to talk about South 
Africa’s ability to host a major sport tournament than a way to “mute the sceptics”, 
and “trump Afro-pessimism” and broader discourses about Africa (Moody, 2010; 
Murphy, 2010).  
 
Most of the criticisms of Western media were aimed at extremely sens(n)ationalist 
stories published mainly in British tabloids. The Daily Star notably published an 
article “World Cup Machete threat” on the murder of Eugene Terre’Blanche, the 
head of the white supremacist movement Afrikaner-Weerstands-Beweging 
(Afrikaner Resistance Movement) two months before the competition:  
 
England fans could be caught up in a machete race war at the 
World Cup in South Africa. The killing of white supremacist 
leader Eugene Terre Blanche caused far-right campaigners to warn 
teams to avoid the “land of murder” this summer.  
(Hugues, 2010) 
 
Mentioning possibilities of “civil war”, “total nightmare” and “explosion of 
violence”, Hugues also lists threats of “machete gangs (…) roaming the streets”. 
While the article primarily quotes fair-right campaigners, it nonetheless creates a 
strong sense of insecurity and violence, notably using the image of the machete and 






Moreover, it foresees the worst-case scenario: “if civil war erupts [it] means the 
tournament cannot be played in the country this summer”. Because it summons 
images of a savage Africa rooted in the colonial imagery of the “Dark Continent”, 
because it fosters an atmosphere of racial violence and because it promises the 
South African World Cup to be a failure, this article could be seen as a case in 
point of Afro-pessimism. 
 
The author of this article is a London-based sport journalist working for a tabloid 
newspaper. In fact, the most criticised articles were not the work of South Africa 
based foreign correspondents but rather, that of parachute journalists or of 
journalists writing from their office back home. As opposed to the Kenyan 
situation, the World Cup also attracted more different types of journalists (most 
notably sport journalists). Moreover, while the criticism had a generalising 
dimension like in Kenya, it did not include the “naming and shaming” of 
journalists on social media, nor threat to foreign correspondents.  
 
Finally, the criticism of Western media was much less entangled with the political 
exploitation of an anti-colonial rhetoric. The hosting of the Cup did raise 
significant issues about local politics including economic development, and social 
and economic inequalities in post-apartheid South Africa (Chari & Mhiripiri, 
2014). The push for a positive media coverage certainly benefited FIFA and its 
president Sepp Blatter. The South African government, for its part, used the event 
as an opportunity to showcase a cohesive national identity – a transient cohesion in 
“a country in which a segregated racial past keeps lurking beneath the surface of a 
fractured post-apartheid transition” (Chuma, 2012 p. 315). As a result, the criticism 
of Western media and Afro-pessimism certainly benefited a range of economic and 
political interests; but it was neither a tool to intimidate journalists nor part of an 
anti-colonial rhetoric used by local politicians to reach the presidential office in a 
questionable context.  
 
The way the debate on Western media coverage of Africa played out in these two 
contexts seems to explain the different reactions of the correspondents to my 
questions about Afro-pessimism. All my Nairobi based interviewees were present 
at the time of the 2013 elections, while all my South Africa based interviewees 
were there during the World Cup. All systematically referred to these two events. 






in Kenya, which explains why correspondents in South Africa were more familiar 
with the term. The criticism of Western media in South Africa was particularly 
aimed at tabloid newspapers and articles written by sport and parachute journalists. 
In contrast, foreign correspondents in Kenya experienced virulent and personal 
criticisms, and even threats. It was thus easier for South Africa based 
correspondents to feel less personally targeted and to distance themselves from 
these criticisms (relying on the first defense strategy identified in section 7.1.1). 
Finally, the criticism of Western journalists in South Africa was not part of a 
broader anti-colonial rhetoric used by local politicians. This, then, explains why 
Kenya based correspondent displayed more irritation and weariness; one even 
explained having to “try not to get too worked up” when talking about these 
questions (East Africa correspondent 2). All of them raised concerns about the 
criticism becoming a tool for political manipulation in the Kenyan context, while 
South Africa based respondent more plainly denounced Afro-pessimism. 
 
To conclude this first section, I now return to a response given by Africa 
correspondent 2 when asked what Afro-pessimism was: “Is that a type of 
hairstyle?” In a way, this witty remark exemplifies the state of Afro-pessimism as a 
floating signifier. Stuart Hall used the expression of floating signifier to talk about 
‘race’ as a signifier whose meaning, “because it is relational and not essential can 
never be finally fixed, but is subject to the constant process of redefinition and 
appropriation” (Jhaly, 1997). Similarly, when analysing what foreign 
correspondents understand by Afro-pessimism, I have shown that there was no 
clear, authoritative definition about what Afro-pessimism precisely was. I also 
showed that correspondents reacted in different ways but mostly with a view to 
distance themselves from Afro-pessimism, often using strategies classically found 
in racism denial by the press. Finally, I showed that their reactions to the criticism 
of Afro-pessimism depended on the local context. Because the debate on Western 
media coverage of Africa has been defined and appropriated differently in the two 
countries, the reactions between South Africa and Kenya based correspondents 
differed. While this section paints a generally defensive picture of foreign 
correspondents vis-à-vis the criticism of media Afro-pessimism, the next section 
will show that an engagement with production processes reveal a more complex 







7.2 Foreign correspondents and the news production of Africa’s 
image 
 
In this section, I engage with news production processes and how foreign 
correspondents talk about these. What can we learn from, and about, foreign 
correspondents when engaging with production processes, and their impact on the 
construction of Africa’s media image?  
7.2.1 When things go wrong 
 
I start by analysing examples shared by correspondents that, in short, give to see 
when, how and why things go wrong. This subsection is thus not meant to 
systematically explain how correspondents work or how African news is made. 
Rather, it provides an informed account of different aspects of the news production 
process that contribute to simplification, generalisation, and stereotypes in the 
coverage of Africa. 
 
From the headline and lead-in text to the choice of illustrations or the copy editing 
process, the production of any single news item involves several individuals with 
distinctive specialisation, knowledge and sensibility. Any article is co-authored, 
although this is rarely visible to the readers. The accounts of foreign 
correspondents that follow suggest that this process of co-authoring plays a 
significant role when things go wrong. 
 
In their large majority, correspondents do not write their headlines. Most suggest a 
title to their editors. But very few have full control over the one ultimately used or 
get a read back. At the same time, headlines are very salient. They have to catch 
the attention of the reader and often emphasise one aspect of the article over others. 
By essence, they reduce an already short piece of writing to one clear and 
unambiguous nugget of information. Paradoxically therefore, this first point of 
entry into the work of correspondents – that significantly frames the reading and 
interpretation of an article – is generally not decided by them.  
 
One risk is that the intellectual process that drives the writing of the article differs 







Headlines are just the worst thing because obviously it’s a muppet 
sitting in front of a computer [back home], who doesn’t understand 
the context and has read the top five paragraphs – well, maybe 
more to be fair. But it’s the thing that will automatically get you in 
trouble.  
(Africa correspondent 1) 
 
The headline choice can notably contribute to gross generalisations that 
significantly alter the argument of an article or even contradict it. East Africa 
correspondent 2 expressed this frustration saying that “often, I find that I’ll be 
trying not to generalise and then I’ll look at my story and the headline is ‘Africa 
something’”.  
 
This discrepancy can also lead to misinterpretation with damaging impacts for a 
journalist’s relation with her or his sources. Aislinn Laing, for instance, tells the 
story behind an article published in 30 April 2013 in the Telegraph. Nelson 
Mandela was recovering in his Johannesburg home from a 10-day stay in the 
hospital. President Zuma came to visit, and images of this visit were released to the 
public by SABC, showing a very frail Mandela. The airing of the video was 
heavily criticised, notably on social media, as people denounced the images as 
degrading and insensitive. Aislinn Laing contacted Mandela’s oldest daughter 
Maki Mandela for an interview to ask her is she was happy about that image: 
 
She said: “No, I am not happy about that. Would anyone want his 
or her grandfather to be shown in that light? It’s not great”. But she 
added: “However, I do want to stress that they have done a really 
good job looking after him, that I don’t criticise the ANC 
generally, that I think his doctors are fantastic and obviously we 
rely on the government to provide that help. So I am not angry. I 
just think that it was unfortunate and that somebody made a bad 
judgment call”. So I knew that it was nuanced (…). But then the 
editor in London probably didn’t think about it and wrote “Nelson 
Mandela’s family furious over TV pictures of frail South African 
icon”. 
 
Whether the editor “didn’t think about it” or in fact consciously made this choice, 
the end result was the sensationalising of the story, first by misinterpreting Maki 
Mandela’s reaction and then, by generalising to “Mandela’s family”. As a result, 
Laing explained that Maki Mandela refused to grant her any more interviews after 








Southern Africa correspondent 1 further shared two examples that demonstrate 
how headlines written back home can simultaneously jeopardise a journalist’s 
relation with her sources and introduce a racial bias. She wrote an article about a 
family of white South Africans who decided to live one month in a township next 
to their housekeeper on the average salary of a South African family living in 
townships: 
 
They changed my title to something along the lines of “Whites 
who live like blacks”. Ouch! When you see this in the paper in the 
morning, you don’t feel so good. Because, what does it mean 
exactly “to live like blacks?” (…) Something similar happened for 
an article about the new South African middle class, and especially 
about young and successful women entrepreneurs. The title was 
something like “Black bling bling”. And here again, you send the 
article to the people you interviewed – some of which you know 
personally as friends – and you have to explain yourself. 
 
Like titles, the choice of photographs generally does not involve the input of 
correspondents but are particularly salient to the reader. Several correspondents 
saw this as one element where generalisation and stereotypes would often creep in. 
East Africa 1 correspondent faced this situation several times (“three times in 
nearly three years”), and shared a particularly compelling example. He wrote a 
story on the rise of processed-food consumption and diabetes in Kenya (“instead of 
HIV, tuberculosis, it’s a more Western disease as it was”), and interviewed middle-
class Nairobians who eat a lot of meat: 
 
They put a picture of ethnic Somalis refugees in Dadaab refugee 
camp, of kids being tested or something, which was just 
completely not what the story was about. Ok, so they have just 
done another reductive “Africans are all poor and ill” photo to 
match a story they obviously haven’t read. They have just seen 
Africa, diabetes and they got the first picture out. And it’s so 
undermining to what the story is about. 
 
In addition, the title referenced Africa, whereas the article was solely about Kenya. 
A similar text-image discrepancy occurred in a story on entrepreneurship and 
thriving businesses in Dadaab refugee camp (“so, debunking what people might 
immediately assume”) where the picture chosen was that of an “emaciated kid or 
something like that”. As the picture choice was not coordinated through the same 
intellectual decisions than the correspondent’s, this article seeking to disrupt some 







Finally, several journalists talked about copy-editing as another key process where 
stereotypes and generalisation would make their way into the coverage. Talking 
about the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya, Africa correspondent 1 
notably explained: “this happened within copy-editing, for instance introducing 
words like ‘tribal’ during the post-election violence. There was a real pressure to 
get into copy, high up, ‘tribal violence’ or ‘tribal bloodshed’”. 
 
In sum, the geographic distance involved in the co-authoring of a news article 
opens up the space for ignorance to impact media content. Indeed, my interviewees 
often summoned ignorance back home as a primary reason for the production of 
stereotypical news coverage:  
 
It’s linked to ignorance: the ability to detect and avoid stereotypes 
does not work as well when the person only knows Africa through 
TV or film.  
(Southern Africa correspondent 2) 
 
This is exacerbated in the context of increased commercialisation. Several 
correspondents highlighted that journalists, in particular freelance, have to make 
concessions to demands that are driven by ignorance and prejudices. Africa 
correspondent 2 gave the example of an article published in TIME on “Africa’s 
drinking problem”. Most of the article dealt with drinking in Kenya, and 
particularly Nairobi where the author, a freelance journalist, is based. It briefly 
addressed South Africa, but did not contain any reference to another African 
country: 
 
It was a great story about alcohol consumption in Kenya. It was a 
shitty one about Alcohol consumption in Africa. I can just imagine 
the conversation the author had with the editors that results in “this 
has got to be about Africa, right?!” What do you do? You are not 
gonna do the story? Not take the 600$? You have got to live. So 
you do some kind of distasteful things. We would like not to 
generalise too much, but it’s still difficult when you are being 
mediated by the editors and the newspapers, and they still have a 
strong tendency to say “well this thing happened in Nairobi, which 
is Kenya, which is Africa”.  
(Africa correspondent 2) 
 
These examples partly constitute classical defence strategies by correspondents as 
they point fingers at others, particularly editors. While not all correspondents 
complained about their editors, there was nonetheless enough evidence to suggest 
that the level of knowledge and interest from editors makes a significant difference 






at TIME after falling out with one of his editors. The latter was reluctant to send 
him to Mali to cover the progress of Islamist militants. Once there, the editor 
insisted on over-ruling on story direction and forced him to abandon 10 days of 
reporting. When Perry said he wanted to go to Timbuktu, the editor asked him: 
“Timbuktu? Is that a real place?” For Perry, this was the straw that broke the 
camel’s back.  
 
These varied accounts provide compelling examples of how sensationalism, 
simplification, generalisation, racial bias and stereotypes make their way into 
media coverage. They demonstrate how different production layers and incentives, 
how ignorance and the geographic distance involved in the production process 
contribute to the representational ‘Othering’ of Africa.  
7.2.2 Journalistic reflexivity 
 
Through this engagement with production processes, we also see emerging a 
picture of foreign correspondents as a highly reflexive group. While many did not 
welcome Seay’s aforementioned criticism of Western media, most in fact agreed 
with a key point of her analysis: “no way one reporter can cover 12-15 countries 
well” (Schiff, 2012). One correspondent – supposed to cover 38 countries “from 
Senegal to Somalia down to the top of Southern Africa” – described this 
assignment as “ridiculous”. Southern Africa correspondent 2 described the Africa 
correspondent title as “in substance, totally stupid since there are 54 countries”. For 
David Smith who holds this title, being responsible to cover some 48 countries (in 
his case) makes them “always vulnerable to the criticism because we can’t possible 
do it properly and 100% comprehensively”; he even confessed to “sometimes 
writing about countries having never been there in my life and a lot of other 
countries I might have been to once”. For him, and many others, the sweeping 
dimension of the title was completely at odd with their awareness that the 
geographic area they cover is incredibly diverse:  
 
I am always pushed back into this pigeonhole because of my title. 
So somebody, somewhere has built a conceptual framework and 
put a rubber stamp on this. But still, obviously, the more time you 
spend here, the more you become conscious of the subtleties that 
even one country alone, like South Africa, has eleven languages, 








These statements do not only constitute a critical take on their job title; they 
demonstrate a strong questioning of the “conceptual framework” that determine 
their professional practice, and of the “idea of Africa” that underpins this 
framework: 
 
This word is again a problematic concept because, as we know, it’s 
incredibly diverse: a billion people, 55 countries. (…) Every 
country has peculiarities, unique characteristics. So what do we 
really mean by this woolly concept of Africa?  
(David Smith) 
 
In fact, correspondents clearly perceived “Africa” as much as a term defining a 
geographical area than an idea. As a result, they displayed suspicion about the 
relevance of using “Africa” in their reporting: 
 
I go through all the British newspapers to see what is being written 
and everyday there will be some romantic reference to Africa like 
it’s just one place where everything happens. (…) If you are 
writing about one particular issue that is that country’s issue, you 
don’t need to broaden it to say Africa.  
 
(Aislinn Laing, Southern Africa correspondent, Telegraph) 
 
In a similar vein, there was strong willingness from correspondents to distance 
themselves from the idea that they “write about Africa”: 
 
If you are on some quest to find the true Africa then perhaps you 
are already on a fraud quest. That’s not what I am trying to do. (…) 
The only sense in which I write about Africa as a whole is that my 
stories are drawn from this geographical patch. (…) I am not trying 
to seek the true Africa. I don’t find myself writing about Africa. I 
write about Kenya, and Rwanda and Sudan and individual 
incidents within those places.  
(Africa correspondent 2) 
 
For others, the naming of the continent and some degree of generalisation should 
not be dismissed as straightforwardly problematic but is something that calls for 
scrutiny and tact: 
 
You have got to be very self-critical when you start saying, “this 
is” about Africa; because generally it's not. It's usually about a 
country, or a town, or a house or a person.  
 
(East Africa correspondent 2) 
 
I think we can and should compare and draw wider conclusions 






not just go “well it happened somewhere on the African continent 
therefore it tells me something about Africa as this thing”.  
 
(Africa correspondent 2) 
 
As much in the way they talk about the “Africa correspondent” title than in their 
critical take on what “Africa” stands for, their views in fact echo the social 
constructivist approach found in much of the literature on media representation of 
Africa. 
 
Foreign correspondents also displayed strong awareness of, and frustration at, one 
of the key in-built features of international news production: ethnocentrism. I 
previously discussed the tendency of news to prioritise issues, events and people 
perceived as closer (geographically, linguistically, culturally, ethnically) to a given 
audience. Cottle (2013) coined the term of “calculus of death” to describe the 
naturalised and institutionalised ethnocentrism that notably shapes disaster 
reporting. The result of this “calculus of death” is a media landscape that, far from 
promoting cosmopolitan ideals, reinforces the idea that some lives, always the 
same, are worth more than others. But against the view of correspondents as 
unaware, powerless cogs in a cynical machine, Cottle also found a strong 
reflexivity among TV correspondents, and analysed some of the ways they try to 
infuse their reporting with cosmopolitan ideals (“the injunction to care”). 
 
My interviewees displayed similar reflexive attitudes. Most journalists working for 
British media complained about the never-ending demand for “Brits in shit”24 
stories – the perfect example of news relevance being determined both by the 
nationality and the skin-colour of the protagonists. Southern Africa correspondent 
1 similarly complained about the preference for stories involving white people:  
 
There’s a phenomenon of identification. I asked myself the 
question on the Westgate attack: would there have been so much 
interest if it weren’t for all the Western victims? Maybe yes. But 
it’s clear that the images of the little white girl running alone in the 
mall had an impact. 
 
The racial identification phenomenon was particularly salient in the South African 
context. Following Mandela’s death, a French correspondent witnessed a very 
large number of parachute journalists going straight to Orania, an Afrikaner whites 
                                                      
24 The expression is used to refer to stories about British nationals (“Brits) involved in 






only town. For him, this reflex testified to the ongoing impact of ethnocentric 
values – here racial identification/white solidarity – deeply embedded in news 
production.  
 
In sum, the correspondents I interviewed have an acute understanding of how the 
logics of news production contribute to the reproduction of an ethnocentric, often 
stereotypical, view of Africa. Importantly, however, they have all been in post on 
the continent for several years. As the following quote suggests, this means that 
they have assuredly had to take part in this system to come to these conclusions: 
 
Many stories commissioned are done so through a prism that 
comes from Europe. (…) So it’s a mixture. You have stereotypes 
and a Western gaze on countries like South Africa. And then you 
have the constraints of media production, which makes it easy to 
talk about crime in South Africa, in particular on TV. I have had 
arguments with TV journalists who wanted to come and do stories 
on crime here. When I first arrived, I used to say yes. But then I 
realised I really didn’t want to do that. Because what will come out 
of the various production constraints of a two minutes story is 
“people are shooting at each other; people are scared”.  
 
(Southern Africa correspondent 2) 
 
Even more compelling is this reflexive assessment from Africa correspondent 1 
who argues that if one could vacuum his writing alone, the picture of Africa that 
his audience would get would be far from a “true representation”: 
 
How wrong is the paper getting it? I would say pretty [emphasised] 
wrong. I would say they [readers who have never been to Africa] 
would be surprised at how many brand new cars there are here; 
that you can get fantastic coffee and milkshakes and, whatever, sky 
vodka. I am just looking literally wherever I can see. (…) I think 
they'd be surprised of that because the idea they are going to get 
from it is that everyone is running around with a machine gun and 
a keffieh wanting to blow white people up in Kenya; in Uganda, 
that it's all about either gorillas or guerrillas; or a crazy president 
who thinks that you shouldn't wear condoms because that's the best 
way to stop HIV. That's a mental exercise that I use quite regularly 
in what I try to push the paper to take. 
 
More than ever before, journalists have been faced with sustained public scrutiny 
of the content and impact of their work, with social media playing a particularly 
important role in that process. All correspondents are familiar with Laura Seay, 
Wainaina’s essay on “How to write about Africa” and the Africa is a country blog. 
This context arguably contributed to create a generation of correspondents highly 






I think we are much more aware of the criticism of Western media 
coverage of Africa than journalists 30 years ago. I am not saying 
things are perfect and that we are done with these [stereotypes] 
because clearly there is still this “little music” 25 being played over 
and over again; and because discussing with our chiefs and reading 
our colleagues’ work impact us. The hardest part is to 
decontaminate all this. That’s clear and that’s a long work of 
deconstruction. (…) You no longer really have obvious racist 
clichés, but this “little music”, yes; we still need to work on this. 
(…) On my Facebook page or on Twitter, I share a lot of articles 
that ask if Western journalists give a reliable, honest and 
responsible image of Africa. And I think that this is an essential 
question for us. We need to ask ourselves this question everyday. 
 
 (Southern Africa correspondent 2) 
 
This high level of critical reflexivity echoes the findings of a study looking at how 
US journalists grapple with the racialisation of their news (Drew, 2010). Drew 
interviewed journalists involved in the production of special series dedicated to 
racism in the post-Civil Rights era. She found that: 
 
[I]nvestigation of racism in their cities prompted them to turn their 
lens inward, engaging in a critical self-reflection about the 
complex relationship between racism and their news content, 
production practices and newsroom hierarchies.  
 
(Drew, 2010 p. 353) 
 
This study raises fundamental questions about the potential for professional 
reflexivity to “become a significant tool for fostering consciousness and action” 
and “to challenge the methods of knowledge production and the values 
undergirding this process” (Drew, 2010 p. 368). While the context of foreign news 
production differs in many ways from national/local coverage, it is still possible to 
ask similar questions about the ability of individual journalists to challenge the 
dominant features of news production – a classic case of structure vs. agency. In 
the final subsection, I therefore ask: does reflexivity among foreign correspondents 
in Africa translate into different production practices? How do journalists negotiate 
and act upon this reflexivity? 
 
 
                                                      
25 This interviewee used the metaphor of the “little music in our head” to refer to the 
institutionalised and naturalised drive for negative and unambiguous stories which, in their 






7.2.3 Acting upon reflexivity  
 
In previous chapters, I identified features of media coverage that can be interpreted 
in light of this reflexivity. In Chapter 4, I showed that there was a greater reliance 
on African interviewees than Western ones – a finding at odds with previous 
studies. I also showed that conflation did occur but perhaps not to the extent that 
critics make it sound; and that reference to “darkness” and “tribalism” were far 
from being systematic features of journalistic writing. In Chapter 6, I showed that 
the dominant narrative about Africa in news magazines was that of Afro-optimism. 
These various findings can partly be understood as the result of a greater awareness 
on the side of journalists of the criticism of Afro-pessimism.  
 
Earlier, I demonstrated how the writing of headlines back home could contribute to 
generalisation, misinterpretation and stereotyping. Because of these experiences, 
some correspondents now request a read-back on their headlines; others have now 
full control of their headlines. This is one example of how individual reflexivity 
can foster new practices, i.e. a greater involvement in, or coordination of, a key 
production stage. 
 
For a few journalists, adopting a human interest angle to frontload and promote a 
sense of common humanity was a productive tool to act upon this reflexivity: 
 
Ok, maybe [Mogadishu] is so crazy and bonkers that some guy in 
London does not get it. There’s no way he’s going to get it. But if 
you find that individual who opened a shop and is struggling to pay 
school fees. And then when the Islamist guys came and took too 
many taxes, he couldn’t send his kids to school. Well then that 
makes sense because it’s just a guy trying to make a living. Even 
though Moga might not mean anything, you can make the world 
make sense in this way.  
(East Africa correspondent 2) 
 
Although done with an eye to humanise a news item – to reduce the distance 
between ‘us’ [the audience] and ‘them’ [distant ‘Others’] – the human interest 
strategy is double-edged. How one defines the relevance point for the audience is a 
Pandora box. This was made clear in an interview with Nicole Macheroux-Denault, 
Africa correspondent for RTL Television, who also defended the “human interest” 
approach. She advocated for this to be used in conjunction with something that 
amounts to “situational” or “strategic” stereotyping (Barker, 2000 p. 191). 






humanising the story, you then “flip the initial stereotypes upside down”. This 
process amounts to what I analysed in the previous chapter when the New Review 
frontloaded an Afro-pessimist representation on its cover, only to undermine this 
discourse in the magazine by providing a range of disruptive stories on art, 
technology and entrepreneurship. 
 
In contrary, photo-journalist Phil Moore (Times, Sunday Telegraph, Guardian, Le 
Monde, Le Figaro) argues that such “strategic” stereotyping mainly contributes to 
reproducing clichés. He mentioned a recent AFP article about free Wi-Fi in Kigali 
that included in its first lines “in a region long associated with war and genocide”. 
It contrasted the country’s history of violence with technological progress 
generally associated with Western countries as a way to spur the curiosity of the 
readers: “a perfect example of the ‘Africa rising’ narrative put on the backdrop of 
‘the horrors of the continent’”. Without dismissing the hugely important part of the 
genocide in Rwanda’s recent history, Moore argued that not everything should be 
set against this backdrop: 
 
It’s lazy and it reinforces stereotypes. What would be good is if 
these stories could just be written against the backdrop of the 
quality of the investment, of the technology, of the creativity – 
whatever the story at hand is. If London was to implement free Wi-
Fi across the city that would be news in its own sense. That would 
be massive news in the British press, and they wouldn’t set this 
against the backdrop of the 7/7 bombing, or on the backdrop of 
massive social inequalities within the city, which exist. It would 
simply be a technology story about Wi-Fi in London. People’s 
perceptions of Africa are that it is underdeveloped, that it’s poor, 
conflict-ridden, etc. There is space for that in some stories, but it 
shouldn’t constantly be in the top-line. 
 
Interestingly here, a better strategy to act upon reflexivity consists in falling back 
onto the ideal of factual news. In other words, to prevent African news from 
reproducing stereotypes about Africa they should be treated as “news”, rather than 
“African”. This is echoed by David Smith for who “there is more criticising views 
of corrupted leaders because they are corrupt rather than because they are Africans 
or fitting a stereotype”. In fact, many correspondents were of the view that being 
too reflexive could hinder the core democratic functions of journalism: 
Sometimes, we are browbeaten and so worried about perpetuating 
these clichés that we almost might be inclined not to cover the 
important and tragic catastrophes which are unfolding, or not 
necessarily unfolding but which are self-perpetuating and self-
sustaining.  







As a journalist I think you just have to write it straight. You can’t 
second-guess it, or sort of think “maybe I’ll play this down because 
I don’t want to reinforce stereotypes”. If there is evidence of 
corruption you’ve got to write about it. You’ve got to make sure 
that you give a voice to those Africans living in a society we are 
criticising, to make it clear that you are not trying to point to the 
whole society about this.  
(David Smith) 
 
In these perspectives, journalists do not really act upon their reflexivity but instead 
rely on core features of the traditional idea of news. 
 
Finally, another strategy through which correspondents negotiate their reflexivity 
consists in actively seeking other avenues to produce more creative, in-depth or 
disruptive writing. Southern Africa correspondent 2 notably adopted a very clear 
strategy. The outlets he likes to work for do not offer enough money to make a 
decent living. At the same time, a two-minute appearance on TV brings him as 
much money as an article that would take four days of work. The occasional TV 
work thus provides an income that allows him to work on more interesting and 
more in-depth projects: 
 
To explain on TV that Oscar Pistorius vomited in court, that’s of 
no interest to me in journalistic terms. But one minute on TV is 
150€, i.e. one article for the newspaper. Paradoxically, you may 
have to finance the most interesting things with what is less 
interesting. (…) I don’t have any culpability over this, because to 
me all of this is the “froth of things”; it’s the “froth of 
information”, the “froth of journalism” and it’s not going to make a 
big difference. However, what this froth is going to finance is very 
interesting, and I may not have been able to do it without this. And 
then I’ll be able to write three pages, or an exclusive investigation, 
and I will bring a real added value in terms of information, so I 
have no remorse. (…) It’s all very paradoxical, because I am the 
first one to think that the Pistorius story is completely 
uninteresting, but then I go on TV to tell this saga. But I accept this 
completely; I tell myself that there are things much, much more 
important than this, and that I need to find a way to finance them.  
 
(Southern Africa correspondent 2) 
 
Such strategy of spreading knowledge production across media outlets and medium 
is also at stake when journalists write stories outside the news pages (features, 
culture, tourism pages), or turn to book writing as a way to escape the constraint of 
general news writing. Another correspondent talked about his involvement in a 






project in collaboration with a photographer. Without these side activities, he 
confessed he would feel like “some terrible person who is failing in that 
responsibility to tell things as they are”. 
 
Foreign correspondents therefore act upon their reflexivity in several ways: at an 
intra-media level (sourcing, writing and editing stages), an inter-media level 
(working across different news media) and at an extra-media level (finding other 
avenues such as books or artistic/cultural projects). These, however, primarily 
constitute individual coping strategies rather than demonstrating a strong ability to 
challenge the broader system of foreign news productions, and in particular the 
commercial orientation of this structure (see section 2.2.3). Indeed, as Africa 
correspondent 1 states, the bottom line for newspapers remains a commercial one: 
 
Newspapers are essentially businesses run by a series of directors 
whose job is to sell as much of that product to the detriment of 
their competitors, and therefore what you put into the product is to 
make it more attractive than your competitors. And, sadly, selling 
prejudice does sell. And challenging prejudice, which does not 
happen on the news page, and it does not happen enough on the 
comment pages, well if you do it too often, you can lose 
customers, essentially.  
 
In his study of the demographics of foreign correspondents in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Vicente found that freelancers working for three or more news organisations 
dominated the profession (50.81%), and that the field was evolving towards 
freelancing (Vicente, 2013 p. 31). Freelancers often pride themselves for being 
independent journalists who can say no and who have greater control over which 
stories they want to pursue. For instance, Southern Africa correspondent 1 
expected that following Mandela’s death there would be a high demand for stories 
about the risk of racial tensions in post-Mandela South Africa: “It’s our job to say 
no. You can say no. If that’s what they want, I am not going to do it”.  
 
At the same time, Vicente (2013) also found that the field was evolving towards 
increased precarious conditions. In this context, how much power do freelancers 
have to “say no”? In an article published in the Columbia Journalism Review, 
freelance war reporter Francesca Borri detailed the many constraints freelancers 
face today as a result of increasing precariousness and competition:  
 
People have this romantic image of the freelancer as a journalist 






to cover the stories she is most fascinated by. But we aren’t free at 
all; it’s just the opposite.  
(Borri, 2013) 
 
Seen in this light, the choice made by the journalist to cover the Pistorius saga on 
TV in order to publish more meaningful stories elsewhere, exemplifies a 
hegemonic production system that co-opts journalistic reflexivity. Just like the 
consumers described by Horkheimer and Adorno in the Culture Industry 
[1944](2002 p. 136) who “feel compelled to buy and use its products even though 
they see through them”, foreign correspondents appear to take part in a system 
through which they clearly see. 
 
7.3 Foreign correspondents and their audience 
 
I now bring in focus my analysis of foreign correspondents and representation of 
Africa by looking at how correspondents imagine and talk about their audience. 
The idea of the audience is a sort of blind spot in the production of foreign news. 
On the one hand, “what the audience wants” is naturalised within the newsroom 
(Paterson, 1996 p. 375); as such, the audience is a representation in itself. On the 
other hand, because perceptions of the audience by journalists significantly 
influence news choices, they ultimately impact media representations. Thus, I 
approach the audience as a discursive construct that dialectically links issues of 
news production and of media representation.  
7.3.1 The grandma, the tourist, the businessman, the political elite … 
 
When asked who they think their audience is, or when talking spontaneously about 
their audience, correspondents most commonly referred to four categories: a) the 
family member / the common person, b) the tourist, c) the businessman, d) the 
political elite / the decision maker. Not all foreign correspondents mentioned all 
these profiles, and depending on the editorial line of the paper, the emphasis would 
be put on different types of audiences, for instance a newspaper like the Times 
emphasises its political readership, while Les Échos emphasises its business 
readership. In one instance, a correspondent was very explicit about not writing or 
working with a Western audience in mind. But looking across all interviews, these 






correspondents to talk about their audience. What does this typology of audiences 
tell us about the production of African news? 
 
The first observation is that foreign correspondents write primarily for an audience 
‘back home’. This is hardly surprising since this is the primary reason behind the 
idea of foreign correspondence. Not unlike anthropologists, foreign correspondents 
are translators between cultures (Hannerz, 1996 p. 118). Their job is to report on a 
part of the world and a culture, and to make sense of it to another. They share with 
anthropologists “the condition of being in a transnational contact zone, engaged in 
reporting, representing, interpreting – generally, managing meaning across 
distances, although in part at least with different interests, under other constraints” 
(Hannerz, 2002 p. 58). Bunce (2015 p. 12) found that the ability to relate to a home 
audience was no longer as important for journalists working in international news 
agencies. However, my interviews with journalists working for nation-based 
outlets reveal that the ethos of writing for an audience ‘back home’ remains 
paramount for this sub-group of correspondents. 
 
The main common denominator of these four types of audiences is that they all 
belong to a national culture. As a result, the involvement of fellow national citizens 
in an event becomes a key indicator that a story will be relevant to the audience. 
This explains, for instance, the ongoing production of the previously mentioned 
“Brits in shit” stories, or the framing of major disasters or conflict situations 
around the fate of fellow national citizens. Embedded within the national belonging 
is also the racial identification of the audience as white. This was perfectly 
exemplified during the Westgate attack in Nairobi that claimed some 67 lives, 
including 4 British citizens and where over 175 people were wounded. On 22 
September 2013, as the siege was still taking place, the Telegraph was running on 








Figure 32 - Telegraph.co.uk article on the Westgate attack (2013) 
 
 
At the time, no British victim had been reported yet and the title relied on a 
statement from William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, claiming British nationals 
were “undoubtedly caught up in the attack”. Without confirmation of British 
citizens killed in the attack, the article frontloaded the fate of victims from other 
Western countries: “Among those confirmed to have been killed in the attack were 
two French and two Canadian nationals (…) The United States said it believed 
Americans were among those injured”. For many correspondents, this phenomenon 
is neither new nor is it specific to the coverage of Africa. As Africa correspondent 
1 put it: “it is the famous joke about the Aberdeen newspaper headline: ‘Titanic 
sinks; Aberdeen man drowns’”. Yet, through this naturalised process driven by 
perception of the audience, the media actively contribute to the sense that certain 
lives, Western and white, are worth more than others.  
 
The correspondents sometimes defined relevance as “what will interest a given 
national readership”, without necessarily involving fellow citizens in the story. 
Southern Africa correspondent 2 gave the example of a story on shale gas in South 
Africa that would speak to the interest of the French readership, as a national 
debate about shale gas was raging at the time in France. He recognised, however, 








Take the rhino poaching: I am the first one to denounce it. We 
have done a lot of stories on this. But clearly this is part of the 
post-materialist values of the Western reader who will be 
interested in what happens to Rhinos but much less about what 
happens in a township. It’s a bit caricatured but I think the media 
coverage is a bit excessive on that story. And at the same time, we 
are all part of this system, and we feed this trend because there is a 
demand.  
(Southern Africa correspondent 2) 
 
Another significant consequence of the way the audience is imagined is 
simplification. The audience is assumed to have little to no prior knowledge or 
interest, especially when it comes to the first two categories (the common person / 
the tourist). This significantly impacts what background and contextual 
information journalists deem important in any given story. Talking about 
Zimbabwe, David Smith explains that he rarely talks about how the Movement for 
Democratic Change [the main opposition party to Mugabe between 1999 and 2005] 
had broken down into different factions: 
 
If you are in Zimbabwe or you are a Zimbabwe aficionado, you 
want to know that stuff, you are already into it; you want to know 
that Welshman Ncube has broken away from Morgan Tsvangirai 
and why it’s important. Frankly, I think the average British reader 
is still about Mugabe vs. MDC. You don’t want to muddy the 
water too much. 
 
The way correspondents imagine their audience drives what they see as “relevant” 
news which confines media coverage of Africa to specific boxes: 
 
Brits in shit. Shark attacks. Or “Pilot kidnapped by CAR rebels”. 
Or “foreign oil worker found with his pants down in a Lagos 
hotel”. Those are all things that I know will pique [the audience] 
interest. The collapse of Africa’s longest running and most 
successful peace deal in Mozambique this week – which is 
significant because it’s a collapse of a peace deal that ended a 
nasty civil war some years back? No way, that would not have 
even been a tiny bit. Congo mineral stuff? No. Nigeria kidnapping? 
Yeah. Boko Haram? Yep. AQMI? Yep.  
(Africa correspondent 1) 
 
These statements echo the claims by East Africa correspondent 3 that most of the 
British press tends “to presume that our readers are only interested in major 
calamities, countries with which we have a historical colonial relationship, Brits in 







In sum, the four types of audiences embody a cluster of news values that mirror 
those that I showed to be driving media coverage of Africa in Chapter 4: 
negativity; the involvement of Western nations or people; the focus on countries or 
people more familiar to a given audience; economic relevance; unambiguity of the 
story. The way correspondents talk about their audience suggests that their work is 
“less shaped by an appreciation of the diversity of things actually there on the beat, 
and more by the attitudes and ideas brought from home” (Hannerz, 2007 p. 307). 
Dialectically, therefore, this imagined audience contributes to the covert process 
through which African news become simplified and stereotyped.  
 
Furthermore, the audience also plays a strong role in the defensive rhetoric used by 
correspondents when faced with criticisms of Afro-pessimism. The audience 
becomes a way to divert the responsibility away from journalists: “the audience 
plays a huge role in agenda setting and I don’t want to let them get away without 
having at least 50% of the responsibility” (Nicole Macheroux-Denault, Africa 
correspondent). The use of the audience as part of a defensive strategy relied on 
two cornerstones. On the one hand, correspondents would argue that the media 
deliver what the audience wants, and that unfortunately stereotypes sell. Given the 
commercial dimension of news production, then, the reproduction of stereotypes 
can be explained by the demand from the audience. On the other hand, 
correspondents would argue that they are not responsible for how people interpret 
media content – another classic strategy used in racism denial by the press (van 
Dijk, 1992 p. 92). 
 
At best, correspondents would recognise that they rely on assumptions about the 
audience. David Smith claimed that journalists have been playing a “guessing 
game for centuries”, and Africa correspondent 2 argued: “there are a lot of 
unpleasant, unspoken truths within knowing what the readers are interested in”. 
Very rarely would correspondents recognise the media’s responsibility in shaping 
the audience preferences that then feed back journalists’ perceptions of the 
audience. Perhaps it takes stepping back from one’s socialisation in the journalistic 
field to question this? Commenting on his public letter criticising the quality of 
CNN’s reporting on Africa in its flagship program 60 minutes, former foreign 
correspondent turned writer and academic, Howard French, wrote:  
 
The media pretends that it’s only serving up what people are 






public’s sensibilities by its own approaches to a variety of topics. 
Africa has traditionally been accorded very little space in the 
media (…) [except for] immense tragedy, interest in a white person 
playing a starring role, or wildlife. Over time, these become 
accepted as the only reasons most people would want to pay any 
attention to Africa.  
(Adegoke, 2015) 
 
Foreign correspondents report for a distant audience. On the one hand, there is a 
distance between what they perceive interest their audience, and what interests 
them personally and professionally as correspondents. On the other hand, the 
distance is the geographical one between the field and “home”. Except one, all my 
interviewees have been living in South Africa or Kenya for at least four years. In 
their daily lives, they do not encounter their ‘back home’ audience. The geographic 
distance translates into assumptions about what the audience is interested in; these 
assumptions, in turn, influence story selection and writing. In this way, the 
journalistic eye is on “the lookout for scenes that carry an already established 
interest for a Western audience, thus investing perception itself with the mediating 
power of cultural difference” (Spurr, 1993 p. 21). How foreign correspondents 
imagine their audience is therefore key to the mediation of the distant ‘Other’, and 
partly explains why this reporting makes “a kind of return trip, catering to ideas, 
even stereotypes, which are in fact already well-established at home” (Hannerz, 
2007 p. 307). Representations of the distant audience (upstream) and of the distant 
‘Other’ (downstream) are in a dialectic relation, whereby assumptions about the 
former feed stereotypes about the latter. 
7.3.2 ... and the digitally connected ‘Other’ 
 
However, the story of how foreign correspondents perceive their audience would 
not be complete without looking at the role played by local audiences. As 
discussed in the first part of the chapter, South African and Kenyan audiences 
increasingly use social media to discuss, comment and question the Western media 
coverage of Africa. In fact, these constitute the audience that foreign 
correspondents engage with the most, both through social media and in their daily 
lives. Seven correspondents shared Twitter followers statistics. In the majority 
(five out of seven cases), most of their followers were from the African country 
where they are based, before followers in their home country. On average, this 






populations who have long held the status of distant ‘Others’ – to be represented 
only – are increasingly becoming audience members.  
 
Through this local involvement, African voices are increasingly heard and take part 
in shaping the narratives about Africa, and this appears to impact how foreign 
correspondents write and work. For Africa correspondent 1, the involvement of 
local audiences through social media can in fact contribute to raising journalistic 
standards: “Nowadays, especially in Kenya, you get picked up on very quickly by 
the twitterati if there is anything that looks like it could be slightly dodgy; which is 
good!” He recalled being in assignment a few years before with a venerable old 
correspondent who was surprised to see him take so many notes when interviewing 
a woman: 
 
He said: “if you have a “the” instead of an “a”, or a “with” instead 
of a “from”, what is she gonna care about?” That's changed now. 
You can be anywhere and some guy is like, “hey” – on his phone – 
“I saw what you wrote about me in a refugee camp or whatever!” 
Which is good! 
 
As this story suggests, the role of local audiences in the digital age is primarily a 
reactive one. A perfect example of this reactive role was the international reporting 
of KONY2012 (Nothias, 2013). KONY2012 was a 30-minute video created by 
Christian American NGO Invisible Children. It aimed to raise awareness about the 
crimes committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army and its leader Joseph Kony. In 
April 2012, the video went viral, eventually reaching 110 million hits in a few days 
(Chalk, 2012 p. 3). This success was as surprising as the online reactions it spurred 
were numerous. Observers in Uganda and elsewhere raised questions about its 
accuracy (Kony was portrayed as still in Uganda, whereas he had left the country 
six years ago), the policy it advocated (US military intervention), and its reliance 
on dehumanising stereotypes and colonial tropes that disempower Africans and 
present them as voiceless distant ‘Others’ (Nothias, 2013). The backlash grew in 
parallel to the video spreading on the web, and a blog compiling the different 
criticisms, Visible Children, also went viral and attracted at least 2.3 million views 
in a few days (Tutton, 2012). 
 
While the international media initially focused on the “buzz” created by the video – 
hereby giving it further promotion – it then incorporated this backlash in its 
coverage. Two Ugandan journalists who had been at the forefront of the online 






international news organisations, including CNN, CNTV, BBC, France 24, the 
New York Times, the Guardian and Al-Jazeera English (Chalk, 2012 p. 8). Social 
media thus enabled these voices to be granted a space in mainstream media 
platforms that have, historically, marginalised such voices. This local engagement 
through social media became part of the international coverage, and played a role 
in shaping the mainstream news narrative. Looking at the 2013 Kenyan elections, 
and the use of #SomeonetellCNN on Twitter, Bunce (2015 p. 24) observed a 
similar phenomenon where Kenyan tweets managed to make CNN amend its 
coverage and “were not restricted to the ‘twittersphere’ – they entered into, and 
became stories in mainstream international news coverage”.  
 
The engagement with local audiences via social media is not a panacea. On the one 
hand, internet penetrations in and across African countries vary greatly (Ogunyemi, 
2011 p. 468 quoted in Bunce, 2015 p. 24), which means that there are strong 
communicative inequalities among local audiences. On the other hand, there is a 
risk to fetishise authentic “African” voices as able to “provide some kind of 
unchallengeable African truth” (Jacobs, 2013). Talking about Kony2012, Jacobs 
(2013) reminds us that Invisible Children “has ‘African voices’ on its staff” and 
that “this was part of the filmmakers’ defence when they responded to criticisms”. 
However, I would argue that there is one area where this engagement from local 
audiences certainly heralds a strongly disruptive potential. It is the fact that foreign 
correspondents increasingly envision local population as either actual or possible 
audience members. 
 
I will illustrate this point with a story shared by “PRI’s The World” Africa 
correspondent, Anders Kelto. Kelto was embarking on a yearlong radio project that 
followed the lives of kids in a school in one of the poorest townships of the Cape 
Town region. After having spent a couple of months in the school in preparation 
for the program, he prepared a video that would accompany the launch of the 
program online. He chose the title “Learning in poverty” and shared his choice 
with his editor. Upon hearing the title, the editor told him that he could not use this 
title. Perplexed, he asked “why?” The editor then told him that, before putting the 
video online and choosing a title for the program, he should go to the classroom 
and show the video to the school kids. As he looked at them watching the video, 
the journalist recalled thinking, “thank god I didn’t use this title!” When I asked 






kids’ lives and learning experience, their present and their future, to the experience 
of “poverty”; that it equated them exclusively with “poverty” and that it completely 
failed to communicate the complexity, nuances and basic sense of common 
humanity that they were in fact trying to show in the program. Ultimately, they 
settled on the title “School Year” with the subtitle “Learning, Poverty, and Success 
in a South African Township”.  
 
This story illustrates what can happen when foreign correspondents envision local 
population as potential audience members. It was not until he envisioned the 
subjects of his reporting as potential viewers that he realised that his title could be 
considered dehumanising and reductive. For now, local populations have mainly 
played a reactive role in the news production process (à la #SomeonetellCNN or 
KONY2012). But that all correspondents talked about the local engagement via 
social media heralds some potential for a stronger impact on the production 
process. More than ever before, foreign correspondents cannot afford not to 
envision local population as potential readers (Franks, 2010a). Whether or not they 
welcome the local backlash, whether or not their media decide to become “more 
nationalistic in the face of global exposure” (Sambrook, 2010 p. 57), foreign 
correspondents are all impacted by the fact that there is a local audience that may 
read their content.26 In that sense, the primarily reactive role of local audiences via 
social media contributes to cultivate journalistic sensitivities over time that will 
impact the news production process upstream, not only downstream. My argument 
is not that foreign correspondent should write primarily with a local audience in 
mind. But it is likely that, faced with growing local feedback, correspondents will 
come to integrate more systematically the “local citizen” as a category alongside 
“the tourist”, “the grand ma”, “the businessman” and “the politician”; something 
that could only lead to greater accountability and more sensitive forms of 
reporting.27 
                                                      
26 For now, this is particularly true for British journalists. The two hubs of news production 
in Africa, South Africa and Kenya, are anglophone countries. These are the two countries 
where the backlash most often comes from, which also means that French journalists are 
not the subjects of as much scrutiny. But given the number of francophone countries in 
Africa, this is likely to become increasingly the case as internet penetration grows in these 
countries. DRC for instance, is the most populous francophone country in the world, ahead 
of France. Twenty-one countries in Africa have French as an official language and an 
additional five have it as a second language.  
27 My findings here are linked to my focus on a sub-group of foreign correspondents 
working for nation-based outlets and who are not parachute journalists. But the majority of 
international correspondents in Africa work for media outlets such as Reuters, AFP, Al 









This chapter provided a critical appraisal of the accounts of foreign correspondents 
on three issues: Afro-pessimism, the news production of Africa’s image, and the 
audience. In the first section, I showed that Afro-pessimism is a floating signifier 
and that the debate about Western media coverage of Africa is played out in local 
contexts and shapes how correspondents react to the criticism of Afro-pessimism. 
Paradoxically, while correspondents seek to distance themselves from Afro-
pessimism, the second section of this chapter demonstrated that when engaging 
with production processes, correspondents were much more open to criticisms. In 
fact, they display a strong awareness of how the logics of news production lead to 
simplifications and stereotypes. This individual reflexivity testifies to a new 
journalistic sensitivity, and even leads journalists to develop strategies to act upon 
it. Yet, these strategies remain at an individual level and are constrained by broader 
features of production.  
 
Finally, I analysed how the way correspondents think about their audience is a 
driver of both continuities and changes in the reporting of Africa. The existence of 
naturalised perceptions of who the audience is and what interests them contributes 
to simplification and to the reproduction of stereotypes about distant ‘Others’. 
However, correspondents also increasingly envision these distant ‘Others’ as 
potential audiences. In the age of digital and social media, local population are 
impacting the reporting of Africa downstream – by being reactive and keeping in 
check Western media coverage. But they also have an impact on reporting 
upstream; as correspondents integrate local population as potential audiences, this 
contributes to increasing the accuracy and accountability of the reporting. This 
emergent trend heralds some potential to deliver higher levels of accountability in 
the reporting of Africa in international news.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
 
local or regional journalists (Bunce, 2015). By virtues of a globalising media market, it is 
possible that the majority of foreign correspondents in Africa have already started to 
operate a significant evolution in the perceptions of the audience. Future research into the 
perceptions of the audience by these local/global correspondents, as well as by parachute 






The representation of foreign correspondents in popular culture and public debates 
often oscillates between heroes and villains or puppets (Hannerz, 2002 p. 60; 
Ehrlich & Saltzman, 2015); between the intrepid cosmopolitan human rights 
defenders portrayed by Jennifer Connelly in the Hollywood blockbuster Blood 
Diamond (2006), and the self-righteous neocolonial subject depicted by Wainaina, 
a mere exchangeable agent of media imperialism and of the “calculus of death” 
(Cottle, 2013). In contrast, my analysis draws a more nuanced and complex portrait 
located in the gap between these two representations (Hannerz, 2002 p. 60). It 
paints an informed account of the primary producers of media texts about Africa as 
individuals caught between the broad demand of their industry and their awareness 
of issues of representation and stereotypes.  
 
I would therefore describe the foreign correspondents as being in a postcolonial 
drift. On the one hand, correspondents “catch the drift” of the postcolonial 
criticism of Western media. They are not only familiar with it and understand its 
general meaning; they also ask themselves these questions and, on several points, 
side with the criticism. It is telling that the most recent, and largest public 
campaign to call for an improvement of the reporting of Africa was led by Howard 
French, a former correspondent in Africa. On the other hand, the postcolonial drift 
stands for the broader evolution of the international media landscape in the 
postcolonial era; an evolution marked by much continuity but also by changes 
brought about by a globalising and digital age.  
 
The perfect example of correspondents navigating this postcolonial drift 
materialised during my interview with Bartholomäus Grill, the Africa bureau chief 
for German broadsheet magazine Der Spiegel. Towards the end of the interview, 
Grill was browsing through huge piles of papers and articles spread throughout his 
office. He was searching for a special issue dedicated to Africa of a German 
magazine to complain about the Afro-pessimist choices made by the editorial team. 
Underneath massive piles of papers and news articles, I caught sight of three 
books: Said’s Orientalism, Mbembe’s On the Postcolony and the Granta journal 
containing Wainaina’s “How to write about Africa”. In a way, the piles of news 
articles perfectly symbolised the weight of a media industry that, more often than 
not, suffocates the foreign correspondents’ awareness of issues of postcolonial 










This thesis has investigated British and French print media so as to evaluate the 
state of Afro-pessimism in journalistic discourse and to assess the nature and 
production of postcolonial discourses on Africa. This conclusion offers a 
thematically structured cross-comparative discussion of my core empirical 
findings. I first answer my four research questions respectively. Next, I underline 
the implications of my findings for the study of representation of Africa and the 
debate about Afro-pessimism in the media. I then discuss the limitations of this 
study and identify future avenues for research. Finally, I emphasise the core 
contributions this thesis makes at the empirical, methodological and theoretical 
levels. 
 
Beyond Afro-pessimism in the postcolonial mediatropole? 
Answering the research questions 
 
Research question 1: What is Afro-pessimism? 
 
The term Afro-pessimism emerged in the early 1990s to describe and condemn a 
discourse on postcolonial Africa that originated in the West and reproduced 
images, narratives, stereotypes and a rhetoric reminiscent of older colonial and 
racist representations of sub-Saharan Africa and Africans. The 1990s also 
witnessed a tremendous increase in international news provision brought about 
notably by the emergence of 24-hour rolling news culture and international news 
channels. This contributed to a global mediatisation of African news, but 
essentially through a narrow lens of war, conflict, famine, poverty, violence and 
political instability. Western media thus became a central focus point of the debate 
about Afro-pessimism. From then on, critiques saw Western media as key 
contributors to the construction, reproduction and circulation of Afro-pessimism.  
 
And yet, as I argued in Chapter 1, the concept of Afro-pessimism lacks a clear 
definition. I illustrated and discussed the absence of clarity around the notion of 






could be detrimental to an adequate analysis of the coverage of African news. 
Chapter 7 provided further examples of the state of Afro-pessimism as a floating 
signifier since foreign correspondents did not have a clear, single, authoritative 
understanding of the notion at hand, beyond the shared view that Afro-pessimism 
has to do with a set of “negative representations”. These findings suggest that the 
lack of clarity surrounding the concept is at stake both within as well outside 
academia. In addition, I also demonstrated that, although the Afro-pessimism of 
Western media seems to have become taken for granted, there are several empirical 
gaps in the literature including (1) a lack of research into French media coverage, 
(2) into media coverage of francophone countries, (3) into the coverage of more 
banal news events, and (4) into the perspective of foreign correspondents. This 
thesis sought to contribute to filling these gaps by providing, at a theoretical level, 
a fully-fledged definition of Afro-pessimism and, at an empirical level, by 
providing an analysis of British and French print media discourse about Africa. 
 
Drawing on the disjointed literature on Afro-pessimism and the literature on 
Africa’s image in the news, I put forward a definition of Afro-pessimism as a 
discourse. I identified the key discursive features that make Afro-pessimism in 
journalistic discourse peculiar. The Afro-pessimist discourse, I showed, operates 
through the combination of five discursive features: (1) it homogenises Africa; (2) 
assigns it racial meanings; (3) relies on a highly selective representational 
repertoire; (4) assess Africa’s progress against criteria set by the West; and (5) 
predicts a bleak future to the continent.  
 
Research question 2: What is the nature of media discourse on Africa? Is it really 
Afro-pessimist and if so, in what sense? 
 
In order to assess the state of Afro-pessimism in media discourse, I conducted an 
empirical analysis of British and French print media, or the postcolonial 
mediatropole. With this notion, I mean to refer to the media systems and cultures 
of two metropoles that were the main centres of the colonial power in Africa. My 
choice to focus on these two countries was motivated by the key claim of 
postcolonial theory that colonialism affected the imagination and system of 
knowledge of colonising countries up to the current era. I focused on two sites of 
investigation with a continental dimension, and I attended to both the linguistic and 







My findings challenge the view of a monolithic Afro-pessimist discourse in the 
coverage of Africa in British and French print media. Instead, my analysis paints a 
more nuanced picture of a discursive construction of Africa that is ambivalent, 
multifaceted and more complex than first meets the eye. Looking at the coverage 
of the 50th anniversaries of independence, I showed that the claims that the media 
coverage systematically refers to “tribalism” and “darkness”, treats Africa as a 
country and fails to give a voice to Africans – three components through which the 
Afro-pessimist discourse can be actively deployed – are not supported by the 
analysis.  
 
Afro-pessimism was not absent from the media coverage either. It was particularly 
salient in editorials that used linguistic, narrative and rhetorical components 
through which the five features of Afro-pessimism were enacted. But overall, the 
main discursive dynamic at stake in the coverage was a master narrative of failure 
caught between a discomfort surrounding colonial history in Britain and France, 
and a social critique of corrupted elites, inequalities and poverty.  
 
In addition, I showed that not one news magazine cover embodied Afro-pessimism. 
Instead, there was a significant uptake for a resolutely positive discourse about 
Africa. This Afro-optimism was not confined to a few publications but indeed was 
found on all covers published between 2011 and 2015, and throughout a range of 
magazines with different editorial lines across the two countries. Beyond a 
homogenous and systematic Afro-pessimism, these findings testify to the co-
existence of different narratives about Africa in British and French print media. 
 
Research question 3: Are mythical representations enduring, evolving or 
disappearing and what are the forces and power relations driving these evolutions 
and/or continuities? 
 
While the narratives that characterise the media landscape are not all Afro-
pessimist, they nonetheless indicate an ongoing impact of colonial power relations 
and colonial representations. 
 
In site 1, I demonstrated that British and French media report primarily on their 






from Africa. Yet, the reporting often drifted from the focus on one country to 
Africa more generally. There was a tendency to ground the reporting in relation to 
Africa as a whole through generic references and, to a lesser extent, through active 
generalisation, comparison and overlexicalisation. My analysis of quoting verbs 
also established that there was a subtle linguistic bias that contributed to present 
Western voices as more authoritative, knowledgeable and reasonable than their 
African counterparts. This bias resonates with the discursive polarisation of social 
actors around binaries characteristic of colonial discourse. I also showed the 
endurance of several colonial myths to interpret the post-independence years, 
namely the pathologisation and infantilisation of Africa and Africans, as well as the 
strategic negation of some parts of Africa’s history. Finally, I proposed that the 
main discursive dynamic at stake – an ambiguous master narrative of failure – 
should be understood in the context of the unsettled colonial memories in the UK 
and France.  
 
In site 2, I showed that the magazine covers drew on pre-existing, often colonial, 
notions of ‘Africanness’ and combined them with signifiers of modernity, 
economic attractiveness and progress. Far from disrupting Afro-pessimism, the 
Afro-optimism of these covers took part in a similar discursive apparatus by 
reproducing the five discursive features of Afro-pessimism. Afro-optimism, I 
argued, should be interpreted in relation to the evolution of colonial power 
relations into a neoliberal ordering of the world that favours short-term profit, 
extractive economies, and foreign capital at the expense of social and economic 
equality. These covers therefore reproduced a reductive vision of Africa caught 
between a colonial imagination and a neoliberal ideology. 
 
In sum, colonial representations and power relations significantly shape the 
discursive construction of these various postcolonial “ideas of Africa”, and not 
only in the form of an Afro-pessimist discourse. In that sense, I would argue that 
mythical representations are simultaneously enduring and evolving, more than they 
are disappearing. My findings call our attention to the non-systematic dimension of 
Afro-pessimism and to several discursive ambiguities and disruptions in the 
coverage; but they also indicate several ways in which colonial ideas and images 







Research question 4: To what extent does the context of news production explain 
the formation of media discourse? What is the interplay between the processes of 
journalistic production and the formation of postcolonial discourse(s) on Africa? 
 
In order to better understand how and why these postcolonial discourses come 
about the way they do, I grounded my textual analysis into the context of news 
production and of the values, practices and structures characteristic of the 
journalistic field. 
 
The “idea of news” and several long-standing news values are key factors shaping 
media coverage. In site 1, I showed that the anniversaries became news insofar as 
they could be related to something negative, controversial, exuberant or when it 
directly involved Western nations or people. Another key value that dominated the 
news was ethnocentrism. This consists in prioritising events that include 
individuals perceived as closer to a home audience based on linguistic, national or 
racial criteria. But it is also visible when coverage relies on pre-existing and 
simplified explanatory frameworks, and on a representational repertoire that the 
home audience, supposedly, more easily relates to. This was found in site 1 and 
also in Chapters 6 and 7, from the reliance on the savannah tree trope (Chapter 6) 
to the preference for “Brits in shit” stories (Chapter 7). 
 
There are others features built-into the fabric of journalism that significantly shape 
postcolonial discourses. For instance, the conventional schema of editorials lends 
itself to the deployment of Afro-pessimism (Chapter 5). The division of labour and 
the different production layers (headline selection, choice of visual, copy editing) 
can significantly contribute to sensationalism, simplification, generalisation, 
stereotypes or a racial bias (Chapters 6 and 7). In Chapter 5, it was even the 
watchdog function of journalism that, when combined with the tendency of news to 
be present-oriented, contributed to sidetracking the commemorative dimension of 
the 50th anniversaries. As a result, the watchdog function of journalism shaped 
media discourse into a narrative sweetener for Britain and France to distance 
themselves from their colonial history and postcolonial responsibilities. 
 
The interview material used throughout Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 shows that these 
features of news productions and journalistic values are naturalised in the 






foreign correspondents talk about their audience – a naturalised representation of 
the audience ‘back home’ that dialectically feeds stereotypes about distant 
‘Others’. Postcolonial journalistic discourses about Africa are therefore constructed 
by and through these production processes and values that journalists perceive as 
common sense, tied to their professional role and even, at times, morally right 
(watchdog function).  
 
These professional values and features of journalistic production, however, did not 
appear ex nihilo. They emerged in the 19th century with the establishment of the 
idea of news media as watchdogs (Hearns-Branaman, 2011) and of a network of 
international news subservient to Western interests (Harris, 1981). Therefore, they 
developed alongside, and are entrenched with, the historical expansion of 
colonialism. Put into this broader context, it would appear that contemporary 
journalistic discourses carry and reproduce colonial representations by virtue of 
foreign reporting having similarly inherited a colonial legacy in its structure, values 
and production practices. 
 
The naturalisation of these values and practices among journalists is the process 
through which postcolonial meanings occur. But it is also the process through 
which individual journalists manage their reflexivity. My interviews revealed a 
strong reflexivity among foreign correspondents about issues of colonial 
representations and stereotyping. While these individuals developed several 
strategies to act upon their reflexivity (at an intra-media, inter-media and extra 
media level), their reflexivity also gives to see, in counterpoint, the broader system 
of foreign news production within which they operate. By their own account, many 
dominant features of the international media industry contribute to the 
representational ‘Othering’ of Africa. Beyond individual strategies, then, the way 
correspondents seemed to cope with being part of this broader structure was by 
retreating to the common sense of “what makes events newsworthy”, “what news 
is for”, “what journalism is” and “what the readers want”. 
 
The reflexivity was also visible in media content, in particular in the magazine 
covers that promised to show the other side of Africa, the new Africa, the Africa 
the media never show you. Yet, this reflexivity appeared to be the result of a 
discursive trickling down that originated from the circle of international financial 






set of commercial incentives, more than by a cosmopolitan, disinterested desire to 
break free from the legacy of colonial representations. In the context of an evolving 
global political economy, these media generally bought into an exploitative 
narrative about the continent as the new frontier-market, a narrative reminiscent of 
the 19th century “Scramble for Africa”. The promises by media outlets that they 
will provide a new, different image of Africa is linked to a set of commercial 
incentive for the media industry itself. Indeed, several British and French media 
outlets hope to benefit from the conjunction of a relative lack of pan-African media 
originating from the continent, of a boom in online consumption and of the fact 
that French and English are widely spoken throughout the continent to establish 
their brand in this media market.  
 
In terms of representation, this trend brings about some disruptions. For instance, it 
prompts a greater consideration for digitally connected local audiences no longer 
only perceived as subjects of reporting (Chapter 7). This trend also leads to the 
appearance of an ambiguous Afropolitanism that refuses to assign a victim identity 
to Africans but that is also entrenched in a capitalist culture of consumerism, 
lifestyle and commodification (Chapter 6). However, in the context of my analysis 
of magazine covers, the trend for new representations of Africa mainly translate 
into the discursive reproduction of the five features of Afro-pessimism under a new 
guise. In particular, I demonstrated that this process occurs through the adoption of 
a corporate visual aesthetic characteristic of stock photography, a process of 
aestheticisation (Aiello, 2012b) that shapes Africa’s difference vis-à-vis the 
expected, narcissistic desires of a foreign gaze.  
 
In sum, the empirical engagement with the context of news production not only 
explained the multi-layered formation of media discourse. It also allowed digging 
deeper into the power relations within which postcolonial discourses, including but 
not limited to Afro-pessimism, are implicated. My findings thus paint a picture of 
the postcolonial mediatropole as an institutionalised fabric of knowledge impacted 
by colonial power relations and their postcolonial evolution into a globalised 
neoliberal ordering of the world; a social institution in and through which mythical 
representations endure and evolve in new, complex and ambivalent ways, more 







Challenging the co-option of the criticism of Afro-pessimism 
 
This research comes to a close at a particularly exciting moment in the public 
debate about Africa’s media image. The criticism of Western media coverage of 
Africa and of Afro-pessimism has gained significant currency beyond academia 
and notably within the media. The Guardian, for instance, published Wainaina’s 
criticism of Western correspondents in Nairobi in 2012. In 2014, it published an 
article about the application “Africa isn’t a country” which used the Guardian’s 
very own API to reveal that its journalists are almost four times more likely to 
mention “Africa” in their articles without referring to a specific country than they 
would for “Asia” (Kayser-Bril, 2014). The same year, the newspaper organised a 
public debate in its London coffee shop (#guardiancoffee) on “Debunking myths 
about Africa”, just like the BBC World Service in 2012 with its “Africa’s media 
image: justified or prejudiced?” debate. In June 2015, the BBC reported early on, 
and thus contributed to promote, a viral Twitter campaign using the hashtag 
#TheAfricaTheMediaNeverShowsYou inviting to promote a more diverse and 
positive image of Africa to the world.  
 
Similar calls for changing the image of Africa are not limited to the field of news 
media. In humanitarian communication, the online campaign “Africa for Norway” 
went viral in 2012 through a song that ironically asked Africans to donate radiators 
to freezing Norwegians as a way to disrupt stereotypes (Paterson, 2013 p. 5). In 
2013, Oxfam launched a new campaign “See Africa differently” that called to 
“make Africa famous for its epic landscapes, not hunger”, “for its food markets, 
not its food shortages” (Tanner, 2013). These are only but a few of many examples 
that point to the liveliness, reflexivity and awareness that surround a broad debate 
on Africa’s media image within the media. 
 
But in the blunt words of Lydia Polgreen, the New York Times Johannesburg 
Bureau Chief, “what is more insulting than the idea of ‘positive news’ from 
Africa? As if the continent was a dull witted child in need of encouragement” 
(Ross, 2012). Indeed, while these various initiatives aim to, and are presented as, 
correcting Afro-pessimism, they largely end up reproducing the discursive legacy 
of Afro-pessimism. I notably demonstrated this in the case of the Afro-optimism of 







This rebranding of Africa – and, its correlative, the criticism of Western media 
coverage of Africa – is implicated in a set of economic and political interests, both 
foreign and local. For instance, NGOs facing compassion fatigue and increased 
competition find in this positive discourse a way to appeal to their donors in new, 
feel-good and narcissistic ways (Chouliaraki, 2010). Governments keen on keeping 
media scrutiny at bay can also rely on the criticism of Western media, as was the 
case in the 2013 Kenyan elections or the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (Chapter 
7). Similarly, international financial circles have spearheaded the “Africa Rising” 
narrative, but mainly in support of extractive economies that economically favour 
foreign countries and local elites, and have damaging social impacts (Sylla, 2014). 
 
In his comprehensive and systematic review of empirical research into US and UK 
media representations of Africa published between 1990 and 2014, Scott (2015 p. 
4) argues that existing research is insufficient to reach “any firm, generalizable 
conclusions about the nature of media coverage of Africa”. In consequence, he 
argues that the widespread belief that Afro-pessimism dominates media coverage is 
a “myth”, in Barthes’ sense, and an “imaginative object” (Scott, 2015 p. 16). He 
concludes by reminding that Said (1978), whose work is often summoned in 
studies of media representation of Africa, identified academic scholarship as a key 
contributor to Orientalism. Scott therefore suggests that studies that make 
unsubstantiated, generalisable claims about media representation of Africa risk 
contributing to a discursive common sense that ultimately provides support to this 
rhetoric of the rebranding of Africa and to a set of corporate and political agendas. 
In other words, there is a risk for academic scholarship on media Afro-pessimism 
to become instrumental in supporting the very system of hegemonic power it seeks 
to challenge in the first place. Power could be redone precisely where it is sought 
to be undone (Ahmed, 2012 p. 13). 
 
At the roots of this risk is the underspecification of the concept of Afro-pessimism 
and its equation with “negative” images of Africa. The result of this 
underspecification is the trivialisation of postcolonial representations that appear 
obvious, common sense, unchanging, hereby mythologising them further instead of 
unpacking their complexities, contradictions and evolutions. It also implies that it 
is impossible to talk about violence, political instability, social inequalities and 
poverty without reproducing colonial discourse. In sum, an underspecified concept 






critical/cultural media studies and postcolonial theory – that seeks to confront 
dominant discourses with their racist and colonial roots so as to challenge the 
hegemonic power structures that produce them. 
 
While there is a risk of co-option of the criticism of Afro-pessimism, I made the 
choice in this thesis to not back down from this risk. Firstly, I put forward a 
conceptualisation grounded in a postcolonial perspective of Afro-pessimism 
beyond “negative images” as a way to remedy to the underspecification of the 
concept. Secondly, I provided an empirical analysis that engaged with the 
complexity and ambivalence of postcolonial discourses and their production. This 
analysis sought to be critical and to show precisely what postcolonial discourses 
are made of, how they come about and how power relations inherited from the 
colonial era shape them. But it also attempted to be transparent and go against the 
grain, for instance by facing the fact that Afro-pessimism was not a systematically 
dominant discourse. In this dual effort at a theoretical and empirical level, this 
research sought to advance our knowledge about the state of Afro-pessimism in 
British and French print media, while refusing to let the study of Afro-pessimism 
and the analysis of postcolonial representations be used against themselves.  
 
Limitations and avenues for future research 
 
There are several limitations to this research linked to its scope and methodological 
approach. Here I outline the main limitations in three areas – audience reception, 
production, and context of investigation – and suggest future areas of research 
related to these limitations and to my findings. 
 
This thesis focused on media content and production and therefore did not engage 
with the question of reception. My findings do not make claims about the reception 
of media texts. I do not embrace a reductive top-down model, which would argue 
that the ideological load of media texts is transferred straightforwardly to readers. 
While I do not argue that reception of these texts is fixed, I have tried to show how 
media discourses both reflect and, precisely, try to fix certain meanings and 
hegemonic worldviews through specific semiotic, linguistic and rhetorical choices. 
Nonetheless, it would be interesting to see future studies include an element of 
empirical investigation into audience reception so as to gain a deeper 






content accepted or resisted by audiences? Or, in the case of content that cannot be 
deemed Afro-pessimist, do audiences re-activate Afro-pessimism in their reading? 
 
Another limitation of this study is the depth of the investigation into key processes 
of production. While I was able to interview media producers directly involved in 
the production of the texts analysed, the fabric of news production is complex and 
multi-layered insofar as it involves a host of other individuals such as editors, 
fixers and translators. In this regard, the ethnographic work of Bunce (2010; 2011; 
2013; 2015) was particularly useful throughout this research to complement my 
analysis of the broader context of journalistic production. I hope this thesis 
demonstrated that an engagement with production contexts provides deeper 
insights into the circulation and operation of power shaping media discourse. 
Inspired by this approach, future studies could analyse further how the structure 
and evolution of the environment of news production impact postcolonial media 
discourse. I notably see two aspects, briefly discussed in my empirical analysis, 
that warrant further research: digitisation and commercialism. How does the digital 
environment impact the reporting of Africa, both in terms of content and practices? 
In Chapter 4, I found that most of the exclusive content published online was in 
fact news agency material. This limited finding suggests that the online platform 
may reinforce the power of established international news providers rather than 
challenging it. In Chapter 7, I suggested that increased freelancing and economic 
precariousness in the field of foreign reporting, resulting from commercialisation, 
could lead reflexive journalists to do distasteful things. Future studies could shed 
even more light on the interplay between commercialism and postcolonial 
representations.  
 
Finally, this study is limited to the context of the UK and France. I therefore cannot 
generalise my findings to “Western media”. What I have done is analysed British 
and French print media against the backdrop of a broader debate about “Western 
media coverage of Africa”, and to provide findings that nuance and challenge this 
broader criticism of “Western media”. While I focus on a Western context, I 
attempted to de-Westernise my approach at a theoretical level by drawing on the 
literature of postcolonial theory. This is in opposition to the dominant form of de-
Westernisation in journalism studies where theoretical frameworks from the 
“North” are used to analyse empirical examples in the “South” that bring “local 






(Wasserman, 2011 p. 103; see also Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012 for a broader 
critique of Eurocentric theory). Still, future studies could contribute further to the 
effort of de-Westernising the debate by looking at similar issues of representation 
in the context of African media as well as in, and across, countries with growing 
economic interests in the continent such as India, Brazil and China (see for 
instance Wasserman, 2011 for a proposal for more comparative projects that attend 
to the context of the global South; see Gagliardone, 2013 for an investigation of 
Chinese media in Africa). Finally, another area that future studies should attend to 
is to compare the coverage of Africa with other geographical areas, both to 
evaluate the extent of a differential media treatment of the continent and to 
understand how a colonial legacy also shapes representations of the rest of the 
world. 
Key contributions  
 
In spite of these limitations, this research has made several substantial 




Firstly, this research has contributed to filling four important empirical gaps in the 
literature. I provided an analysis of (1) French media and (2) francophone African 
countries. Overall, my findings did not reveal strong differences in the way British 
and French journalists cover Africa, and in the way francophone and anglophone 
countries are covered. The most noticeable difference was that French newspapers 
prioritise francophone countries and British newspapers prioritise anglophone 
countries (site 1). But this difference in media content is the result of a similar 
mechanism in the two countries, namely the role of colonial ties in determining 
newsworthiness. In spite of this different geographical focus, I found that the main 
discursive features of media coverage, both in site 1 and 2, were largely shared 
across the two countries. Another gap in the literature that this thesis contributed to 
fill is (3) the study of the more banal and mundane forms of coverage, those that do 
not fall in the categories of wars and disasters. By changing the focus, the 
empirical investigation revealed that there are a variety of discourses at stake in the 
coverage of Africa: Afro-pessimism and commonly held assumptions about 
Western media reporting of Africa exist but they are not as systematic as often 






ambiguous narratives such as in the case of the reporting of the 50th anniversaries 
of independence. Finally, (4) I analysed the views of an elite group of journalists 
that have rarely been consulted in previous studies, despite their key role in 




At a methodological level, my approach grounded the analysis of media content 
into contexts of production, hereby producing interrelated empirical data at both 
levels. This choice was inspired by, and contributes to, the uptake in the field of 
social semiotics and CDA to engage with media producers and with the 
multimodal nature of contemporary communication. In terms of content, my 
analysis attended to the linguistic as well as the visual dimensions of media 
content. The engagement with media producers, for its part, offered insights into 
the values, incentives and constraints shaping media discourse. By linking 
contextual aspects to features of media content, the analysis provided a deeper 
understanding of the power relations within which postcolonial discourses are 
implicated. Thus, this methodological approach also contributed to a greater 
dialogue between postcolonial theory and journalism studies by inviting to take 
into account the material conditions under which racialised forms of knowledge in 




Finally, at a theoretical level, I put forward a conceptualisation of Afro-pessimism 
to remedy to the underspecification of the concept. This was a way to prevent the 
concept from becoming instrumental in an ideological project that critical/cultural 
and postcolonial studies seek to challenge. By using a clear definition, I was able to 
delineate what constitutes precisely Afro-pessimism in the coverage as well as 
what does not. Furthermore, this definition also allowed understanding that Afro-
optimism, which at first sight may seem to be a new and different discourse, was in 
fact a clear discursive continuity. This definition will hopefully provide a solid 
benchmark for future studies interested in assessing the state of Afro-pessimism 
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List of countries used to retrieve data in Site 1 
 
Between 1957 and 1962, the following 24 countries (in alphabetical order) 
in sub-Saharan Africa gained their independence from colonial powers. 
These countries therefore marked their 50th anniversaries of independence 
between 2007 and 2012. 
 
* Benin (France – 1960) 
* Burkina Faso (France – 1960) 
* Burundi (Belgium – 1962) 
* Cameroon (Germany / France / Britain – 1960) 
* Central African Republic (France – 1960) 
* Chad (France – 1960) 
* Democratic Republic of Congo (Belgium – 1960) 
* Gabon (France – 1960) 
* Ghana (Britain – 1957) 
* Guinea (France – 1958) 
* Ivory Coast (France – 1960) 
* Madagascar (France – 1960) 
* Mali (France – 1960) 
* Mauritania (France – 1960) 
* Niger (France – 1960) 
* Nigeria (Britain – 1960) 
* Republic of the Congo (France – 1960) 
* Rwanda (Belgium – 1962)  
* Senegal (France – 1960) 
* Sierra Leone (Britain – 1961) 
* Somalia (Britain / Italy – 1960) 
* Tanzania (Britain – 1961) 
* Togo (Germany / France – 1960) 







Coding sheet for Site 1 
 
 
1. Newspaper  
 








1. International News  2. Domestic News 3. Opinion 
pieces/columns 
4. Editorials   5. Culture  6. Business  
7. Other 
 
6. Length (in words) 
 
7. Page  
 
8. Focus: continental or national (specify country)? 
 
9. Peg (see note 1) 
1. Celebration / 2. Other: detail 
10. Acknowledgement of news agency material (see Note 2): 
1. Author / Co-author  
2. If the article quotes a news agency, how much of the article the news 
agency material constitutes (approximately): 




11. Individuals quoted (see note 3): as identified in the text, either by reference 
to their nationality or by the reference to the institution they represent. In 
that sense, it is individual in so far as they come to represent a national 
institution or a community in the text. It does not make claim to make a 
statement about the identity of the individuals. “African”, as used here, is 
not limited to sub-Saharan Africa. If the name of the individual is written, 
write the name. If anonymous, write “anonymous”.  
 
a. Government / political party:  
i. France  
ii. UK 
iii. Other European 
iv. US. 
v. African  
vi. Other / Unable to determine 
b. NGO / INGO: 







iii. Other European 
iv. US. 
v. African  
vi. Other / Unable to determine 
c. Business / Company / Firm representative:  
i. France  
ii. UK 
iii. Other European 
iv. US. 
v. African  
vi. Other / Unable to determine 
d. Journalist:  
i. France  
ii. UK 
iii. Other European 
iv. US. 
v. African  
vi. Other / Unable to determine 
e. Other member of the civil society (non-NGO):  
i. France  
ii. UK 
iii. Other European 
iv. US. 
v. African  
vi. Other / Unable to determine 
f. Academic:  
i. France  
ii. UK 
iii. Other European 
iv. US. 
v. African  
vi. Other / Unable to determine 
g. Expert: 
i. France  
ii. UK 
iii. Other European 
iv. US. 
v. African  
vi. Other / Unable to determine. 
h. Vox pop: 
i. France  
ii. UK 
iii. Other European 
iv. US. 
v. African  
vi. Other / Unable to determine 
i. Other: 
i. France  
ii. UK 
iii. Other European 
iv. US. 
v. African  







12. Quoting verbs: for each individual quoted give details (on a corresponding 
line) of the quoting verb(s) used. In brackets, characterise the verb(s) based 
on Caldas-Coulthard’s typology of the meaning potentials of quoting verbs 
(Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 59): Neutral structuring verb / 
Metapropositional verb (give detail: assertive – directive – expressive) / 
Metalinguistic verb / Descriptive verb / Transcriptive verb. 
----LEXICAL FIELDS---- 
Give examples of words, group of words and/or expression for each category when 
applicable (5 examples max) (see Note 4). 
13. Corruption and bad governance 
e.g. corruption, corrupt, undemocratic, dictator, dictatorial, kleptocratic. 
14. Darkness. 
-e.g. dark, darkness, darken, darkly, heart of darkness, bleak, gloom, 
gloomy. 
15. Economic Growth 
-e.g. growing investments, growing economy, booming economy, rising 
economy, positive growth rates, upbeat economic picture, new business. 
16. Good governance  
-e.g. free elections, democracy, political stability, peaceful transition, 
stable regime, good leadership. 
17. Poverty 
-e.g. poor, poverty, disadvantaged, impoverished, penury, beggar. 
18. Progress and achievements 
-e.g. success, progress, achievement, prosperous, bright, improvement, 
positive change/outlook, flourish 
19. Social / political instability 
-e.g. conflict, coup, turmoil, instability, unstable collapse, crisis, dispute, 
insecurity, recession. 
20. Terrorism 
-e.g. Al Qaeda, AQMI, terrorist, terrorism, extremist. 
21. Tribal 
-e.g. tribe, tribal, tribalism, ethnic. 
22. Violence and death 
-e.g. death, dead, dying, deadly, murder, killings, killed, violence, war, 
casualties, assassination 
23. Witchcraft 
-e.g. witch, witchcraft, witch doctor, exorcism, healer, magic, superstition, 
spell, juju 
 
----THE FACE OF AFRICAN LEADERSHIP AT 50 / THE MEMORY 
OF THE INDEPENDENCE---- 
24. Does the article mention current African heads of State? If yes, specify 
which one(s). 
25. Does the article mention past African heads of State? If yes, specify which 
one(s). 
26. * (see note 5) Are the anniversaries characterized by an adjective? If yes, 
which one(s). 
27. *Is there a reference to “colonialism”, “post-colonialism”, “pan-
Africanism” or “FrançAfrique”? If yes, write the sentence where they/it 
appear(s) 






28. Does the article mention the “West”, “Western”, “North”, “Northern”, 
“Europe” “North”? If yes, write the sentence(s) where it appears.  
29. Is there a generic reference to “Africa” e.g. “in Africa”, “African”, “the 
continent”, “Africa”? If yes, give details. 
30. Does the article contain cases of conflation through active generalisation, 
comparison and/or overlexicalisation? If yes, give quote(s). 
 
----REFLEXIVITY (AFRICA’S IMAGE)---- 
31. *Does the article mention Africa’s image or the debate about media 
representation of Africa? If yes, give quote(s). 
----ADDITIONAL INFO FOR DISCOURSE ANALYSIS---- 
32. *Is there any particularly striking figure of speech (hyperbole, metonymy, 
synecdoche)? Give details and provide a brief interpretation.  
 
33. *Is this article interesting for further micro-analysis (e.g. representative of 
overall coverage, or on the contrary, particularly different): explain briefly 
in my own words why. 
 
Note 1: The difference here is between articles that focus primarily on the 
anniversaries as opposed to articles that simply mention the celebrations. The goal 
is to assess how the anniversaries themselves are framed, but also when they were 
discussed in the context of other stories.  
 
Note 2: This category, albeit limited, allows assessing the visibility of news agency 
material. 
 
Note 3: The goal here is to assess who holds the authority to speak about African 
issues and which kind of voices is made available. I am not counting the number of 
quotes but the visibility of speakers; as a result if an individual is quoted several 
times in the same article, he/she will appear only once in the coding. However, all 
quoting verbs used for this speaker are recorded. This is how it would appear in the 
excel coding database: 
11. Individuals quoted 12. Quoting verbs 
a.ii: Tony Blair 
 
a.v: Joseph Kabila 
 
 
h.v: elderly guard 
> “said” (neutral) x2 
 
> “said” (neutral) 




Note 4: These thematic lexical fields derive from the recurring claims in the 
literature on Africa’s media image about the topics, issues, and types of words used 
in the coverage of Africa. See notably Brookes (1995) for “darkness”, “tribalism”, 
“witchcraft”, “corruption”, “social and political instability”. Other categories were 
added to offer the possibility to account for other aspects of the coverage such as 
“economic growth”, “progress and achievements” and “good governance”. I coded 
single words as well as group of words. When there was an ambiguity about the 
connotation accompanying a word or group of words, the word / group of words 
were coded based on the context in which they appear. For instance, “Ghana 
succeeded in reducing poverty”, the group of words “succeeded in reducing 
poverty” would qualify as “progress and achievements” rather than “poverty”. 






for “economic growth”. But if the sentence reads, “news businesses have been 
steadily developing”, then it qualifies as “economic growth”, whereas if the 
sentence states, “the political situation has a damaging impact on the development 
of new businesses” this would qualify as “political and social instability”. This 
coding process is therefore limited in that it does not tell us much about the rhetoric 
or argument of the articles. That being said, it is a particularly useful tool to assess 
the use of lexical fields that have strong connotations built-into them such as 
“darkness” and “tribalism”. 
 
Note 5: The asterisk means that this category/question will not be used to draw 
quantitative conclusions. Rather, the questions with * allow to build up a 
knowledge of the data that will feed into my interpretation of the coverage in the 









List of magazines monitored (Site 2) 
 
FRANCE UK 
Courrier International Monocle 
L’Express Prospect 
Le Figaro Magazine New Statesman 
Le Nouvel Observateur The Economist 
Le Point The Spectator 
M, le magazine du Monde  The Week 
Marianne Sunday supplements from: 
The Financial Times Week End,  
The Independent on Sunday,  
The Observer,  
The Sunday Telegraph (and 
Telegraph Magazine on Saturday) 













An asterisk (*) means that the question is a core one, and should be ask (or 
covered) in every interview. 
 
Introductory question 
How did you come to your current position and how long have you been working 
in this position? 
 
Selection process / News Values 
*Can you describe the ways your newspaper/media outlet decides to cover a story? 
That is, how do you assess how much to put into a particular coverage and who 
makes the key decisions? 
 
Perceptions of the audience 
*In your opinion, what news about Africa does your audience expect? 
 
Is it important for you to get feedback from your audience and if so, how do you do 
so? 
 
Impact local context / news diet 
*How would you describe your relationship and interaction with local helpers and 
with other international journalists?  Follow up if they do skip either part + be 
prepared to elaborate (stringers, translators, drivers, fixers, other assistants). 
 
In terms of daily routine, could you describe to me the local media outlets you 
read/consult and whether you use them for ideas or as source? 
 
Practical challenges and constraints 
*What would you say are the biggest practical challenges that you face on a regular 
basis? What are the major constraints you have to work with? 
 
News agency material 
*Could you describe the way you use news agency material to research and write 
your stories? (Which ones do you use, why and how much?) 
 
Do news agencies have different priorities when it comes to African news? 
 
Criticism of Western media / Afro-pessimism 
*Have you heard of the term Afro-pessimism and what does it mean for you? 
(Always try to ask this question fairly early one in the interview). 
 
*Journalists working for international, mainly European and North American 
media, have come under intense criticisms for their reporting of African news 
generally. Among these are the ideas that coverage is scarce, focuses excessively 
on “negative” stories, tend to simplify complex issues and convey stereotypes (for 
instance by relying on simple prisms of ethnicity or tribalism). In an opinion piece 







“Many Africa correspondents file stories that fall prey to pernicious 
stereotypes and tropes that dehumanize Africans (…) Western reporting on 
Africa is often fraught with factual errors, incomplete analysis, and 
stereotyping that would not pass editorial muster in coverage of China, 
Pakistan, France, or Mexico.” 
 
Do you agree with that statement? 
 
Commercialism and representation 
*French journalist Anne-Cecile Robert argues that the “marginalisation of Africa 
in the Western media” is caused by financial constraints that lead to over-
simplification of sensitive and complex issues. To what extent do you feel 
economic pressures impact your work? 
 
Intercultural communication 
Africa editor of Der Spiegel Bartholaumaus Gryll wrote a book where he reflects 
on his 25 years of experience as a foreign correspondent in Africa. He notably 
writes:  
"Whenever I look at [Africa] I say to myself: Try to discard the distorted 
images and projections. But don't think that you will then find the true, 
genuine Africa. You can only portray Africa and the Africans from a 
European perspective. You have no other." 
 
Do you also think that you can only portray Africa from a European perspective?  
 
Homogenisation 
*It seems very difficult to talk of Africa, as a whole, without falling into a form of 
essentialisation. Do you think about this when mentioning “Africa” in a piece? Is a 
certain degree of generalisation inevitable or even desirable? 
 
Afro-optimism 
Recently, there have been attempt at telling more “positive” stories about Africa 
(show coves by The Economist and TIME Africa Rising). What do you think about 
this kind of coverage? 
 
Reconstruction questions (if possible) 
*I have here an article that you wrote. Can you tell me what you remember about 
researching and writing this story? (Follow-up on decision process, cost/benefit 
analysis, interaction with editor or other correspondents, interaction with sources, 
use of stringers).  
 
-Depending on the article, ask specific questions to the interviewee about strategies 
identified in the article through the coding. These can include for instance, the use 
of certain sources, the framing of these sources or the use of quoting verbs, the use 
of overlexicalisation, comparison or active generalisation. Point some of these 








Example of questionnaire (Site 2) 
 
 
1. In what capacity were you involved in the production of this cover? 
 
2. Can you tell me what you remember from the process of working on this 
cover: how many people worked on this cover? Did you receive guidelines 
to create the cover and if so, which ones? Was the process in any way 
different from the production of other covers? 
 
3. Did you use any images/material from a stock photography agency? 
 
3. Why did you make the choice to use X semiotic choice (e.g. colour, 
shape, design, individual depicted)? 
 











Solicitation E-mail  
 
 
Dear [name],  
My name is Toussaint Nothias, I am a PhD student from the Institute of 
Communications Studies at the University of Leeds. I am conducting 
research into the coverage of African stories in French and British press. I 
am looking to conduct an interview with you (general time frame 60 min) to 
discuss your experience in producing African news stories and your 
attitudes towards the notion of Afro-pessimism in Western media. I feel my 
research would benefit from your help due to your experience and position 
in the field, and also because [name of organization] is one of the key 
institutions I am looking at. In the end, I hope my research will contribute to 
a better understanding of journalists' practices in producing African stories. 
 
For more information about my research, please find attached an 
information sheet. You can also have a look at my personal webpages and 
some of my publications (see links at the end of this email). The information 
sheet provides details about the use of data and confidentiality. I should also 
let you know that you can withdraw from the research at any time before, 
during the interview or after the interview (up to the writing up of the thesis 
i.e. January 2014). Furthermore, if it is not convenient to meet in person, the 
interview could be conducted over the phone or skype but a face-to-face 
interview is preferable. 
 
[More specific information about my schedule], so if you are interested then 
please let me know your availability. If you feel you are too busy, which I 
fully understand, then I hope you could refer me to someone else in your 
organisation that would be able to assist me. Should you have any further 
questions about the research project, my schedule or anything else, please 
do not hesitate in contacting me, either by email or by phone: 
+447853945131. 
 
Thank you in advance for any help you can give. 
  
Toussaint Nothias 















Beyond Afro-pessimism? British and French print media 
discourse on Africa. 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take some time to read the following information sheet carefully.  
 
Purpose of the project  
 
The aim of this PhD project is to understand what kinds of news about Africa are 
produced in French and British media, how and why. Against the backdrop of 
criticism of Western media coverage of Africa being too “negative”, this study 
postulates that there is a pressing need for thorough and up-to-date empirical 
research. In particular, it aims at understanding the working, sometimes difficult, 
context in which journalists produce news and how decisions about which stories 
to cover are made. I hope my research will contribute to a better understanding of 
journalists' practices in producing African stories and to explore efforts made by 
journalists to provide a balanced reporting of the continent. 
 
Participation in the project: what is involved? 
 
You are being invited to take part in this project given your experience and 
position in the field of international news. This would involve taking part in a one-
off semi-structured interview (60 min is a general time frame). At any point during 
the interview, if you do not wish to answer certain questions or wish to put an end 
to the interview, you can do so without giving a reason. I am flexible regarding 
interview location and will endeavour to accommodate your favourite option. If we 
are unable to meet face-to-face, a phone, skype or written interview can take place, 
at a time convenient for you. 
 
Type of information and importance of your contribution 
 
My research would highly benefit from your help due to your experience and 
position in the field. As this research aims at understanding the working context of 
news production, your contribution constitutes a paramount aspect of the project. I 
am also hoping that my research will provide a platform for the voice of journalists 
to be heard on the often heated – sometimes partial and limited in understanding - 
debate on Africa’s media image.  
 
The kinds of information that I would be interested in gaining include –but is not 
limited to – the following: use of news agency material, interaction between 
journalist-editor, interaction with other foreign correspondents as well as local 






By taking part in this project, you accept for the data collected to be used in 
relevant future research, including journal articles, book chapters and conference 
presentations. 
 
Confidentiality and withdrawal 
 
Upon starting the interview, you will be given this information sheet and a consent 
form. Anonymity is the default option for this research. All steps will be taken to 
protect the data and to retain your anonymity in publication of quotes, especially if 
you would be in a unique position e.g. where the description of your employer 
would disclose your identity. Should you wish to take part on a non-anonymous 
basis, you may do so. 
 
Interviews will be audio-recorded, unless you prefer not to. The raw data including 
transcripts and recording will not be made available for any other persons or 
purposes.  
 
You will be able to withdraw from the research at any time, before, during or after 
the interview  (up to the writing up of the thesis i.e. January 2014) without having 
to give any reason for this.  
 
Contact point for further information 
  
Thank you for taking the time to read through the information. I truly hope you’ll 
be able to assist me in this research, as your participation will assuredly provide 
fascinating insight into the important debate about Africa’s media image.  Should 
you have further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me directly, either by 
email or phone. 
 
Toussaint Nothias 


















Title of the Research Project:  
Beyond Afro-pessimism? British and French print media on Africa 
 
Name of the researcher: Toussaint Nothias 
 Add your 
initials 




I confirm that I have read and understood the letter explaining the 
above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions 
about the project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw without giving any reason and without there being any 
negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any 
particular question or questions, I am free to decline.  
 
I agree for the interview to be audio-recorded and stored electronically  
I agree for the data collected from me to be used in relevant future 
research, including journal articles, book chapters and conference 
presentations. 
 
I agree to take part in the above research project  
I give permission for my name to be used in this research (Optional)  
 
Name of participant  
Signature   
Date  
Name of researcher   
Signature   
Date*  
 
*To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant.  
 
Once all parties have signed this, the participant will receive a copy of the signed and dated 
participant consent form, the letter and any other written information provided to the 
participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent form will be kept with the project’s 
main documents in a secure location at the University of Leeds.  
 
Contact details of lead researcher: 
M. Toussaint Nothias, 07853945131 
cstn@leeds.ac.uk 
